



STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL  
CRITICISM AND CONSTRUCTION

“ Plus l’homme a su, plus il a pu ; mais aussi moins il a fait, moins il a su.”—BUFFON.



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STUDIES IN  
PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM  
AND CONSTRUCTION

BY

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TO  
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PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE  
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,

THESE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

ARE GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY

**Dedicated.**



## PREFACE.

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IN the following pages my aim is to illustrate the principles of philosophic method by endeavouring critically to establish certain fundamental principles or *Grundbegriffe* in the spheres of Psychology, Logic and Epistemology, Ethics and Metaphysics; in other words, to lay the foundation for a more complete structure in each of these three branches of Philosophy.

This double aim, however much it complicates the inquiry, is inevitable. A general discussion of philosophical method *in abstracto*, without concurrently developing a general philosophical position, would seem to me to be futile even if it were possible. This is true of all branches of knowledge—true of the physical sciences as much as of any others. Generalisations as to scientific method—that is, as to the intellectual processes by which actual scientific results ought to be obtained—must assuredly be of very little value unless drawn in close connexion with concrete scientific work. But nowhere is the connexion more close than in Philosophy. Here, we cannot formulate our problems unless we are prepared with at least partial solutions. Indeed we may say that a problem

*well* put is in Philosophy more than half the solution. The *Standpunkt*—the *true* starting-point or fundamental point of view—is nearer the end than the beginning of the journey; and a *Standpunkt* is what I have endeavoured to work out. This task is never easy; but it is of course for others to judge the extent to which I have failed owing to its length and difficulty.

To those thinkers whose writings and personal teaching enabled me to grasp some of the many aspects of the one problem of Philosophy—with a living idea of their real significance—my indebtedness is greater than I can fittingly express in words. I refer to Professor Andrew Seth, of Edinburgh; to Dr James Ward, of Cambridge; and to the Rev. C. B. Upton, of Manchester College, Oxford, who was my first instructor in Philosophy. Among the teachings which have come to me only through the medium of the written page, there are some which I have found stimulating and suggestive in a high degree, although on some important questions I have diverged from their conclusions. The writers to whom I refer are, for Logic and Metaphysics, Mr F. H. Bradley and Mr Bosanquet; for Ethics, the late Professor T. H. Green, Dr Martineau, and Professor Sidgwick. My other obligations are doubtless extensive, but do not call for special mention in this place. I must add that to Professor Seth and to Mr Upton I am indebted for some suggestive and helpful criticisms on portions of chapters v., vi., and vii., while these were in preparation.

Most of the Introductory Chapter has appeared as an article in *The New World*: with the Editor's permission, the material of that article is reproduced here. Brief preliminary studies for chapters ii., vi., and vii., were published in *Mind* and in *The Philosophical Review*, two years ago; but these articles do not adequately represent the argument of the present work. A considerable portion of § 2, chapter vii., has appeared in the *International Journal of Ethics*.

I have said that the following investigations form a general critical survey of the whole field of Philosophy as this term is now understood by all who make it a special department of study. There is one conclusion which in its various phases is dealt with explicitly enough in these chapters, but which seems to me to be of such supreme importance that I do not resist the temptation to state it summarily here. A recent writer has said that we must be well grounded in Humanity before we can study Divinity to any good purpose; and this applies indeed to the study of all ultimate problems. Our knowledge of the General Nature of Reality, our knowledge of the 'nature of things' in the world around us and of the nature of God, depends *in the end* on our knowledge or insight into the nature of man in its manifold forms: there the deepest nature of all reality is revealed so far as it is revealed at all. But even this significant acknowledgment is futile unless we also recognise that our knowledge of man's 'nature'—of man's essential qualities in themselves and in their results—is capable of indefinitely various degrees of truth; the

truer, the wider and deeper it is, the further it goes towards solving the problem of existence; in its superficial forms, such knowledge may have practically no bearing on this problem at all. What then is man's characteristic quality—what is, at once practically and theoretically, most *significant* in his experience? Some urge that it is Will, Activity, or Effort, conceived as a kind of push or impulse onwards; others urge that it is Feeling which not only prompts our Actions but directs our Judgments; others argue that it must be Thought. I contend that no progress can be made until it is recognised that not one of these three can be opposed to the others; human existence or experience cannot be interpreted in terms of one of these unless the others are made of equal importance with that one.

If Thought is opposed to Emotion and Will, it cannot be our most real function, for Life includes more than can be accounted for by Logic, in any sense of this term. If Will—in opposition to Intelligence—is made the basal principle of our nature, then such a theory when consistent must regard this Will as blind and aimless, and therefore results in a Pessimism more hopeless than that which founds itself on the fact of pain or failure: for the striving is aimless and yet by our very nature inevitable,—we are its victims:

“ . . . The struggle naught availeth,  
The labour and the wounds are vain;  
The enemy faints not nor faileth,  
And as things have been they remain.”

If the theory supposes that such a Will can be over-



come or in some way laid to rest, this surely proves that it is not the deepest principle in us; for that by which we overcome it is nearer to the roots of our being. If Feeling is made "the principal thing," and therefore made the standard of Worth as regards conduct and ultimately as regards truth, then we are left in a state of perfect anarchy; unless there is some standard by which the relative worth of Feelings themselves may be judged. Feeling, as such, is *blind*, and cannot judge of itself or of anything else, unless the term is made to include Thought. Of course both the Will-theory and the Feeling-theory admit the presence of Intelligence in us; but by Intelligence they understand a faculty capable only of operations of which counting or calculation is a type—capable only of arranging 'facts' given to it from sources independent of itself, and of arranging them only according to limited principles. The whole interest then centres in the nature and sources of these 'facts' to which 'intellect' is subordinate. Such tendencies will be found in the thought of Jacobi, Schopenhauer, and Lotze, and the numerous writers who have drawn their inspiration from these sources. Thought cannot be thus limited; it is itself a living, creative function.

On the other hand, if Thought is not opposed to Emotion and Will but is made somehow to include them, then we have the confusions resulting from the use of a word in a strained, unnatural sense—a sense inconsistent with many of the associations which are inseparable from the word through its use in ordinary language. This double-faced theory results in the bias

of 'intellectualism.' But we do not correct 'intellectualism' by opposing Emotion and Will to Thought—assuming that Reality is found in them *more* than in Thought and that we are before all things active and feeling beings; nor by regarding our nature as a mere combination of the three, as a rope may be of three strands; but by regarding even our deepest knowledge of these three (in their distinction and relation) as itself only symbolic and partially true; so that the three functions become three *inseparable* and equally complete symbols of what man verily is. Our most perfect knowledge is only the most perfect symbol of what we are—the most perfect yet attained. It does not yet appear whether it will be always thus with our knowledge, or whether an absolute knowledge will still be symbolic or not.

By consistently carrying out these principles, it becomes possible to conceive the reality of God, of Man, and of Nature or the world, without merging two of them in the third, as Pantheism, Sceptical Idealism, and Naturalism do; and to conceive this without denying the absolute validity of the real laws of Thought.

I gladly take the opportunity which these words of preface afford, of acknowledging a twofold obligation to the Hibbert Trust: first, for the many advantages I have enjoyed as a Hibbert Scholar; and again, for generous and timely assistance in the publication of this book.

S. H. M.

WARRENPOINT, IRELAND,  
*November 1897.*

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# STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM AND CONSTRUCTION.

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## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION.

THE explanation of the problem of Philosophy which is theoretically most satisfactory is generally found to be practically least so; the reason seems to be that in order adequately to comprehend the bearings of the former, we must already in some degree have accustomed ourselves to philosophical reflection. In this Introduction my endeavour is to give a general indication of the ways in which the actual movements of human thought practically lead into Philosophy. We may regard these movements as arranging themselves round two *foci*,—scientific thought and religious thought; each of these is the *focus* of an area which has no clearly defined outer limit but fades away.

The problem of the true and reasonable relation between Science and Religion is a problem arising out of the relation between two deep but partially

independent *activities* of human thought; hence it is continually assuming new forms as the years go on. This is only natural; stagnation is impossible in human thinking,—scientific thought and religious thought alike are never at a standstill. All experience shows that ideas are like seeds,—they must either die and vanish, or go on to grow; they cannot abide unchanged. Ideas may indeed seem to survive unchanged in the form of religious and political creeds; but in this case one of two things must in reality have happened. The ideas may die and leave behind them a husk of words,—professions of faith, creeds, and the like,—which may be religiously preserved intact and repeated as divine truth for many generations, but which none the less are a mere form of words,—the meaning which once gave them life has gone. On the other hand, if the ideas are really significant and fruitful, if they are capable, through criticism, of giving birth to further thoughts, they must evidently become too wide and deep for the fixed expression they have received, so that they break it up and demand its restatement.

Not only is it true that the fixed expression may be inadequate to the thought, but the thought itself may be inadequate to the reality which it endeavours to express. For although thought is a real activity or function of the human mind, and has a structure and laws of its own, yet it may fail to apprehend its own nature and aims. Again, the whole mind is not *merely* a thinking activity but is more; and these other functions of our nature may, and often do, grow and develop faster than the thinking function; then the latter fails to comprehend them, and the intellectual expression and explanation which it gives to



them may be thoroughly inadequate.<sup>1</sup> We may say that this is the case with every religious movement of the deeper and more vital sort, particularly in its earlier stages. Involved in every such movement is that kind of belief which is a principle of life rather than a declaration of the intellect; the belief which is part of a man's nature—a sign of his whole character. In this sense, when a man's *belief* grows wider and deeper, it is because his whole nature—or some vital function thereof—has grown, has taken a step forward. To take a very simple case, this is the belief which a child has in its mother. Now, since different functions of our nature—themselves equally vital to that nature—may be unequally developed, it may happen that those who hold a real belief of this kind most intensely, whose lives may be entirely moulded by it, are the very ones who are least able to express it in an intellectual form—in the form of definite assertions which can be clearly *understood*. Either they cannot express it in this way at all, or if they do, the intellectual expression of it may be quite insufficient, or entirely or partly wrong. Would it not be absurd to expect the child to set down the particulars of its belief in its father and mother, in the form of a number of propositions beginning with 'I believe'—like a creed? Is the reason simply because the child is a child—is not old enough and wise enough? I scarcely think so; for in regard to all our deepest beliefs, the real roots of our personal character,

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the intellectual function may be in advance of the other sides of the man's nature; and the result of this will depend entirely on the extent to which the intellect is aware of the significance of its own principles and ideals. If it takes a superficial, inadequate view of these, it will engage in mere destructive criticism, which finally it will endeavour to direct upon itself, ending in Scepticism.

we are in the same position. We cannot dig up the roots of our own being.

It is well to remember that what we have been saying is as true of scientific *text-books* as it is of religious *creeds*. The inadequacy of the established creeds and confessions to express the best religious ideas of modern times is widely recognised, and the conflict and uncertainty which prevail are themselves signs of progress; but the case is not different with science. In those very sciences where there is the most constant discussion, with incessant conflict of ideas and incessant criticism, there is also the greatest hope of real progress and of the attainment of real knowledge. In those there are not many fixed results to show—the list of results that are distinct and clear is small; but there is every hope and prospect of its becoming larger. To this class belong the sciences dealing with the nature and history of living beings—Physiology and Biology; and the science which endeavours to trace whatever law and order is to be found in the boundless complexity of the operations of mind—Psychology. But in the so-called ‘exact’ sciences, where fixed formulas are always appealed to, it is very questionable whether there is as much prospect of real knowledge. The exactness of these sciences—Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry—rests in *measurement*, so that their results can be expressed in numbers; but numbers and measurements do not explain anything,—they cannot be more than descriptions, though of course very accurate descriptions, of facts of observation. It is in explanations that knowledge consists; mere descriptions are only the veriest beginning of knowledge. In so far as these sciences go beyond descriptions to



explanations, they appeal to principles as dogmatic as those of any religious creed or confession. It does not follow that these principles are fundamentally wrong, but they are not progressive; how far, for instance, their application in Physiology to distinctively vital processes is justified, though it is an extremely difficult question, is one quite open to discussion. We have no need here to inquire into this matter; it is enough if we see the significance of the fact that the growth of knowledge is only possible through struggle, conflict, and opposition overcome; we may say of knowledge, *sub pondere crescit*,—a truth which has been beautifully expressed by James Russell Lowell in one of his sonnets:—

“The hope of Truth grows stronger day by day;  
I hear the Soul of Man around me waking,  
Like a great sea, its frozen fetters breaking,  
And flinging up to heaven its sunlit spray,  
Tossing huge continents in scornful play,  
And crushing them, with din of grinding thunder,  
That makes old emptinesses stare in wonder; . . .  
For high, and yet more high, the murmurs swell  
Of inward strife for truth and liberty.”

In the intellectual world, as in the physical, there is no progress without conflict, criticism, and competition; in the realm of ideas we see unmistakably a struggle for existence, a ‘natural selection’ and ‘survival of the fittest.’ This is the principle which Hegel had in view in the applications of his Logic—his doctrine of Thought as a dialectically progressive movement through the meeting of opposites—to the history of human thought and endeavour in every direction; it is this that gives to his expositions of history such power as sources of instruction and enlightenment,

for those who are not destitute of the historic sense. This is true, notwithstanding the excessively rigid formalism with which the principle is applied by him in certain cases. We can never find clearly marked theses and antitheses (in pairs) from the opposition of which the higher truth springs; we can only find conflicting *ἐπεργείαι*, streams of tendency, *movements* of thought. Truth and error struggle together; or rather, one fragment of truth mingled with error contends with another fragment mingled with different errors.<sup>1</sup> The problem is never rightly put in the form, Which of these two is right and which wrong? but in the form, Which of these two (if either) contains the *more* of truth? And to solve this problem, we have to find a point of view above *both* the conflicting principles from which to criticise them; that is, we need a principle containing more truth than either of them. The attainment of truth is only possible because many human thinkers defend different and conflicting beliefs and theories, so that here one thing is upheld, there the opposite; for without such opposition, the higher principle could never emerge,—even the mere need for it could never be felt. It counts for nothing that this or that individual man gives up the effort, and despairs of real knowledge; human reason has an indestructible confidence in itself, and attacks its problems with renewed energy again and ever again. The irresistible, undying confidence of reason in itself, in its power of attaining to real knowledge at last, is shown by the history of human thought in all its branches,—scientific, philosophical, theological. The mind of man has

<sup>1</sup> All generally current beliefs and theories contain, *in solution* as it were, fragments of truth of different sizes and shapes, which require to be *precipitated*.

always persisted, and seemingly always will persist, in the attempt to think consistently about the world, to make it intelligible and rational, to comprehend it somehow as a Whole. It seems to be by a native and natural impulse that all men endeavour to understand and comprehend things for the sake of understanding them; and this is the mainspring of all attempts at science of every kind. Is not this an indication strong and sure that man is greater than he seems? May we not say it speaks with no uncertain sound in favour of the faith that makes him a child of the Infinite and Eternal?

It is this incessant conflict of current modes of thought—scientific, political, sociological, moral, religious—that makes Philosophy an absolute necessity for the thoughtful part of the community, or for the human race, though it may sometimes be a luxury (as it were) for the individual. The best general definition of Philosophy is probably that which describes it as an attempt to find *points of view* from which to judge such conflicting modes of thought, both in knowledge or theory and in practice, or an attempt to establish reliable principles by which to criticise them. These principles are not a further group of beliefs and theories, to be set beside those already current, to be used as the basis of mere hostile criticism directed upon the latter from without. Whatever 'new' truths Philosophy may bring to light are *developed* from the different aggregates of "what is taken to be knowledge (or reasoned and systematic thought, so far as this is a wider term than knowledge) in the thoughtful part of society to which the philosophising individual belongs"; and the principles of criticism which Philosophy seeks to establish are principles by which this development may be

effected. Hence we see the truth of the observation frequently made, that every one who thinks at all must philosophise to some extent—though generally in a more or less imperfect and unsatisfactory manner; and the two great branches of Philosophy—the theory of knowledge and the theory of ethics—endeavour to carry out the process systematically. Here, again, the condition of progress is the same; it is possible only as a result of divergence, conflict, and mutual criticism. The philosophical principles of criticism of which I have spoken can be derived only from penetrating reflection upon the essential characteristics of our nature as theoretical or cognitive, and as practical, so that divergent interpretations are always possible, and in our present state inevitable. Hence we find that a *self-criticism* of philosophic principles takes place, the nature of which it should be the purpose of the history of Philosophy to exhibit.

Thus every conquest of the human intellect, in the way of truer knowledge, is analogous to a survival of the fittest issuing from a struggle for existence; and the source and motive of all the effort and struggle is the conviction, indemonstrable but native to our intelligence, that the attainment of truth is one form of the highest good for man. This is sometimes expressed by saying that truth is an absolute good, or end-in-itself, in Kantian phraseology—that is, an end valued simply for being what is, and not merely as a means to something further; but what is really meant is, that *the function or activity of our nature* which manifests itself in the attainment and realisation of truth is an absolute good,—and this, so far as it goes, is in essential harmony with the religious view of man's life and destiny; while, as we have seen, it must be recognised as the

explanation of both the existence and the progress of science.

In another respect, also, there is no discoverable variance or divergence between these two movements of thought, though the contrary is constantly assumed, and is productive of much error and confusion. I refer to the distinction of knowledge as characteristic of science, and belief or faith as characteristic of religion. The implication is that a much higher kind of certainty attaches to the conclusions of the sciences than to any distinctively religious belief. The antithesis which is supposed to hold between knowledge and belief, or reason and faith, is appealed to alike by theological apologists and anti-theological 'scientists,' who, though they differ in everything else, are usually quite ready to agree in the acceptance of confused but dogmatic assumptions. How thoroughly superficial this distinction is we may see if we resolutely face the question, What is truth? This is indeed the fundamental question of the Theory of Knowledge and of the higher developments of modern Logic, which is simply Reason taking knowledge of itself, becoming aware of its own structure, responding to the appeal "Know thyself!" What is the meaning of truth, certainty, knowledge? What are the general characteristics of truth, as such? Surely this question needs to be considered before we discuss what particular truths we can arrive at, or separate some kinds of knowledge from others as being in a high degree clear, sound, and reliable, while the latter are not. The purely arbitrary character of such procedure becomes evident in the light of the conclusions of recent logical inquiry.

All knowledge, in so far as it really is knowledge, is wanting in the character of certainty; this must ever



be so, as long as man remains finite. Its uncertainty rests simply on its fragmentariness or incompleteness, on account of which the different pieces of knowledge that we have attained to are detached and isolated from one another. No portion of knowledge is *certain* or absolutely true until all portions have been so extended and developed that they can be seen in the form of a single, complete, all-inclusive whole. This would be omniscience; and the idea of omniscience is irreconcilable with that of finite personality such as ours. Short of this, our different knowledges, being isolated, must be uncertain. The only way to avoid this uncertain and hypothetical element is for each individual to keep within the limits of his own sensations and mental images, as bare facts, and, moreover, to be dumb. Directly he makes any assertion about these facts, or in any way intelligently addresses himself to another being, he is in the realm of knowledge and consequently of 'uncertainty.' Instead of quarrelling with knowledge for being 'uncertain,' we should quarrel with our own mechanical notions of certainty, which arise from the employment of the idea in an exclusively practical reference, and are inapplicable to knowledge in the proper sense. Any portion of knowledge begins to be certain in so far as we begin to see its organic connection with other knowledges; it is uncertain in so far as we are unable so to connect it, for we do not know what transformation or development of it may be necessary in order that it might enter into this universal relation. In brief, all our judgments fall short of the whole truth; every judgment is therefore 'uncertain,' inasmuch as we do not know how far it must be transformed to be developed into the whole truth. Naturally we never regard our judg-

ments from this point of view, just because we are never in the position of omniscience, and so cannot tell how far they fall short of the whole truth; but the conclusion is seen to be unavoidable when we reflect upon it. Our knowledge may be true *as far as it goes*, but it is always held subject to a revision which may be so fundamental as to effect its complete transformation. In scientific strictness, this is the only meaning of 'certainty' or 'uncertainty' with reference to knowledge as such. But, as we have indicated, it is in the practical reference that the ideas of 'certainty' and 'uncertainty' are primarily applied, and it is the practical reference that gives them whatever significance they possess for everyday life; to illustrate this we must first dwell on another aspect of our intellectual activity.

There are certain principles which are postulates of knowledge in the sense that without them science cannot even begin to work. If they are false, every fabric of knowledge falls to pieces, for they are the general bonds of connection which hold it together, and only through them has our knowledge even the small extent of coherence that it now possesses. Such postulates are, the existence of one's self as a rational or thinking being; the existence of a world beyond one's personal consciousness, which is relatively permanent and independent, and to which other similar rational beings are similarly related; and the trustworthiness of those logical principles which lie at the basis of scientific reasoning. To state these postulates systematically is an important part of the function of the theory of knowledge; but here I need only try to indicate their general nature. Traditionally they are styled 'laws of thought,' or 'necessities of thought'; we can, however,

find a more pregnant designation when we compare the general activity of thought to the activity of a living organic body. In this case the intellectual postulates appear as the vital processes or functions—*e.g.*, digestion, circulation, respiration—by which the life of the organism is preserved, and its growth effected; they are the *vital functions of thought*. It is useless to discuss the ‘certainty’ of any one of these principles, when considered in isolation; the very fact that we are separating it and considering it by itself precludes us from seeing its real significance. Its true character only appears through the function it performs in the growth of intelligence and the attainment of knowledge; and to discuss this function is to treat it not in isolation but in relation to other similar principles,—to inquire into its place in our intellectual activity as a whole. Instead of treating such principles as isolated certainties in the traditional intuitionist manner, we should treat them as demands of our intellectual consciousness,—as postulates which must be granted if science is to exist and knowledge be possible. Their theoretical ‘certainty,’ then, depends on the trustworthiness of that deep tendency of reason by which every endeavour after real knowledge is sustained; but their practical certainty is of another kind. If it is true, on the one hand, that they are products of the very structure of our intelligence, and on the other hand, that the known world is always found to conform to them, or that it is always possible to interpret experience by their means, then we should expect beforehand that both the individual and the social mind would be so framed as to accept them with perfect readiness, so that what we might call the mental *line of least resistance*, or least friction, would lie in the direction of their



adoption as principles trustworthy to think by and reliable to act upon. We should expect to find them handed down by social inheritance, and embedded in those social forces of spoken and written language, tradition, education, and so forth, by which the mental furniture of the individual mind is largely organised. Above all, there is the fact that the most fundamental of the intellectual postulates are of such a character that without them not only the activity of intelligence, but even the existence of men in any *organised* social communities, would be impossible.

Such considerations explain how, when these postulates are stated in the form of definite propositions, the mind at once accepts them as 'self-evident truths,' whose 'opposite is inconceivable,' or as 'ultimate certainties,' according to the current modes of description. This is what is meant by *practical certainty*; the whole mind, as at once intellectual, emotional, and active, is so framed that all men with the utmost readiness accept and act upon certain general propositions; and this is 'common-sense.' Hence we, in general, apply the term 'knowledge' in a special sense to the conclusions that can be reached from facts of sense-perception when interpreted in the light of such assumed self-evident principles; and thus the truths of science have the great advantage of at least appearing to rest upon the powerful force of these practical certainties. But this is not sufficient for any valid distinction to be drawn, as regards trustworthiness, between 'scientific' knowledge and other kinds of knowledge, for the 'practical certainty' of any belief contributes nothing to its intellectual validity or theoretical certainty—that is, to its real trustworthiness or certainty in the only proper

sense of the term. Its real trustworthiness, as a means of interpreting our sense-experience and thereby obtaining scientific knowledge, can only arise from the fact that it rests upon principles which belong to the very structure of intelligence. If these 'practical certainties,' as we have called them, do not rest upon such principles, then their practical efficacy or persuasive force affords the strongest support for total scepticism; this is demonstrated with perfect clearness in Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. What we have called practical certainties may be called habits of belief; and manifestly if these habits are not a deposit from experiences that have been moulded by the structure of reason, they are simply the product of non-rational forces, the influence of social custom and 'authority.' This is Hume's conclusion, which has been well summed up thus: "The true philosopher therefore is not the Pyrrhonist, trying to maintain an impossible equilibrium or suspense of judgment, but the Academic, yielding gracefully to the impressions or maxims which he finds, as a matter of fact, have most sway over himself. 'I may—nay, I must—yield to the current of nature in submitting to my senses and understanding, and in this blind submission I show most perfectly my sceptical principles;' for, after all, 'if we believe that fire warms or water refreshes, it is only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise.'" If, on the other hand, reason has a structure of its own, and our habits of belief are a deposit moulded by its informing activity, then the best inquiry into the "Foundations of Belief" will be to investigate that structure as thoroughly as possible. The coercive force of the 'practical certainties' and 'habits of belief' will be irrelevant; we cannot appeal

to their practical necessity. And it must not be forgotten that even if they are ultimately rational, non-rational forces must have largely entered into their formation.

The considerations above adduced, and the distinctions drawn, have an evident bearing on Mr Balfour's positions in his well-known works, *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt* and *The Foundations of Belief*. In both works there is a preliminary contention which is obviously true: *i.e.*, that the vast majority of our beliefs—religious, ethical, social, and those habits of belief which we call 'common-sense'—do not depend on the consciously reasoned assent of the individuals who entertain them, but are generated in the mind by "custom, education, public opinion, the contagious convictions of countrymen, family, party, or Church," and not least by the *Zeitgeist* or spirit of the age, producing a certain "psychological 'atmosphere' or 'climate,' favourable to the life of certain modes of belief, unfavourable or even fatal to the life of others."<sup>1</sup> This is a system of *causes for belief*, and one in which conscious *reasoning* plays a very small part. So far we may all agree. In both works, again, we recognise the same endeavour—to show that scientific belief and religious belief are on the same plane as regards trustworthiness and 'authority.' But there are two lines of thought by which this aim is realised: the *Defence of Philosophic Doubt* is almost entirely occupied with the one, and the *Foundations of Belief* is chiefly (but not quite consistently) occupied with the other. According to the one view, the system of causes for belief, alluded to above, is wholly non-rational or extra-rational in character, because conscious reasoning

<sup>1</sup> *Foundations of Belief*, pp. 206, 213.

plays so insignificant a part in it; since, then, the only 'authority' for any and every established mode or habit of belief is this non-rational force of custom and tradition, we are led at once to Hume's conclusion that all forms of belief are equally worthless, though most of them are practically inevitable. In this case science and religion are very obviously 'reconciled,' though it is doubtful whether the terms of peace would be acceptable to either side. According to the other view, the current habits of belief are far from being substantially irrational or non-rational; and, further, the fundamental beliefs on which science rests are on the same plane as those on which religion rests, because both alike are postulates, though derived from different sides of human nature. In our attempt to disentangle the confusions lurking in the ordinary notion of 'certainty,' and to show that the notion is wholly inapplicable to any human knowledge, we were obliged to leave this aspect of the case in the background. Just as the analysis of our intellectual consciousness, of reason itself, brings to light postulates on which the sciences rest, so the analysis of our ethical and æsthetic consciousness brings to light postulates proper to these modes of activity. Just as the authority of all scientific postulates rests on the authority of the ideal tendency to realise truth in thought, so that of the ethical and æsthetic postulates rests on the authority of the impulses to realise righteousness in character and social conduct, and to seek for, delight in, and create beauty in nature and human life. In all cases alike they are postulates or demands transcending all past experience, and calling on us to rise above it. Mr Balfour's insistence upon this, in the first and fourth divisions of his later

work, is valuable and timely, and with it I thoroughly sympathise. We shall have occasion to show more fully in the sequel what surely must be evident to every unprejudiced reader: that the foregoing is not an appeal "from the intellect to the heart," but an appeal from man as merely engaged in objective knowledge—in reflective interpretation of the universe around him, in the light of his intellectual ideal—to the whole nature of man.

In a discussion such as the present, we may most conveniently examine certain leading conceptions of religious belief, which differ from one another through and through, and observe the bearings of modern science upon each.

We are first met by what is called 'dogmatic' religion—*i.e.*, religion which claims *absolute truth* for the propositions in which it expresses itself. We cannot spend time in dwelling on all the confused and inadequate ideas on which this mode of thought rests. We have seen that no truth, conceivable by man, can be absolute. Dogmatic religion, as a rule, is unaware of the real significance of its own *dicta*,—of the truth involved in them and the motives which historically led to their formulation; and the 'rationalism' which prides itself on the rejection of these *dicta* is just as little aware of it. Of more significance for our present purpose is the distinction of 'natural' and 'supernatural' events, which is supposed to be of central importance for the 'dogmatic' presentation of religion. Let us examine it and see what meaning can be put into it. There is great difficulty in finding what exactly the defenders and the assailants of the miraculous mean by a miracle or a supernatural event. They seem, how-



ever, to be thinking chiefly of the causes of the event ; a 'supernatural' occurrence is one that is caused or produced in a way absolutely unlike all the ways in which events are usually produced ; at any rate, great stress is laid on the necessity of a distinction *in kind* between supernatural events and all others. A miracle is sometimes said to be a *unique* act of the Creator—so unique and special as to appear to us to be an interference with the ordinary course of events ; but this is not a difference in kind, if the ordinary course of events depends on and springs from the divine activity ; for this would mean that all things are symbols of the divine nature and power, but *in varying degrees*. The distinction which we have in view is one which in effect divides the universe into two separate parts, related to one another only through occasional acts of causation, proceeding from the supernatural part, and interfering with the order of things in the natural part. Now there are two reasons why we must entirely reject all belief in such 'interferences.'

One reason—the one which has most practical influence, though it is not final or conclusive—is that they are contrary to all experience. Experience, quite apart from 'science,' shows that there are general laws or kinds of orderly succession in the course of events ; such general order as appears, for instance, in the succession of day and night, summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, life and death. This regular succession of events, in a thousand different lines, accustoms us from force of habit to expect that things will follow one another in a regular order, and this expectation is always fulfilled. This constitutes an overwhelming *presumption* against the reality of a miraculous event,—which must necessarily appear to us to be an interfer-

ence with this order. But it does not follow that a deviation from this order is impossible; an expectation, bred by experience and custom, that events will occur in a certain order is not the same thing as the knowledge that they must necessarily so occur, and such knowledge is not in our possession. We are justified in approaching a narrative of an event which seems to be a new departure in nature with a prejudice against believing in it; but this prejudice, and the presumption from experience on which it is founded, would have to give way before sufficiently strong evidence, if such were produced. We should have to believe even the most extraordinary story if the evidence on which it rested were impregnable, though the more extraordinary the story, the more unusually strong would the evidence for it have to be. This is the principle that is generally appealed to against the miracles related in Hebrew and Christian tradition, according to the dogmatic or strictly literal interpretation thereof; but, in this case, the controversy resolves itself into one which concerns the date and authenticity of the historical documents—a region of discussion which, happily, we have no need to touch.

It is not, however, merely a matter of evidence; we can penetrate further into the question than this. Suppose that some unusual or extraordinary event were proved to have occurred on a certain date, it would not follow that this event was a miracle, in our sense of the word. We see this at once when we consider what is the real meaning of a law of nature, in the sense in which science understands the term. A scientific law is always expressed in the form of a supposition or a conditional statement; *if* certain things happen, then they must necessarily produce certain

other things,—wherever and whenever the causes occur, then the effect must follow. The law only ‘comes into operation’ when the causes actually occur in the series of events in space and time. But it is conceivable that the causes might only occur once in a thousand or a million years; then the law would only come into operation once in all that time—but there would be no miracle. An event might happen, the like of which had never been heard of within the memory of man, and yet not be a miracle, but happen according to law. This would be the instinct of scientific observers in such a case. They would make the most accurate record of the event in all its circumstances, and preserve it in the hope that subsequent discovery might throw light on it, or that, at some time, it might happen again. They would regard it as due to the operation of some complicated law or laws hitherto utterly unknown. Of course, such an event may be described as miraculous or supernatural, but this would be in another sense, and in this connection the terms would be misleading; it would be better to coin a word—such as ‘supernormal’—to express the difference between these and ordinary events.<sup>1</sup> But this restricted meaning of the ‘supernatural’ would probably not satisfy those to whom the distinction of natural and supernatural seems of supreme importance, for it reduces this distinction to one of degree only. We are forced to the conclusion that if the doctrine of the miraculous, according to the letter of its usual expression, is carried out with logical strictness, a ‘miracle’ must be taken to mean an event whose causes can never be understood by human intelligence on any terms, and must ever wholly

<sup>1</sup> In this sense the term ‘supernormal’ is employed by Professor Sidgwick and other members of the Psychical Research Society.



transcend its grasp ; Mr Spencer's ' Unknowable ' is the apotheosis of miracle. To understand or explain an event is simply to find in it the operation of a universal law of which it is an individual case ; we have first the general law, stated conditionally or in the form of a supposition : " The system of causes A B C D, wherever and whenever they occur, will have the effect E ; " and when we find that the observed facts *a b c d* are an individual case of A B C D, we *so far* ' understand ' them. The ideal of science is the attainment of as many such explanatory laws as possible, so that a world where miracles happened would be a world where knowledge and science were impossible. This is the second, and to my mind conclusive, reason for rejecting all belief in the miraculous, which implies that we can put any events in a class by themselves as supernatural.

A world where miracles happened would contradict that attempt to understand things which is the mainspring of science ; for, if the world is intelligible, if any knowledge about it is possible beyond the recurring uniformities which experience, on the whole, shows us, this is only because general laws do obtain within it, beneath the appearance ; and every law, as we have seen, depends upon the principle that the same set of causes will always be followed by the same effect. This is the great primary postulate or demand that science makes upon the universe, and a demand that has always been fulfilled. This is evidently a deeper principle than the custom-bred expectation that the usually experienced order of things will continue ; events utterly abrupt and unexpected may occur, and yet be produced by causes which always would produce those same effects, when the circumstances proper for

their operation occur. There is a well-known ancient hymn that concludes with the words, "O God, in thee have I trusted; let me never be confounded." Many scientific workers would refuse to say that, and object to what is implied in it; but this at least they must say—this at least science does say and always has said: "O Universe, in thee have I trusted, and I have never been confounded." Science proceeds, and can only proceed, on the postulate, assumption, trust, faith—call it what we will—that the world will not perpetually baffle our efforts to understand it or put us to permanent intellectual confusion; and this trust in the universe that it is rational is one kind or one direction of trust in God; so far, science and religion are at one. We are told that the Emperor Napoleon remarked to the great astronomer and mathematician Laplace, "They tell me you have written this large book on the Mechanism of the Universe, without saying a word about the Creator." Laplace replied, "Sire, I am not aware of needing any such hypothesis." Perhaps not, for his purpose; but he needed the other 'hypothesis' or trust that we have spoken of; and this is not so unrelated to what he called the 'hypothesis of God' as he thought.

We must not forget to take a clear view of the result at which we have arrived in the preceding discussion. We have been using the word 'miracle' ('supernatural event' being regarded as a synonymous expression) in a rigid metaphysical sense, according to which it means something whose explanation is for ever beyond the reach of our intelligence. In this sense the limits of the 'natural' are those of the intelligible or rational. I do not suppose that any one, worthy of being regarded as a representative of any commanding phase

of religious thought, has in modern times consciously intended all that this implies; when consistently carried out, it resolves itself into the doctrine of the 'two-fold nature of truth,' maintained during the decline of Scholasticism. Traces of this 'theory,' if such it can be called, are found in such writers as Lamennais and John Henry Newman, or—to select two names representing a wholly different point of view—Hamilton and Mansel, especially the latter. We have already estimated this depreciation of Reason in the supposed interest of Faith; concerning which an eminent Roman Catholic divine has truly said that "not religious faith, but universal scepticism, gains by the stroke which smites reason to the ground." Nevertheless many religious thinkers have written and spoken about this question of the miraculous, *as if* they meant that the supernatural and the incomprehensible were the same; and hence it is well to see clearly that *this* meaning is utterly untenable. But if our conclusion leaves the 'supernaturalist,' in the above-mentioned strict sense of the term, no ground to stand upon, it leaves just as little to the 'anti-supernaturalist' who wishes to bring all existence to the same plane, whether by 'levelling it' up or down. When we have settled that the natural and the rational are coextensive, we have only just opened the question. We require in the next place to learn the laws and structure of intelligence in order to know what really is intelligible. Now there is no reason to doubt that a thinker—a scientific man, let us say—may argue, draw conclusions and systematise facts, and that these processes may be correct as far as they go; while through it all the inquirer may have a very imperfect comprehension of the laws and aims of thought itself.

In that case, his view of what is intelligible may be narrow and one-sided; forms of real experience which have deep significance may be 'incomprehensible' or 'irrational' *on his view* of reason, and hence may be in the end unreal to him.<sup>1</sup> This is why 'rationalism' is often, and not unjustly, used as a term of reproach. A deeper insight into the laws of our intelligence and into the ideal which it lays upon us would lead to very different results. Above all this, there is no reason to doubt that we are far from having reached any complete or final statement of *all* the structural laws of thought, not even when we work, in the light of Kantian and Hegelian principles, as deeply into the logical constitution of thought as is possible for us here and now. Hence *nothing* can be condemned as 'supernatural'—*i.e.*, impossible—on the ground of its being incomprehensible to us, unless it *absolutely contradicts* what we cannot but take to be a vital law of thinking.

If then we change our ground and let the 'natural' mean the *known*, and think of the extent of our knowledge as compared with that of our ignorance, we must say that for man all things as yet are supernatural. A few scattered drops of knowledge are ours out of a boundless ocean that waits to be known; what shall we say of those 'scientific' eyes that are dazzled by the glittering of these few drops, and cannot see the ocean from which they come? Are these the measure of all that waits to be known? "Am I," says Carlyle, "to view the stupendous with stupid indifference because I have seen it twice or two hundred or two

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the following: "That man has had a liberal education . . . whose intellect is a clear cold logical engine, with all its parts in smooth working order, and ready like a steam-engine to be turned to any kind of work" (Huxley, *Lay Sermon* on Education). This is Reason at the stage of what Kant and Hegel call the Analytical Understanding.

million times? Custom doth make dotards of us all. True, it is by this means we live, for man must work as well as wonder; and herein is custom so far a kind nurse, guiding him to his true benefit. But she is a fond, foolish nurse, or rather we are false, foolish nurslings, when in our resting and reflecting hours we prolong the same deception."

We shall see in the sequel that the doctrine of *degrees in reality* is the ultimate philosophical expression of the truth contained in the ordinary conception of a supernatural world. Thus, on the whole, we find four different meanings of the supernatural: first, what is absolutely unintelligible, and therefore impossible; second, what is real as a matter of unanalysed experience, but not yet *thought out* or intellectually comprehended, and brought into intelligible relations with other known aspects of reality; third, what is not yet 'known'—i.e., is neither experienced nor thought out; fourth, what is (relatively to some kind of existence which we are considering) a deeper reality—e.g., the self-consciousness of man, relatively to the world of 'matter and motion.' We might add, as a fifth sense of the supernatural, that which is *unusual* according to the customary order of events in nature. The first of these meanings is alone inadmissible.

During the last century the question between science and religion had quite another form; and the way of viewing the matter which then prevailed has not yet disappeared. The attempt was always made to argue from the natural world to the existence of an intelligent Cause thereof,—just in the way in which we usually argue from one fact to another fact. This was in the days when the reality and meaning of Evolution was



scarcely suspected, and that only by a very few thinkers; so that the physical world was believed to have been, on the whole, the same since its beginning. Under these circumstances, the relation of God to the world was conceived as that of Creator and Contriver, after the analogy of the human mind in manufacturing things. Let me quote Dr J. Caird's clear and impartial statement of this point of view: "The ingenuity and deftness of a human artificer are shown in moulding into accordance with a preconceived plan rude material elements which could never, by any possibility, from their own nature, have so shaped themselves. If stone and wood and mortar had any natural tendency to grow into houses, or iron, brass, zinc, and other metals into watches, steam-engines, electric machines, the mechanist would lose credit for contrivance and dexterity; . . . but it is because the mere pieces of dead matter could not shape themselves into correlations of means with useful or beautiful ends that the skill of the external designer is rendered so striking. In like manner, when we see the rough materials of a world, which have no inherent tendency to frame themselves into such results, wrought up into planetary systems, vital organisms,—wrought up into innumerable diversified structures, each often in itself, in form and function, a marvel of exquisite combination and contrivance, and finding itself in wondrous correspondence with the other existences around it,—this view of a world in which things having no natural connection with each other are adjusted in a marvellous way to each other for a definite purpose, at once suggests to us the presence of an external designer of infinite power and wisdom, for only by the agency of such a one can such results be conceived possible."

If this venerable 'design argument' were an appeal to our feeling, to our sense of beauty and proportion in things, then it would certainly have a value of its own; though it would have to be extended into a general view of the implications of our consciousness of beauty. But it is an appeal to the intellect, to be judged by the canons of the logical understanding, and from this point of view it has been shown again and again to be wrapped in fatal ambiguity at every step.<sup>1</sup> I have not, however, introduced it for the sake of entering into this side of the question, but to show exactly in what way it has been overthrown by the principles with which the scientific thought of this century works. The argument has not been so much affected by the sciences dealing with inorganic matter (chemistry and physics); indeed, those physicists who have been interested in theology have usually exhibited a marked partiality for this line of proof; in this they only follow the example of Newton, who at the close of his great work lays it down, in the manner of a self-evident truth, that the whole complexity of natural things can only have proceeded from the 'ideas and will' of a single being of infinite power and intelligence.<sup>2</sup> The design argument begins by laying stress upon the 'natural' inertness or incapacity of matter, and assumes an intelligent will to account for the forms of adaptation that such 'matter' has received; and it is the principles,

<sup>1</sup> For an admirably clear and concise estimate of its value, see Dr Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*, ch. v. (2); and on the general question how far discursive argument can 'prove the existence' of God, see also Upton's *Hibbert Lectures*, ch. ii., and Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*, part ii. ch. iv.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly the authors of *The Unseen Universe* "assume, as absolutely self-evident, the existence of a Deity who is the Creator of all things" (p. 47).

results, and speculations of modern biology, and of evolutionary science in every direction, that have demonstrated the futility of all argument upon these lines.

In stating the design argument, we made for a moment the imaginary supposition that if the materials employed by the human artificer had any 'natural tendency' to *grow* into the objects he desires to make from them, he would deserve no credit for contrivance and dexterity; his work would be merely one of cultivation. Passing, then, to the case of the supernatural designer and the dead formless matter out of which he creates a world of law, order, and beauty, we find that the corresponding supposition is actually realised. Dead matter, as there is reason to believe—that is to say, what *appears to us* to be dead matter—has been capable of giving birth to the most rudimentary forms of life at some stupendous distance of time; in the beginning all forms of life were indistinguishable, like mere specks of jelly; in the course of time they gradually diverged from one another, and grew more and more different until at last they attained the almost infinite variety we now find; all the enormous differences that have arisen can be accounted for by the relations of the living creatures to one another and to their environment; and, above all, the human race, viewed on its bodily side, or measured by its physical organisation, is simply one among the other species of animals, of like origin with them. There seems, then, nothing left for the supernatural designer to do. It is true that the supernaturalist can appeal to the difficulty of representing the origin of life, and insist that a special, unique act is required for its origination—as also in the case of consciousness, or at any rate of the human conscious-



ness; but these are admittedly appeals to ignorance, and must necessarily be overthrown with the removal of that ignorance; and, further, in the case of mind, all indications of biology and psychology point to the conclusion that the dawn of consciousness is coeval with the dawn of life, that there has been a continuous growth from the primeval rudimentary germs of feeling up to the complex forms of mental life which manifest themselves in us, and that this growth in complexity of mental life has proceeded *pari passu* with growth in complexity of nervous organisation. Not only man's erect gait and noble bearing are now held to have originated in the course of a vast process of evolution, but his whole intellectual and moral power,—his speech, his reason, his conscience; and all this upward growth can only have been accomplished at the cost of continual effort and struggle and pain.

No conclusion can be drawn from the mere *difficulty*, or even the apparent impossibility, of explaining the origin of life from 'matter,' or of consciousness from organic life: for this difficulty may be only due to science having taken a limited view of the nature of what we call 'matter,' or to the fact that science in professing to deal with matter is dealing only with certain *aspects* of what we mean by material reality—namely, those aspects of it which are capable of measurement or quantitative treatment. The sciences which deal specially with its 'properties'—physics and chemistry—are eager to tell us that they know nothing of what matter really is; they only know that it is something quite other than what it appears to be. This seems to be—from their point of view—the only certain conclusion. We may sug-

gest, however, with Lotze, that what a thing *is* appears in its *action*, so that the true nature of matter only appears in what it does, and what it produces; the true nature of the antecedent cause only appears in the effect. This view may be expressed in Tyndall's words (from the famous address to the British Association); if we are to understand what evolution really is, "we must radically revise our notions of *matter*," and discern in it "the promise and potency of every form of life." If matter has 'evolved' or given birth to life, consciousness, rationality, freedom, morality, we may not think that these are anything *less than they seem*, but that 'matter' is something *far more than it seems*. By this is meant that if dead matter, or what appears to be such, passes naturally into organic life, it is because the former implicitly contains the capacity for organising itself;<sup>1</sup> if organic life passes into fully conscious life, it is because the former already contains the principle through which consciousness arises; and so on. From this point of view we overcome the separation between man and the world which is at once vital to the design argument, and fatal to it. We may question the legitimacy of this line of thought, but we cannot found a theology on the contrast between what we arbitrarily choose to consider the 'natural' incapacities of matter and the actual order and harmony of the material world; we can never again try to pass "from Nature up to Nature's God," as the old arguments tried to do. To my mind it seems clear that if we regard nature by itself, in abstraction from man's consciousness and intelligence,

<sup>1</sup> Or, as we may otherwise express it, the former depends on or is conditioned by a deeper reality which has this higher capacity; and similarly in the case of the other transitions.

it is as easy to regard the world as the offspring of blind forces as of an intelligent will. Yet it was nature, viewed thus in an irrational abstraction, that was considered the best starting-point for a constructive argument to 'prove the existence' of God.

The problem wears a very different form at the present day. We are learning that there can be no question of *proving the existence* of God, in the sense in which these words were once understood. We know that man exists and thinks and acts; and we know that the universe of physical things exists and is apparently boundless; but we cannot with any meaning speak of proving the existence of anything outside of man and nature. He who asks for proof that there is 'a God,' or who declares himself an atheist, shows, I should say, that he scarcely understands the matter he is talking about. The question is only as to the relation of man and nature. What is man's place in nature? What is our origin? What may we know, and what may we reasonably hope for, as to our destiny? As the century draws to a close, there is a growing tendency to get the great problem stated in these terms,—at once the simplest and the clearest: What are we? What are we here for? Hard as this problem is to deal with, it is not bewildering; but it is bewildering to begin, as theology used to do, with a multitude of queries and arguments concerning the nature and character of God. It is becoming manifest that we can only know what God is by first knowing what man is. Hence 'philosophy' has been not unfittingly defined as the clearest and deepest form of human self-consciousness, for its problem is the same as that of theology. Professor T. H. Green truly said

that theology—that is, dogmatic or systematic theology—and philosophy are related to one another simply as the uncritical and critical methods of dealing with the same problem. Let us endeavour to arrive at some reliable general principles by which we may be guided in considering this problem.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE NATURE AND AIMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

FREQUENTLY it is pointed out that the habit of isolating and abstracting one inquiry from others within the 'magic sphere' of Philosophy is a fruitful source of error and confusion. Philosophy, like Wordsworth's cloud, *moves all together*; we cannot isolate and come to a final conclusion upon one problem without thereby prejudicing our conclusions upon all the others. Without denying this, it is just as important to remember that Philosophy, *unlike* the cloud, must be a whole of parts that can be intelligibly distinguished, and not a region formless within and without. That is no whole which does not consist of parts which are clearly distinguishable just because the nature of their mutual relation and connection is understood; and the 'parts' of Philosophy are not unrelated inquiries, but differences of method within the One inquiry.

The significance of these general observations will appear more clearly in what follows.

§ 1. Let us first consider the nature and aims of Psychology. It has been well said that Psychology

may be concisely defined as the description and explanation of conscious states *as such*. This statement indicates both its standpoint, or the subject-matter to which it limits itself, and its method.

The subject-matter of Psychology is conscious states *as such*; in other words, it is necessary, but also sufficient, if any fact is to have import for the science of Psychology as this is now understood, that it enter into or form part of some one's experience, some individual's conscious life: and the processes by which it is appropriated into that life form the problem for Psychology. Hence this science deals with mental life not as the latter appears through outward signs, but as it is for the individual who lives the life: and it starts from the self-consciousness or self-knowledge which is current in ordinary experience. In technical language: Psychology is interested in any event only in so far as it is a Presentation to a conscious Subject; indeed no other account, at once consistent and perfectly general, can be given of the facts with which the science deals—facts of mind. In so far as they are equally Presentations to a Subject, they are of equal importance to the psychologist; he is not concerned to estimate them by any standard of Worth, as, for instance, Ethics would do. We must carefully observe that by the term Subject, at the present stage, is implied no more than was implied by the terms 'some one,' 'some individual'—*i.e.*, that conscious states only exist as gathered together in the unity and continuity of a single life. Each conscious Subject is thus a relatively permanent 'finite centre'—if I may so adapt Mr Bradley's phrase—or a centre controlling a finite circumference. The most general definition of a psychological fact is, that it must fall within such a 'circum-



ference'—*less* than this the conception cannot mean; and the conception of the Subject is that of a unity and continuity of the many distinguishable facts or states—*less* than this it cannot mean. There is no ground, so far, for assuming that the function of the Subject is exhausted in such unification, or that we cannot *fill in* the conception of the Subject and make it more determinate.<sup>1</sup> We know that it must be at least a unifying principle: and that we cannot get behind the unity of consciousness, is fully recognised in the most representative modern works on Psychology.

By the 'explanation' of mental facts, and also whenever speaking of a 'scientific' treatment of such facts, I shall understand their reduction to one and the same fundamental type: in other words, the reduction of their seemingly endless variety and complexity to modes of one and the same fundamental principle, operative throughout. We aim at showing that every actual state of mind is capable of being represented in the form  $f(a^x, b^y, c^z)$ —always the same function of three variables<sup>2</sup>  $a^x, b^y, c^z$ ; all variety being due, not to variation in the form of the function or in the nature of the constituents  $a, b, c$ , relatively to one another, but only to variations in the quality or intensity or other proper characteristic of each: these characteristics are symbolised by the exponents  $x, y, z$ . In such a case, what we have represented as  $f(a, b, c)$  is a principle of scientific explanation, or as we may otherwise express it, a "tool of analysis." The aim of science, as

<sup>1</sup> It may be said that the whole problem of Philosophy consists in determining the nature of the Subject.

<sup>2</sup> I say *three*, but we shall have to come in contact with theories which fix on two, or even one only.

we shall see later on, is simply to attempt for particular kinds of Reality or existence what Philosophy attempts for all Reality known to us—to explain the variety as manifestations or modes of working of a single Power or Principle. It will be seen that this method must go beyond that of merely empirical description, or *historia naturalis* in the old sense of the term; and we may, with Lehmann,<sup>1</sup> contrast the work of Bain and Nahlowsky, in the department of Feeling, as instances respectively of the purely empirical treatment and the treatment which proceeds by explanation on the ground of a general psychological principle. Such purely empirical treatment of a region of mental fact cannot be more than the material for science—it is not itself science. It may, however, be unconsciously employing, or tending to employ, some scientific principle; it may again implicitly involve two or three conflicting principles, as seems to be the case with the work of Professor James. The tendency of Bain's work throughout is certainly in the direction of what has been called Presentationism and Automatism; the same is the case with James's work in the department of Emotion.

In explaining by means of such a principle, our method will have to be one of Analysis,—analysis directed upon the present concrete facts, in order to elucidate the present and past history of mind. At this point I may fittingly distinguish the various psychological methods which have actually been employed, and at the same time indicate an exact sense in which the terms 'analytic' and 'historical' may be used. First must be signalised a method of great historical importance which is here categorically re-

<sup>1</sup> *Gefühlsleben*, pp. 5, 6.



jected. It aims at showing how the facts of mind may be built up out of elements which are assumed to be capable of having existed previously in a state of mutual independence, more or less. This method always tends to be atomistic, and its assumptions are analogous to those of Mechanics, when the development of mind is viewed as a process of mechanical aggregation; or they are analogous to those of Chemistry when it is viewed as a process of combination. Surely the only philosophical and reasonable method is to work back from the present, the known, to the unknown, observing what elements may disappear provided it still remains possible to say intelligibly that some kind of psychical life remains. Now, as Dr Ward and Professor James have most forcibly urged, it is only in a figurative way that we can speak of distinct elements in, or 'parts' of, the field of presentation; we have first a more or less definite field and then a change within this field, and so on; and while these changes continue—in other words, as long as we are conscious—there is no breach of continuity. Again, we find that as the intensity of consciousness diminishes this continuum does not cease to be such and pass into discrete parts, but that differences and distinctions within it disappear. What we approach is a 'continuum in which differences are latent,' or an 'indefinite homogeneity.' This, then, on grounds of experience, may be taken as the type of mental growth, so far as intellection, the growth of the life of ideas, is concerned: the explicit coming to light of what was previously implicitly present—the progressive discernment of differences in a continuum where differences were previously latent. The *distinction* of elements within the continuum implies their being *related*: the

complexity and multiplicity of the elements related and that of the relations increase *pari passu*. If this view of mental development be rejected—and if rejected for intellection it cannot of course be retained for feeling and volition—I can see no alternative but to accept the theory of psychical atomism in its most complete and consistent form. It is open to the objections that we have to invent our ultimate elements, and cannot show that they have ever existed; that we have to a certain extent to invent the laws of their combination; and that even then we have no possibility of so applying them as to read off and predict particular facts in the way done in Physics and Chemistry. In these sciences, even if the assumptions—of ‘atoms,’ &c.—could be regarded as merely a ‘hypothetical fiction,’ they are fictions which have some justification because they are useful, and enable us to frame general laws from which consequences can be deduced in anticipation of experience. When an atomistic psychologist can write a biography in advance, then we may respect his hypotheses.

The tendency at the present time appears to be to pass entirely beyond the atomistic point of view, and to represent the growth of mind as a process of organic development after the manner of Biology. But the biological principle of development requires a philosophical interpretation—in other words, it requires to be critically, clearly, and distinctly stated; and this the specialists, in Biology and Psychology alike, seem strangely reluctant to do. However, we may regard the principle on the one hand as simply excluding all idea of a growth or aggregation from without—an external combination of fact to fact as mind develops; and on the other hand as simply affirming—without

explaining—a growth from within; so that the growth of intellection and feeling alike is viewed as an unfolding of subjective capacity and resources. To develop this view and to show the ‘how’ of the ‘growth from within,’ would be in effect to adopt the principle which Aristotle formulated as *γένεσις ἕνεκα τῆς οὐσίας*: the end being regarded as implicit in the beginning, — the development as the product of that which develops. In so far as we are unable to carry it out in this way, the ‘biological’ view of mental development approximates to a method which, though constantly used, is not usually characterised with sufficient definiteness and distinguished from others. This method we may call the impartially *historical*: it aims simply at investigating the characteristics of the facts of mind, in their chronological order, as gradually more complex forms appear. Its question is, What is the order (in time) in which the facts appear in the normal mind? This mere time-order is the only principle of connection between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ forms which it attempts to use. It would aim only at describing the characteristics of each higher form of feeling or intellection as it emerges, and observing the order in which these forms emerge. This indeed seems to be all that we are able to do in the present unsatisfactory state of our science. In most of the existing psychologies the idea of development appears to oscillate between this historical view and the atomistic view. This vagueness is especially evident in the treatment of Feeling.

The Analytic method, of which I spoke, relies on introspection and on every possible means of helping and verifying introspection. In no sense whatever is such an analysis a division into parts capable of ex-

isting separately: we analyse a mental fact when we are able by discrimination to become aware of its several features or elements. 'Introspection' is no attitude special and peculiar to the psychologist, nor can it be compared to an inner sense or perception. Introspection is simply a particular case of self-consciousness: we are self-conscious when we reflect upon certain of our mental functions *as ours*, and this is introspection. In ordinary life the interest of such reflection lies for the most part in idiosyncrasies; the scientific introspection of the psychologist is the *same process*, extended and made as systematic as possible, and directed to the end of discovering not personal peculiarities but characteristics shared by all minds. Indeed it would be going too far to say that the psychological reflection even of the practical or pre-scientific stage is merely personal. The natural associations of individuals in the family and in civic life practically necessitate a reflection—though it is scarcely conscious—which results in a knowledge of mind, confused and superficial, yet containing the germs of scientific knowledge. Again, beyond the knowledge which is sufficient for merely practical needs, a more theoretical reflection becomes possible with the development of language, and above all of literature, for then we can have, so to speak, permanent embodiments of mental life, in which various forms of mental experience are concretely described. This prepares the way for the more thorough, and more general, reflective analyses of the scientific psychologists.

The analytic side of Psychology has been much neglected, in comparison with the historical, in recent treatises. This is especially seen in the Psychology of

Judgment and Reasoning.<sup>1</sup> In some works these—the very elements of cognition which are most prominent in our actual conscious experience—are almost ignored. We look in vain in any of our Psychologies for a complete analytically descriptive treatment of these. As a matter of fact, it has come about that they are most strangely and arbitrarily separated from Psychology and brought under the head of 'Logic,' along with various epistemological matters, and with fragments of other psychological matters and of metaphysics. I maintain that a considerable part of the discussion in such Logics as those of Ueberweg, Lotze, Sigwart, Bradley, and Bosanquet, is purely psychological, and ought to have a prominent place in any 'Psychology of Cognition' that deserves the name. Of course the *title* of a treatise discussing these subjects is a matter of no importance; the main point is, Is there any principle by reference to which they can be conclusively separated from Psychology? It is usually said that Logic is a regulative or normative science, showing how we 'ought' to reason: it treats of the 'ideal,' while Psychology treats of the 'actual,' showing how we do reason. This distinction seems to me to be rather worse than useless; it obscures the whole matter by introducing the complicated metaphysical problem of what is the true relation and contrast between the ideal and the actual, between 'ought' and 'is.'<sup>2</sup> In the first place, we must ask, what exactly is meant by saying that Logic shows us how we *ought* to reason? Surely that it shows us what the true nature of reason-

<sup>1</sup> In *both* respects Mr Stout's *Analytic Psychology* is a noteworthy exception.

<sup>2</sup> It must surely be evident that this distinction is not more easy to define in the sphere of Intellect than in that of Conduct.

ing is—it shows us its essential *differentia*, which is simply the nature of the process itself. So far as any process of thought is fallacious or false reasoning, it is *not* reasoning; its links must be more or less non-rational in character, being determined by the force of feeling, of custom or habit or ‘authority,’ or other processes which it is the business of Psychology to investigate. Unless, then, it can be denied that reasoning is an actual process of the mind, we must admit that it is the business of Psychology to show us what reasoning is, since Psychology has to deal with mental processes. It may be replied: “Certainly reasoning is an ‘actual process of the mind,’ but Logic does not treat it as such; Logic treats it in abstraction from the concurrent non-rational processes such as the sources of error you have mentioned: it treats the intellect *per se*, investigating only its organic functions, so that human knowledge is viewed as it were *sub specie æternitatis*, as the possession of mind in general.” Now, all Psychology may be said to deal with ‘mind in general’ in the sense that it is not biography nor a record of personal peculiarities, but deals with the normal mind; further, the ‘abstraction’ referred to by the objector is merely one first from the processes of the emotional or conative order which develop concurrently with those of intellection, and then in part from the processes of sensation, ideation, and ‘reintegration,’ viewed as non-rational. ‘Logic’ cannot abstract entirely from the latter, as even a cursory glance at any treatise—except, of course, on ‘formal’ Logic—will show. The objector simply points out that the higher Psychology of cognition is a distinct branch of the science, and this no one would deny; we are obliged to treat mental functions to a certain extent



in abstraction from one another. We may take the particular case of Belief; the objector presumably would say that Logic treats Belief with reference to its intellectual contents and its reasons or grounds, while Psychology cannot do more than investigate its causes: in this science we "work with the category of cause and effect," dealing with "mere events." If the latter assertion is more than a tautology I should meet it with a direct denial: the principle of cause and effect, as we shall see, has a special meaning for each special science—for Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Psychology: hence to say that in the last-named science we use the category of causality is either to say that we make Psychology a branch of one of the lower sciences, or that in Psychology we use psychological principles—the specific principles of that science which distinguish it from the others. Coming, then, to the case of Belief, we must observe that this is a total state of mind or *psychosis*, involving Intellection, Feeling, and actual or nascent Volition. It is a result of the social and other environment acting on the previous mental development as a whole, in any stage of which the same three elements may be discovered at work; the intellectual causes, as such, include the logical Reasons, so far as reasoning operates in producing or sustaining the belief. In other words, the so-called 'logical' reasons form simply one element in the organic unity of the concrete psychical causality which has produced the belief, and which is for Psychology to unravel if it can be done.

If it be said that Logic must investigate not merely the rational grounds which as a matter of fact are assigned for belief, but its ultimate grounds and reasons, this must signify that Logic inquires into the meaning of Truth and Error as such, and into the ultimate rela-



tion between knowing and being which is expressed in the conviction that Truth must be true of Reality. This brings us to what is perhaps the most fundamental principle on which the attempt is made to ground a distinction between Logic and Psychology. Logic inquires into the distinction of the true and the false, the former being an Ideal at which we ought to aim in our thought—an end to which the process of thought should be directed. Psychology cannot investigate the grounds of this distinction or show its ultimate significance. It may be possible, however, for us to show how the distinction is used in the organisation of thought and knowledge; and since this is to deal with the processes and results of mental functions, it would be within the sphere of Psychology. The question, How does knowledge 'physiologically and morphologically' organise itself in the collective mind? is a psychological matter. For knowledge is essentially a social function, pointing through the medium of language outwards from mind to mind. The analytical Psychology of cognition requires us to introduce the conception of the 'collective mind,' and to emphasise that social function of thought which is its essential aim.<sup>1</sup> We may say that the Ideal of pure thought or knowledge requires that the intellectual contents of different minds shall be in all respects similar: and this similarity suggests a deeper identity. Only through such a kingdom of intelligences can the intellectual ideal be realised. Hence in this department of the science we pass entirely beyond the subjective point of

<sup>1</sup> There is a corresponding deficiency in historical Psychology. It has been justly remarked that the growth of our common intellectual inheritance requires to be dealt with by a branch of Psychology which is missing—a genetic Psychology of the general or collective mind.

view—almost akin to that of solipsism, as though all that existed were the contents of a single individual mind—which characterises the Psychology of sensation and imagination, and to which the whole science is sometimes supposed to be limited.

Our conclusion, then, is that Logic must be identified with Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge, if it is to be distinguished from Psychology: its central problems are, What is the ultimate meaning of Truth? what are the conditions of its attainment? Epistemology is *continuous* with the higher Psychology of cognition; but the former develops the latter in such a way as to transfer what we may call its centre of gravity to a new sphere. Let us now investigate the bearings of these inquiries more fully, particularly in their relation to Metaphysics or Ontology.

§ 2. The two basal elements of knowledge—it will be agreed on all hands—are the consciousness of self and the consciousness of an objective world from which the self is distinguished. Between these two the positive relation and the difference are equally essential. The self distinguishes itself from the world, but recognises that its relations to the world alone give to its theoretical and practical activities any significance. Each of these two modes of consciousness is a process of thought-knowledge, and like all knowledge is a process of reference,—the reference being in the one case to the reality of self, in the other to reality other than self. Let us examine some of the characteristics of the former.

The central fact of consciousness seems to be the power of becoming self-conscious. In the mind of the individual there gradually becomes organised an idea

of self as a person of a certain character, with certain tendencies and habits; and the reference to self occurs upon the more or less definite emergence of this idea in consciousness. This idea, like every other, may fall indefinitely short of the reality—that is, of the individual's nature as it verily is—but this is irrelevant for our present purpose. The meaning and significance of the idea lies in the reference to self, which is fundamental in it. In this matter the position of Descartes surely is unassailable. The irreducible fact of my existence is 'I am thinking,' which simply means 'I am conscious of . . . .' This is the actual concrete fact. It is impossible not to believe that the states, affections, or modes of consciousness are *my* states,—that they belong to me as Subject. Descartes preferred to say, "In knowing them as mine I know that I exist." But it is less ambiguous to express the matter thus: the only account, presenting itself as immediately intelligible, that I can give of *my* existence is, "I am conscious of presentations"—*i.e.*, of perceptions, mental images, ideas, memories, opinions, knowledges, and the like<sup>1</sup>—and the only corresponding explanation of *their* reality is, they are constituents of my conscious life. In being conscious of them, I immediately *experience*—as well as reflectively *know about*—a life of Feeling and Activity in relation to them. Hence, although no state of Feeling or Activity can ever be an element *in* a presentation as such, I know what I mean by both terms. This distinction was clearly pointed out by Berkeley. In his phraseology we cannot have an *idea* of Feeling

<sup>1</sup> It will be observed that these are not all 'subjective states' in the usual sense of the phrase—*i.e.*, the sense in which the play of dream and reverie is so: the greater portion of the modes of 'presentation' we have mentioned are real objective knowledges.

or Activity—*i.e.*, we cannot have them objectified as presentations, or “know a spirit [our self] as we do a triangle”; but “we may be said to have a *notion* of them: I have some notion of my mind and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words.”<sup>1</sup> What we have said must not be taken to imply that we are self-conscious at every moment of our lives. As a matter of fact, it is not so; nevertheless, as Kant has it—“Das ‘Ich denke’ [I am conscious] muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können.” However absorbed we may be in objective events or in trains of ideas, their reference to our self may emerge at any moment.

In the conception of a being, such as the self which each of us is, we have the essential element in the meaning of the word Substance. This view used to find expression in such phrases as that the human spirit is a ‘simple and indivisible Substance.’ There is nothing to object to in this, provided it is understood simply as an analytical statement of the meaning of the term Substance. There have been, too often, traces of a tendency to speak as if the word Substance had a meaning quite apart from its application to the human self: thus Descartes concludes, “I am a Substance whose nature or essence it is to think.” From the same point of view, the self is often described as a ‘substrate,’ ‘underlying substance,’ &c. The apparent implication of all this is, that the self is in some mysterious way separate from its own states, and looks on at them as a spectator. This is characteristic of a pre-Kantian mode of thought, which has not yet died out. On the other hand, there is the tendency, which has its origin in Kant, to limit the use of the conception of

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Human Knowledge*, §§ 89, 142; cf. §§ 135, 137.

Substance, as that of Causality, to the interpretation of external phenomena, and to deny its applicability to consciousness and self-consciousness, which are supposed either to be beyond the pale of 'scientific' knowledge,—the view of Positivism; or to require 'higher' categories for their interpretation,—the view of Hegelian Idealism. I think we must conclude that the category of Substance, like that of Causality, has different meanings for the different sciences, and that its fullest and truest meaning is found in its psychological reference alone. Akin to the same pre-Kantian view is the distinction of a 'pure' and an 'empirical' Ego, on which great stress is sometimes laid. Lotze, with his usual penetrating accuracy of thought, clears up these confusions: "The fact of the unity of consciousness is *eo ipso* at once the fact of the existence of a Substance; we do not need . . . to seek in an extraneous and superior 'substance,' supposed to be known beforehand, the source from which the Subject would have the capacity of figuring as the centre of manifold actions and affections."<sup>1</sup> Our view, then, cannot be disturbed by Professor Huxley's criticism of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*.<sup>2</sup> He supposes that the existence of a self—as also of reality other than self—is simply a hypothesis to account for the facts of consciousness, which may be self-existent. This separation of the 'I' and the 'thought' must inevitably result in the position of Hume. The 'thought,' as such, unreferred to self, is not the concrete fact; the only concrete fact is as Descartes states it, for we only know thought as self-existent (that is, unreferred) when it is merely a temporary state in the life of a being that

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysic* (Eng. Tr.), § 243.

<sup>2</sup> See his *Essay on Descartes*.

is continually self-conscious, referring its states to itself as Subject. Thought only exists in this personal form; by abstraction we can think of it as self-existent, but it is never found to be so in the real world. We do not, therefore, have on the one side 'something called thought' (*i.e.*, the whole concrete conscious life), and on the other hand 'something called I,' and attempt to 'explain' the former by reference to the latter. Self is realised or lived or completely manifested *in* the actual threefold process of conscious life. There is no 'substance' of the soul to be known apart from the actual mental life; in so far as you know the fundamental constitutive processes of that life, as shown by Psychology and Logic, you know the 'substance of the soul.' On the other hand, the concrete mental life does not mean the fleeting presentations and transient ebullitions of feeling; the deeper currents are the easiest to overlook, but are none the less 'facts.'

Such considerations as those which have been urged in favour of the recognition of the psychological subject receive more sympathy from psychologists at the present time than used to be the case. Indeed the only question is, how far the acknowledgment of such a unity and continuity of consciousness can be kept free from metaphysical implications. Thus, Dr Ward maintains<sup>1</sup> that the assumption may be kept as free from such implications as may "the assumption of a biological individual or organism with which it is so closely connected;" but he immediately goes on to point out that this analogy must not be pushed too far. "If we find anything among the facts of Psychology comparable to the parts or organs of the animal body, these are the ideas, objects, or presenta-

<sup>1</sup> *Mind*, vol. viii. pp. 466, 467.



tions which constitute the contents of consciousness: in the unity of this content at any moment and its continuity from moment to moment, we have a certain counterpart to the unity and continuity of the body. Still this unity and continuity is not [all of] what we mean by the psychological Subject: on the contrary, we look to this Subject for an *explanation* of this unity." He adds the very pertinent observation that we may have to look to it too for an explanation of the unity of the organism: "at any rate, as soon as the biologist regards the organism as adapted to the end of living, or of surviving in the struggle for existence—thereby giving to life a meaning other than that of a series of physical processes—he has changed his front; for such teleological references imply feeling, and effort or impulse as the result of feeling; and it is just these purely psychological facts of feeling and impulse which compel us to recognise a Subject of consciousness as well as a unity and continuity of consciousness." Now if the Subject of consciousness were no more than a unifying principle—if the conception of the Subject signified no more than a unity of the manifold presentations—then we might fairly argue that the recognition of it could be kept clear of 'metaphysical implications.' But as is admirably pointed out in the passage quoted above, we assume a central unity of Feeling and Activity as well as of Intellection,—a centre of actions and affections which cannot be reduced to presentations. Could this be reconciled with a 'double-aspect' or 'monistic' metaphysics without emptying it of all its significance? Obviously not: hence it is really a metaphysical assumption. We shall see at a later stage to what extent, and why, it is so.

§ 3. Let us now observe some of the characteristics of the reference to reality other than self. Our presentational states, when appearing in the medium of those relations implied in judgment, continually refer themselves to a reality which we know by their means. In ordinary life and thought, it is just in this aspect that we are specially interested in them, as true or false, as a means whereby truth or truths may be obtained and error avoided; "we treat them consistently as significant, as ideas of *something*, as representative or symbolic of a world of facts." The reality here referred to is an independent world or system of related facts; 'independent' only as being distinguished from the growing changing thought of individuals about it. Such a system is implied in the very notion of Truth. The *differentia* of judgment, the statement of which is as old as Aristotle, is that it may be true or false, according as the ideal relation that I have framed holds objectively, between the facts, or not: that is, according as it can or cannot be referred to the real system. The relation or reference that we are endeavouring to define is not one of mere correspondence:<sup>1</sup> we cannot get outside our own thought and call it true if it 'corresponds' with reality, false if it does not; but every judgment refers to Reality and consists in explicitly filling in, or determining, our conception of some portion of

<sup>1</sup> The conception that the forms of Thought through which knowledge is organised are *parallel* to, or *correspond* to, the forms of real existence is maintained by an important school of Epistemologists. This conception is dealt with, historically and critically, by Professor Adamson, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. *Logic*, pp. 797 and 802. There is a strained sense in which the idea of correspondence is applicable to the case, but its associations all point in the wrong direction.

Reality.<sup>1</sup> This conception of an objective system of *facts*—so far, undetermined in nature—connected by relations which are so far undetermined in character, is the least that we can mean when speaking of ‘trans-subjective’ or ‘extra-conscious’ reality or realities. It is the most abstract expression we can give to the general conception of reality which is implicit in objective judgments.

From reality in this sense must be carefully distinguished what is usually called ‘material’ reality. This simply means the concrete sensuous content of present perception, with its invariable characteristics of Extension in three dimensions and Duration: “the exclusive *focus* of immediate perception, which lights up its content.”<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding its aggressive qualities, it would be absurd to maintain the independent reality of this fluctuating fragment. What we call matter—*i.e.*, the material apparently given in this primary presentation—is always the experience of a particular percipient Subject at a particular time and place; whatever more it may be, it is always a ‘here-now’ for some one. In Berkeley’s phraseology, its *esse* necessarily involves *percipi*: but it does not follow that its *esse* is exhausted in *percipi*,—in other words, that it consists merely of “ideas in my mind” in the Berkeleian sense. It must be borne in mind that in speaking of ‘matter’ we are speaking only of matter as appearing in immediate perception. The world with which the material sciences (Physics and Chemistry) deal—the world of atoms or material centres in constant motion—is not

<sup>1</sup> Since we are now dealing with *objective* judgments, the question of how far these statements apply to self-knowledge—*i.e.*, to judgments of ‘introspection,’ so-called—is deferred: see § 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bradley, *Logic*, bk. I. ch. ii. §§ 23-27.

perceived. The attempt sometimes made to put it on a level with what is given in sense by saying that if our senses and instruments were fine enough we should *perceive* these motions, seems to me to be a superficial evasion. Such senses would be altogether unlike anything to which *we* can apply the name: the abstract possibility of new senses, showing us entirely new aspects of reality, has no bearing on the question: we cannot conceive or intelligibly talk about such senses until we have actual experience of them. To resume: the plain man's recoil from the doctrine that 'matter' consists simply of 'states of consciousness' seems thoroughly justified; and equally justified is the recoil of all reflective thinkers from the idea that the 'matter' which we perceive exists, exactly as we perceive it, independently of any and every percipient consciousness. We have to keep carefully to the strait and narrow way between these two quicksands of Crude Idealism and Crude Realism. What is called 'matter,' if supposed to exist independently and for itself, is a hypostatized abstraction—a fiction coined from nonentity. But the objective system referred to in knowledge is neither material nor immaterial: being defined as above, it is so far—for us, for our knowledge—not determined as the one or the other. Its further determination is a matter for Ontology. As we shall see presently, the physical sciences consist simply of attempts partially to determine it,—just as Psychology is an attempt partially to determine self-consciousness or the 'conscious system' of mind as such, which is the object of all judgments referring to self.<sup>1</sup> Knowledge is a growth with two branches, which *begin* by diverging,—the one pointing inwards, the other out-

<sup>1</sup> See chapter v.

wards. The fundamental correspondence between the two is a fruitful and suggestive principle to bear in mind. But this correspondence must not be exaggerated into a parallelism. The so-called 'subjective' branch, or self-knowledge, is nearer to the root of things than the so-called 'objective' branch, or world-knowledge; for the former, when developed into carefully reflective consciousness of our cognitive function, is found to *include* the latter: the growth of knowledge in every direction is a function of the self,—it depends on the activity of self-conscious spirits: and its *growth* would not be possible unless these self-conscious spirits were, on one side of their being, finite. In this we begin to see the significance of the Kantian doctrine that self-consciousness is the highest condition of the possibility of knowledge.

It is of the nature of knowledge to "grow from more to more"; and for this reason, as we have seen, knowledge cannot be kept out of the sphere of properly psychological research. We may say that Psychology and Epistemology deal with the very same facts, but regard them from different points of view. In actual experience we do not usually adopt towards our conscious states—and we scarcely ever adopt towards our cognitive states, considered in abstraction—that purely historical and analytical attitude to which the psychologist limits himself. We are interested in our cognitive states *as cognitive*—that is, as true or false; while the psychologist is interested in them *as conscious*—as entering into the conscious lives of ourselves *quâ* individuals. The attitude which we adopt in ordinary life is the attitude of the epistemologist. He concentrates on the question of Truth—that is, on the reference to a world or system which is 'real' relatively to



the changing presentations and growing cognitions of the individual consciousness. The fact of this apparent reference, and the manner of its occurrence in Judgment, Psychology must accurately set forth; but Psychology rests in the appearance. Epistemology does not rest in the appearance: its business is continually to emphasise this fundamental constituent of knowledge, and to show that it cannot be doubted, perverted, or denied, as is done by the various forms of Scepticism, Relativism, Subjective Idealism, and the like. In the course of this inquiry it would be shown that the fact in question is no mere Intuition—that it is not merely a clear and distinct belief arising inevitably in consciousness: this much Hume and every Sceptic would willingly allow. It would be shown to be a belief which is *rationally* inevitable, by exposition of the consequences to which doubt or denial of it must inevitably lead.<sup>1</sup>

Intuitionism makes the certainty of all the fundamental principles of knowledge consist in their isolation—*i.e.*, each is known to be certain, in and for itself, on simple presentation of it to the rational faculty. The best modern expositions of this point of view will be found in the writings of Dr James Martineau and of Hermann Lotze.<sup>2</sup> The Theory of Knowledge must, I think, regard the matter from another point of view. Its aim should be to exhibit knowledge as an organic unity of such a kind that no one constitutive principle of it can be denied without denying all the rest—that

<sup>1</sup> For an indication of the lines on which such an Inquiry would proceed, I may refer to Professor A. Seth's *Scottish Philosophy*, ed. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See especially Lotze's *Logic*, bk. iii. Historically we should also refer to Hamilton, and then back to Jacobi, by whose influence Hamilton was largely dominated.



is, without giving up every kind of knowledge. We wish to discover the *vital functions* of knowledge, or the principles whose organic co-operation is essential for its existence; and the importance of such functions lies not in their isolation but in their union. On this view the basal principles of knowledge will be of such a character that they prove one another when put together, though no one of them can authenticate itself in isolation. But it must not for a moment be supposed that we are within sight of the possibility of forming such a system of first principles: this must remain an ideal merely, though it is an ideal which must be steadily kept in view if any progress is to be made in the Theory of Knowledge. Hence we have provisionally to accept the doctrine that all mediate certainty must in the end rest on immediate knowledge, and that the ultimate premisses of proof cannot be proved. At the same time we have to recognise that this point of view—which is essentially that of Intuitionism—is not final, but only a temporary stage: though we may have long to remain in it.

§ 4. We have now to raise the following questions:<sup>1</sup> In what sense does the psychologist deal with Reality? In what sense does the epistemologist *start from* Reality? In what sense does he endeavour to *pass to* Reality? The answers that will be suggested may be thus summed up. (a) Epistemology begins by assuming Reality in the psychological sense: that is, it starts with a conception of Reality which, though sufficient for its purpose, is very partial and incomplete. (b) It does not endeavour to *pass to* Reality: it endeavours

<sup>1</sup> Mainly suggested by Professor Jones's attack upon Epistemology, *Mind*, N.S., Nos. 7, 8.

to vindicate a function of knowledge which is a psychological fact. (c) This function of knowledge *refers to Reality*—which for the pure Theory of Knowledge can be defined only in a negative and relative way. From the very nature of the case, we cannot attempt to make this conception of Reality positive, or to complete the (psychological) conception with which we started, until a clear view has been obtained of the significance of the epistemological problem. (d) The attempts just made constitute Metaphysics, or (a much more appropriate term) Ontology—the science of Reality as a whole.

In the first place, then, what is Reality for the psychologist? In other words, what is the nature of the fundamental function—or union of functions—which we concluded it was necessary to take as the principle of scientific explanation in Psychology? This question has already been answered by implication. We have seen (in § 1) that the psychological subject—that is, the Reality with which Psychology deals—must at least signify a unity of the many distinguishable states; and (in § 2) that this reality has a double aspect,—*i.e.*, the Presentation in its various grades of ideality, from Perception through Imagination to Conception and Judgment,—and the states of Activity and Feeling that cannot enter into any Presentation as constituent elements of it. I return to the question in order to bring out more clearly what was implied. We found that the reference to self, though always occurring within the field of presentation—in the wide sense of the term ‘presentation’ which has just been indicated—appears as a reference *beyond* the factual sphere of presentations as such: which is an indication that the Subject is not simply

a name for their unity and continuity, but, while meaning this, means also more. Accordingly, as I have already implied, the natural view, which we spontaneously tend to take, is that the function of consciousness is not exhausted in the unification of its contents. Consciousness is more than knowledge,—it is not all merely cognitive. There is a great tendency to treat it as if it were this—especially since all its constituents are more or less *known about* whenever in self-consciousness we reflect upon our mental functions. This tendency—which shows itself in Metaphysics as Intellectualism, in Psychology as what has been called Presentationism—seems to me to be profoundly and fatally wrong. It is because consciousness is more than knowledge that we are able to be self-conscious at all.<sup>1</sup> The factors of consciousness which are more than knowledge constitute what Hamilton would have called the ‘subjectively subjective’ side of our mental life; in this we can distinguish (a) an intensive state which is in general conditioned by the presentations; and (b) an intensive state which in general conditions the presentations. These are respectively Feeling (pleasure or pain) and Activity, which is essentially *selective* or feeling-directed in relation to the presentations. Neither of these notions can be further analysed or defined. The facts they stand for are matters of an experience closer than knowledge. The psychologist must decline to give any account of the reality of the presentations except by his impartial analysis of them and of their relations

<sup>1</sup> Self-consciousness has a real content which is *more* than the content of the objective knowledge realised by that self. When I am reflectively self-conscious, I am not *merely* conscious of having attained to certain knowledges about Reality beyond me.

to these subjective facts; and this analysis at the same time constitutes all the account he can give of the reality of the Subject of these presentations. But his account must be partially true; if it is true in the psychological reference it cannot be false in any other reference. A *completely* true account of the reality of the Subject would be a final ontological account. Thus Psychology depends on an ontological hypothesis, but on one which is *limited*; it is this limitation which specialises Psychology—in other words, distinguishes it from Ontology. Our conclusion, then, in brief is, that Psychology compromises with Ontology by declining to transcend this fact of presentation to a Subject, as we have analysed it: declining to transcend it in either direction, subjective or objective.

In truth it is impossible to ignore the metaphysical and ethical aspects of psychological inquiry. I venture directly to reverse the ordinary view and say that the more truly scientific the inquiry becomes, the less possible is it to ignore them. It is only by a compromise, merely for practical convenience, that the separation is made. We cannot entirely separate the science from metaphysics, and at the same time leave metaphysical questions open and unprejudiced; certain fundamental questions are implicitly settled by such a separation, since the implication will be that there is nothing in mind beyond the elements which the 'scientific' 'non-metaphysical' treatment makes use of in its so-called explanation. When we have made the practical compromise referred to, there is always an extensive region of psychological work wherein such compromise produces little difficulty. For the rest, it is in the interest of clear thinking not to stretch the separation of Psychology and Metaphysics, since then we can make our

metaphysical assumptions as explicit as possible. We cannot totally expel them; and surely it is better for them to be openly recognised than to be lurking unseen and so giving a subtle bias to 'scientific' results.

We have now dealt with the first of the three questions indicated above; the second and third do not present so much difficulty. It has already been shown how as knowledge develops two fundamental lines of divergence appear in it—the reference to Self and the reference to Reality other than Self. Both of these are psychological facts in the sense in which we have explained the term. The reference to Self is as much of a problem for Epistemology as the objective reference; there is no absolutely self-evidencing character belonging to the former that is absent from the latter. The view of Common-Sense is, that in each of those 'duration-blocks'—as Professor James would say—which we speak of as the Present or Now, we have an 'immediate' or 'direct' apprehension or consciousness of ourselves as Subjects of Feeling and Will as well as of Knowledge. This so-called immediate apprehension—which seems very simple but in reality is extremely complex—we have to expand and explain, and justify or criticise. I have already had occasion to indicate that it appears to combine two elements. Those conscious functions which make the 'more than knowledge' of which we have spoken, are *known about*, and this knowledge is reflective—*i.e.*, belongs entirely to the presentational side; but at the same time it seems to require a basis of immediate experience.<sup>1</sup> When, however, we take into account the successive duration-blocks, it becomes apparent that the existence of the Self through these is altogether a matter

<sup>1</sup> These problems we shall deal with in chap. v.



of intellectual construction. With regard to this, Epistemology does not, like the historical method in Psychology, rest content with mere succession, but endeavours to show—after the manner of the Kantian ‘Deduction’ of the Unity of Apperception—how such experience of succession is possible. It is possible if there is in consciousness a principle which either is permanent and “identical with itself through Time” or has a mode of existence that in some way transcends Time. Both of these possibilities are included in the idea of a principle which is present *in the same sense* to every term of the succession.

The other aspect of the central problem of Epistemology lies in the reference which we have called ‘trans-subjective’:<sup>1</sup> this also needs explanation and vindication, in the manner we have pointed out. It must be carefully observed that we do not “start with a self-contained subject” or assume that “at first we know nothing else” than “subjective states.” Consequently we do not seek to “leap from them [subjective states] into something absolutely different”: we start with an individual who, ideally, *has* “transcended his own existence.” We may safely say that there never was a time in the life of any individual when he recognised his cognitive states as being his own and yet did not just as spontaneously recognise and accept their reference to realities other than his finite self. It is in fact a psychological impossibility

<sup>1</sup> This term is employed by Volkelt, *Erfahrung und Denken*: with it he contrasts the reference to Self as ‘intra-subjective.’ But he endeavours, in the Cartesian manner, to assign superior certainty and validity to the latter. This view we shall have to regard as highly questionable.



for a man to "*know* only his own states":<sup>1</sup> the supposition that it can be so arises only from the vague and unscientific character of the terminology employed. Descartes, and many others after him, regarded Thought as a kind of prehensile organ with which mind is endowed. In this case it becomes possible, and apparently intelligible, to ask whether the objects of this Thought (in knowledge) are "states of the mind itself" or "external objects." Descartes assumes the former; hence immediately arises the question, What warrant, then, have we for belief in the conscious minds of our fellow-men, or in any other trans-subjective reality? From the nature of the case, no warrant can be found. Now the proposition that "all the objects of our knowledge are ideas in our own minds" is utterly destitute of meaning, and plausible only through a careless use of language; but apart from this, if we start with mental modes unreferred save to the Self only, we cannot establish the reasonableness of their reference *at a later stage* to reality other than Self. These statements could only be *fully* justified by examining in detail some actual presentation of the opposite theory, such as that of Volkelt. In the present Introductory Studies we cannot do more than show that the theory of knowledge here outlined is thoroughly consistent with itself.

We must observe that, implicitly involved in Berkeley's theory, there is an attempt to pass from knowledge of subjective states to objective knowledge, which differs from that of Descartes, and which has its attraction for some thinkers at the present day.

<sup>1</sup> That is, unless the term is so general that 'knowing only one's own states' means 'not being able to get outside one's *thought*.' But this truism was not what Descartes had in view.

The fact on which stress is laid is merely negative—the individual's want of consciousness of *productive power* in relation to the presentations of the senses, while he has this consciousness of productive power in relation to his *thought* as such, and of controlling power in relation to his mental images. It is inferred that the presence of sensation postulates a reality or realities beyond the individual's consciousness, as the originating cause of his sensation: the implication of course is that the being, or beings, must be of nature similar to his own consciousness. We must point out that the analogy breaks down unless thought is a kind of sensation or sensation a kind of thought: otherwise, we cannot infer from subjective *productive power* in the one case to similar but trans-subjective power in the other. Apart from this, we cannot found such large conclusions on a mere want of explicit consciousness of production in relation to sense: why may not the individual Subject be a Leibnitian monad, and its whole experience simply the evolution of its own nature? The argument can only be made valid by *presupposing* an intellectual grasp of trans-subjective reality; and it then becomes simply a means of determining the constitution of that reality.

§ 5. We have spoken of the 'intra-subjective' and 'trans-subjective' references as giving rise to the *central* problem of Epistemology: for the critical examination of these prepares the way for a systematic criticism of the constituent elements of knowledge.

The physical sciences assume the validity of the trans-subjective reference, and in effect they seek, by hypotheses concerning the nature of the objective system referred to, to reduce the indefiniteness of the

conception, "that which does not depend for its existence upon any individual's knowledge of it." I say 'in effect,' because no science ever explicitly presented its problem to itself in this way; nevertheless the work of the sciences presupposes the fundamental reference in the general form in which we have defined it. Now the special sciences, in dealing with extra-conscious existence as thus understood, make implicit assumptions concerning its nature; or, as we may otherwise express it, each of them in its own sphere assigns a special meaning to reality, and should limit itself to dealing with reality in that special sense.

(a) Physics and Mechanics limit themselves to events that can be reduced to mechanical action—*vis a tergo impressa*. In using this phrase as characteristic of mechanical action, I assume the point of view of English physicists, according to which the only 'action' between bodies which is intelligible is that which occurs when they are in contact,—being, therefore, of the nature of 'stress,' that is, tension or pressure. The only form of action with which Newton and Galileo had to deal was that of visible contact or of freely falling bodies; the notion of visible contact-action (*vis a tergo*) was the clearest that presented itself, and was taken as the type of all action. Newton rejected with contempt the notion of 'action at a distance' or attraction between portions of matter separated by any immaterial element. In this, English physicists have followed him; hence the attempts constantly made to explain the apparently attractive forces of Gravity, Electricity, and Magnetism, as peculiar cases of action by stress.<sup>1</sup> Continental

<sup>1</sup> This is well illustrated in Mr MacAlister's review of Stallo's *Concepts of Modern Physics, Mind*, vol. viii.

physicists, however, appear to have brought themselves to see no difficulty in 'action at a distance': this has been the case since the time of Kant, when it was assumed that there do verily exist forces of attraction between material bodies or particles. Thus Kant, in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, supposed matter to be essentially endowed with two kinds of force, attractive and repulsive, these being more or less balanced; by this means the finite density of matter was explained. This position is *prima facie* more reasonable than the Newtonian, and it is far more carefully thought out than the latter, which starts from the uncritical metaphysics of 'common-sense.' Lotze has subjected the notion of contact-action to a careful examination, and has shown that so far from being simple it is in the highest degree obscure, so that we have no right to reject in its favour the notion of distance-action;<sup>1</sup> and Newton's definitions—by which he supposed he was explaining real qualities of things, *e.g.*, 'force' as real *cause*, 'mass' as real *quantity of matter*—have been severely criticised, as in Mach's *Development of Mechanics*, and in the properly physical parts of Professor Karl Pearson's very variegated composition, *The Grammar of Science*.<sup>2</sup> It must be borne in mind that here, and in what follows, our object is merely to indicate the nature of the problems which the principles of science present for the Theory of Knowledge; but we can only do this by at least suggesting their solutions.

In one respect all physicists alike have developed a new point of view since Newton's time: that of the

<sup>1</sup> See his *Metaphysic, Cosmology*, ch. vii.

<sup>2</sup> They keep their places in all English text-books, which in this as in other respects, follow the authoritative treatise of Thomson and Tait.

doctrine of Energy. Events are explained, from the mechanical point of view, if they can be exhibited as cases of the 'transference' of what is called Energy. Energy is universally defined as the Power (Capacity, or some synonymous term) of 'doing work' (overcoming resistance through space). It is a protean something, never observable by the senses, and always passing from one form to another, from one portion of matter to another. We find two kinds of Energy distinguished: Kinetic energy, which a material system possesses in virtue of its motion, and Potential energy, which it possesses in virtue of its position, as when a pendulum is at the extreme point of its swing. Energy is like a homogeneous continuum, containing no principle of difference within it; hence Matter is assumed as a second entity, supplying the diverse and ever-changing forms in which Energy manifests itself in space and time. These material forms are ultimately reducible to aggregates of atomic centres, conceived as subjects of motion, and as capable of *intrinsic* movement (vibration, &c.): motion, of one kind or another, is their only quality. Energy is always spoken of as if it were measurable; but what is really measured is the sensible motion (in space and time) of the material forms: even in Weight—when estimated in any other way than by muscular sensation of strain—what is measured is really motion,—the 'unit of mass' and 'unit of work' are in the last resort movements through a unit of length in so many units of time. In fact, modern Physics is returning to the position which was marked out by Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes, and of which in its full significance they were clearly conscious: "Give us Extension and Motion, and we will construct the world." There is, indeed, scarcely an excuse for



the idea that Energy is something verily existing, measurable somewhat as a fluid is, and contained in the material universe and circulating in it very much as water in a sponge. Such crudities are indeed worthy of those who are never tired of sneering at the 'mere metaphysician.'<sup>1</sup> The first step towards an explicit revival of the Cartesian view will be taken when it is generally recognised that Potential Energy is an obscure fiction, and that 'all Energy is Kinetic'—that is, there is no Energy which is not associated with motion. This conclusion is defended by Mr MacAlister (*l. c.*) In the case of an oscillating material system, the energy of motion is alternately in the system itself and in the moving matter around it; there is no need to assume any mysterious 'potentiality.' It may then become evident that Energy is the bare notion of a principle of Continuity—or perhaps we should say, of Identity—assumed to be immanent in a multiplicity of atomic centres of motion. The nature of motion is defined in Newton's first 'law,' which states that any material element moves, or varies its motion, only in so far as it is determined to do so by adjacent moving elements; or, we may add, by some cause which cannot be explained on purely physical principles. The principle of Conservation may then be stated thus: the more we are able to *isolate* an aggregate of material elements, and regard it as a self-contained whole, the more completely will the motion of any element in it determine and be determined by the motions of all the other elements. For Physics, what is real is what can be brought under this law. But physical science knows of no locked or closed material 'system' or aggregate, and only to such would the law be completely applic-

<sup>1</sup> See Professor Tait's writings, *passim*.



able. Hence even if Energy were measurable, it is quite unjustifiable to speak of the quantity of Energy in the material universe *as a whole*. Science has no concern with anything self-contained, self-existent, or *whole* in any absolute sense: these are ontological conceptions. There may be forms of reality which cannot be brought under the 'law' of Conservation or mechanical reciprocity; for which, therefore, mechanical explanation is inadequate, and with which physics cannot deal.

(b) Chemistry introduces a new principle—namely, what is called Affinity—by which certain elements combine, while others refuse to do so. These combinations are attended by events that are capable of being expressed in mechanical terms; but although the nature of chemical affinity is very imperfectly understood, there seems to be no prospect of a purely mechanical explanation: the chemical change is *qualitative*, and mechanics can deal only with *quantitative* changes (those to which the process of measurement by reference to a fixed unit is applicable), hence mechanics cannot do more than enumerate the quantitative *conditions* (relations of weight, &c.) which are necessary for a given chemical qualitative change to take place. Further, it is of the essence of mechanical determination to be an external determination of one atom or material element by others; while chemical affinity seems not unfittingly to be compared to a species of immanent attraction of a molecule of one kind for another (or a definite number of others) of another kind. It is probable that the difference will be generally recognised when physicists recognise that the customary phraseology about the transference, transformation, and quantitative measurement of Energy, as such, is meaningless.

(c) Biology and Physiology assume a new principle—organic activity. Living matter only exists in individual centres or organisms. The biological definition of an organism is: a being such that all its activities are co-ordinated in the interest of itself as a whole. The statements often made to the effect that mechanical explanation is the watchword of modern Physiology,<sup>1</sup> simply mean that Life can only be treated scientifically by isolating its particular processes, and ascertaining the physical and chemical *conditions* of each. These conditions are necessary in order that the vital process in question should take place; but the latter is not reducible to, or ‘constituted’ by, its physico-chemical conditions,<sup>2</sup> much less can the co-ordination of all these vital processes to the one end of the life of the whole be explained by physics or chemistry. The organism must not only be capable of adapting itself to changes in its environment—it must initiate activities of its own, independently of such changes. In this matter, Professor Sanderson’s address to the British Association (1893), and the subsequent discussion in the biological section, may be regarded as rather more than symptomatic.<sup>3</sup>

(d) Psychology assumes yet another principle—conscious activity, continually rising to self-consciousness. The nature of the psychological hypothesis has been already discussed in some detail.

Let us now briefly review these principles and their mutual relations. Each of them is a limited ontologi-

<sup>1</sup> See, *e.g.*, the quotations and references given by Höffding, *Psychology*, ch. ii.

<sup>2</sup> In the same way, a chemical change is not constituted by the mechanical (quantitative) conditions which are necessary for it to take place.

<sup>3</sup> See *Nature*, vol. xlviii. pp. 464, 574, 613.

cal hypothesis—that is, an attempt to assign a meaning to Reality, or *fill in* the conception of it to a certain limited extent. We have seen that Psychology, arising from the subjective reference of knowledge, may be distinguished as a subjective science, the others as objective sciences. In this case, ‘Psycho-physics’ or ‘Physiological Psychology’ must be placed among the objective sciences; when Psychology devotes itself to experiment—that is, chiefly, to physiological experiment—it simply places itself at the standpoint of the sciences of non-human nature: “it is as purely objective as it was before purely subjective; it takes its stand in the object from the outset, and treats subjective facts themselves as objective—*i.e.*, as mere appendages or accompaniments of the objective facts of nerve and brain.”

This brings us to notice that the hypotheses of the sciences may be arranged in an order of decreasing generality and increasing complexity. Chemical processes involve mechanical processes, but cannot be reduced to the latter; biological processes involve chemical and mechanical processes, but cannot be reduced to either of the latter. What then is to be said of the relation of Biology and Psychology? Our conclusion must be that truth is on the side of those psychologists who defend what is called the ‘causal interaction’ of mind and brain, in the sense that the energy of consciousness in some way conditions the state of the brain, while the latter in some way conditions conscious states. It is obvious from what has been said that no physical or mechanical law, such as that of Conservation of Energy, can be brought in as evidence in this matter. The principle of Conservation can only be made applicable to the case by assuming

that the animal organism forms part of, and is *merely* a part of, a closed system of mechanical movement, which is the material universe as a whole. The fact that this assumption is actually dallied with by many physiological psychologists and popular apostles of science need not deter us from recognising that it is simply a wild dogma. The real question is, Has Extension an existence of coequal validity with that of Consciousness? Descartes, Spinoza, and the modern 'monists' assume, without proof, that it has; but this is entirely a metaphysical question, which cannot be settled by a dogmatic assumption.<sup>1</sup> It is on 'phenomenological' grounds that we reject the monistic or identity hypothesis, as expounded, for instance, in Höffding's *Outlines of Psychology*. We may express the relation as before: psychological processes 'involve' physiological, but cannot be reduced to the latter. But there is a very important difference. We found that chemical changes 'involved' mechanical, and could not be reduced to the latter; but it seemed that the only *scientific* treatment of these changes consists in the analysis of their mechanical conditions,—of course, with the recognition that these are only *conditions*, and that the whole process is more than they: the result being that we can only give an external descriptive account of the qualitative changes which are the manifestation of the 'more'—of what transcends mere mechanism in the process. The case seemed to be the same with regard to the mechanical and chemical conditions of the changes in which life consists. But it is not the case that the only scientific treatment of consciousness consists in the analysis of its physiological conditions, although psychologists are more ready to acknowledge

<sup>1</sup> On this whole subject, see Appendix to this chapter.

this in a general way than to act upon it in particular cases.<sup>1</sup>

The function of Epistemology is explicitly to formulate and compare the ontological assumptions on which the several sciences rest. It has to "submit such conceptions to a critical analysis with a view of discovering how far they can be *thought out*, or how far when this is done they refute themselves and call for a different mode of statement if they are to be taken as a formulation of the ultimate nature of the real."<sup>2</sup> This might be called a 'criticism of categories.' The investigation is 'critical,' because it is not content with mere phraseology or mere picture-thinking, but with clear and distinct meanings. Under these circumstances it appears that Reality cannot be conceived except after the analogy of our own conscious and self-conscious life—or after the analogy of some aspect of that life, such as unity or identity. It is a question whether reality conceived in any other way does not become an existence without content: in other words, does not approximate to that conception of empty or abstract Being which *as a conception* is indistinguishable from Nothing. From this point of view, if we regard reality as an all-inclusive whole which is implicitly 'filled in'—of which the *general nature* is implicitly but fully known—from the outset (by reference to the conscious life of man), then we may say that the sciences make abstractions of particular portions of it. For this way of envisaging the matter, a proper use of the

<sup>1</sup> For a very careful examination of the extent to which Physiology can aid Psychology, see Mr Stout's *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. Introduction, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Enc. Brit.*, art. *Philosophy*, p. 793a.



Hegelian Logic is most helpful.<sup>1</sup> Epistemology has further to investigate and state clearly the methodological assumptions made by the special sciences. Among these the most important are: the Uniformity of Nature,—“the same system of conditions, *if* it occurs more than once, will produce the same effect”; and Universal Causation,—“every process or fact must be *somehow* completely conditioned by other processes.” In examining these, we are led to inquire into the nature of rational evidence and proof, and into the different kinds of evidence approximate to the different special sciences. It is most important to know what kind of evidence we ought reasonably to expect in an investigation belonging to a particular science. These questions have their centre in the idea of a ‘hypothesis’ as *explaining* perceived facts, and of the method by which we pass from the facts to the explanation,—in other words, from empirically valid to unconditionally valid judgments. Under what conditions is this possible? These are the problems with which what has been called ‘Inductive Logic’ has professed to deal; and we may safely say that its achievements have been in inverse proportion to the magnitude of its pretensions. This can hardly be a matter for surprise, seeing that our one great authoritative text-book of Inductive Logic—or what until recently was such—implies a theory of Knowledge or Nescience which is in part based on the agnostic sensational empiricism of Hume. I do not deny that Mill’s philosophy leaves room for physical science, if by the latter is meant nothing more than a classification of ‘actual or pos-

<sup>1</sup> See Mr M’Taggart’s *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, ch. i. §§ 20-24; ch. ii. § 34; ch. iii. §§ 87-90.



sible' phenomena according to their resemblances and differences, and a codification of their orders of coexistence and succession: though it would be difficult to adapt this view of physical knowledge to the actual extent and significance of such sciences as Physics and Chemistry. On the other hand, even a 'positivism' of this kind is excluded by the principles developed in Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. The difference between Hume and Mill in this respect is due to the fact that, for the former, the fleeting impressions and ideas of the moment are the only reality; while the latter introduces what is in effect the objective world of science and common-sense, in the guise of 'permanent possibilities of sensation.' But, like all 'positivists,' he limits the categories of the world—that is, the principles to be used in rationally interpreting it, in gaining scientific knowledge of it—to those of "the like and the unlike, the synchronous and successive": and thereby reduces his Theory of Knowledge to an incoherent fragment.

§ 6. The problem of Ontology consists in the co-ordination of the results of the special sciences with each other. Its ultimate ideal is to connect all parts of our knowledge together in an organically complete whole: the more we are able so to connect them, the truer for us is their account of reality. In this sense, the ultimate test of truth is consistency or harmony: the 'ultimate' test, in distinction from the test which applies to Judgments of perception, referring to what is true at a particular time and place only. Our knowledges are the more true, the more they mutually support one another. This has been already illustrated and defended in relation to those principles which we

have called the vital functions of Intelligence; and we must now extend it to the whole organisation of science,—to all those truths whose truth is not limited in time and space, as in ordinary empirical Judgments.<sup>1</sup> This co-ordination of the different branches of knowledge is in effect a co-ordination of the different kinds of reality with which the sciences deal,—an attempt to bring them to unity; its ultimate ideal is to explain all things as manifestations, or modes of working, of a single universal Power or Principle. Such a Principle may be called the Absolute Reality: in other words, that which depends on nothing beyond itself, but on which all else is dependent. Thus Ontology is ‘completely unified knowledge’; the sciences, physical and psychical, are ‘partially unified knowledge’; common-sense is knowledge in a chaotic and disorganised state. The difficulty with regard to common-sense does not relate so much to the truth or falsehood of its Judgments as to the want of clearness and distinctness in its conceptions: it is but very vaguely aware of the significance of its own *dicta*. We advance from this state of confusion by progressively clearing, defining, and determining our conceptions.

In the course of such a unification of the sciences, we should become more clearly aware of the meaning of the term ‘involve’ in the connection in which it was used above,—how it is that processes of a higher category are dependent upon those of a lower, while they are different from the latter and, in a sense, opposed to them. When this unification is accomplished—if ever it will be accomplished by the mind of man—the conception of reality will be fully ‘filled in,’—

<sup>1</sup> The place and function of these in the organisation of knowledge is the subject of chap. iii.

reality will be completely defined: for, as Kant points out in his *Methodenlehre*, complete definitions are the last result of Philosophy. But a definition or conception of reality, or of any aspect of reality, need not be false because it is not completely true: the principle that Truth always has *degrees* is of vital importance in Epistemology. We must beware of supposing that the fixed alternative 'either wholly true or wholly false' is applicable to any of the products of human thought, in common opinion, science, religion, or Philosophy. No possible theory, belief, or conception of ours can perfectly represent the concrete whole to which it refers, and which we regard as 'known' through it; for as soon as the intellectual content of the belief is made clear and distinct, it bears evidence of its incompleteness on its face, and becomes at once apparent in its true character as a fragment of an abstract outline. But it is not false on this account: the more complete and exhaustive knowledge does not annihilate the less complete, but embraces and transcends it, just as the wider view obtained by rising to a distance from the surface of a plain transcends the more limited view of an observer on the ground, but *includes* it.

Closely connected with the explanation of the problem to which we have been referring—the *involution* of the lower processes in the higher—is the explanation of the world-process of *evolution*, in the widest sense. The two radically divergent interpretations of this time-process—which are usually called the Idealistic and the Naturalistic—depend on the significance that is to be attached to certain apparently essential characteristics of human nature which manifest themselves in our Judgments of Worth. We must be guided in our unification of knowledge by the significance which

we assign to these facts of our nature: 'guided,' because on this will depend our inclination to Naturalism or Idealism—that is, whether we regard the lower mechanical categories, or the higher, as most truly expressing the nature of Reality in its completeness, or as possessing the highest degree of Truth. We cannot say that "as soon as Epistemology draws its conclusion, it becomes Ontology,—the theory of knowledge passes into the theory of being,—the ontological conclusion is an immediate implication."<sup>1</sup> As we have seen, knowledge is governed by an ideal of intellectual Worth in the form of a rational system or completely consistent organisation of all Judgments of fact,—which is the end or aim that Intelligence sets up for itself, and which Epistemology has to investigate; but there are also ideal ends in the spheres of practical conduct and æsthetic creation, which remain for Ethics<sup>2</sup> and Æsthetics to investigate. Hence the theory of knowledge by itself is inadequate to give a complete theory of being, inasmuch as the former, dealing only with intellectual Worth, leaves out of account two sides of our nature; and the theory of being must account for these also in drawing its final conclusions as to the relation of our human nature to the nature of the universe. Thus the ontological conclusion is not an 'immediate implication' of Epistemology taken alone, but only of this when taken in conjunction with Ethics and Æsthetics; while, again, it is not 'something added on by an external process' to Epistemology, for it is one and the same self-conscious activity, which expresses itself in three dif-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Enc. Brit.*, art. *Philosophy*, p. 795a.

<sup>2</sup> We shall see, however (ch. vii.), that Ethics includes much *more* than this.

ferent ways, forming the subject-matter of the three so-called 'regulative' sciences.

The true function of Epistemology was perceived long ago by Socrates. The great significance of the principle he enunciated is only concealed by the very simple and obvious form in which it presented itself to his mind. He held that in every dispute there is something upon which the disputants ought to agree; there ought to be a standard recognised by both, to which both can refer: if they had not agreed upon it, nothing but confusion could result. Hence, as Xenophon has it, he "led his respondent on to the underlying assumption" in any dispute. The standard of reference took the very simple form of a definition or determination of an idea, and consisted only in answering the question, "What is the thing you are disputing about?" Hence he was led to distinguish two kinds of human knowledge: on the one hand, clear and distinct thought (*ἐπιστήμη*), obtained by using definitions: this is a common ground on which different men can meet and understand one another; on the other hand, ordinary opinion (*δόξα*), more or less haphazard and vague, and leading, when it pushes itself beyond its limits, to endless conflict and divergency. This corresponds to the distinction already drawn between partially unified and non-unified knowledge; but before drawing attention to the implicit significance of the Socratic principle, it is worth while to dwell on a remarkable ambiguity in his explicit formulation of the question, "What is the object of investigation?"—an ambiguity on which Plato's Idealism, if taken as an Ontology, goes to wreck, and which for modern Philosophy might be regarded as an object lesson.



The purpose of Socrates in asking the question was to arrive at a clear determination of conceptions—*i.e.*, at real knowledge. Now real knowledge is knowledge of reality; hence Plato went on to infer that there must be real existences to which the conceptions, as constituent elements of knowledge, correspond: these are the Platonic 'Ideas,'—real objects of knowledge, which are quite *different* from the things of sense, just as the abstract conception is from the concrete material of perception. Now by this procedure no reliable conclusions can be reached, for it ignores the most fundamental constituent of knowledge. Granted that in answer to the question τί ἐστὶ, we have obtained our clear conceptions—that we know what they 'are' as conceptions: how do we know that they are anything more than thinkable and free from contradiction? The question τί ἐστὶ, with a deeper meaning, remains: in what sense can they be referred to or predicated of reality? or (more generally) what is the justification for *any* such reference? The conceptions only form elements of knowledge when they occur in the medium of Judgment; and every Judgment contains an objective reference. Investigation of the significance of this reference must be the first problem of Epistemology, and not one to be taken up afterwards in a secondary way. Coming to modern times, we find precisely the same fatal defect involved in the Cartesian and Leibnitian systems and their descendants: we find Truth tested by certain intrinsic qualities of each distinguishable idea as such. According as an idea is distinct (from others), clear (in itself), and free from logical contradiction, to that extent it is true. Truth, to be true, must be true of Reality; this relation or reference is essential to the very idea; surely then it is more



reasonable to investigate the nature of this relation and the meaning of the terms between which it holds, before summarily fixing on some characteristic of 'ideas' by which to distinguish true ideas from false. The meaning of Truth as such is the prior question; in the course of this investigation the criterion or criteria of Truth should appear. This is precisely the critical question which Kant proposed to himself, in his well-known letter to Marcus Herz: What is this objectivity in which Truth consists?<sup>1</sup> It is a relation set up by our Intelligence: what, then, must be the structure of Intelligence, in order that such a relation may be possible? This Kantian problem is simply the real problem of Epistemology: the structure and functions of Intelligence as such.

The preceding observations may be further illustrated by reference to two eminent thinkers who belong to our own day. There is a curious resemblance between the Socratic use of the question *τί ἐστι* and the method of Lotze; this is seen most clearly in the part of Metaphysics which the latter writer calls 'Ontology.' Here we have only a determination of conceptions—Being, Individuality (*Dingheit*), Change, Causation. The result is that we have no coherent theory of knowledge; these conceptions are made consistent, but we have not by this means got beyond the conscious Subjects whose mental products they are.<sup>2</sup> But in the 'Cosmology'

<sup>1</sup> This question, says Kant, is one which he himself, in his long metaphysical researches, and all others had left out of account, and which "gives the key to all the mysteries of metaphysic."

<sup>2</sup> We are told (*Met.*, § 143) that "experience compels us to adopt them"; but what exactly is implied in this, Lotze nowhere inquires. I am aware that in the third book of the *Logic* Lotze makes some contributions to the Theory of Knowledge, but I do not think they are of a character to call for any modification in what has been said.

we take our stand at once in the world of objective realities, when examining "the forms in which the particular elements of actuality are united in one orderly cosmos" (Space, Time, Motion, Matter); and similarly the Psychology distinguishes from the objective world "a world of spirits by which it is apprehended." But the distinction is given no *locus* or standing as a definite factor in our knowledge: like the others, it appears to be picked up at random.

Much there is in these discussions which is suggestively, acutely, and convincingly reasoned; but the inconclusiveness of an inquiry conducted in such a thoroughly unsystematic manner becomes painfully apparent to the reader. How inconclusive it is may be seen by contrasting with it Mr Bradley's method of approaching the same problems in his *Appearance and Reality*. According to him, Time, Change, and (in general) all qualities and modes of existence which involve Relations are *facts*, but "there is no presumption anywhere that any *fact* is better than appearance," even though (as Lotze would say) "experience compels us to adopt" the fact. The 'fact' is an appearance if it (that is, our conception of it) is found on examination to be unintelligible or self-contradictory. Lotze, on the other hand, *because* experience compels us to adopt the fact, endeavours to free it from apparent contradiction and make it intelligible. How are we to judge between these diametrically opposed points of view,—apart from Epistemology? Lotze would probably reply that if "the very essence" of the idea of relation *contradicts itself*, then unless the universe is a bad joke, the relational point of view is a pure illusion and cannot apply to reality at all. In this case we should have

an absolute antithesis between reality and appearance; but we cannot maintain this, and at the same time argue that "appearances are facts, which somehow must qualify reality." Reality would be left as the pulseless identity of a Spinozistic 'substance' or Parmenidean 'being,' wherein all distinctions are wiped out and utterly annihilated; it would contain within it no points of relation—nothing that is distinguishable from anything else. The theory which makes this its supreme principle must, when pushed to its ultimate conclusion, commit suicide by condemning even the fact of knowledge, even reason itself, as an illusion: for knowledge *without* distinctions and relations is nothing, and *with* them it can only—on such a theory—"stain the white radiance of Eternity." Still, these considerations do not dispose of Mr Bradley's argument, in his first part, on 'Appearance,' nor do they touch the question of how far it is justifiable to start with a wholly uncriticised distinction between appearance and reality. These questions have to be enlightened by epistemological considerations, to which Bradley and Lotze pay comparatively little attention. We must begin by turning Reason, not to the investigation of the universe as a whole, but to a more laborious and far less attractive task—the examination of its own nature as Reason; only by such means can we discover what questions it is reasonable to ask about this universe, and, in Kant's words, "establish a tribunal which may ascertain and confirm the well-grounded prerogatives of human reason and at the same time dispose of all baseless pretensions which are put forward in its name: both functions being performed not arbitrarily nor dogmatically, but by reference to the essential structure of Reason itself." It

would have been well if philosophical thinkers after Kant had borne in mind this double aim of the Critical Philosophy: for these words seem to me to define precisely the point of view from which the system of Hegel should be criticised.

How, then, does the aim of Socrates compare with that of the Critical Theory of Knowledge? Simply in this, that just as he attempted to take up a point of view superior to a particular controversy by finding principles common to both the disputants and assumed by them, and by then turning them to find the bearing of these principles, when explicitly stated, on the question in dispute; so the Theory of Knowledge endeavours to take a place logically prior to all controversy by seeking for "an inventory of all that is given us by Pure Reason, systematically arranged." Unfortunately the place it seeks to take is as yet an Ideal only. Kant falls into a grievous error when he says that Epistemology is a science which admits of *completion* in a short time and with little labour, as soon as we have recognised the real nature of its problem.<sup>1</sup> A sufficient comment is made on this curious fancy when we compare Kant's table of twelve Categories with the Logic of Hegel. Assuredly the vital functions of Intelligence, on which the existence and growth of Knowledge depends, can never be arranged with systematic completeness until the whole organism of Knowledge is realised for us. What is possible is an arrangement adequate to the present state of our knowledge and its present needs; and as the century draws to a close, the necessity and supreme importance of this inquiry are being more and more widely recognised.

<sup>1</sup> The references to Kant in this and the preceding paragraph are of course to the First Preface (K. d. R. V.).

## APPENDIX.

## THE THEORY OF MONISM.

§ 1. It will enlighten the epistemological problems which we have been considering if we discuss the bearings of a metaphysical theory which is very popular at present, particularly among scientific thinkers who have been led to take an interest in Philosophy, and at the same time are biassed by their whole training and course of study towards accepting the provisional assumptions of physical science as an ultimate position. I refer to the conception sometimes described as the 'identity-hypothesis' or 'double-aspect theory' of the relation of mind and body; sometimes, again, as the theory of 'scientific monism' or 'metaphysical parallelism.' The best popular exposition of it is that of Romanes, in his *Mind and Motion: and Monism*. But not only is the theory of present interest; it is of great historical importance as having been fully worked out in the seventeenth century by one of the greatest intellects humanity has ever produced—Spinoza.

Nevertheless, it is one of those ambiguous theories which may be made to face in nearly every direction, and from which the most contradictory conclusions may be evolved. Every theory may be called *monistic* which regards the world—including man—as the dependent manifestation of a single Power or Principle: every philosophy is monistic which seeks for a single real Ground of all things. Again, the so-called monistic theory of mind and matter is often stated in such very general terms that any one would accept it who did not hold a theory like that of Descartes,—of two distinct substances acting on one another. Such statements of it suggest that the negative of this dualistic view is its chief implication; if so, the stress laid upon certain principles of physical and mechanical science



to prove it seems quite unnecessary. Thus Höffding<sup>1</sup> classes together Spinoza, Leibniz, Schelling, Hegel, Fries, Beneke, and Fechner as Monists; and in the hands of Romanes, the theory has become so accommodating as to admit of individual immortality, the possibility of 'miracle,' and of physical 'answers' to prayer.<sup>2</sup> By other monists, of course, such conclusions would be promptly rejected. These remarks are not intended to be taken as *argumenta ad hominem*, but as indications of the vague manner in which Monism is sometimes stated and conceived. Green, who strenuously resists every attempt to show that the reality of the material world is constituted otherwise than by the activity of a spiritual principle, yet expresses himself to the effect that "our intelligence is not to be regarded as a result of Nature, or Nature as a result of our intelligence; but they are to be regarded as having a common source and as being communicated to us in inseparable correlation."<sup>3</sup> The Monistic theory has been expressed in just such terms; but Monism, when clear as to its own meaning, must regard the Ground of all things as manifested *equally* in what Green calls 'the uniform order of Nature' and 'our knowledge of that order,'—as much in Nature as in Man; while for Green, the 'common source' of the two is itself a spiritual principle, and therefore is revealed far more fully in Man than in Nature. The distinguishing characteristic of Monism is to reject this view and to seek for a Principle of which Mind and Matter are equally essential attributes.

This theory rests on four assumptions. The *first* assumption is that of complete psycho-physical parallelism: the doctrine that for every distinguishable change in consciousness there is a corresponding change of cerebral activity. This is only scientifically proved for those particular changes in consciousness which consist in the emergence of sensations and mental images, but it is assumed to hold throughout. The *second* assumption is, the unity and continuity of the material world,—the world of matter and motion, consisting

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Psychology*, ch. ii. (a vigorous but not very profound defence of 'Monism').

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 88 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena*, §§ 35, 36 (editor's summary).



only of motions of elements whose nature it is to move ; it is treated as a solid and universal continuum ; all physical processes—including those in which organic life consists—are regarded as mere parts of a locked system of mechanically determined motions. The *third* assumption is that this material universe, as such, has an existence of equal validity with that of consciousness—has the same degree of reality as mind. The *fourth* assumption is that the material world of motion and the mental world of thought are—in Spinoza's words—*una eademque res*, under two aspects ; or two distinct attributes of a single substance. The standing metaphor for this is, the convex and concave sides of the same curve, which cannot be separated without destroying both, and yet are different and in a sense opposed in their appearance. In this case, we find a more limited and a more general view ; that matter has a 'psychical side' only when it attains that degree of complexity of organisation which is required to constitute a nervous system ;<sup>1</sup> or, on the other hand, that not only the highly complex motions forming the nervous system, but all motion in the universe has its psychical side ; *omnia animata*, as Spinoza said. This is what is commonly known as Monism, and is defended by Paulsen,<sup>2</sup> Höffding,<sup>3</sup> Lewes,<sup>4</sup> Carus,<sup>5</sup> and many others.

Let us examine the fourth of the assumptions that have been indicated. With regard to this, it may be maintained that the unity is only a matter of verbal assertion—we cut the Gordian knot in words only, and explain nothing. It is a great question whether the unity of two things so devoid of anything in common, as the world of motion which the monists have in view and the world of consciousness, is at all conceivable. The two 'aspects' are equally real ; though neither of them is independent of that of which they are aspects, yet consciousness is as independent of motion as motion is of consciousness—this is required by the hypothesis of 'parallelism.' The underlying unity *ex hypothesi* can never be *known* as such ; all of it that can ever be known is the one

<sup>1</sup> Riehl, *Science and Metaphysics* (Eng. Tr. of concluding portion of *Der Philosophische Kriticismus*).

<sup>2</sup> *Einleitung in die Philosophie*.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, and in his *Ethik*.

<sup>4</sup> *Physical Basis of Mind*.

<sup>5</sup> *Fundamental Problems*, and articles in *The Monist*.

or the other of its two relatively independent 'aspects,' and its nature as the *identity* of these must remain wholly unknown and unknowable. The idea of substance and attribute throws no light on the matter unless we have first critically examined the meaning of this relation and the sphere of its legitimate use. We have no experience of a substance with absolutely disparate attributes. The identity theory has some appearance of being intelligible owing to its skilful employment of the metaphors of 'aspects,' 'sides,' 'convex and concave,' &c.; but even this support will not bear examination. These metaphors are altogether inapplicable to the case; for the distinctions they imply have no meaning save for an observer somehow independent of the object which has the 'aspects': and the aspects adduced—for instance, in a curve in space—are really similar in nature, being simply opposite directions in space, and the like, while mind and mechanical motion are opposite extremities of 'the whole diameter of being.' Who is the observer who distinguishes the aspects or attributes in the case of the duality of consciousness and motion? Simply *consciousness itself*: this attribute must therefore be the more fundamental of the two, for it not only knows itself but knows the other attribute, while 'motion' *ex hypothesi* knows neither itself nor consciousness; and consciousness is not merely a mirror for itself and the world, but interprets the world in the light of postulates derived from its own nature. That is, not only in knowledge does consciousness go beyond the line of obedient 'parallelism,' in demanding that the universe shall be an intelligible whole; it forms Ideals in the spheres of practical conduct and æsthetic contemplation, which carry it beyond all finite experience. Thus Spinoza, in working out his monistic scheme, was obliged to assign an immense preponderance to the attribute of Thought (consciousness as a whole).<sup>1</sup> Such considerations forcibly suggest that the third assumption, indicated above, is as untenable as the fourth, and that the distinguishing characteristics of 'matter' are less real than those of mind. When developed in this way, Monism points in the direction of the theory of Spiritualism

<sup>1</sup> In fact, it would be impossible to work out the scheme quite consistently without denying the essential attributes of consciousness: *vis a tergo* is the characteristic of mechanical motion, but *vis a fronte* of conscious processes.

or Idealism. We will attempt a brief synthetic statement of this view in its most general form.

We have seen that in addition to the function of our personality which appears in *knowledge*—in judgments as to the *whether or not* of a thing's existence or the *how* of its existence, that is, in Judgments depending on a standard of Truth, we also form Judgments depending on a standard of Worth. Such Judgments of worth fall into two classes, which may be distinguished by saying that one class relates to the worth of things as determined by characteristic relations which are only in an indirect way the product of will. These are the *Æsthetic Judgments*, depending on a standard of Beauty. The other class relates to events that are much more within our own control—our conduct and character as conscious beings. These are the *Moral Judgments*, depending on a standard of practical goodness, and ultimately on a meaning or purpose in our lives. These Judgments of Worth, in both kinds, are often taken to be quite distinct from the intellectual Judgments referred to above, which are Judgments *of fact*; in knowledge we endeavour to make our ideas conform to facts, while in practical conduct we endeavour to realise our aims, that is, to make facts conform to our ideas,<sup>1</sup> so that the Judgment of Worth is *upon fact*. But we must look more closely still at their difference and connection; for, so far, we seem to have a certain contrast or opposition between the idea of Truth and that of Worth. This contrast, which tends to appear, for example, in Lotze's writings, may be very misleading.

It is by means of these factual judgments that individual minds attain to knowledge, that is, each ideally recognises or rather reconstructs what really exists. We have seen that the ideal goal of all attempts at knowledge is to attain to an understanding or comprehension of Reality as a whole—of all kinds of existence regarded as belonging together; whereas the special sciences deal only with particular kinds of existence, regarded in separation. Metaphysics attempts to comprehend the different kinds of existence together; it has not to 'deal

<sup>1</sup> In æsthetic creation, we endeavour to make facts conform to one another: it thus appears to hold an intermediate place between intellectual and moral activity.

with Reality as a whole' in the sense that it *ignores* all the results of the special sciences,<sup>1</sup> but in the sense that it seeks to combine these results, removing their limitations and doing justice to each. Now this idea of a completely unified knowledge is itself a standard of Worth, by which we test those attempts at scientific knowledge to which men have hitherto attained. It is an ideal of *consistency*, in this sense: the more consistently we are able to co-ordinate the results of the sciences with one another, the more nearly we believe ourselves to have approached to a knowledge of the universe as a whole,—of Reality in all its kinds, considered as one whole; in other words, the more nearly we have approached to a completely unified knowledge. This Ideal thus constitutes a standard of *Truth in general*, as distinct from the more or less particular or limited truths with which we deal in science and common life, and which are true only under certain conditions of time and space. It is one aspect of Worth, which may be called the logical, and is co-ordinate with the ethical and æsthetic aspects. The particular Judgments are dependent upon the sensuous basis of concrete perception: these Judgments form the material which is organised under the guidance of the intellectual standard of Worth. The latter is of course a postulate of our intelligence; and thus we see how far it is true that in knowledge we 'conform our ideas to fact.' The *general nature* of Reality, in view of which we organise knowledge, is given us by our intelligence itself, hence in this direction we have to conform our ideas to the laws of our own Thought; but the material which is thus conformed—that is, the particular Judgments of fact—could not exist but for the immediacy of sensuous presentation: as we shall see, these Judgments have to conform themselves to *this* immediate element. On the other hand, in practical conduct we conform the immediate element to our ideas, but again it is under the guidance of an Ideal which, like that of the intellect, is given by our own nature; while in Art we conform various aspects of the immediacy to one another, but, once more, under a standard which is nothing foreign to ourselves.

According to Idealism, the facts are explained if there

<sup>1</sup> Many expositions of 'the relation of Science and Philosophy' in effect amount simply to this.

exists a Universal Being,—‘universal’ because in vitally necessary relation at once to each subjective human consciousness and to the objective system of things,—who is the fullest realisation of all to which these strivings and aspirations of ours may be dimly discerned to tend. Idealism finds in the conscious and self-conscious life with its ideal Ends—the True, the Beautiful, the Good—the key to the nature of the whole, the Absolute. It holds that “we must be in earnest with the unity of the world, but must not forget that, regarded as a system of forces, the world possesses no such unity; it acquires it only when regarded in the light of an End of absolute value or worth, which is realised or attained in it; and such an End-in-itself we find only in the self-conscious life of man, in the world of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness which he builds up for himself, and of which he constitutes himself a citizen.” Thus in the first place, Idealism recognises that the deepest reality in the Universe is a Conscious Activity not different in kind from our own consciousness, in which it manifests itself most fully. The problem of Ontology then becomes, to show how it is concealed and revealed in varying degrees in the various forms of natural activity known to the sciences. We say ‘concealed and revealed,’ for the Idealistic view implies that what we call matter or the material world is a Phenomenon or appearance, in the sense of a very partial and imperfect manifestation of a reality of whose nature our spiritual life is the highest revelation that we have. It does not say that matter is unreal, or an illusion, but that matter is only real as being the dependent manifestation of what we can only think of as a Spiritual Being. It does not say that matter is a perfect manifestation of Spirit, but that it is a very imperfect and fragmentary manifestation. Hence come the specific characteristics of matter which ordinary thought always sets in opposition to those of Spirit. We say that the Absolute is ‘in vitally necessary relation’ to each individual consciousness, and ‘manifests itself’ therein most fully; for Idealism implies that the individual consciousness is not only rooted in the infinite but *is* itself infinite on one side, while it is finite on another as having a centre of selfhood of its own. It is the very essence of the Absolute that wells up in us and



is experienced by us under the form of our Ideals of Worth—the rational impulses to seek for and realise that Ideal, for ourselves, in its three aspects. In other words, there is the gradual emergence of a universal Spiritual Principle in and through the finite self-consciousness of the individual, which is thus *aufgehoben*—in Hegel's sense—without losing its individuality. The Ideals give rise to a threefold striving or *ἔρως* in our nature—a striving after what, from the individual view-point, is *not yet* realised but may be so, or after what is potentially ours; while from the universal view-point, these springs of action, as they tend to become supreme, constitute a self-surrender, as it were, to that which *is* eternally real—to that of which it may be said, as of Aristotle's unmoved Mover, *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*. The apparent inconsistency between the two statements will be discussed elsewhere (chap. vii.); but we may say at once that every Idealist view of the world is unintelligible unless we are in earnest with the Hegelian conception of *degrees of reality*. Owing to his neglect of this conception, or failure to see its significance, Green's attempt to establish and defend Idealism in bk. i. of the *Prolegomena* is, I think, a complete failure.

§ 2. The whole line of thought leading from the double-aspect theory to Idealism arises out of those facts which force us to assign the preponderance to the conscious side of the duality. But these facts may be overlooked, as they often are by Physicists and mere Physiologists; and then Monism develops naturally into a half-materialistic view, usually called Conscious Automatism. We only *know* mind as correlated with cerebral states, which are assumed to be part of a continuous and coherent system of mechanical causation; and mind itself—if we ignore the existence of the Ideals which give all its unity to our life—may easily be represented as consisting of unsubstantial, fleeting, discontinuous states. Hence the conclusion is that the *material* side of the duality is the most fundamental, and that consciousness (as we know it) consists of dependent inert accompaniments of cerebral motions. I say 'consciousness as we know it,'—for underlying this remarkable theory there is usually a species of atomism which assigns to every one of the discrete units of



matter—the atoms—a psychical life of some kind, and it is supposed that when matter is organised in so complex a way as it is in the brain, the atoms, in virtue of their psychical character, somehow manufacture what we know as consciousness or mind. The crudity of this conception needs no remark.<sup>1</sup> If the more comprehensive and less one-sided theory of Monism is indefensible, *a fortiori* this extreme development of it is so; let us therefore return to the former. We have examined the third and fourth of the assumptions on which Monism relies, and now come to the second, which is really the main root and support of the whole theory. It implies a certain view as to the mode of existence of the material world, as such,—that is, the world where ‘laws of motion’ reign supreme: this world is supposed to have the unity and continuity of a complete system. Does our *knowledge* of the so-called material universe bear out the view? Let us consider this knowledge under the two heads of perceptive or sense-knowledge, and thought-knowledge. We need not imply that these are different in kind, but only that for certain purposes it is of primary and fundamental importance to emphasise their divergent characteristics; and we need not press the term *sense-knowledge*,—sense-being or sense-experience would be more appropriate. Our point is that those qualities of matter which are supposed to distinguish it from mind, and which are opposed, in the view of ordinary thought, to mental existence, cannot exist in independence of mind and its activity; for their apparently *non-mental* character arises from the fact that they are due to the discriminative activity of thought in connection with a sensuous basis which is not manufactured by that activity. But though this basis is not made by the activity of thought, yet it cannot form any kind of experience or knowledge apart from thought. It only exists as it ‘burns in the one focus’ of my or of your perceptive thought here and now. But let us waive this, and let us suppose that there is an immediate apprehension of material qualities—of extended and solid forms, for example—apart from the discriminating and relating activity of thought.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Some effective criticisms are passed upon it by Romanes, pp. 70-77 (*op. cit.*)

<sup>2</sup> This view is adopted *in principle* by Mr Hobhouse, in his recent work on the Theory of Knowledge; *cf. infra*, ch. iii., Appendix.

It is obvious that such 'apprehension' must be limited to what is here and now present to me or to you ; but this is not all. Within these limits, the immediate apprehension that we do have is that of an incoherent fluctuating fragment, 'with ragged edges,' without any self-supporting or self-subsistent character. The ultimate fact, beyond which we cannot go, is *mind apprehending matter* ; as we have seen, matter is only *directly* given as the contents of some particular individual's perception or apprehension at some particular time and place ; and apart from this relation, it is a fiction. To deny this, would be to affirm that all the material 'things' of which we have immediate apprehension exist exactly as we apprehend them in independence of our minds, which are simply mirrors in which 'things' reflect themselves. The things persist and act according to laws of their own ; the mirrors come and go and are conditioned by the laws of the things. This theory contradicts itself as soon as it is stated clearly. The material things must, to be perceived, reflect themselves in the mirrors ; the reflection or copy is the 'state of consciousness' which the mind or mirror directly perceives ; the independent reality is *behind* it, and then the resemblance of the reality to its copy, and even the very assumption that there is a reality behind the copy, becomes open to question ; we are landed in the position of Hume. This has often been pointed out ; but the nature of the self-contradiction we have referred to is not often indicated with precision. As soon as we maintain that the material world of perception—the world of form, size, colour, sound, &c.,—exists independently of all mind just as it does when presented to a mind, we must admit that the perception of it is simply a copy of itself which it leaves in the mind. We are obliged to make a separation between the perceived thing and the real thing ; for the process of perception is a transitory, fragmentary phenomenon,—it only takes place at intervals, and it varies from mind to mind in fulness, definiteness, and accuracy. Therefore in our anxiety to vindicate the independent reality of the world which is 'immediately apprehended,' we have reduced the latter to transient states of the individual consciousness, and erected behind it another world which is not perceived or apprehended at all.

It may be said that all such argument is true but futile, and that modern science has resolved the whole difficulty by its 'discovery' that all of what Locke called the 'secondary' qualities of matter—colours, sounds, tastes, &c.—are only states of consciousness produced by infinitely complex motions of particles in empty space; the reality of the material universe consists in space, solidity, and motion only; and these 'primary qualities' exist in themselves just as they do for our consciousness. This is, of course, simply a return to the position of Locke, which is that of the ancient Atomists, and is generally adopted by the physicist who wishes to philosophise a little and to do it safely. Unfortunately, the legitimacy of this separation of the primary and secondary qualities is very questionable,<sup>1</sup> as Berkeley clearly saw. It is certain that the primary qualities cannot be perceived—*i.e.*, immediately presented—apart from the secondary; and as regards conception, can we think of abstract, empty extension and duration without thinking of a *what* that is extended or endures—can we think of it without adding the general idea of something objective that fills the extension and duration? In one part of his *Transcendental Æsthetic* Kant argues on the supposition that we cannot think pure space and pure time as non-existent, though we can think away everything *in* space and time; this doctrine he seems to reaffirm in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. But in the *System of Principles*, when fully conscious of the deeper implications of his own theory of knowledge, he shows that space cannot be conceived as empty, but only as filled with a real content (the 'secondary' qualities). We can think away any particular objects or changes in space and time, but not the universal *schema* or form of objectivity in general and of change in general.

When once this illegitimate separation is made, the 'monistic' theory presents itself as a plausible way out of the difficulties which result from our having on the one side matter defined only as that which occupies and moves in space, and on the other side mind or minds. Obviously we cannot rest in the idea that a dance of atoms, or what not, in empty

<sup>1</sup> This is effectively argued by Mr Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, bk. i. ch. i.

space impinges on a mind and thereby produces various effects in the way of sensation. It is this incompatibility of the two kinds of existence, together with the fact of their correlation, that makes monism appear a brilliant solution: may they not be two sides of one Reality? Now, we have seen that the theory can only state itself by the help of confused metaphors which have no application to the case; we have seen that it fails to appreciate the deepest characteristic of mental life—self-consciousness and the formulation of Ideals; and we have seen that its treatment of our perceptive knowledge of the 'external' world is thoroughly uncritical. We have now to see that its treatment of our thought-knowledge is just as defective. If the *esse* of matter as perceived necessarily involves *percipi*, it follows that the whole 'material' universe beyond the individual's present perception—so far as he *knows* that universe—is a matter of thought-knowledge, a result of the constructive activity of his intelligence in harmony with other intelligences. The world is *for him* an ideal construction reared by thought, under the guidance of its own nature as intelligence, but on the basis of perception. The truth is that in this connection (thought-knowledge) there is no meaning in speaking of a *material universe*; the universe in question is simply the objective system to which knowledge, in one branch of its self-development, refers. Implicitly science begins by assuming that reality has the form of such a system, and proceeds partially to interpret its contents; and if objective knowledge is considered by itself, in abstraction from self-consciousness, there is no ground for determining the system as 'material' or as 'immaterial.' Since, then, the sciences from their nature must be concerned in objective knowledge only, they are not entitled to speak of the universe as material or the reverse. Probably it is a vague consciousness of this which makes physicists so eager to assure us that they do not know what matter *is*. It does not need even this consideration to show us that the objective knowledge which the sciences claim to have attained is only a fragment when compared with reality as a whole. This must be admitted by all intelligent beings; but there is more than this. It is not even a coherent fragment, but an aggregate of detached fragments. To say nothing of the difficulties that each science has

within itself, it is separated from the others by a chaos. The doctrine upheld by Höffding and others in this connection seems to me to be in the highest degree misleading and false; what can be more arbitrary than to assume that all causes which cannot be reduced to cases of mechanical reciprocity—that is, of motion determining and being determined by motion only—are ‘supernatural’ or ‘miraculous’ causes? We have already explained and defended the view that to merely mechanical science a chemical combination is ‘supernatural’ in the only sense in which this extraordinary term has any meaning; similarly, the real constitution of the living organism is ‘supernatural’ to both mechanical and chemical science; and so on.

Our conclusion is, that the universal solid *continuum* of matter in motion simply does not exist. It is a figment of the ‘scientific’ imagination, and should lead us to remember that our choice is not between metaphysics and no metaphysics, but between a metaphysics of crude dogma and one that is critically aware of what it is doing.

§ 3. We have thus seen that all the foundations of ‘monism’ break down under examination; all that is left is the fact that a parallelism of mental and cerebral processes is well established in the region of Sensation and Mental Imagery.

Before finally dismissing the theory from our minds, it will be well to notice one of its implications, which is generally brought into the foreground in any discussion of it. The theory is supposed to remove the difficulties involved in the ordinary view that there is ‘causal interaction’ between mind and body. I do not suppose it will be denied that every rational being must believe in the reality of such ‘interaction’ when engaged in practical conduct of any kind. If, then, the theoretical difficulties of this belief were insuperable, we should have to acquiesce in a dualism of reason and practical conviction which might prepare the way for scepticism, unless we could give a satisfactory account of the origin of the practical conviction; or, again, we should have to set aside the latter as an illusion; and this procedure might have serious consequences, for the belief in question is not less spontaneous and ineradicable than certain others which are



quite indispensable to science. Such considerations, however, have only an indirect bearing on the question. What happens when my will 'moves' my arm? As we have implied, the view of common-sense is that my will moves my arm because mind and body are so related that a state of the *brain*—which is known to the only function of the organism with which consciousness is immediately correlated—may *affect* the state of consciousness, and *vice versa*. The word 'cause,' as used in this connection, may easily be misleading, in this way. Materialism is usually described as holding that various states of motion in the brain may 'cause' a state of consciousness; and Spiritualism or Idealism is described—by Romanes, for example—as holding conversely that consciousness may 'cause' material motion. But as thus used, 'causation' implies the existence of an agent which creatively produces out of itself something new,—it signifies a process of manufacture where the material wrought up into the product is the nature of the productive agency itself.<sup>1</sup> It would be a very crude conception of Idealism to regard it as teaching that the body, and matter generally, is a *product* of mind in this sense; yet this conception has found its way into more than one psychological text-book where the different views of the connection of mind and body are explained. Common-sense, then, in declaring that a state of the mind 'causes' a state of the brain and nerves, is easily open to misconception; in reality it has no creative causation in view, but only a mutual conditioning.

The Theory of Monism, it is well known, rejects this belief as an illusion, and denies that my will moves my arm. The mental process called Volition goes on alongside of the physical process of muscular and nervous action; the former is caused only by previous mental states, the latter only by previous physical states. Three lines of thought are supposed to lead to this conclusion. The *first* is thus stated by Romanes: "It appears simply inconceivable that an Order of Nature could be maintained at all if it were liable to be interfered with at any moment in any number of points" by

<sup>1</sup> We may note that in this sense what is produced must have been already present *in* the productive agent. Hence the absurdity of Materialism in its old form.



human wills.<sup>1</sup> But in what sense is it true that there is an Order of Nature maintained? In the sense of a mechanical *continuum*, such order, as we have seen, does not exist. There is an Order of Nature in the sense of a general average uniformity in the succession of events, as when by an empirical generalisation, or custom-bred expectation, we are led to believe that 'while the earth remaineth,' day and night, seed-time and harvest, summer and winter, life and death, 'will not cease'; but with this, human wills could scarcely interfere. In a deeper sense there is an Order of Nature—that the same causes will always produce the same effects; but this is irrelevant.

The *second* line of thought appeals to the so-called law of the Conservation of Energy, which, it is said, renders any such psycho-physical interaction as common-sense has in view impossible. But this law has really no bearing on the question, as we can see when we ask, What is our *knowledge* of 'Energy'? Some 'Natural Philosophers' speak of Energy as if it were something verily existing, a supersensible medium circulating in the material universe; but in reality Energy is only manifested in motion,—motion alone is measured. Modern Physics is returning to the position of Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes.<sup>2</sup> This is explicitly recognised and stated with admirable clearness by Romanes: "Our knowledge of the external world is nothing more than a knowledge of motion. For all the forms of Energy have now been proved [*sic*] to be but modes of motion; and matter, if not in its ultimate constitution vortical motion, at all events is known to us only as changes of motion; all that we perceive in what we call matter is change in modes of motion. *We do not even know what it is that moves*; we only know that when some modes of motion pass into other modes we perceive what we understand by matter."<sup>3</sup> The principle of Conservation may be reduced to this—for Physics, motion can only produce further motion, and can only be produced by motion. To make this principle *universal* is obviously to beg the whole question.

The *third* line of thought lays stress on the unlikeness of motion and mind. It assumes that space—and consequently motion—is as much of an ultimate reality as mind is; and

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. ch. ii. § 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 3 (*italics mine*).

asks, how can two such incomparable things *act* on one another? We have already seen reasons for seriously questioning this assumption, and shall see further reasons in the sequel. But apart from this consideration, the unlikeness of mind and motion has no bearing on the question of their interaction; for every case of interaction in the last resort is inexplicable. In the case of physical causation it may be said that the cause and the effect are *comparable*, for both are 'material,' and *quantitative relations* can be established between them, as a rule, by Physics. This is true; but as a matter of observed fact, the relation of causation is one of *qualitative* change; and *ex vi terminorum* it can never be explained by its merely quantitative aspects, which are capable of measurement, and can be dealt with mathematically.

Before leaving this question, we must observe that it is a travesty of the doctrine of interaction to represent it as implying that the 'continuity' of a nerve-process is interrupted in the brain, where an extraneous 'supernatural' agency 'interferes.' This is to beg the whole question; a 'nerve-current,' when treated as a *thing*, is a mere abstraction,—it has no continuity or unity apart from the unity of the whole organism in living, and we have every reason to suppose that the unity of the organism would not be possible apart from the unity of a feeling-consciousness. We have not bare mind on the one side, and bare body on the other, and the former 'acting' on the latter or *vice versa*; we have a coherent, though not self-subsistent or self-contained, psycho-physical totality, consisting of a central conscious function in mutually conditioning relation with a complex of co-operating vital functions; when 'mind acts on body,' what is meant is that the psychical factors contribute indefinitely *more* to the particular psycho-physical result—which is in this case a mode of voluntary conduct—than do the physical factors; and conversely when 'body acts on mind.' A new turn given by Romanes<sup>1</sup> and Lewes<sup>2</sup> to the 'monistic' doctrine in this matter is worth comment. They claim to find a justifiable meaning for the phrase 'my will moves my arm,' on the monistic view, because will *quâ* psychical and neuro-muscular motion *quâ* physical are 'convex and concave,' &c., so that

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> *Physical Basis of Mind*, Problem III. ch. vii.

neither could be what it is apart from the other. But it is evident that in this theory, though the will may be said, in this strained sense of the words, to be an 'agent' in the physical world, yet its 'agency' in this sphere must be understood and interpreted as other physical agents are,—that is, as mechanically determined by antecedent and simultaneous agents. Romanes, in his not too lucid chapter on 'The Will in relation to Monism,' seems to argue that on his theory the will is not only an agent (in the physical world) but a free agent; it is an agent as being substantially one with the physical, and a free agent as being, *quâ* psychical, unaffected by anything extrinsic to its own nature. Is it not evident that though the will, *quâ* obverse of physical movement, may be called an 'agent' in the world, it is *not a free agent*, and that, *quâ* psychical, it may be called 'free' but is *not an agent*? Or, to slightly vary the expression, we may grant that it is free in a sense and that it is an agent in a sense; but that in the sense in which it is free it is not an agent, and *vice versa*.

## CHAPTER III.

ON THE DISTINCTION OF INDIVIDUAL AND  
UNIVERSAL JUDGMENTS.

FEW distinctions play a more important part—if importance may be judged by frequency and freedom of usage—than that of Individuality and Universality in modern philosophical discussions; and few, we may add, are more vaguely and variously conceived, or prove more fruitful sources of misunderstanding and controversy. With equal emphasis the notion of Individuality is treated as expressive of a fundamental constituent of Reality, and as a transparent self-contradictory illusion; and we find corresponding variations in the treatment of Universality, from the ‘traditional universal worship,’ the ‘Platonising tradition,’ for which Professor James expresses such contempt, to the psychical atomism of Hume or of Herbart, where the existence of universals is denied altogether, or where they are regarded as mere *products* having no vital significance for any of the essential functions of mind. Hence a critical examination of the two conceptions, side by side, may be not without value as a means of enlightening certain current con-

troversies: and as we shall see, the best way to do this will be to examine the corresponding fundamental distinction in Judgments, and the bearing upon it of the principle of Identity, which is treated sometimes as the essential mark of the Individual and sometimes opposed to it as the characteristic of the Universal. It is important to notice that with regard to the former of these conceptions there are two distinct questions. In the first place, what is the general meaning of Individuality—what are its constituent elements as a conception? What is the *least* that it must mean, in order that we may be able intelligibly to affirm or deny its applicability to the Real? Secondly, in what manner may we refer this conception to Reality? Must we conclude that there is but one real Individual, namely, the Universe as a systematic whole, or may we intelligibly affirm the existence of a plurality of relatively distinct Individuals? In asking these questions, we assume that the conception of Individuality, like that of Universality, has an intelligible kernel of meaning; and that its use in this meaning—or in various related meanings—belongs to the very structure of Intelligence, whereby it is the *nature* of Thought so to think.

We shall be first occupied with the notion of Identity in its bearing on Individuality; the latter notion being determined, the true significance of the Universal will appear.

## I.

§ 1. I begin by briefly reviewing certain theories, which have been widely held, as to the nature of the synthesis in Judgment; for though their untenability is now generally recognised, there are one or two



points of interest and importance which such a review may emphasise.

The oldest view is that which regards the Judgment as essentially a predication; the Subject is taken in 'extension'; that is, it signifies what we call a 'real thing' or a group of such,—so that here we come upon the notion of Individuality; the Predicate is taken in 'intension'—that is, it signifies certain qualities, activities, or relations which are affirmed of the 'thing.' The traditional Logic adopts this view in its fourfold division of propositions,—though it fails to provide a proper place for Judgments explicitly referring to a *single* Individual; but in its doctrines of conversion and of the syllogistic figures it works with another theory. We shall see that the predication view gives a true account of our intentions in thinking; but it is true only in a general way, and, moreover, not in all cases. For when the predication is expressed—as every predication naturally is—in the typical propositional form, 'S is P' or 'S has the quality P,' we are far from understanding the exact meaning of 'is' or 'has'; and, further, our Judgments sometimes express relations which are distinctly not predicative in the strict sense, and which cannot be put in that form without much artificial manipulation. Thus it has been proposed<sup>1</sup> to add to the predicative form of the proposition, as co-ordinate with it, other forms embodying relations of time and space, of cause and effect, of resemblance and difference. In this connection we may observe that when testing any general theory or interpretation of Judgment by actual instances, it is often by no means sufficient merely to adduce some isolated Judgment as a 'concrete in-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Martineau, *The Theory of Reasoning; Essays*, vol. iii.



stance'; for, as Sigwart observes, "the Judgment as such has real existence only in active judging, in that mental act of a thinking individual which takes place at a given moment." You have not got a concrete Judgment until you have got it in its place in the actual movement of thought in a living mind: in many crucial instances you require to know, at least in a general way, the circumstances which immediately led up to it and the object in view in making it. To consider it apart from these is to abstract from everything which gives it its concrete significance—with the exception of the mere language-symbols; and then in most cases it can be made to imply whatever you choose. Thus, most Judgments involving one of the relations referred to above—time, space, resemblance, &c.—seem at first sight to assert concerning at least two Subjects 'with adjectival relations between them';<sup>1</sup> but it does not follow that they really do so. For example, the assertion 'Fort William lies to the west of Ben Nevis' might easily be made to appear as an assertion about two subjects; but as actually made it would be found to give Information about Fort William or about Ben Nevis, but not about both. Every Judgment gives information about one single Subject, or a group of Subjects regarded in one aspect, and not about two or more. Information we may regard as the essential characteristic of Judgment, and not merely affirmation or assertion and denial; all Thought—and Judgment is one of the essential functions of Thought—points through the medium of language outwards from mind to mind: its essential aim is at least to form a common ground on which different intelligences can meet, and which

<sup>1</sup> Mr Bradley traverses the traditional predication doctrine in this way.

affords them a means of mutual understanding. Hence, though every Judgment is 'that mental act of a thinking individual which takes place at a given moment,' it is always actually or ideally addressed to *other* thinking individuals.

Taking this very simple and obvious view of the matter, we see at once what necessarily must be the nature of those cognitive elements which we *use* in Judgment; they must have a meaning for other minds beyond the one which judges,—otherwise no information would be conveyed; and they must have identically the same meaning for all these various minds, for in so far as they have not, the information conveyed is confused or misunderstood. Hence the essential characteristic of Judgment is to use, or approximate to using, the *conception* or 'universal meaning'; the latter is obviously the more pregnant designation. The conception only has the required character, as may be seen when we observe the way in which conceptual Thought departs, through Imagination or Memory, from Sense. The immediate *datum* of primary presentation—the concrete sensuous basis of perception—exists only here and now as some one perceives it. It must always exist for some percipient individual at a particular time and place, and what is 'here-now' in fact for him *ex vi termini* cannot be so in fact for any other individual, and, above all, is *incommunicable* even symbolically. It is not merely a unique and *actually* unsharable experience, for that is equally true of the mental imagery which clusters round the sensuous basis; it is not only that the *esse* of the latter necessarily involves *percipi*. But, as we endeavour by abstraction to get back to pure sense, we find ourselves approaching a consciousness which would consist only of an undifferentiated

mass of feeling—if we may use the term in this connection;<sup>1</sup> such a conception is what *more mathematico* we may call a limit: and any kind of mutual understanding between two such consciousnesses is obviously inconceivable in the limit. Such a state, therefore, is not only actually, but even symbolically, unsharable. But as consciousness develops, and not merely variations in intensity and massiveness are vaguely felt in the sensuous field, but differences and *points of relation* are discriminated within it, then the presentations so discriminated leave behind a mental tendency or psychical disposition<sup>2</sup> which effects the subsequent appearance of mental imagery; and this, through the time-reference it bears, becomes, for the individual, representative of the ‘here-now’ that is no longer actual as such. Now such secondary presentations in different minds may roughly resemble one another; and, in virtue of its representative character, the imagery may, by the help of language, be used as a universal meaning; this is ‘picture-thinking.’ Its deficiency appears precisely in this, that though different minds may have like imagery, the resemblance can extend only to the rough or fragmentary outline thereof, and, as a rule, not beyond its spatial or temporal qualities. The universal meaning begins to be reached only in so far as we are able to discriminate within the imagery certain points of relation beyond those of space and time, forming a ‘content’ which must be identically similar for different minds. This is the conception, in the proper sense; and, as must be carefully observed, it is always to some extent an Ideal, in the

<sup>1</sup> This is Mr Bradley’s use of the term in *Appearance and Reality*.

<sup>2</sup> Or, if it is preferred, a physiological disposition in the brain-centre: I waive the question here.

strict sense, and not merely an 'idea.' The scheme of relation constituting any definite conception is capable of *filling in* to an indefinite extent; it is never such a given, formed product as the ordinary Logic would take it to be.<sup>1</sup> The foregoing, of course, does not imply that such agreement of content is a sufficient test of Truth; but it is not without the interest of suggestiveness to observe that the agreement becomes increasingly perfect as we pass continuously from the sensuous material of perception towards conception; and that the intellectual content of the individual's consciousness, while remaining his own possession, in proportion as it becomes really cognitive, becomes less and less for his consciousness, a *peculiar* possession.

We shall return to the theory of predication, and fully discuss its implications, in its universal and individual forms, after noticing two other views which are more or less one-sided, since they fix on the side of extension only or on that of intension only.

§ 2. The theory which would take both Subject and Predicate in extension,—regarding them as names for two groups or classes of individuals, one of which is included in, or excluded from, the other by the Judgment,—cannot be a true account of what takes place in the mind, or of our intentions in thinking. The 'class' signified by the Subject or Predicate can only become an object of thought, can only be known or distinguished, by reference to its qualities. The latter must therefore enter into the signification of the terms

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the classifications of Botany and Zoology, where each class is defined by the explanation of a *typical* individual belonging to it; and the conception of the type of any sub-class is simply a more determinate or more specified form of that of the more general class.

standing as Subject and Predicate, so that these cannot be read in extension *merely*. Further, it is only in what are expressly Judgments of Classification that we think the Predicate in extension at all. We may say with Mr Bradley that "if the view stood apart from implied preconceptions, and by itself as an interpretation of fact, it would scarcely be so much as discussed." On this fundamental falsity the traditional Logic has founded its mechanism of the syllogistic figures and the conversion of propositions. These fictions become more curious and interesting when fully developed in Symbolic Logic, but then they cease to claim to represent any actual or possible process of *thought*.<sup>1</sup> The view which takes both Subject and Predicate in extension merely must, as Mr Bradley has shown, end by making the Judgment purely verbal—that is, by destroying it altogether. This becomes apparent when we ask, What is the extent of the *difference* between Subject and Predicate—of their difference as ideas or meanings, not merely as language-symbols—which the Judgment is supposed to admit and affirm? We may say that *any* real answer to this question will dispose of the extension-view.

There remains the view which takes both Subject and Predicate in intension, and understands the proposition as asserting that the conception S includes in it the conception P. It is in advance of the 'theory' we have just examined, inasmuch as it recognises that the Judgment involves at least some kind of synthesis of conceptions or universal meanings. On the other hand, it may rest on the idea that the 'concept' is simply a bundle of qualities—

<sup>1</sup> Mr Venn, in his *Symbolic Logic*, indicates the true place of this 'science.' See also *Enc. Brit.*, art. *Logic*, §§ 34, 35 (p. 800).



a mechanical aggregate of general *marks*, and that its universality is only the greater or less numerical extent of the aggregate. This idea finds expression in the 'law of the inverse ratio of extension and intension,' and is excellently criticised by Lotze.<sup>1</sup> But in any case this interpretation of Judgment does not give a true account of our intentions in thinking. It is not true of any Judgment which gives us Information about a Subject—whether the Subject be what we call a 'real thing' or a conception which is extended and more definitely determined by the Judgment. We can justify it only if we are prepared to make the intension of a term include all the known *and unknown* 'qualities' which the thing denoted by the term may possess. This would introduce fundamental confusion into our thinking, for every significant term, when appearing as the Subject of a Judgment, would stand for the universe as a whole. The source of the defect in the intension-view is the basal error of all merely conceptualist logic: it makes the Judgment assert a relation between ideas only. Whatever plausibility this view of the matter may possess, arises, I should say, from the extreme ambiguity of the term 'idea.' The Judgment as such is an 'idea' of mine in the sense of being a function of my mind, a mental 'act' of thought; but except in the Judgments which are expressly the result of introspective reflection,<sup>2</sup> it is perfectly obvious that what is asserted is not a relation between my idea S simply as mine, and my

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, §§ 25-32.

<sup>2</sup> And even then only when the statement expresses what is a mere personal idiosyncrasy of my own. We shall deal with the Judgments of 'introspection' later on (ch. v.)



idea P; what is asserted is an objective relation among facts, a relation which does not depend upon my ideas for its existence. My knowledge refers to something which is 'independent' of it in the sense of being

"Actual ere its own beginning, operative through its course,  
Unaffected by its end."

What is referred to is an *objective system*: 'a system,' in that it is a world of *inter-related* parts: 'objective,' in that their relations are independent and permanent relatively to the change and progress of my intellectual consciousness, where judgments concerning them are made. In other words (the so-called judgments of 'introspection' being excluded from present consideration), every judgment involves a trans-subjective reference in the sense which was defined in the previous chapter.

It is of course possible to say, with Herbart, Lotze, and others, that "logical judgments do not only speak of what is real, of things—many of them have for their subject a mere matter of thought, something unreal or even impossible." To meet this difficulty, we must first—with Professor James, Mr Bradley, Dr Keynes, and Dr Venn—distinguish various 'worlds' or 'orders of existence' to one or other of which the judgment must refer. Professor James suggests the following list:<sup>1</sup> (1) The world of sense, or physical 'things' as apprehended in the completeness of their spatial and other sensible qualities. (2) The world of physical or mechanical science, consisting of nothing but 'matter' defined by its primary qualities only—in other words, defined only as that which occupies

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 292.

and moves in space. (3) The world of ideal relations or abstract truths, as expressed in logical, mathematical, metaphysical, ethical, or æsthetic propositions. (4) The world of 'idols of the tribe,' illusions or prejudices common to the race: the motion of the sky round the earth, for example, belongs to this world: and for mechanical science, the 'secondary' qualities of matter, such as colour, sound, temperature, are nothing but 'idols of the tribe.' (5) The various supernatural worlds, mythological, religious, or theological: and the worlds of fable, folk-lore, or deliberate romance and fiction. (6) The various worlds of individual opinion, as numerous as men are. (7) The worlds of sheer madness and vagary. Each of these is a system of more or less definitely inter-related parts, so that within each world certain things are *true* of each part of it: thus, "In the world of *Ivanhoe*, the hero does not *really* marry Rebecca, as Thackeray *falsely* makes him do." Now whatever be the world to which the Judgment may refer, if it is believed to be a real world by the thinker who judges concerning it, the Judgment conforms to our rule, of referring, in the thinker's intention, to a genuinely objective system. But the world may be known by the thinker to be unreal, and yet, so far as it is a systematic world, *true* Judgments concerning any part of it are possible, as in the example we have just given; in what sense do such Judgments refer to objective reality? The answer to this question is suggested by a term which the Cambridge Logicians—particularly Dr Keynes and Dr Venn—have adopted, and which they employ to signify what we have called a 'world' or an 'order of existence.' Any such world, as those we have distinguished, is described as a

Universe of Discourse—a system of ideas which is the product of an intelligence or of various intelligences in union. The reality of any such universe is constituted only by the minds among whom it originates and circulates—for whom, in a word, it is a universe of discourse; they are the ‘objective reality’ which the thinker has in view in judging concerning it, and apart from them, the world referred to is merely a *flatus vocis*. Hence the Judgments which deal with what Lotze calls “a mere matter of thought, something unreal or even impossible,” do actually refer to real existence in a true and important sense.

It is not sufficient, however, merely to recognise that Judgment involves an objective reference; we must be more explicit and ascertain exactly in what way it is involved. This, as will be seen, is of great importance in view of one of the objects of our inquiry—the meaning of Individuality.

§ 3. John Stuart Mill seems to recognise, but also desires to explain away, the reference to reality which is involved in every Judgment. In the *Examination of Hamilton*, and in the independent discussion in his *Logic*, he insists strongly, in revulsion from the conceptualist view, that our Judgments refer to ‘real things’; but then, as Mr Bosanquet observes, “he almost takes our breath away by calling them *states of consciousness*.” This is closely connected with the inconsistency of holding an empiricist theory of perception and yet introducing objective reality in the form of ‘permanent possibilities of sensation.’ He is clear, however, in rejecting the doctrine of predication; both Subject and Predicate are reduced to collections of attributes,

and the Judgment is interpreted as asserting that the attributes signified by S 'always accompany' or 'always coexist with' those signified by P. The reason given for this, as against the theory of predication, is that we only know the Substance or Subject by its qualities; hence to predicate qualities of the Substance is only to say that certain other qualities accompany those that are known. Now, by 'qualities,' *sensible* qualities only are understood: thus Mill's conclusion is an application of the Berkeleian theory of perception—the theory that we cannot even intelligibly speak of a reality which *has* the qualities. The latter expression, on the contrary, we take to be a metaphorical one which is naturally and legitimately used to indicate the relation of Substance and Attribute; it signifies that the Substance is at least something more than the unified totality of the perceived and inferred<sup>1</sup> qualities, and is such that the qualities depend upon it—they are in some way conditioned by it. We only know the Substance or Subject by a few of its qualities—enough to identify it; and according to the theory of predication, the very reason of the Judgment is to tell us more of its qualities. To express this more accurately, we must say that we have first a more or less partial and vaguely defined *conception* of the Subject, and the aim of the Judgment is to fill in this outline to a certain extent and so far make it more determinate. In so doing, the Judgment is regarded as giving information about the Substance itself. This, then, is the fundamental problem: How is knowledge of the qualities the same as knowledge of the Substance, or how is it possible

<sup>1</sup> I use this phrase in recognition of the fact that without thought there could be no perception

to say that the Substance is the qualities? *In what sense* does the former transcend and condition the latter? Or, in other words, In what does the identity and Individuality of the Subject consist? Some position must be taken up with regard to these questions, before the theory of predication can be considered intelligible.

Among recent writers on Logic, Mr Bradley has very clearly emphasised the reference to reality in Judgment. But, according to him, the synthesis is essentially between the whole content of the Judgment and reality in general. Both Subject and Predicate are taken adjectivally; the distinction between them, though possible in most Judgments, has no significance. Together the two form but a single adjective, so that the Judgment expresses a single idea, and attaches this idea, this 'floating adjective,' to the nature of Reality as a whole. The Universe as a whole, then, is the true subject of every Judgment. This is an extreme statement, which it is difficult to reconcile with the facts. My assertions in general are not made about Reality as a whole; they are made of some definite portion of reality which is taken—for the time, at least—as a distinct or individual thing. The Judgment may very well be expressed thus:

S (X) is P,

where the Subject is Reality (symbolised here as X) already qualified so as to be the individual S, and the additional qualification P is predicated of it. The synthesis is between S (X) and P, not between the combination SP and X,—reality in general or the universe. This, it will be seen, approximates to the traditional theory (predication), but widens it so as to include the cases which that view, when taken strictly, ex-



cluded. Mr Bosanquet's statement of the matter is truer to fact than Mr Bradley's unqualified interpretation. The former writer distinguishes between the 'ultimate' and the 'immediate' Subject, and hence is enabled to find a place for the traditional distinction of Subject and Predicate within the Judgment. According to him, the *ultimate significance* of every Judgment is to refer an idea—that is, a conception or 'meaning' as explained above—to Reality; while on the other hand no Judgment can be found *within* which Subject and Predicate are not apparent. "In every Judgment, the ultimate Subject, Reality, is represented by a *selective* perception or idea which designates a something accepted as real; this something, taken as standing for Reality, is the actual Subject of the Judgment, and is qualified by the ideal content which forms the predication."<sup>1</sup>

A few comments must be made on this statement of the case. When we say that in its *ultimate significance* every Judgment refers to Reality as a whole—the objective system *as* a universal system of related elements—the words italicised are of extreme importance. We mean that, admitting any Judgment to be true, we cannot deny the modifying effect which by development of its implications it may have upon any portion of our system of knowledge;<sup>2</sup> and that this postulate concerning thought rests upon a postulate concerning Reality—viz., that its elements are everywhere mutually dependent or 'inter-related,' as we say. Only in so far as the states of one being or thing or 'element of reality' are affected by those of another, and *vice versa*—only in so far as the two beings are not mutually independent—can a Judgment referring to one of them

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, vol. i. p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bosanquet, vol. i. p. 73 note.



be modified by a Judgment referring to the other; and only in so far as we *understand the nature of the mutual dependence* can we know the extent and nature of the mutual modification which the Judgments ought to exercise on one another. Thus, only in so far as we have insight into all the connections and dependences that subsist among all things, can we form our Judgments into such a system that any one of them may be considered to refer to Reality as a whole, and the nature of this reference be explicit and intelligible. But our comprehension of the fundamental inter-relations of things—the comprehension which is the positive attainment of Science and Philosophy—stands in the midst of our ignorance as a drop in an ocean; so that the reference of our Judgments to the Universe is indeed ‘ultimate.’ That such reference is really possible is a postulate of thought; to grasp its nature is the ideal goal of thought; but from this, our present attainment is separated by a distance indefinitely great—as surely it would be little short of fatuous self-deception to deny. Our only fruitful inquiry, therefore, will be into the characteristics of the ‘immediate’ Subject of our Judgments. Mr Bosanquet’s account of it is very brief and very general: he takes it as ‘standing for’ Reality, or as the ‘presentation’ of the latter, in relation to the individual’s knowledge; its function is merely to “explain where and how Reality accepts the qualification we attach to it,”<sup>1</sup> or to “limit the aspect of Reality to which the predication refers.”<sup>2</sup> The problem, as Mr Bosanquet observes, is exactly that of the meaning of Individuality: our review of the theories of Judgment has brought us to a position from which a clear view of its significance may be taken.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> P. 106.

To this end, the notion of an Individual Qualification of Reality, symbolised above as  $S(X)$ —the 'immediate' or 'actual' Subject of Mr Bosanquet's terminology—must be made as definite as possible.

## II.

§ 1. It has often been asserted that the principle of Identity makes all predication of the form 'S is P' impossible, as ordinarily understood, since every object of thought must 'be itself' and cannot be anything else. This is the theory which Hegel referred to as that of *abstract Identity*, and which, as we shall see, is equally fatal to *all* synthesis, whatever view of Judgment we may adopt: it becomes just as impossible to qualify X by SP as to qualify  $S(X)$  by P. It is expounded and adopted by Lotze,<sup>1</sup> who insists that it is the one supreme law of thought, and discusses the system of the forms of Judgment on this basis.<sup>2</sup> His predecessor Herbart had also worked with it, but worked consistently, so that it becomes of determining importance for the Herbartian constructions in ontology. Hence is necessitated a discussion of the epistemological validity of the principle. I shall try to show how there is possible an interpretation of it which, so far from invalidating the Judgment in the form ' $S(X)$  is P,' becomes simply its regulative canon as an individual Judgment. The interpretation which will be suggested is in brief as follows. Premising that Unity and Identity are perfectly synonymous terms, I

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, §§ 54, 55.

<sup>2</sup> For a thorough examination of this side of Lotze's logical doctrine, see Professor Jones's *Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze*, ch. iv. (on Judgment).

regard the principle enunciated by Hegel as indisputable—every *real* Identity or Unity is an Identity in the midst of diversity, a Unity underlying diversity. This merely general principle is thus developed when applied to reality. With regard to the Self, it is simply a formal transcript of the unity of self-consciousness; with regard to reality other than Self, its effect is that this is inevitably thought of as consisting in ‘finite centres’—centres each of which controls a finite circumference, which are numerically distinct, and of which every one ‘is what it is’ or ‘is itself’ in the sense that in so far as it is real at all it is real in some determinate mode, embracing within it distinguishable qualities and relations, and is therefore at least a unity of these. Finally, I shall show, from the real nature of the principle of Identity itself, that though the finite centres are thus conceived as numerically distinct, plurality is not to be accepted as ultimate. Our thesis then is, that the principle of Identity, rightly understood, justifies the Judgment in the form ‘S is P’ as applied to any definite reality, since such a Judgment simply assigns to the latter a determinate mode of existence, ‘S (X) is P’; and further, it prevents our confusing one reality with another, or fusing them all together<sup>1</sup>—*res de re non predicatur*, where *res* means

<sup>1</sup> As, for example, in Brahmanism:—

“ They reckon ill who leave me out ;  
 When me they fly I am the wings,  
 I am the doubter and the doubt,  
 And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.  
 If the red slayer think he slays,  
 Or he the slain thinks he is slain,  
 They know not well the subtle ways  
 I keep and pass and turn again.”

These lines also well express the significance of the central doctrine of Heraclitus—everlasting fusion and diffusion of all things.

trans-subjective individuality. We are thus enabled to rescue the Individual Judgment from the condemnation which Professor Adamson and others, following Hegel, pass upon it: "the merely assertive Judgment, the qualitative or positive Judgment, fails to express what it proposes to express, fails to show how a unity is possible between the diverse logical marks of its two factors, Subject and Predicate; the form of the Judgment is wholly inadequate to the thought contained in it."<sup>1</sup> This is an excellent and pointed expression of the view that I wish to controvert.

In its general form, the principle of Identity explicitly states that every unity, in order to be thinkable at all and more than a mere name, must combine diversity within it: it must be a unity of distinguishable elements,—of aspects which are capable of constituting a unity just because they are distinguishable from one another. But according to the Logic of Abstract Identity, any such unity is unintelligible; no possible object of thought can combine distinguishable aspects, for any one of these aspects obviously must 'be something *itself*,' it must be what it is, be itself; and its relations to the other aspects of the object are, so to speak, new aspects of itself, each of which must again 'be what it is,' and be nothing else,—and so on *ad infinitum*. It is a great question whether the conception of 'otherness'—that is, of the nature of *distinction* as a process of thought—which underlies Mr Bradley's dialectical critique of the general idea of Relation,<sup>2</sup> does not really rest on this abstract view of identity, which vitiates his main line of proof. To illustrate this would

<sup>1</sup> *Mind*, vol. x. p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, ch. iii.

be to call attention to an aspect of Mr Bradley's method which only one of his critics, so far as I am aware, has examined with sufficient care. I refer to Professor Andrew Seth.<sup>1</sup>

I am aware that Professor Mackenzie and others have called attention to the 'purely subversive' character of Mr Bradley's dialectic, and have contrasted it in this respect with that of Hegel. Thus, Professor Mackenzie observes: "In the work of Hegel nothing is ever simply *aufgeschoben*, set aside; it is always *aufgehoben*—i.e., taken up into its place in a higher unity. . . . The object of a true dialectic must be not merely that of subverting inadequate points of view, but also of showing how they are to be taken up as elements in a point of view that is more comprehensive."<sup>2</sup> From this and similar passages I gather that the critics do not deny the element of contradiction, the want of logical self-consistency, which Mr Bradley thinks he finds in partial constituents or inadequate views of reality. But we must not grant to the law of Abstract Identity even this relative validity; we must take up the uncompromising position, that all metaphysical conclusions which rest on this principle in its purity are absolutely false; and with the principle of Abstract Identity there vanishes all ground for maintaining the *self-contradictory* character of any partial view of reality. We may maintain that it is Hegel himself who has done most to destroy for ever the possibility of the view that any constituent of reality can involve internal self-discrepancy or self-contradiction, however partial a constituent it may be. This brings us to an import-

<sup>1</sup> See the *Contemporary Review*, vol. lxvi. : *A New Theory of the Absolute*. Reprinted in *Man's Place in the Cosmos*.)

<sup>2</sup> *Mind*, N.S., No. 11, p. 327.



ant distinction. Such inherent self-contradiction, or want of *intelligible* character—as, for instance, in the conception of a first cause, first in time—is quite other than an inherent fragmentariness, finiteness, or want of self-existent or *self-explaining* character. It is the latter defect which marks a partial, dependent constituent of Reality; and this defect must be given or found as a matter of existence or experience,—we cannot prove logically that it obtains in any particular case by a mere dialectical manipulation of the conception of that case. In the same way the defective state of existence is not *aufgehoben* by dialectic; the Higher point of view, the Higher unity, is not attained until the Lower has consciously realised it in its own life as a *whole*, on all its sides. We shall be brought round to this point again in the sequel.

§ 2. We have indicated the nature of a general discussion which for our present purpose must be restricted to the particular relation of ‘substance’ and ‘attribute,’ with its supposed want of intelligible character. It is the simplest thing in the world to show by the Logic of Abstract Identity that this relation, and by consequence every predicative Judgment, fails to be intelligible, and must therefore be regarded as an artifice “most necessary, but in the end most indefensible.” Mr Bradley first points out, what we saw above, that though the judgment of predication naturally takes the form ‘S *is* P, Q, R,’ yet S is regarded as something more than the unified totality of the qualities P, Q, R; we express this by saying that it ‘has’ them. Thus, “the whole question is evidently as to the meaning of ‘has,’ and, apart from metaphors not taken seriously, there seems really



to be no answer; we seem unable to clear ourselves from the old dilemma—if you predicate what is different you ascribe to the subject what it is *not*, and if you predicate what is *not* different, you say nothing at all.”<sup>1</sup> Lotze states the difficulty thus: “*Every* predicate P that differs in any way whatever from S, is entirely irreconcilable with it; *every* Judgment of the form ‘S is P’ is impossible, and in the strictest sense we cannot get beyond saying ‘S is S’ and ‘P is P.’”<sup>2</sup> Here we have the concentrated effect of the Logic of Abstract Identity: a thing is eternally itself, and nothing else,—the substance is the substance, the qualities are the qualities, each quality is itself,—all are distinct entities, and by no device are susceptible of rational connection.

We may note that the laws of Identity and Non-contradiction are two ways of stating the same principle; as Lotze points out, ‘A is A,’ and ‘A cannot be not-A,’ amount to the same thing. We shall see that this remains true when we abandon the abstract form of the laws.

It was Hegel who first formulated in all its significance the true principle that Identity is only realised through diversity—that every real Unity must be a Unity *of* diversity. Surely it must be obvious that before we can intelligibly speak about Unity or Identity, we must have distinguishable elements, qualities, or aspects in and through which the identity is to hold. It is only because of differences that Identity is asserted—only through them is it cognisable; and what can be more contradictory than to make the identity annihilate the differences which are the necessary basis of our

<sup>1</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, ch. ii.

<sup>2</sup> *Logic*, § 55.

apprehension of it?<sup>1</sup> Yet it seems as if the Logic of Abstract Identity acted unconsciously like an inherited prejudice, so that those who are the first to acknowledge its absurdity may not succeed in completely emancipating themselves from its trammels. It is well known that the Logic, and consequently much of the Metaphysics, of the pre-Kantian thinkers was enslaved to it; and viewing Kant's philosophical development as a whole, on its epistemological side, we may say that it consisted in a gradual self-emancipation from this fatal error; as when the question with which he apparently starts, 'How are synthetic *a priori* Judgments possible?' resolves itself in the course of his treatment into the deeper problem, 'How is synthesis of any kind possible?' and is answered by a proof that if Intelligence exists at all it is its nature to be *synthetic*, and by a penetrating exposition of some of the modes in which its synthetic structure acts (the Categories). But the thoroughly universal application of the true principle of real Identity, and the essentially synthetic structure of Intelligence at every stage of its growth, were first formulated by Hegel.

It is impossible, however, not to observe the seriously misleading character of the tendency to describe real identity as an identity of 'opposites,' in such a way that the opposition which the identity covers may be understood to imply any kind of self-discrepancy or self-contradiction; and this is what Hegel's *expressions* often suggest. Indeed most of the misunderstanding, and unsympathetic criticism, to which the Hegelian

<sup>1</sup> For a short but effective statement I may refer to Hegel's smaller *Logic*, § 115 (and note). The significance of the principle for the matter of Judgment is concisely and trenchantly pointed out by Professor A. Seth, *Scottish Philosophy*, ch. v. (on the Relativity of Knowledge).

Logic has been subject, are directly invited by the manner in which Hegel has chosen to expound his view of Thought. Mr Bradley has remarked<sup>1</sup> the prevalence of an idea that the *Logic* is a "sort of experiment with conceptions *in vacuo*." "We are supposed to have nothing but one single isolated abstract idea, and this solitary monad then proceeds to multiply by gemmation from or by fission of its private substance, or by fetching matter from the impalpable void. But this is mere caricature, and it comes from confusion between that which the mind has got before it and that which it has within itself. Before the mind there is a single conception, but the mind itself, which does not appear, engages in the process, operates on the *datum*, and produces the result. The opposition between the real, in the fragmentary character in which the mind possesses it, and the true reality felt within the mind, is the moving cause of that unrest which sets up the dialectical process." But the whole process, as set forth in the *Logic*, is phrased and arranged precisely as it would be if this 'caricature' were an accurate account of Hegel's deepest intention: and the matter is not quite clear even in the form in which Mr Bradley leaves it, as we shall see directly.

Again, it has been supposed that Hegel endeavoured to identify conceptions which are opposites in the sense of being formal contradictories,—that he rejected the law of non-contradiction. This means that, in his view, no two assignable propositions were incompatible; in other words, all argument and even all assertion would be unmeaning, for the same name would do for everything in turn. This is to treat

<sup>1</sup> See his discussion of the Hegelian Dialectic, *Logic*, pp. 379-382.

the Logic as the raving of a madman: yet can we wonder that such a view has been taken when at the very first stage we are apparently compelled to identify Being and Nothing, which are pure contradictories, "disparates which wholly exclude one another and have no other side"?<sup>1</sup> But with the single exception of the first pair, Being and Nothing, the dialectical oppositions of the Logic are not those of pure contradiction; the opposition in every other case is between distinct but complementary notions mutually involved in each other. With regard to the general nature of this process, Mr M'Taggart's *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* will probably determine the course of discussion for a long time to come. But since in this work he has not dealt with the logical transitions in detail, he has left an all-important question in some obscurity. How far are these transitions purely intellectual? When we have predicated any one category of reality, how far is it due to the nature of pure thought alone that we are compelled to predicate the complementary conception of the same reality? Mr Bradley, in his pregnant explanations of the Dialectic, still leaves the same question entirely undetermined. If the process is valid at all, it is valid as an inference, and accordingly he treats it as such, and indicates its *data*: "before the mind there is a single conception, but the mind itself, which does not appear, engages in the process, operates on the *datum*, and produces the result,"—so that the other *datum* is "the true reality felt within the mind." Now to regard the movement as purely intellectual is to regard all its *data* as purely intellectual, and therefore to regard 'the mind itself' as not merely rational but as *rationality*,—intelligence

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bradley, *Logic*, pp. 140, 141.

being the whole of it. In this case it is the whole nature of *Thought*, as such, that is brought to bear on the conception, and complements and corrects it, giving rise to the dialectical advance. The careful reader cannot avoid the conclusion that this was Hegel's view. If so, I would venture to maintain that the Dialectic breaks down at every step.<sup>1</sup> But if consciousness or the mind itself is more than knowledge,<sup>2</sup> then we cannot pass from one conception to another on purely intellectual grounds. The standard by which the adequacy of the conception is judged—the *true nature* of the mind itself—must not be merely *implicit*, as Mr M'Taggart continually expresses it, or, in Mr Bradley's phrase, merely *felt*; the 'advance' is only possible so far as this standard is explicitly, clearly, and distinctly conceived. All we can do is to *define* our conceptions of reality and of its various modes and aspects, and compare them with reference to this standard. In other words, the 'complement' of any given conception arises from our reflection upon self-conscious experience as a whole; by the so-called complement we make definite the more abstract conception, and so bring it nearer to a complete representation or definition of the reality upon which we have an immediate hold in self-knowledge—which itself has degrees of truth. For example, there is nothing in the mechanical categories, when thoroughly defined, and considered merely on their own merits in the abstract, to show that they are inadequate as a

<sup>1</sup> We shall have occasion to refer later on to the failure of the connections in two triads, Being, Nothing, Becoming, and Being-for-self, the One, the Many.

<sup>2</sup> A view which Mr M'Taggart himself states and defends with admirable clearness (ch. v. §§ 189 ff.)



final and complete account of reality; <sup>1</sup> no logical operations about such conceptions could prove that they were not. They seem to bear witness to their own incompleteness only because they are instinctively compared with the conceptions of more complex and fuller forms of reality which are actually embraced in experience; as soon as we have well defined the conceptions of these latter, the inadequacy of the mechanical conceptions becomes apparent.

It is only for the sake of brevity and clearness that the above reflections have been expressed in what may seem to be a dogmatic form.

### III.

§ 1. It must be carefully observed that so far we have only arrived at a very general statement of our principle. Every identity that is referred to reality is an identity including within it distinctions and relations; but this does not show us exactly in what way it is referred.

First it is necessary to distinguish two different senses of the term Unity or Identity, which it is in the interest of clear thinking to keep apart, though they are often employed as if they were interchangeable. In the one sense, Unity means System: this is simply the general notion of something intelligible—something whose constituent objects, qualities, and relations can be grasped by our thought. We can at once distinguish four relations—not equally fundamental—which are involved in the idea of an intelligible system. (a) Certain conditions of trans-subjective

<sup>1</sup> The conception of Infinity to which they lead is not self-contradictory in any proper sense of the term.



reality which are *revealed through* the temporal and spatial order appearing in perception. We here assume that neither time nor space is an ultimate reality: that they *exist only for the percipient mind* but are not illusions or 'states of consciousness' or mere subjective forms shutting us out from the true nature of trans-subjective reality. Temporal and spatial conditions are often spoken of as 'relations,' but they are relations of such a unique kind that it would be well if the term were used in this connection either exclusively or not at all. (b) Substance and Attribute, or Individuality. (c) Reciprocal Causation. (d) Resemblance and Difference,—both as qualitative. *Quantitative* difference is simply numerical distinctness, and is applicable in the last resort only to distinct Individuals, in the sense in which we shall define the term; in this sense two Individuals may be numerically different while their qualitative difference is evanescent. Qualitative likeness and unlikeness are less fundamental relations than the remaining three: for of the former the things that stand in them "do not need to take note," as Lotze quaintly puts it, while they do need to 'take note' of the relations upon which Causation depends.

This conception of reciprocal Causation is the most fundamental in the idea of a system; and this suggests that Harmony is a more appropriate term than System, as distinctly implying that the qualities of the Individuals making the System adapt themselves to one another's conditions. The idea may be illustrated by reference to the Leibnitian doctrine. For Leibniz, the Harmony or System of an infinity of numerically distinct self-developing individuals is the ultimate reality,<sup>1</sup> and is secured because the develop-

<sup>1</sup> I do not mean that this was the *intention*, but that it is the effect, of his theory.

ment of each individual or monad is of such a nature that its states are accommodated to those of every other monad. The former reflect the latter in the form of knowledge, which may vary infinitely in degree of distinctness. The intellectualism of the Leibnitian system appears in this view that the Harmony is essentially one of knowledge. A more penetrating and suggestive analysis of the notion of Harmony is given by Lotze in his account of 'Causation.' We find, in the first place, that any A can only affect B when it stands to it in a certain relation X, and *must* affect it in a certain way when the condition of this relation is fulfilled. In the second place, the effect of A varies according as it stands in the same relation X to different things, B, C, D, &c., so that the effect depends as much on the nature of that which appears to us as passive (*i.e.*, B, C, or D), as upon the nature of that which we call the efficient cause (A). In the third place, the effect, even between the same things A and B, varies with the varying relations in which they stand to one another, and always consists both in a change of the things and their relations.<sup>1</sup> This conception may be said to rule the sciences to-day in a way in which it never did before. It is the highest stage to which scientific thought can rise, in interpreting the Universe, without using the categories of conscious and self-conscious life. It includes not merely the mechanical but the *organic* type of systems, if the latter is defined simply as a special kind of co-ordination of parts, without reference to a real *central* unity.

That the Universe is a harmony, in the sense we

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lotze, *Grundzüge der Metaphysik*, § 39.

have defined, may be taken as a self-evident truth: for if it were not, it would consist of absolutely independent beings,—independent in the sense that any one of them would be unaffected by the annihilation of all the rest. Every such being would be a universe in itself, independent and unrelated to such an extent that it could not even be *numbered* with, or *distinguished* from, the others. Thus the conception of a plurality of independent reals is thoroughly self-contradictory. But we must ask, with Professor Seth, “Does the postulate that the Universe is ‘one’ in this sense carry us beyond the fact which it explains or names,—the fact that we are able to pass indefinitely from one fact to other facts, reducing them to law as we proceed? Does it carry us beyond the infinite progress of finite knowledge and give us any idea of an experience which resumes the life of all the worlds in a central or focal unity?”<sup>1</sup> We must carefully distinguish from the notion of Harmony that of real Unity or Identity: in passing from the former to the latter we make an important advance, and if we ignore this, the whole conception of Unity is emptied of its significance. Unity implies “a single life, in and for which the various experiences organically relate themselves,”—it must be a *living* unity, with a centre or focus of its own. It is exclusively in this sense that we shall employ the term Identity or Unity. To assert the Unity or Identity of all things is to assert that they are substantially one, that they are modifications of a single complete Life, in which all the variety of actual existences is felt and thought as a whole. The distinction between Unity and Harmony may be illustrated by reference to Leibniz and Lotze. The all-pervading

<sup>1</sup> *Contemporary Review*, vol. lxvi, pp. 863, 864.

Harmony is essential to the Leibnitian conception of the universe; while the notion of a substantial unity is hopelessly inconsistent therewith, for it can hardly be denied that the *Monas Monadum*, the supreme Monad, or God, has no intelligible place in the system, and yet apart from it there is no real Unity of things in the Leibnitian conception. Lotze, again, in his discussion of Causality, endeavours to find a merely *logical* passage from the postulation of an actual Harmony to the postulation of a substantial Unity as its Ground. This is not the place for a detailed examination of Lotze's important discussion: but it brings out very well the nature of the distinction between the two notions we are speaking of. However, it is very questionable whether the passage from Harmony to Unity can be made compulsory by appeal to purely logical or intellectual considerations. I invite the reader to consider whether the two conceptions are really held on the same terms,—whether the latter is really, like the former, an *intellectual* necessity whose denial is suicidal. I would suggest that the real 'Unity of the Universe' is not, and cannot be, a postulate of the pure objective intelligence by itself; it is a postulate of that direction or mode of intelligence which is called self-consciousness or reflective self-knowledge, by which we become aware—with more or less of clearness, adequacy, and truth—of our personal life as a central unity embracing *more* than knowledge. Hence I think many current statements concerning the 'Unity of the Universe' which seem to be very profound are in reality very superficial. Their necessary truth when Unity means merely Harmony is without further discussion implicitly treated as guaranteeing their truth when Unity means substantial Identity.

§ 2. In the next place, we have to distinguish an application of the principle of Identity which is comparatively simple, where no such perplexing ambiguities as those on which we have been dwelling can present themselves: its application in the reference of words to ideas, of language to thought. Let A denote any object of thought—that is, any more or less defined *conception*, whether referred to reality or not—which is so far distinguished from other objects as to be indicated by a single symbol in language, a name or term, M; then to say that ‘A is A’ (identity) or ‘A cannot be not-A’ (non-contradiction) means that M must always stand for the same A; if the meaning of M is fluid, the symbolical expression of thought (in language) is thrown into confusion.<sup>1</sup> In this connection we may remark on the meaning of an ‘identical’ proposition. A mathematical equation, if it is purely symbolic—that is, if it is true for all values of any term involved—is the typical example of such a proposition. The equation states that two symbolic expressions stand for or represent one and the same thought or meaning, which generally, but by no means necessarily, will be that of numerically quantitative magnitude. Thus in the expansion of  $(a+x)^n$  by the Binomial Theorem, what is really asserted is that the expression on the right side of the sign of equality represents the same magnitude as the series on the left, if the latter is finite or convergent. The consummate mathematical skill required in the discovery and proof of far more complex and more general formulæ consists in nothing else than the knowledge when and how most compendiously to make

<sup>1</sup> Here the law of identity applies only to the *meaning of a word*; but the *meaning of an idea* is a very different thing, as we have seen, and without it the idea could have no intellectual worth at all.



purely symbolic transformations. We may say that the whole of the 'higher mathematics,' on from Algebra and Analytic Geometry, consists in formal operations with such equations under the appropriate laws of the combination of terms and symbols. How far these basal laws themselves are not analytic but are matters of *perception* resting upon synthetic constructions in space and time—how far, for instance, we simply *see* from their arrangement that  $m \times n = n \times m$ —and how far this applies to the laws which lie at the basis of arithmetical operations, would be interesting questions to discuss in relation to Kant's doctrine in the *Transcendental Æsthetic*.<sup>1</sup> Mathematicians tend to use the term Analysis as covering the whole of Pure Mathematics with the exception of Pure Geometry; the latter—as Kant saw—rests at every step upon synthetic constructions in space. This difference of principle is of importance, and must not be confused with the subordinate distinction of the analytic and synthetic methods of proving any particular mathematical proposition. Now, when we deal with propositions expressed in words—which are symbols in a sense analogous to the mathematical, though, as indicated above, each should have only one meaning—we may have an analogous 'identical' proposition stating that two different forms of verbal expression stand for a single object of thought or 'idea.' Such a proposition would be purely verbal—that is, it could only state the meaning of a term the nature of whose extension and intension were previously unknown. It is of course a mere matter of terminology whether we reserve the term 'verbal' to indicate state-

<sup>1</sup> Some instructive observations are made in the course of an interchange of opinion on this subject between Professor Sidgwick, Professor Adamson, and Mr Monck in *Mind*, vol. viii. pp. 77-81, 252-258, 421, 424, 576.



ments of this kind, or use it to distinguish nonsensical propositions, such as are without any meaning; these are mere sound and nothing more.

Passing from the meanings of words to the meanings of ideas, we must inquire into the significance of the principle of Identity in the latter reference.

§ 3. In the case of an ultimate law of thought, all that can be done is to state it in what seems to be its most pregnant and comprehensive form. When thus stated, the principle of Identity develops itself naturally into that of Individuality. It must be understood as asserting that 'the real is the individual' in this sense; objective reality is known in the first place<sup>1</sup> as existing only in numerically distinct modes or determinations, each of which, though involving within it distinguishable elements, is itself, embracing these distinctions, and is not any other. The principle of identity marks one side of the fact—that of non-contradiction the other; the expressions 'is itself' and 'is not any other' mark the exclusiveness of such individuals with regard to each other and with regard to the environment, assigning to each a centre of its own. Each is thus an 'identity in the midst of diversity' realised as such; each is a centre controlling a finite circumference,—it is possessed of that *central or focal* unity which must be the mark of every real Unity as distinguished from a mere System or Harmony of related parts.

In this way, while thoroughly accepting Hegel's criticism of the principles in their abstract form, we are able to regard them as not only not inconsistent with predication but as explicitly stating what we saw must

<sup>1</sup> The significance of this qualification will appear more clearly in our concluding section.

be the very nature of predication. The affirmative categorical asserts as real a Unity in the midst of a certain stated diversity,—it assigns an individual determination or finite centre to reality, and at the same time further qualifies it. The negative categorical denies that a suggested unity holds in a certain stated diversity,—it denies that an individual is determined in a certain suggested way, on the (implicit) ground that it is conceived as determined in a way that excludes the suggestion. The Subject of the Judgment may be understood to symbolise<sup>1</sup> the individual in all the completeness of the qualities or determinations (known and unknown) that really belong to it; this is the 'substance'; the known determinations, on the other hand, are the 'attributes.' The 'attributes' or 'modes' are simply as much of the 'substance' as is *known*, and, conceived as dependent, form the intension of the Subject; the function of the predicate is to extend the area of these. In other words, the conception of the Subject must have some *degree of truth* in reference to the Reality: a degree which may be indefinitely far removed from the complete exhaustive truth, but is not therefore false unless it is treated as if it were the whole truth; and the function of the predicate is to bring this conception to a certain extent nearer the complete truth.<sup>2</sup> Since, as we have said, the individualities to which such Judgments refer are numerically distinct, we have differences of 'quantity,' so-called, in Judgment, according to the greater or less extent of the group to which the subject-term refers.

<sup>1</sup> This does not imply that the intension of the term includes the *unknown* determinations; the intension consists of the known determinations *conceived as depending* upon others yet to be known.

<sup>2</sup> To this point we shall have to return.

All the Judgments which thus categorically refer to and qualify an individual or group may be called 'individual': a term which seems preferable to 'singular,' though this designation is employed by Bradley, Bosanquet, and Sigwart. In all of them the Subject is limited by certain conditions of time and space, and only under these conditions is the Judgment true. These limits of the truth are always determined by their relation to the 'here-now' of present perception,—whether this reference is explicitly indicated or not. Of such a kind are those apparently universal but really individual Judgments where the 'all' refers to a group thus limited. From these apparent universals we must distinguish the real or *absolute* universal, as it may best be called, where the 'all' is not limited by any reference to time or place. The characteristic of the Individual Judgment is to qualify its subject by conditions which are true of some particular sphere in time and space; to transcend this limitation is the characteristic of the Universal Judgment.<sup>1</sup>

§ 4. This brings us to an important doctrine which has been emphasised by recent logicians, but which, I think, has scarcely yet been stated so as to appear in its true light. For our intelligence, all individual Judgments are categorical and all true universals are hypothetical, or rather *conditional*. The term 'hypothetical,' employed by Bradley and others, is a very unfortunate one in this connection, for it suggests that doubt or uncertainty attaches to the true Universal by its very nature, which would be a fatal error. Whatever uncertainty is involved may arise, on the one

<sup>1</sup> When this fundamental distinction in Judgments is once grasped, all subordinate distinctions become comparatively insignificant.

hand, from the fact that the universal Judgment has been illegitimately arrived at, or on the other, from the fact that we are not sure whether it can be legitimately applied to some particular case. The Universal is a scientific generalisation, stating a law of the universe, and is only applicable in experience—that is to say, under the conditions of time and space—if the circumstances which it postulates are realised there.

This distinction of the individual Judgment as 'categorical' from the universal as 'hypothetical' is no doubt fairly true of the procedure of intelligence in ordinary and in scientific thinking. Individual Judgments are normally and fittingly expressed in the categorical form, while the universal or *law* is not accurately expressed in any other form than the conditional. It is, however, a purely relative distinction,—it cannot for a moment be maintained to be final or absolute. We shall see that there is a deeper reason why every Judgment from its nature must be conditional, not in relation to events in space and time, but to Reality as a whole. Nevertheless, the distinction in question has a real significance which is often overlooked, and which appears when we regard it as an inaccurate statement of the distinct and necessary parts played by the Individual and Universal Judgments in the growth of knowledge. No such real Universal can be *used* as knowledge—*i.e.*, it cannot be made a means of interpreting experience—apart from the 'categorical' singular Judgments in which its application to experience consists. I do not imply that this has been ignored; it is impossible to ignore the function of the 'minor' (the individual Judgment) in relation to the 'major' (the Universal, or law of Nature). The fact that has tended to pass out of sight is this: we require to investigate

the question, In what sense is the Universal true of *experience*—of events in space and time? Mr Bradley and Mr Bosanquet have shown that the truth of the real Universal, or pure 'hypothetical,' consists—in one aspect of it—in its reference to an actual objective system within which it is affirmed; in this system general laws of connection obtain, so that it becomes possible to affirm a universal and necessary relation in the form, 'given A, then B must follow.' This is the world of what we have called Harmony: it is the world of science—the same objective system to which, as we saw, every Judgment refers, but now in process of organisation by science. The truth, then, of the real Universal lies in its affirmation<sup>1</sup> of the connection of the *then* with the *if*—that is, the affirmation of the existence in reality "of such a general law as would, if we suppose some conditions present, produce a certain result." Thus in the pure hypothetical form of Judgment the *reference of our thought to an objective system is more explicit* than in any Judgment which can properly be expressed in the categorical form.

The whole interest of the two writers has its centre in this reference to a general law, with its implication of an objective system, and in the further question as to how far the law or ground of the hypothesis is implicit, occult, or latent in the universal Judgment when expressed in its proper conditional form. But this reference is only one side of the truth of the universal Judgment; the latter requires also to be connected with experience; a universal that was not so connected would be barren and empty as knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Now to

<sup>1</sup> This affirmation Mr Bradley takes to be 'categorical.'

<sup>2</sup> Any number of Universals cannot give us more than such a system of *relations without terms* as that which Green has in view.



ask, In what sense are Universals true of *experience*? is to ask, In what sense are Individual Judgments true? the former question involves the latter. The Universal (bearing no reference to time or place) cannot be true of experience (which consists of events in time and space) until it has been brought into relation with experience; and it cannot be brought into relation with experience at all unless an individual Judgment, referring to time and place, is true. This appears very clearly in the case of such an ultimate generalisation as the Law of Uniformity,—“the same system of causes will have the same effect.” This I take to be categorically true, as a fundamental postulate of our intelligence: a system of causal conditions  $ABCD \dots$ , having occurred once with the effect  $E$ , will have the same effect wherever and whenever it occurs again. But what avails this for the growth and organisation of our knowledge, unless we can say *truly*—in some sense of the word, or significance of the idea—that ‘here,’ or ‘there,’ is a case of the conditions  $ABCD \dots$ ? The same relation between the two kinds of knowledge appears when we consider the proof or discovery of such Universals. When (as above) the Universal expresses, in the form of a Judgment, what is a constituent part of the organic structure of intelligence, then the notion of proof is inapplicable to it; but in most cases the Universal states a law formulated on grounds of experience. In such a case we may say that a single individual instance here and now may form the ground of a truly universal law, provided the investigation of it is sufficiently thorough; but whatever the process of the investigation, it can only consist of individual Judgments. Again, therefore, the truth of the latter is an important aspect of the case. We



may express it otherwise: in order to reach *unconditionally* valid Judgments—which is the aim of science—we must start from *empirically* valid Judgments, true of some particular place and time or aggregate of places and times; so that the sense in which these are true affects the sense in which the others are true.

The necessary contrast and connection between the Universal (referring to an objective system) and the Individual Judgment (referring to events of experience) is well shown in the Disjunctive Judgment, which brings out, more explicitly than does the Hypothetical, the necessity of both sides of the act of thought. If regarded simply as an affirmation about an individual, Disjunction is merely a stage in the removal of ignorance: 'A is either B or C' signifies that we have grounds for determining A so far, but not for deciding whether to qualify it by B or by C. We may, with Lotze and Sigwart, assign this as the true type of Disjunction with reference to an individual subject or group of subjects; but we must carefully observe the condition of the possibility of such Disjunction. We cannot say of A that it must be either B or C unless we know that A enters as an element into a certain objective system of relations, and also unless we know enough of the nature of the system, and of A's place in it, to restrict the further qualifications of A to the sphere of 'either B or C.' Both sides are necessary to the fact: we must have the general system as the ultimate ground of the Disjunction, and we must have the individual element, A, referred to it. Let us take an instance of an extremely simple and abstract form of such a system,—the order of space and time as defined only by the impossibility of an individual's simultaneous presence in two different

places; it is only by reference to this system that we can say of any person—for his mere *existence* is enough to place him in the 'system'—that 'either he was present here on that occasion or he was not.' Again, take an example of a rather less simple system: if we have three positions marked in space, we know that, of their distances from one another, either two only are equal, or all are equal, or all are unequal. Here the system referred to is that which is implied geometrically in space of two dimensions. For a more complicated example, we may give: "Any section of a cone by a plane must be a point, or a straight line, or a circle, or an ellipse, or a parabola, or an hyperbola, or two intersecting straight lines." Examples might be multiplied—chiefly from Logic or Mathematics, for these are the only two branches of science where we have sufficient knowledge of systems to form exhaustive Disjunctions, in the form 'A *must* be B, or C, or D,' &c. In every case it would appear that the Disjunctive Judgment implicitly refers an individual to such a system, implying at the same time the general nature of the system and of the individual's place in it; but in no case can the individual subject, whether as regards its existence or its significance for our knowledge, be exhaustively 'constituted' by its relations to such a system: for relations without terms are unintelligible for knowledge, and are never found in reality.

The problem of Disjunction has been approached from another point of view by those who write under the influence of Hegel. They find that the implication of a system is the whole significance of the Disjunctive Judgment. This view seems equally one-sided with that of Sigwart, who finds the significance of this form of judgment in its being a stage in the

removal of our ignorance concerning an individual. Thus Mr Bosanquet finds the *essence* of the Disjunctive Judgment in the affirmation of such a system as we have been speaking of; and he seems to set aside the reference of an individual to the system as of no importance, from the point of view of knowledge.<sup>1</sup> This points in the direction of Green's view that the essence of knowledge consists in the progressive apprehension of a general scheme of relations which are relations of nothing at all. Mr Bosanquet treats this scheme or system as the 'individuality' which is implicitly affirmed. The judgment in effect analyses the relations of which the system is composed, and so exhibits the individuality "in the different forms which it is capable of assuming *as a whole*, and which consequently it cannot unite in itself under a single set of conditions; . . . all that is necessary is that the subject-content [the system] should enter as a whole into each of the enumerated forms,"<sup>2</sup> so that the latter are mutually exclusive. From this point of view, Disjunction expresses what is really the ideal of knowledge; though of course it is not implied that in every system we are able to disjunctively relate the parts. Now we may fully grant that to make the universe thoroughly intelligible as a systematic whole, and to comprehend fully the relation of the whole to each of its parts, is the goal of all knowledge, of all science and Philosophy; and that if the relations of each part to the whole were fully known, each part would be a unique manifestation of the whole, in the manner implied in Mr Bosanquet's account of Disjunction. But the form of expression for this would be Conjunctive—the universe would be seen to be determined as A and

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 343.

<sup>2</sup> P. 346.

as B and as C, and so on. This conjunctive insight would necessarily show the true mutual relations of the parts, or their significance relatively to one another; and in this insight, we should have passed beyond the view of the universe as merely a Harmony—which is all that pure intelligence can give, and all that is implied in the possibility of Disjunction: we should view it as all embraced in the central unity of an Absolute Life. Mr Bosanquet could scarcely refuse to admit the impossibility of supposing that the Disjunctive Judgment, as it appears in our finite thought, could be a constituent factor of an omniscient intelligence; and why does such an idea seem almost absurd? Surely because it is impossible to get rid of the aspect of doubt or partial indecision in Judgments of this type; and this indecision arises from the primary reference of such a Judgment to an individual representative or member of the system implicated—an individual whose qualities are partially determined by reference to its place therein. Both the system and the single element or elements in it are essential to this form of Judgment; the one is of equal importance and significance with the other, though in the actual intercourse of mind and mind, now one side, now the other, may be explicitly emphasised.

§ 5. How, then, are these individual Judgments true? In what consists their 'empirical validity'?

This question has been investigated with great thoroughness by Mr Bradley,<sup>1</sup> and his discussion of it seems to me to be as suggestive as his conclusion is questionable. The argument is essentially as follows: The conception or universal meaning, with which the

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, bk. i. ch. ii.

Judgment always deals, is inadequate to the facts given in perception—the empirical content of time and space: for, to obtain the conception, “we have separated, divided, abridged, dissected, we have mutilated the given;” and the result is a hopeless abstraction. Then, if I understand him aright, Mr Bradley goes on to infer that the Judgments which categorically refer such ‘abstractions’ to reality cannot be true, for the real is that which appears in perception and shows itself through what is given there: it is that of which the given sensible facts are a *revelation*, though a fragmentary and imperfect one. Hence what is hopelessly inadequate to the appearance cannot be true of that which appears therein. The point is that nothing existent agrees with the ideal synthesis, as such, which forms the content of the Judgment. The Judgment has reference to a concrete particularised reality, and is therefore incongruent with the latter through its *abstractness*. Now there are two senses in which thought may be considered abstract, and I do not gather that the significance of their distinction is adequately appreciated by Mr Bradley. Thought is abstract as compared with the concrete material which is elaborated into sense perception; again, there is the sense in which the thought of some element or elements, related within a system, is abstract compared with the thought of that system as a whole. In the latter sense any incomplete truth is abstract; it is only *conditionally* true, for we do not know what transformation would be necessary in order to expand it into the *complete* truth. It falls short of this in a way *like* that in which conception as such falls short of the concrete in perception. But at the most this is merely an analogy, and one that may easily become very misleading; it is not an argu-



ment. Mr Bradley seems to make it into an argument; his final reason for obliterating all distinction between the so-called 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' Judgments, or between what we have called individual and true universal Judgments—or, rather, his final reason for assigning to the former a minimum of truth as compared with the latter—is that in the individual Judgment of sense on the one hand we never take the full extent of the subject as presented in sense, and on the other we pass beyond the simple presentation of sense. We isolate certain elements or aspects from their environment in the perceptive complex.

Before considering the consequences of the abstractness of thought in the *first* sense of the two indicated above, let us dwell on those of its abstractness in the *second* sense, for this applies to every kind of judgment and to thought in general. All thought is 'abstract' in the sense that it is true of reality only under a condition; this must ever be so as long as we fall short of omniscience, and it applies to the ultimate implication (of reality as a Harmony) in the hypothetical and disjunctive Judgments as well as to every other. Mr Bradley states the matter as clearly as could be wished in his later work: "All our judgments, to become true must become conditional: the predicate, that is, does not hold but by the help of something else. . . . Judgments are conditional in this sense, that what they affirm is incomplete. It cannot be attributed to reality as such, and before its necessary complement is added."<sup>1</sup> At the close of the chapter in the *Logic* to which I have referred,<sup>2</sup> he seems also to fall back on this general ground of the inevitable incompleteness of human knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, p. 361.

<sup>2</sup> Bk. i. ch. ii. pt. 2.



Any portion of knowledge begins to be 'certain' only in so far as we begin to see its organic connection with other knowledges: it is 'uncertain' in so far as we are unable so to connect it, for we do not know what transformation or development of it may be necessary in order that it may enter into this universal relation. No Judgment can ascribe to real existence its elements as they appear in the content of the Judgment. Every Judgment is therefore 'conditional,' 'hypothetical,' 'uncertain'—if we must use such terms—inasmuch as we do not know how far it must be transformed in order to be developed into the whole truth. It will be evident that this is only to say that our knowledge as a whole and in every detail is partial and fragmentary in the extreme. But it is not therefore false: 'incomplete' is not the same as 'untrue.' There is nothing in the nature of any kind of Judgment to prevent its being true *as far as it goes*; but every Judgment, every rational constituent of knowledge, is held subject to a revision which may have to be so thorough as to effect its complete transformation.

It might seem as if this argument could be turned against the individual Judgment: must we not conclude that this form of Judgment, from its nature, must contain far less of truth than the universal or 'hypothetical' and disjunctive forms, because it is further removed than the latter from the comprehension of reality as a universal system? Such a conclusion would be untenable. Our whole inquiry has shown that the essence of the individual Judgment is to refer to a centralised system (or a group of systems) *within* the universal system; and this reference is the essence of our conception of indi-

viduality. The individual Judgment may even come *nearer* to a full representation of the individual system, *quâ* individual with its own focal unity, than the universal does to a full representation of the universal system *quâ* universal. In this case it will contain more truth than the universal. On the other hand, since the individual is not self-contained or isolated from the universal, it follows that knowledge of the latter is originally related to knowledge of the former; and a complete knowledge of the Universe, such as would be possessed by an absolute and infinite Intelligence, would be equivalent to a complete knowledge of the individual.<sup>1</sup> When we thus consider the ultimate truth of assertions—in the strictest sense of the term ‘ultimate’—then we fully grant that the categorical Judgment in its individual form disappears; the distinction of individual and universal has to be broken through. But I do not understand the state of mind which claims to be able to place itself at such an absolute or ultimate point of view: and even from such a point of view there is no ground for assuming that the distinction of individual and universal would *disappear*. We have seen that the two kinds of Judgment are equally necessary for the organisation of knowledge: the one ‘goes as far’ as the other to this end, and both, we may be sure, fall short of ultimate truth by a distance indefinitely great.

Mr Bradley’s special attack upon the individual Judgment is a conclusion from the ‘abstractness’ of thought, not as compared with the Universe as a whole but as compared with what is given to me or to you in Sense. With regard to this, we must first

<sup>1</sup> Cf. what was said above (ch. iii. pt. i. § 3) on the modifying effect which all judgments must ultimately exercise on one another.

point out that truth cannot reside in sense or sentience, as such; the latter cannot be true, nor can it be false, and for the same reason,—it bears witness to nothing beyond itself. If we endeavour to abstract from thought and get back to pure sentience, we approach a state of consciousness which is a mere *fact* of diffused vagueness. Strictly speaking, there can be no sense-knowledge; but there is a *sense-being*, as it were, upon which conceptions (the vehicle of thought-knowledge) in some sense depend, for unquestionably they are occasioned by it. There is an *ἄπειρον* or undifferentiated mass, and the continuous process of conception and Judgment consists in finding points of distinction and relation within this indefinite material. We cannot say that reality is manifested or revealed in and through this *ἄπειρον* until Thought has begun to work upon it. Indeed, from the metaphysical point of view, to regard reality as revealed in what *ex hypothesi* is a mere *continuum*, would lead us straight to “the pit of undifferentiated Substance out of which Hegel dug Philosophy.” There is nothing positive, nothing definite, in the sensuous mass by comparison with which thought could be declared inadequate; to convict thought of inadequacy on this score is simply to convict it of *being* thought. We must therefore conclude that Mr Bradley’s view is untenable; but the divergent view which we indicated just now is not yet made sufficiently clear. The individual Judgment refers to a finite central unity within the general system which is implied in such functions of thought as Hypothesis and Disjunction. It refers to an objectively real individuality. But it is only possible on the basis of a *datum* of sense present to the judging mind, and we

have said that it is possible because it *finds* points of distinction and relation within this *datum*, which otherwise would contain no discriminated differences. It depends on sense, which only exists as present here and now to some percipient mind; and yet it is true in an objective reference which must transcend the sphere of sense. This is our difficulty.

§ 6. Manifestly this problem of the relation of thought, as such, to sentience is only another side of the problem, What is the relation of the sphere of sentience to the sphere of objective reality? There are two views as to this, and both are explicitly stated by Green.<sup>1</sup> When following out the one line of thought, he expresses himself in this way: "When we come to say what nature is for our Reason, we cannot get beyond the mere formal conditions of there being a nature at all." "For Reason, nature is a system of becoming which rests on unchangeable conditions." "Is not the notion that an event in the way of sensation is something over and above its conditions, a mistake of ours, arising from the fact that we feel before we know what the reality of the feeling is, and hence continue to fancy that the feeling is something apart from its conditions? For the only sort of consciousness for which there is reality, the conceived conditions are the reality." When having the other line of thought in view, he says: "Undoubtedly there is something more than thought; feeling [sentience] is so." "The world before there was sentient life was not what it is to us as sentient; the world of conditions of feeling is not to intelligence

<sup>1</sup> The quotations which follow are from the *Works*, vol. ii. pp. 72-81, 181-191.

(even our intelligence) what it is to us as feeling." "The sensitive act is other than any such relation as thought constitutes, and is necessary to the reality of the natural thing; it is an event in time, and as such the absolute *ἔτερον* to self-contained thought." "Sensibility is the condition of existence in time, of there being events related to each other as past, present, and future."<sup>1</sup> Green's perfect candour is evinced in these clear statements of both sides of the question.<sup>2</sup> It is remarkable and significant that so many thinkers who work under the influence of Hegel, or of the Hegelian development of Kant, have failed to free their conclusions on this basal question from ambiguities that are misleading and mischievous. Many of their statements leave us in complete uncertainty as to which of the two lines of thought they are really following. It is very satisfactory, however, to find that Mr M'Taggart, throughout his *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, insists well on the necessary distinction and correlation of thought and the immediacy of sentience: though he does not explain what the *precise function* of thought is with regard to the immediate *datum*. We must conclude that the first line of thought is fatally erroneous in principle. Sentience exists, and is an existence of which we cannot rid ourselves; in becoming the vehicle of knowledge it is not gradually sublimed away into thought. Again, thought exists, and *as we know it* exists only in the form of our own conscious function; and in our own

<sup>1</sup> Green therefore concludes that as the condition of "changes prior to the existence of feeling [sentient beings] on earth or anywhere else," we must postulate an "eternal sensibility" which "never was not." This invites comparison with Mr Bradley's doctrine in *Appearance and Reality*.

<sup>2</sup> It would seem that Green himself had not come to a final conclusion between them.



case no amount of *thinking* brings us any nearer the experience of immediate sentience, which is the basis of developed *perception*. Further, since even an Infinite Thought must—if the term Thought is to have any meaning in such a connection—be conceived by us after the analogy of our own thought, and as not different from it in kind, we cannot assume even that in the Divine Thought there is no function corresponding to what for us is immediate experience. We have no right to assert—in Berkeley's words—that "there is no sense nor sensory, nor anything like a sense or sensory, in God." To say that an object by being merely *thought of* is present to the Divine Consciousness as in perception, is to empty the word 'thought' of all that it can mean for us. Dr Caird's comments on the Kantian view, that the thought of an object might be completed and yet the object be conceived as merely possible so long as it is not presented in sense,<sup>1</sup> seem to me to be unfortunately ambiguous on these points.

Our first conclusion, then, with regard to the relation of sentience and thought, is this: "The process of knowledge is *continuous*; it is 'the process of finding distinctions within an indefinite subject,' or the 'articulation into system' of 'an indefinite reality.' But it is still true that conception has only a mediate relation to reality, while in perception there is an immediate relation. We cannot explain in what this direct experience consists, for that would be to make it mediate—would be, in fact, to dig up the roots of our own life. All that we can say is that without this direct contact with reality, or rather this *immediate presence of reality in us*, there would be no subject

<sup>1</sup> *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i. p. 598.



within which to discover distinctions, no reality to articulate into a conceptual system. The distinction, therefore, between perception and conception is not only undeniable 'within its own limits': it is primary and fundamental."<sup>1</sup> This view of the immediate presence of reality in us in sense is suggested by Kant;<sup>2</sup> and it naturally results from a critical comparison of the doctrines of Bradley, Bosanquet, and Lotze with regard to sense as the vehicle of objective knowledge.<sup>3</sup> By this conception we get rid of the difficulties which result from regarding the sense-datum, with Locke, as an *effect* of reality upon us, or, with Bradley, as a 'revelation' of reality. If the latter conception is admissible at all, we must regard sense as a revelation of reality in respect of those elements in it (in sense) which can be intellectually grasped by thought; not in respect of its whole sensuous character which *distinguishes* it from thought. But this practically results in rejecting the notion of 'revelation' altogether as regards sense, and brings us back to the doctrine of immediate presence. The Judgment of sense grasps certain intelligible relations within the sensuous material, and refers them to reality conceived as thought must from its nature think of reality; these relations can be grasped by thought because sense, as sense, while containing no *intellectual* distinctions, does contain *felt* differences. There are differences in consciousness prior to the intellectual consciousness of differences: the former constitute what Mr Stout calls the *anoetic*, the latter, the *noetic* consciousness. That there are felt differences apart

<sup>1</sup> Professor A. Seth, *Mind*, vol. iv. p. 529.

<sup>2</sup> *Transcendental Aesthetic*, § I, *ad. init.*

<sup>3</sup> We shall see that it needs to be supplemented by a similar doctrine with regard to self-knowledge (ch. v.)

from intellectual distinctions is assuredly undeniable; and the correlation of the two in the developed consciousness is explicable only if *the felt differences are of such a character as to harmonise with, or anticipate, the distinctions and relations with which thought, following its own structure, must work.* If this is so, we can understand how certain modes of sentiency may become the *basis* of a thought-affirmation in the form of the individual Judgment. The question how these merely sentient differences arise is one that may conceal dogmatic presuppositions which we have rejected. We have rejected the view of sense as a manifold of discrete atomic data: it is a continuum within which, nevertheless, variations are possible. We have rejected the idea that this continuum can be explained as produced in consciousness by an activity from without, or even that it can be regarded as a revelation of anything beyond itself. For the purely sentient consciousness—if such exists anywhere—the present sentiency is the whole universe, is all of reality that exists for such a consciousness: there is no reference to anything beyond. So far as this reference arises, it is due to the germination of thought. The question as to the origin of sentience can only be answered from the point of view of an absolute or omniscient Intelligence, and is an inadmissible question from our point of view.<sup>1</sup>

#### IV.

The principle of Identity, as we have been led to formulate it, gives the most abstract and general form of the conception of individuality. Less than this the conception cannot mean; and it may mean much *more*

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix to the present chapter.

without ceasing to be that of an individual. It is to be distinguished on the one hand from the abstract particular,—that which is, as it were, all difference and no resemblance,—which ‘is something itself’ and can in no sense be or even be *like* anything else; and on the other hand, from the abstract universal,—the pure conception. We must now reduce the extreme generality of our principle, and in particular take into account the all-important constituent of Change or Becoming, the place of which, in the conception of individuality, has not yet been assigned. By means also of this fuller definition we shall be able to distinguish the affirmation of real individuals, in this sense, from the ontological principle of pluralism. To this end we may use the definition to formulate as precisely as possible the ontological problems of ‘Being and Change’ and ‘the One and the Many.’

We have been led, on epistemological grounds, to postulate a plurality of beings mutually independent to a certain extent. What then becomes of these when we have in view the attempt to give an ontological account of existence,—to unify the hypotheses of the several sciences by regarding all aspects of reality as modifications of a single complete Being, a single Power or Principle manifested in various ways and degrees in all things? The answer is, that the plurality of individuals is not conceived in such a way as to leave only two courses open—to accept it as ultimate, or to reject it altogether. In other words, plurality has an important degree of truth and of reality; but it is not the final truth nor the ultimate reality. It is a serious error to say that we “set up ‘reals’ in epistemology,—the supposed absolutely existing ‘things’ of ordinary picture-thinking,—in order to knock them

down in metaphysics, by regarding them as 'moments in the being' of an intelligently directed life."<sup>1</sup>

In the *first* place, the ordinary conception of 'things' is not a product of picture-thinking, but has its ground in the employment of the conception of individuality either as a fundamental principle of knowledge, in the sciences, physical and psychical, or as a merely relative principle for æsthetic and ethical ends. In ordinary thought we have many difficulties in applying the notion of individuality to the real; for its application may be fluid. It is so of necessity when we treat as a 'thing' some fact whose unity belongs to it only as an object of æsthetic contemplation, as in the case of a mountain, a rainbow, a waterfall, a flash of lightning; or when its unity consists in its serving some human end—satisfying some need or desire of man, as in the case of a house, or a railway-train; or when its unity is merely spatial or temporal aggregation—thus, a 'piece of wood,' or a 'heap of stones,' even when not viewed as relative to some æsthetic or practical end of man, is a 'thing.' For artistic, ethical, and practical purposes generally, it is sufficient to speak and think of mountains, fields, and rivers,—houses, furniture, and fires, &c., &c.,—as individuals. The one definite and unhesitating application of the notion of individuality is to the conscious lives of ourselves and others; and this suggests some questions. The consciousness of another person—his thoughts and his feelings, his concrete personality on its psychical side—is for my consciousness a trans-subjective reality in the epistemological sense; his personality does not depend for its existence upon my ideas about it, and however

<sup>1</sup> See Professor Ritchie's observations in the *Philosophical Review*, No. xiii. p. 16.

thorough and extended my knowledge of his personality may be, he continues to exist, think, strive, desire, and will in independence of that knowledge; his personality, like mine, has a central unity of its own,—it has *self-hood*. Now whether my knowledge of the concrete consciousness of another can be called ‘indirect’ or not, the knowledge is obviously impossible unless his physical body is an object of my perception;<sup>1</sup> an animal organism—which is an object of sensible perception in space and time—is in some sense the *vehicle* or organ of his consciousness, and hence becomes the means through which his consciousness communicates with mine. To adopt Clifford’s expression, the former is for my consciousness an ‘eject.’ The relation of the eject to its perceived physical manifestation is the relation of consciousness to the animal organism through the nervous system; and concerning this we seem able to say only that there is a mutual conditioning between them—the latter is the vehicle of the former. What then is the warrant for denying the possibility of a similar eject<sup>2</sup> in the case of a lower animal or a vegetable organism which we perceive just as we perceive the human organism? We must allow that in these cases also there is a real central unity manifested in the physical activities and growth of the organism. Having gone so far—and this we must needs do, unless we are prepared to deny feeling to the whole of the

<sup>1</sup> I make no reference to ‘thought-transference’ or to any alleged direct communication between mind and mind through other than the ordinary physical media, because the precise nature of the *facts* underlying such ‘phenomena’ is, in my opinion, so little known that they cannot be made the basis of any scientific conclusions. They are *finger-posts to the unknown*, and nothing more.

<sup>2</sup> Not similar in the sense of being a cognitive consciousness, but in having a certain central unity of its own.



animal kingdom save man—we must go further and not draw the line at organic beings. The fluid and uncertain manner in which the conception of individuality is applied below these limits is a characteristic of common-sense, which always starts from the practical point of view, and is satisfied with whatever knowledge is sufficient for ordinary practical purposes; but the uncertainty referred to tends to disappear with the growth of science. It is this use of the conception of individuality, now in the form of an 'atomic' theory, that lends such significance to the hypotheses of the special sciences. Particular scientific theories are comparative details; but if you destroy the individualistic hypothesis which is always involved, you destroy the sciences altogether.

In the *second* place—referring again to Professor Ritchie's assertion that we set up 'reals' in Epistemology in order to knock them down in Metaphysics—we must say that Metaphysics endeavours to *complete* the conception of reality established by Epistemology, not to destroy it. We have seen that in the true universal or 'hypothetical' and disjunctive forms of judgment there is implied on the one hand an objective system of relations, on the other an objective individuality of which these relations are to be predicated. We have seen that this individual reference can uniformly be detected in Judgments of sense, which play the largest part in pre-scientific thought, while for science, they are the necessary basis of the reference to system in which scientific knowledge consists. It follows that the objective system must be conceived as a system of finite individual beings qualifiable by the relations which they hold to one another, but not 'constituted' by these.



Thus it is manifest that the conception of the individual, so understood, is not that of an absolute self-existent thing,—the 'real' as understood by Herbart. It is possible to complete the conception of individuality, in the ontological reference, without either contradicting and annihilating it, or turning it into the notion of an isolated atom. In view of the persistency of such misrepresentations of the doctrine of individuality, it is desirable to give what may be called a graduated analysis of the principle,—to indicate its distinguishable components and arrange them in order of increasing definiteness.

(a) We have first the conception of pure Being—bare Reality. Here we are met by the Hegelian doctrine which professes in some sense to identify this with Nothing. It is true that the more abstract we make it—the more thoroughly we abstract every qualification and determination—the nearer the conception approaches to that of Nothing; hence we may say that the conception of pure Being, in its emptiness of all positive content, tends to become indistinguishable from that of Nothing, so that in the ultimate abstraction pure Being and Nothing are two names for one conception. This result only shows us that to affirm abstract Being, pure and simple, is in effect to affirm nothing at all. However necessary it may be to emphasise the importance of this as a weapon of defence against the Eleatic tendency in Metaphysics, its significance for our present purpose is very slight. For no Judgment ever consciously affirms merely abstract Being; it affirms at least the Being of *something*,—in other words, it affirms a determinate existence which stands in the greatest possible opposition to non-existence. It may be said that the

identity of Being and Nothing, as conceptions, applies when we affirm the *mere existence* of something, and that this is tantamount to denying its existence. But to affirm the mere existence of *something*—if the words are to have any meaning—is to affirm more than mere existence; it is to affirm a determinate form of existence. Even the most abstract and general conception of the epistemologically objective reality—being defined as that which is independent and permanent relatively to the change and growth of the individual's knowledge—is less abstract than pure Being, and so is not to be identified with Nothing.

(b) This conception of reality begins to receive a more positive content when it is conceived as *qualified*, as determinate being. "Being with a character or mode, which simply *is*: such unmediated character is quality. . . . Quality may be conceived as the determinate mode immediate or identical with being. . . . A something is what it is in virtue of its quality, and losing its quality it ceases to be what it is."<sup>1</sup>

(c) Another degree of abstraction is removed when being is conceived not only as qualified but as *intensively* quantified—that is, when the qualities are conceived as intensive. Intensity is that mode which may change without bringing with it any change in the quality (as such) which has the intensity. There may be *more* or *less* of any quality. Change of intensity does not involve change of nature, while change of quality does; hence, as Hegel puts it, intensive quantity is less 'immediately identical' with being than is quality. Any distinguishable quality may have distinguishable intensities; the most familiar, and the best, examples of this are the varying intensities of

<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *Logic (Encyclopedia)*, § 90 and note.

pleasure and of pain. The fact that change of intensity in a sense-quality (as understood in Psychology) brings with it change of quality, seems to me to be an argument for the view that these qualities are in reality not simple, as they seem to be, but very complex. With regard to such sense-qualities, intensity or degree as above defined includes *both* psychological 'intensity' and 'extensity.'

(d) When the intensive qualities are conceived as cohering together in central unities which are numerically distinguishable—in other words, which are *extensively* quantified—then we have the germinal conception of individuality which is implied in Singular Judgments.

(1) Individuals are conceived as many. Hegel asserts that the One implies the Many because the former can only be defined by its negation and repulsion, that is, by reference to the Many. This is only true of 'ones' which consist *merely* in limits marked out in space and time. The notion of individuality has a *positive* content, which involves a combination of unity and diversity according to a principle. Possibly this fact that any reality can be shown to combine the two aspects of unity and plurality was all that Hegel had in view. (2) Intensive quantity or degree is a conception distinct from extensive numerical quantity,—just as quantity is from quality; extensive numerical quantity may be conceived as different without carrying with it any change of quality or of degree. On the other hand, we are met by the Hegelian doctrine that continuous and discrete quantity mutually involve one another, as do intensive and extensive quantity. The principle seems to be the same in both cases, although the latter pair of categories appears at a higher stage of the Dialectic than the former. It is

thus stated by Mr Bosanquet: "Number considered as the vehicle of magnitude or quantity is both discrete and continuous: . . . it is the essence of quantity to be so." "All units are numbered in virtue of a continuous quality or identity which pervades them." "It is nonsense to speak of counting without saying what is to be counted; and in specifying what is to be counted we specify at once the nature of the continuity and the rule of the discretion."<sup>1</sup> This is an application of the doctrine that Comparison, by which we arrive at resemblances and differences, is only possible in virtue of a real identity in the things compared; while Judgments referring to extensive numerical quantity imply comparison in the distinction of the individuals. Now if the real identity referred to means substantial, central, or focal unity, then the doctrine may or may not be true, but assuredly is not self-evident. If it means only that some definite characteristic occurs in each of the things, so that they resemble one another, then the proposition is self-evident to the extent of being tautological: it only says that in order to be compared or numbered things must objectively, in themselves as it were, be related to one another in such a way as to be capable of being compared or numbered.

(e) We complete our logical outline of the conception of individuality when the central unities are conceived as being 'in time' by introducing the notion of Becoming or Change. We can distinguish degrees of definiteness in this conception itself; thus, Change may mean: (1) qualities (of any kind) following one another in succession (of any kind); this we may call 'change in general' or *mere* succession; (2) qualities in suc-

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, vol. i. pp. 159, 160.

cession, viewed as *continuous*—i.e., as *belonging together* in some kind of unity; (3) qualities in succession, but viewed as succeeding one another in such a way that they can change only within a closed series of forms: here the unity or identity holding them together is an immanent principle *conditioning* their movement, so that no individual can pass out of the series of its own forms into those belonging to another. Here,—as when any individual A can change only into A (a), A (b), A (c), &c., any B into B (a), B (b), B (c), &c., and so on,—we have the conception of an individual changing. Analysing the conception of Becoming, Hegel finds that it involves the attribute of Being, “and also what is the very reverse of Being—viz., Nothing”—and that these two attributes “lie undivided in the one idea.” The Becoming or Change of qualities consists in one quality disappearing in order to give place to another which comes after it; the thing, the individual, does not in changing simply cease to be,—it ceases to be in one respect or mode in order to be in another. It thus appears that there is no contradiction in change, such as Hegel’s statements might imply,—no contradiction in that a thing may both be and become; but change involves two conceptions which we do not as yet see clearly how to connect. It is an ontological problem, not a logical contradiction; how do the modes of existence, which are always changing ‘in time’ and fleeting more or less, depend on the principle which holds them together, keeping them within bounds, so that we say they are changes of one thing? In what sense does this principle transcend and condition the individual existence as such?

Of these two questions, the former makes prominent the problem of Change; the latter, that of Plurality.



If we answer the latter in the negative, if we say there is no transcendence, then we have accepted Plurality as ultimate. This is the position in which Leibniz, however unwillingly, is obliged to rest; it is also the position worked out by Herbart, on logical grounds which deserve far more detailed examination than they have yet received. We may make the general statement that all thinkers who, like Bradley and Lotze, find a real contradiction or self-discrepancy in change, find it by more or less thoroughly applying the logic of Abstract Identity. The subject of change must be 'identical with itself' throughout; the subject S must always be S. This is to exclude change beforehand from the subject which is to change; the changes cannot belong to the subject 'itself.' But according to our interpretation of the principle of Identity, to say that the subject S must always be S means only that the changes of S must occur along a definite series of forms. The problem of change arises *within* the subject which always 'is itself.' It does not appear that the analysis of pure thought or objective knowledge, as such, can carry the problem beyond the impartial formulation of it which we have attempted. *Data* for its solution must be drawn from a wider sphere than that of objective knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

We may say that Leibniz, Herbart, and Lotze, by their aims and methods, and successes and failures, demonstrate unconsciously how deeply important, for any thinker's metaphysical constructions, is his view of the *essential structure* of Thought. Both Leibniz and Herbart assume that the structural functions of thought are accurately set forth in the scholastic formal Logic, where the law of Abstract Identity is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pt. iii. § 1 *ad finem*.



supreme. Herbart applies these principles more thoroughly than Leibniz, so that the difficulty (to which they give rise) of explaining any *real* continuity, intensity, inter-relation, is gradually pushed before him until it is concentrated in the difficulty of explaining the connection which he assumes between the multiplicity of intensive *Vorstellungen*, or psychological presentations, and the 'real' called the soul: the soul has no intelligible function in their regard. Leibniz does not push the principles of his logic so far, but they are the same as those afterwards employed by Herbart. This is equally true of Lotze, who is emphatic in making Abstract Identity the supreme law of thought. But both Leibniz and Lotze differ from Herbart in one important respect, as regards which the two thinkers invite careful comparison. By the side of their view of thought as merely formal and analytical, they assume as ultimate truths certain postulates concerning reality; and though these are obviously products of the synthetic structure of thought, they do not treat them as such, or see the inconsistency of this with the formalistic view. Lotze assumes in this way the principle of Sufficient Reason, and also certain synthetic *data* which he calls Perceptions, but which are really structural principles of Thought expressed in the form of Judgments. The formalistic view of thought, therefore, is implicitly condemned both by Leibniz and Lotze.

## APPENDIX.

## KANT'S VIEW OF THE RELATION OF SENSE AND THOUGHT.

WITHOUT plunging into *Kant-philologie*, or losing ourselves in a multitude of words, it may be possible concisely to discuss some of the aspects of Kant's thought on this problem. Apart from the intrinsic interest of the subject, this will illustrate point by point the contentions of the preceding chapter.<sup>1</sup>

To insist as we have done on the distinct characteristics of sense and thought is not to assert a dualistic separation between the two. The problem of their relation does not arise only when such an illegitimate separation is made,—it arises as soon as we recognise the necessity of the distinction; and it is not solved merely by pointing out the general necessity of the correlation. We need to know what *in particular* this correlation is. This was the problem as it presented itself for Kant. It is true that Kant starts his investigation with the conception that the activity of thought is separate from, and opposed to, the sphere of sense as the basis of the world of concrete experience.<sup>2</sup> Hence, in Professor Adamson's words, "he is led by the exigencies of the problem of reconciliation to insert term after term as a means of bringing them together, but never succeeds in obtaining a junction which is more than mechanical." But if we set aside all notions of their 'opposition' and of the need for 'reconciliation,' the problem of their difference and mutual dependence remains of primary and fundamental importance, and gives to the Kantian epistemological inquiry all its significance.

<sup>1</sup> I may remark that among the critical commentaries on Kant which I have consulted, I have learnt most from those of Professor Adamson.

<sup>2</sup> Pure sense never appears in our experience; it can only appear there when organised by thought; it is the basis of what appears there.

Every reflective thinker both in science and philosophy must start with the conception of a trans-subjective world as valid, whatever transformation he may give to this conception in the course of his inquiries; and Kant is no exception. The trans-subjective world he calls *das Ding an sich*: but his view of the nature of the 'thing in itself,' and of its relation to the individual percipient mind, grew wider and deeper as he proceeded. Let us first indicate the significance of this.

§ 1. In the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, the mechanical view is to the front. The *real* object—which is the *Ding an sich*—mechanically acts on the receptive faculty of the mind and produces various effects there in the way of sensation. This was Locke's idea; he starts with the assumption of a universe of so-called 'material' things in relation to the different individual minds, and of conscious experience as its effect on the mind. Hence all the difficulties of the subjectivity of sensation. Among these, the relativistic prejudice is the most impressive both in its intrinsic absurdity and its inevitableness if we once grant the original presupposition. If sensations are merely subjective affections produced by objects, how can the character of the sense affection be any clue as to the nature of the foreign agency which produces it? Apart from the presupposition, there seems really to be no meaning in saying that Sense consists of subjective states; the latter phrase only has meaning in view of a metaphysical substance whose affections the 'states' are. Sensation is always extended and projected in space and *present* to an individual percipient, and may be distinguished as *perceptively* objective from his ideational processes, which are 'subjective' only in comparison with the *spatial* objectivity of perception. Kant, when conscious of the deeper aspects of his theory of knowledge, adopts this meaning of the terms, and argues that subjectivity, in the former signification, could not be experienced except against the background of objectivity in the latter signification. Whether or not we accept this view that the experience of existence in space is necessary for the experience of existence in time, it is certainly one of Kant's main points in the 'Refutation of Idealism' as introduced in

the second edition of the *Critique*; and it seems to be the only way in which the notions of subjectivity and objectivity can intelligibly be applied in the sphere of sense.

§ 2. Kant, as we have said, *starts* with the same presupposition as Locke; the 'objective' existence is the *Ding an sich*, and the 'subjective' consists of the effects produced by this in the metaphysical substance of the mind. Superimposed on sensations are the *forms* of perception,—by which they become ordered in space and time,—and the categories of the understanding, by which the intelligible relations necessary for scientific comprehension are established among them as ordered in space and time. All that is thus elaborated is stamped as merely 'subjective,' as giving no knowledge of the *Ding an sich*: why is this? Because its sensational basis is 'subjective.' But we have seen that there is no intelligible meaning in this assertion, except the mere fact that sensation only exists as present to an individual mind, and knowledge is only realised through individual minds. Abandoning the mechanical notion of 'subjectivity,' the significance of Kant's theory begins to appear. On the basis of the given *αἰσθησις* of sense an objective and intelligible world is elaborated, as Kant himself shows in the *Transcendental Analytic*. In this part of Kant's work the *Ding an sich* passes out of sight, and hence the account given of the objectivity conferred by the categories is deeply unsatisfactory. It would not be difficult to show this in detail; but it is of more importance to notice the reason.

The fundamental *objective reference* of thought, on which we have been dwelling in the two preceding chapters, is the ground for Kant's primary assumption of an ultimately real world, the 'thing in itself.' But his dogmatic prejudice that this world mechanically produces the material of knowledge in us leads him to regard it as unknowable. When therefore in the *Analytic* he comes to deal with the world which is knowable and partly known—the world which is the object of scientific knowledge—then the true objective reference of thought has to be set aside, for (in his view) it is only a reference to a problematical unknown beyond experience. Hence the objectivity of the world of science has to be

accounted for by some other means. For this purpose Kant constructs the conception of self-consciousness which has proved so attractive to those who read him in the light of Hegel. I shall not dwell upon this here.

Without violence we can correlate the doctrine of the *Ding an sich* with the objectivity of scientific knowledge. The only 'thing in itself,' or *res completa* if there be such at all, is the universe as a whole,—the ultimate reality, embracing all percipient and intelligent beings and the objects of their intelligence. The world of science which they in union erect on the basis of their perceptive experience is a *partial determination* or filling in of the *Ding an sich*. We cannot say that Kant had realised this view; for though as his inquiry deepens he dwells less and less on the unknowable character of the *Ding an sich*, to the end he leaves it in dualistic separation from the world of experience and scientific knowledge.

§ 3. In the constructive parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant deals only with the world of science erected on the basis of 'external' experience. The categories, or vital functions of thought as we have called them, are the principles which thought, under the guidance of its own nature, *uses* in the interpretation of experience. Kant allows no higher category than that of Reciprocity. In effect this is identical with the idea of Harmony or System which we have defined elsewhere; it implies no central unity, and is easily adapted to the conceptions of merely mechanical science. Hence if we limit our view to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and in it to the constructive portions of the work (the *Æsthetic* and *Analytic*), we seem left in the easy position of agnosticism. We have 'science'—mechanical science being the most fundamental—at work upon events in space and time, and we find that from its nature science must be limited to such work. Hence it is useless to seek for any other knowledge; for however far our scientific knowledge of events in space and time is extended, it brings us no nearer to a knowledge of the real world beyond experience—whose very existence indeed is best forgotten. This is the reason why much of modern agnosticism claims descent from Kant.



To suppose that Kant finally rested in such a view would be simply a wild absurdity. To see this we have no need to go beyond the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself. The destructive criticism in the *Transcendental Dialectic*<sup>1</sup> has a positive implication of deep significance. Kant's aim is to show that the object which scientific knowledge reaches by its work, under the categories, on perceptive experience is not a *res completa*, and that it leads to inconceivabilities and contradictions if taken as such. We may entirely waive the question whether the form of the particular dialectical arguments by which Kant seeks to prove that these inconceivabilities follow is valid or not. Their positive implication is what concerns us. They imply a postulate by which thought seeks to know reality as a *res completa*,—not merely as an indefinite continuum, which is all that the scientific understanding can reach with its category of mechanical reciprocity,—but as a whole, self-limited and self-existent. What is this postulate but a determination of the *Ding an sich*?

§ 4. Another significant result of the idea that reality acts upon us in sense is that the effects of its action are conceived as complexes of atomic *data*,—as a multiplicity or manifold of points about which nothing more can be said. This view was carried to an extreme by Hume, for whom all impressions and ideas were 'distinct existences' between which no real connection can be *perceived* by the mind. This view of Sense Kant probably derived from Hume; for it is quite opposed to the Leibnitian doctrine of the continuity of consciousness, with which Kant must have been familiar. It is certain that he begins by conceiving of sense in this way, as a manifold of undefinable particulars. Sense is thus in its very nature opposed to the nature of thought, which is to produce universal synthetic principles and general ideas. These must be brought to bear on the chaotic manifold if experience is to be possible. Experience in the wider sense—experience as it is in process of organisation by scientific knowledge—must be constructed out of such manifold by the understanding bringing the categories or interpretative synthetic principles to bear

<sup>1</sup> In what follows I refer only to the *Cosmological* discussion in the *Dialectic*.



upon it, and arranging it in the forms of space and time. How are they brought together? In dealing with this problem Kant seems to introduce a middle term between the unsynthesised manifold and the intelligible unities of experience or scientific cognition. This middle term is the 'Synthesis of Imagination,'<sup>1</sup> which renders possible 'Judgments of Perception' or of '*mere* Perception.' Now in effect this is not merely a *tertium quid* introduced to remove the difficulties arising out of an illegitimate abstraction of sense from thought; it is a *revision and reconstruction of the inadequate conception of sense with which Kant started*. It is a recognition on Kant's part that the chaotic manifold does not exist and never did exist.<sup>2</sup> This result is inferentially involved in Kant's thought rather than anywhere explicitly stated by him. He speaks of the synthesis of imagination as if it were accomplished over the manifold *data* of sense; but we may learn from him that it does not need to be accomplished, that there is no manifold, and that the synthesis in question is only another name for sense as it really is.

We do not need to go beyond Kant's words to find that, even if there is a manifold in sense, the intellectual synthesis through the categories does not act upon it but on the 'blind' synthesis of imagination; it is this that is worked up into knowledge by thought. What then is Kant's account of this primary synthesis? We must first notice that it is not the 'same' as the intellectual synthesis, or even 'another aspect' of the latter. There are a few phrases which might be turned to support this view; but many others explicitly forbid our adopting it. The strongest of the former is as follows: "It is one and the same synthesis which in the one case under the name of Imagination, in the other under that of Understanding, produces conjunction in the manifold of sense." But they cannot possibly be *merely* the same; the most that can be meant is that they are two different operations of one function.

<sup>1</sup> Kant also describes it as 'Productive Imagination'—a 'blind,' 'unconscious' function of the mind.

<sup>2</sup> Such psychological work as that of Dr Ward, Mr Stout, and Professor James is sufficient utterly to discredit the notion that sense can ever be a mere manifold.

This being understood, we find two accounts of the synthesis of imagination.

§ 5. One line of thought makes this synthesis equivalent to a conscious apprehension of formed objects in space and time. Thus, Kant speaks of the difficulty of showing how the categories confer objectivity on what is given in sense, since 'objects' can be given in sense apart from them. Similarly, in the *Prolegomena* he distinguishes Judgments of Experience, which involve the use of an intellectual principle of synthesis, from Judgments of Perception, which do not.

This reminds us of the view of 'Immediate Apprehension' expounded by Mr Hobhouse in his *Theory of Knowledge*.<sup>1</sup> As a preliminary to his defence of this conception, he insists that Kant's complete and final view of sense is the view which regards it as a chaotic manifold,—that the essence of his theory consists in showing how an intellectual synthesis is necessary to form our actual experience out of this manifold,—and that since modern Psychology has exploded the notion of such a manifold, the foundation of the Kantian theory of knowledge breaks down. His conclusion is that the basis of knowledge consists in the Immediate Apprehension, or 'Assertion' (as he also calls it), of present reality in the form of definite objects occupying space and time. This apprehension is absolutely certain, independent, and self-contained; since it does not go beyond present reality, no subsequent extension of knowledge can have a modifying effect upon it. We may form Judgments *about* what is immediately apprehended; but Judgment is an intellectual function, employing universal meanings, and is distinguished from Apprehension, which is its basis and may exist without it.

The root of the matter is reached not by questioning whether there can be, in some sense, a direct apprehension of differences and changes in consciousness; but by questioning whether this can be called *Assertion*, or described as a mode of *knowledge*, and yet distinguished from Judgment and Thought. Dr Caird denies absolutely that Kant is justified in speaking of *objects*, much less of *Judgments*, in connection with 'mere perception' or apprehension; and he warns us

<sup>1</sup> Part I. ch. i., ii.

against attributing to Sense, as such, those characteristics which it can only have for a Subject, or mind, which is not merely sentient but also intelligent.<sup>1</sup> As we have elsewhere said, sense cannot appear in *our* experience unless it is organised by thought. The minimum of knowledge or Judgment or Assertion necessarily passes *beyond* the immediately present existent fact. The individual Judgment of Perception, as we have explained it, does this as effectually—though of course not to the same extent—as the most abstractly universal hypothesis. We are in the region of thought as soon as ever *language* begins, even language so rudimentary as not to be vocal, provided it consists of some outward symbols *standing for* states of one consciousness and capable of *suggesting* them<sup>2</sup> to another. In what possible sense, then, can we apprehend or ‘assert’ anything *as real* apart from thought? What does such reality mean *for the consciousness which ‘asserts’*? Mr Hobhouse would probably find the latter question rather difficult to answer, if he is to distinguish the ‘assertion’ from even the germinal form of thought.

§ 6. The other line of thought, which we find in Kant, puts the doctrine of Imagination in quite a new light.

According to this view, the synthesis of imagination, ‘without the categories,’ that is, before thought has developed, yields us a ‘blind play of images,’ ‘less than a dream,’ such as we may assume the consciousness of a lower animal to be. Thus Kant says:<sup>3</sup> “If in thought I make myself into an animal, I can conceive sensible ideas to carry on their regular play in my soul, seeing that they might still be bound together according to an empirical law of association and so have influence upon feeling; . . . but then I should not through these ideas have *knowledge* of anything, not even of the state of myself which the ideas imply.” In other words, the ‘anoetic’ or sentient consciousness is not an absolutely homogeneous state of feeling, but contains *variations* which succeed each other in a regular order; it contains *felt differences* which are not a chaos, and hence as thought develops it becomes

<sup>1</sup> *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i. p. 385.

<sup>2</sup> We cannot say, at this stage of consciousness, ‘suggesting ideas of them.’

<sup>3</sup> In a letter to Herz, quoted by Dr Caird, vol. i. p. 313.

possible for intellectual distinctions to supervene upon these felt differences. Thus, space and time, and the sensuous content which must always fill them if they are to be real, are not mere forms of thought, but are always formed *by* thought as they appear in our experience. Dr Caird, following a hint of Kant's,<sup>1</sup> suggestively applies the notion of *pre-established harmony* to the relation of sense and thought; but when he proceeds to approve and adopt the expression that thought is *implicit* in sense, I find it hard to attach any clear meaning to the word. It seems to me to be a mere phrase which throws no light on the matter.

Thus Kant's doctrine of imagination is really a reconstruction of his doctrine of sense. The notion of sense as a chaos of *data* received from a foreign agency must be finally abandoned; and with it goes the conception of the 'subjectivity' of knowledge. Indeed if it is not abandoned, all the difficulties of the relation of sense and thought arise over again. If the so-called synthesis of imagination is a 'subjective' synthesis conferring connection upon *data* received from without, are the modes of this synthesis of purely subjective origin, unprompted by anything in the characteristics of the *data* themselves? Or are they a response on the part of the Subject to certain peculiarities of the *data* as they came from the side of the 'object'? The *former* supposition of course makes our knowledge purely subjective, in the sense that it might be extended infinitely without coming any nearer to knowledge of the real 'nature' of the object,—to which indeed, on such a view, it would have no relation whatever. The *latter* supposition raises the further question, in what sense do the modes of reaction of the Subject *correspond* to the objective peculiarities of the *data*? But both suppositions are based on a fundamental error, and must be rejected as inadmissible. We cannot begin our theory of knowledge by attempting to explain sentience as *caused* by reality beyond it. The explanation is the *end* of a completed theory of knowledge such as at present we have no prospect of forming. We are only able to understand, in a very general way, the part which sentience plays in the organisation of our experience.

<sup>1</sup> Caird, vol. i. p. 356.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE GENERAL NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

STATED in its most general form, the aim of Psychology is to *classify* and—in some sense of the word—to *explain* the facts of consciousness as they occur in the actual life of the normal mind in its relations to other minds and to the ‘natural’ or non-human world—that is, in its relations to its social and physical environment; for of this relation there are certain general aspects from which the mind cannot be abstracted without a complete departure from reality. As the first step towards realising his aim, the psychologist must obtain a clear and unambiguous statement of the characteristic, specific features of his facts: he must look for certain general features or elements which must be present wherever the facts or processes occur, and which constitute the nature of a conscious process; according to the current phrase, he must begin with a ‘general analysis of consciousness.’ It is far more reasonable to begin thus than to begin with any kind of historical investigation; for consciousness in the concrete is just what is ‘given,’—it is that of which we have the most immediate awareness, while



the past history of our mind is non-existent for us save as fragmentary memories (facts of present consciousness) which cover only parts of it and entirely fail to cover its earliest stages. Apart from this consideration, it is evident that if a historical method of inquiry aims in any degree at shedding light on the constitution of the actual facts, it should be preceded by an analysis of these facts, as they exist when they are nearest to us. Without exact conceptions of these we cannot compare with them the 'results' of the historical inquiry. It is, too, on the basis of the concrete facts, and nothing beyond, that we must formulate our scientific principle of explanation;<sup>1</sup> otherwise we may be formulating a fiction, or assuming a *simplcity* which the facts never exhibit.

It was implied above that any and every consciousness only exists in relation to an environment. This remains always true, though the portion of the environment which is *presented* to consciousness is susceptible of expansion and contraction to an indefinitely great extent,—from the merely physical, through the social, up to the ideal environment in which ideal truth and goodness are realised in consciousness. In this relation, to a surrounding world of some kind or some extent, are plainly involved at least two functions,—a receptive and a reactive. If the terms could be kept clear of mechanical implications, we might say that the rule of the relation is,—give and take, action and reaction, impression and expression or response. The receptive function appears in that the Subject, the individual consciousness, is *aware*, more or less, of the nature of its environment,—the reactive, in that it *adapts* itself, more or less, to it. In general, it is on the ground

<sup>1</sup> See ch. ii. § 1.



of the explicit awareness that the adaptation is possible; so far as the adaptation takes place without conscious awareness of the environment in response to which it is made, it is *habitual* or *instinctive*. *Habits* are simply *instincts* whose origin we can trace. The 'awareness' covers the whole of cognition or knowledge in its various grades; 'Intellection' is the convenient technical term introduced by Professor Croom Robertson. The 'adaptation' is simply what we call involuntary and voluntary action in its various forms; for this, let us with Hamilton employ the term 'Conation.' This real and unmistakable difference led early to the formulation of the 'bipartite' division of mind, into intellectual and active 'powers' or functions. But now it becomes necessary to ask, what is the relation between these? We only respond to as much of the environment as we are aware of, and we respond differently according as the extent and character of our apprehension differs; how then does the 'awareness' become the occasion of the 'adaptation'? The two-fold analysis of mind cannot be sufficient, for it fails to provide any connection between them. Inquiring into this connection, we are led to see the necessity of introducing, into our conception of the relation in which consciousness consists, the obscure but all-important element of Feeling—understood as signifying at least pleasure and pain. Whether more can properly be included in the signification of this most ambiguous term is a matter for subsequent discussion. At present it is sufficient to say that we are able to distinguish three elements in, or constituents of, consciousness; and that their mutual relations may be provisionally expressed thus: whenever some change takes place in our surrounding world—that is, the

world of which we are aware—we are pleased or pained by it, and we act accordingly.

In the present chapter my object is to emphasise both the *distinction* and the *relation* between these constituents of our mental life—in brief, to attempt a full critical exposition and defence of the threefold analysis of mental function. The necessary distinction of the three elements may be emphasised by dwelling on the broad, general characteristics peculiar to each;<sup>1</sup> and I shall then endeavour to investigate as thoroughly as possible certain fundamental problems arising out of the manner in which the *relation* between them is conceived.

§ 1. It has been said that all facts belonging to the order of Intellection—all Presentations, in the wide sense of this term—have the following characteristics: they admit of being more or less attended to, and they admit of Reproduction and Complication—understanding by the latter term that they become differentiated so as to admit of being *discriminated* into distinguishable wholes. Differentiation is prior to discrimination in the order of time, and is its *basis* throughout.<sup>2</sup> If we suppose the discriminative activity of the intellect absent, and with it all modes of pleasure, pain, desire, and volition which would be impossible without that activity, we have no right to assume that no *consciousness* remains, or that only an absolutely homogeneous or *simple* state remains: there remains a sentience which is not ‘undifferentiated,’ *if this means* that it con-

<sup>1</sup> I need hardly say that in this I am not attempting to summarise the Psychology of Intellection, Feeling, and Conation.

<sup>2</sup> For the epistemological meaning of this, see ch. iii. pt. iii. § 6, and pt. iv., Appendix.

tains no diverse aspects for the sentient consciousness. But these diverse aspects or felt differences are not discriminated into *terms with relations between them*. It is only when this properly intellectual discrimination has at least *begun* that we are justified in using such plural terms as facts of Intellection, Presentations, Ideas, Sensations. In the course of this process of discrimination the following orders of Intellection become distinguishable.

(a) The normal Perception, of which there are three factors: the reactive or attentive phase of consciousness, the recognition of an appearance as a fact of a certain nature or kind, and its localisation. Some crucial questions, reaching down to fundamental principles, arise with regard to the second of the three factors of Perception: for 'recognition' has different degrees, and depends on mental processes of different orders of complexity.<sup>1</sup> The traditional English Psychology endeavoured to make the single principle of Association, conceived as operating between 'sensations' or distinct atomic *data*, explain this and all similar problems as to mental elaboration, but its inadequacy is now becoming recognised by all students of the subject. There are different processes, working on different levels. In Perception we discriminate, identify, and in fact classify an appearance; and this involves the use of a general term bringing before the mind a universal or conception by which the identification is completed. Hence Perception has been called a 'presentative-representative' process. The more complete the Perception is, the larger is the part played

<sup>1</sup> See Dr Ward's important articles on *Assimilation and Association*, in *Mind*, N.S., vol. ii. No. 7, and vol. iii. No. 12; and for a further advance on the same lines, Mr Stout's *Analytic Psychology*, bk. ii.

in it by the representative factor, over and above the 'anoetic' or merely presentative factor,—the given mode of sentience. We may contrast what an English ship signified to Crusoe and what it signified to his man Friday. The representative elements in Perception constantly tend to run off into trains of ideas which would take us quite away from the present fact; we cannot, therefore, draw a dividing line between Perception and Ideation. The level of Perception proper is attained as soon as distinct classification of an appearance is possible, when by the help of a universal it is reduced to unity and so becomes an *object for us*. The more primitive the Perception is, the more general and vague is this classification, until at last it becomes an indistinct feeling of familiarity. At this stage, therefore, we have no *memory*, which involves an explicit distinction of the past from the present; we have *retentiveness*, which depends simply on the persistence of past changes, and is exemplified in merely biological growth.

The passage from the elementary to the complex form may be illustrated thus. Some primitive, momentary differentiation of sentience, *P*, leaves a residue of itself, *p*; subsequently *p'*, *p''*, &c., are left by other differentiations (connected with the same objective reality, but not yet so, of course, for the consciousness we are dealing with); and eventually, as when some special interest attaches to this presentation, we may have the actual perception of the object, which is the result of the fusion of the present differentiation with the various *residua*, *p*, *p'*, &c. Now there is no evidence for the *distinct* existence of *p*, *p'*, &c., previous to the formation of the percept; we can only have an image of the percept when it is formed,—only then has it definiteness enough to produce the subsequent

appearance of an image of itself in the mind. Thus we cannot use this scheme to symbolise the 'origin' of a perception out of various primitive differentiations, for the latter are not distinct until the percept is formed. We cannot make clear to ourselves *how* the one stage arises out of the other; all we can say is that through repetition of differentiations,<sup>1</sup> there is first produced a 'feeling of familiarity' or *subconscious* recognition, which eventually issues in an explicit, definite recognition of an object. Images, or 'free ideas' as Höffding well calls them, are always images of objects, and depend on completed perceptions. It is only between such free ideas that 'Association' operates: and this is the significance of the *dicta* of Mr Bradley and Professor James — "association marries only *universals*," "association is always *of things*." In Mr Stout's words, "the connection which is operative in the process of revival is not between atomic particulars as such, but between general elements of content which they have in common."<sup>2</sup> In Professor Dewey's words, "The sole way of accounting for the fact that we have significant experience, or that sensations in addition to being psychical occurrences are also psychical meanings, is that the mind conserves permanently out of every experience the meaning of that experience, and . . . reads this conserved meaning into a given sensation."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This term I use in its *anoetic* significance: and for reasons already explained it is inadmissible to say, repetition of 'sensations' or 'impressions.'

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> *Mind*, vol. xii. p. 392. Professor Dewey's language in this article suggests that sensation is a *manifold* over which intelligence comes as a relating faculty. The manifold does not exist, and never did; 'sensations' are merely prominent aspects of a continuum. But the essence of Professor Dewey's argument, which is excellent, still holds good.



The particularity of the revival is due to the particularity of the present experience; as Mr Stout has said, "any actual reproduction is the work of the present psychological *datum*; the special features of this give a special embodiment to the *preformed general connection*." To Mr Bradley and Dr Ward belongs the credit of being the pioneers, for English thinkers, of this great psychological advance. Incidentally it brings out another matter of importance: the 'universal' is not the mechanically formed product with which formal logic deals; it grows gradually out of the image, as the latter is used with stress on its structural relations rather than on its pictorial character. The relations involved in its spatial form are intermediate, forming a transition from its pictorial to its conceptual character.

(b) We have already described the general character of the primary representation in distinguishing it from perception. The image qualitatively resembles the content of a past perception, and it becomes representative or symbolic of the latter through the time-reference it bears. It is thus the vehicle of 'memory.'

(c) The secondary representation or 'generic image' is produced by the occurrence of the same cluster of imagery in different contexts. The latter neutralise each other, and the central image becomes at once stronger, in the sense of being more permanently retained, and also more generalised in the sense of having a less definitely pictorial character.

(d) The Conception—the vehicle of knowledge and characteristic mark of thought—begins to appear when certain intelligible relations are established among the members of a primarily or secondarily representative group. The conception is in process of formation



when within a complex of imagery, more or less generic, we distinguish certain points of relation, and when by such a scheme of relations we aim at *understanding* what is represented by the imagery, as well as *picturing* it; this objective reference seems essentially involved in conception. As soon as such a *schema* is fairly discriminated, the imagery which has been the occasion and possibility of its discrimination becomes irrelevant, and a General Term is sufficient to fix it for the mind. In the formation of the *schema* are involved in germ all the functions of Judgment and Inference; it is simply by an extension of the functions involved in conception that, in Judgment and Inference, we endeavour to organise the vast scheme of relations in which knowledge as a whole consists.

The definition of sentience as the basis of perception is a matter of great difficulty; as Dr Ward has justly said, 'sensation' is, next to 'consciousness,' the most hopeless term in Psychology. To assign the physiological conditions of sentience is, of course, no definition. Mr Bradley, speaking of the Real as that which we 'encounter,' or which 'touches' us, in Perception, has described some of the characteristics which common-sense would assign to what it would call our sense-knowledge of reality: "The real is . . . that which appears in the series of events in space and time. It is that which resists our wills; a thing is real if it exercises any kind of force or compulsion, or exhibits necessity. It is, briefly, what acts and maintains itself in existence. And this last feature seems connected with former ones. We know of no action unless it shows itself by altering the series of either space or time, or both together; and again perhaps

there is nothing which appears unless it acts.”<sup>1</sup> This emphasises very well the *compulsory* character of the sentient basis of perception: we have to accept in its entirety, and cannot evade, what comes upon us in the present time and actual space before us,—and we try to express this by speaking of it as *given*. But all such expressions as those employed by Mr Bradley—and they are very common—are unfortunate, as suggesting that the facts in question are produced by some force acting on the mind from without;<sup>2</sup> the term ‘given’ can probably never be cleared of this implication, which also comes to the front when we speak of perception, or rather certain constituents of it, as ‘passive.’ As a simple matter of fact, the most fantastic flights of imagination often have just as much ‘passivity’ as sensation. Modern Psychology fails to find anything of which such purely ‘passive’ or ‘given’ character can intelligibly be affirmed; and it has rightly abandoned the attempt to explain any fact whatever as caused in the mind by an activity from without.

It is possible to distinguish certain aspects of sentience which mark it off from other orders of mental fact. (a) It must always be the experience of a particular percipient being or organism at a particular time and place; but this by itself is of course insufficient. (b) It has continuous extensive quantity, so that *parts* can be marked within it, both simultaneous and successive. (c) It has continuous intensive quantity, so that it can vary in *degree*.<sup>3</sup> Both space and

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> Of course I do not imply that Mr Bradley himself holds this view.

<sup>3</sup> These are Kant’s ‘Axioms of Intuition’ and ‘Anticipations of Intuition.’

time seem essential to sentience, for the latter cannot be experienced or conceived without continuity, and continuity cannot be experienced or conceived apart from space and time. If we go back to the primitive consciousness, we must say that continuity is realised in the primitive germ-experiences of space and time—*i.e.*, ‘massiveness’ and ‘duration.’ Since all attempts have failed to derive space-perception from a state of consciousness from which every spatial characteristic is absent, which is capable of varying only *intensively*, I assume that *in principle* we must adopt the view of Dr Ward and Professor James, that the most primitive experience has an irreducible extensive character. Similarly, in explaining time-perception, we must start with a primitive irreducible experience of time-transience. The course of experience teaches us to distinguish, in the germinal space-experience, what we now know as height, breadth, and depth,—and in the primitive time-experience, what we now know as present, past, and future. The Psychology of time and space has to trace the *stages* and the *conditions* of this course of development.

It would seem that continuity, extensive and intensive, is a characteristic peculiarity of sentience, both in its primitive form and when elaborated into perception. For facts of the order of imagination have no extensive divisible quantity; and it is a great question whether they have any intensive quantity, in the proper sense.<sup>1</sup> They vary in distinctness and completeness, which we mistake for intensity. If we must admit variation in intensity—which seems to me to be highly questionable—it is only possible within very narrow limits. There is no such difference between the cry

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lotze, *Metaphysic*, §§ 262, 263.

of a bat and the roll of thunder, when *imagined*, as there is when *perceived*.

§ 2. Feeling, in the sense in which the term is here used, is a psychological abstraction, just as motion is a physical abstraction. There is no actual motion which has not a definite direction and velocity; there is no actual feeling which is not related to some content of consciousness, some group of primary or revived presentations, which together with the reactions of organic sensation and the induced movements of attention, gives to the feeling a specific character of its own. The actual feeling is not "made up of various component parts of a general pleasure and pain; any more than the different colours are produced by different mixtures of bright and dark" (Lotze). But in science we are obliged to deal with pleasure in general, pain in general, feeling in general, in which sense there can be no difference other than that of duration and intensity—and perhaps also extent—between the pain of a great grief and the pain of toothache, or between the pleasure of poetry and the pleasure of 'pushpin.' *These are not statements about facts* but about the meaning of a scientific term.

To enlarge upon the ambiguities of 'feeling' and related terms is to say things that are both true and trite; nevertheless it is worth while briefly to review the customary terminology in order to show how great is the extent of its indefiniteness and how merely *practical* its ordinary utility. It is not uncommon to meet with the observation that the subject-matter of this portion of Psychology is perfectly definite, inasmuch as "all know what we *mean* when we speak of pleasure or pain." The latter statement is certainly true; these

terms, as regards their Connotation or Intension (if the expression is at all admissible), stand for an aspect of our inner experience which defies further analysis, and to be known must be experienced. Nevertheless what we might call their Denotation—the extent of their proper application within the whole range of mental life—is certainly far from definite. Much confusion would be avoided if we were able to dispense with the use of terms, which in common language derive all their meaning from reference to our actual concrete experiences, to indicate in Psychology the result of analytical reflexion upon those experiences. The terms pleasure and pain have very different implications and associations in the two cases. It is, I think, hardly open to doubt, when we consider the usage of ordinary thought and language, that the primary reference of the terms in question is (or was) to the experience of *physical* pleasures and pains,<sup>1</sup>—feelings that are localised at some portion of the peripheral surface of our bodily frame, or are more or less vaguely referred to some internal part. Implying no psychological analysis, they cover also the intellectual or presentative elements involved in such localisation. It is natural that this should be the primary meaning; for, as we know, bodily feelings are very prominent in early life, and through the whole of it are sufficiently prominent to exercise an important part of our energies. But while this is the primary reference of the terms, their ‘denotation’ has been extended to cover the whole range of feelings conditioned or aroused by primary presenta-

<sup>1</sup> Professor Sidgwick remarks (*Methods*, III. xiv. § 3) that Pleasure is not ordinarily used to include all kinds of pleasant feeling; it suggests rather the commoner and coarser kinds of such feelings. It is the same with the correlative term Pain.



tions,—feelings which have an object; our physical—organic and peripheral—feelings have no object in this sense: that is, no object which can be introspectively distinguished. Not only so, but the terms pleasure and pain are still further extended so as to cover a considerable portion of the feelings determined purely by *representations*, of varying degrees of ideality. It is in this latter reference that the extreme vagueness of their application is most evident. We recognise a certain incongruity in their rigorous application through this indefinitely extended region of representation. This is probably due to the ineradicable reference which they bear to physical pleasures and pains. These, as just remarked, have no object which can be distinguished by introspection from the feeling; while the whole class of feelings determined by presentations and representations are modes of ‘feeling-attitude,’ as it has been termed,—modes of feeling *towards* an object. The state of ‘feeling-attitude’ is never adequately expressed, reflectively or cognitively, without an explicit relating of Self to the object. Thus we must at least say, ‘It pleases me,’ ‘It displeases (or pains) me,’ ‘I like it,’ &c. We call these feelings pleasures and pains; but the latter words suggest a *passivity* which does not characterise the feelings as they actually occur.

Beside what we call pleasures and pains, there are those states of consciousness, familiar and easily recognised, which we are disposed to distinguish as ‘emotions,’—anger, fear, hope, love, &c. The typical emotions are initiated normally by the rise of ‘percepts’ of actual scenes, events, and circumstances; but it is to be noted that they may be aroused in an intense form by representations of past events, and even by



imaginings in the ordinary sense—by representations of events which have never been experienced by the individual, and which he has no reason to believe ever will be experienced.<sup>1</sup> All emotions have an object in one or other of these senses; and in pathological cases the emotion may *constitute an object for itself*. Though an emotion may be *groundless*, from the point of view of an 'impartial spectator,' it is never *objectless* for the consciousness which feels it. Every typical emotion is a complete 'psychosis' or state of mind—all the three functions of consciousness enter into its constitution; and inseparably bound up with it are certain organic activities, internal reflexes and external movements (voluntary or instinctive) which we are accustomed to call the 'expression' of the emotion. Any typical emotion, so constituted, is as qualitatively distinct from other kinds of emotion as one sensation is from another. On the whole, then, it is obviously incorrect to say that emotions are states of pleasure or pain, or that they differ only in degrees of pleasure or pain; and accordingly we never naturally do so. Nevertheless we always find emotions to be either pleasurable or painful,—they are accompanied by feeling-tones of varying intensities.

Another state of mind, perfectly recognisable when experienced, but which common-sense is quite incapable of analysing, is *desire*. Ordinary thought only ventures on the very rough classification of desires according as the objects which satisfy them are states of the mind or of the body. The denotation of the term is practically as unmistakable as that of the terms by which we

<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to ascertain how far we can be conscious of the purely imaginary or fictitious character of the representation *at the moment when* it is arousing the emotion.

indicate the ordinary emotions; but the extreme difficulty of analysing the state of consciousness signified, is evinced by the bewildering variety of conflicting analyses found in our Psychologies, and, above all, in our text-books of Ethics. Desire, for the adult consciousness, is an experience *sui generis*, which we never describe, and which cannot properly be described, as a mere mode of volitional activity or as mere pleasure or pain; but it is normally painful according to its intensity, especially when its object is such as not to be capable of *progressive*, but only of what we may call *catastrophic*, attainment or satisfaction. Moreover, since all desire prompts more or less to action, we find such terms as 'impulse,' 'spring of action,' and even 'instinct,' used to cover all the facts covered by 'desire'; and since 'emotions' are inseparably accompanied by organic activity, they, too, may be described by just such terms, which are indeed vagueness incarnate.

Akin to desire in its impulsive character is the state of mind we call 'interest'—another term signifying what for common-sense is unanalysable. The great importance of interest, especially in its ethical and ethological aspects, is very evident. Our interests are the expression of the dominant tendencies of our mental activity,—they are the things we notice, attend to, adopt,—they are part of our self, and to acquire new interests is to enlarge the scope of self. It would be difficult to state the truth more forcibly than Professor James has done. "The moment one thinks of it, one sees how false a notion of experience that is which makes it the mere presence to the senses of an outward order. Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses which never properly enter into

my experience. Why? Because they have no *interest* for me. My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I *notice* shape my mind—without selective interest experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground,—intelligible perspective, in a word. It varies with every creature, but without it the consciousness of every creature would be a grey chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible for us even to conceive. . . . Subjective interest may, by laying its weighty index-finger on particular items of experience, so accent them as to give to the least frequent associations far more power to shape our thoughts than the most frequent ever possess. The interest itself . . . *makes* experience more than it is made by it."

The preceding brief review was undertaken to show the highly indefinite character of our ordinary terminology; but it has also made evident another fact of great importance, which we have had occasion to notice. All the states of mind which we attempt to distinguish as emotions, interests, desires, impulses, have normally the characteristic of being pleasurable or painful in some degree. In other words, their tendency is to move upwards towards pleasure or what is definitely agreeable, or downwards towards pain or what is definitely disagreeable; and the main problem in the Psychology of Feeling is to investigate the exact function of the feeling with regard to each. Hence the indefinitely great extent and difficulty of the questions which arise in this department of the science.

Feeling—that is, the psychological abstraction with which we here deal—is a purely affective or pathic state which is capable of variation only in four ways: in its

nature as being pleasant or unpleasant,—in its intensity, —in what, for want of a better term, may be called its extent or breadth,—and in its duration. As regards its extent, it may be transient and contracted, or abiding and deep-seated. In a suggestive passage, Höffding contrasts these: “A feeling may be very strong and deeply rooted without being violent, but is then more easily overlooked; the feelings accompanying ideal aims and relations are far less in a position to produce momentary effects and sudden ebullitions than are the physical vital functions. . . . Ideal feelings are spread over a longer space of time and take effect more secretly: yet they are capable of possessing themselves step by step of the central position in the mind.” This fact is in great danger of being ignored; and it seems to me to have important bearings. As regards the duration of feeling, it must be observed that we cannot properly speak of a *stream* of feelings. Long ago Aristotle remarked that pleasure is ‘a certain whole,’—and so is pain. Every feeling is a unity, and lends a special unity to the presentations which condition it, marking them off from others as having a *practical meaning* for the individual into whose experience they enter. Even if these presentations are successive—that is, if when viewed in themselves they consist of more or less discrete portions, one after the other—yet in feeling we are able to hold the succession together in a certain special unity; we are able to experience it as a whole, so to speak, and thus to make it into a duration. Succession cannot enter into a feeling, but duration may. This leads us, finally, to notice a characteristic of feeling which is of significance beyond Psychology. If we understand by the ‘present,’ not the abstract fiction of an indivisible moment, but the concrete ‘now’ in its

ever-varying extent, then we may say that every feeling from its nature is of the present only. Presentation, as we have seen, is capable of being formed, by analysis and synthesis, into wholes of discriminated and inter-related parts; while feeling has a unifying function which excludes any such analysis or synthesis. Presentations again are susceptible of retention and reintegration; that is, they may recur again and again in clear consciousness, and tend to recur in the same combinations; but feeling is of the present only. Indeed it would be almost meaningless to say that feeling is retained or reproduced, for feeling in this sense has no character by which it could be identified as the same at different times. The only possible criterion of sameness would be the sameness of the presentational substrate of the feeling. The only course open to us seems to be to affirm that a *new* feeling is called forth by the present representation of the same object. Feeling is not retained, any more than the concrete imagery which clusters round the present sentience is retained.<sup>1</sup>

§ 3. Having briefly surveyed the general characteristics of feeling and of presentation, let us now turn to the active element.

In nearly every modern work on Psychology we find some sections devoted to a destructive criticism of the faculty theory, although the notion of faculties has totally disappeared both in Psychology and Physiology. Science, as we know, aims at finding something more fundamental, operative in various ways in the various 'powers': its explanation is in a sense also a simplifi-

<sup>1</sup> It must be observed that such questions only arise because in Psychology we are compelled to regard the whole mind as *essentially* a process in time.



cation. But if the principle used is too simple, if it is inadequate to the complexity of the facts, then instead of explaining these we shall explain them away. The notion of faculties implied also that of activities, and we must replace the many faculties by the one function of activity or attention or conation—the *name* given to it is comparatively unimportant, provided we recognise that it is the *ground and root of the notion of activity*, and is inexplicable by anything else. It is easy to raise objections to any name which we may use to designate the fact; ‘activity’ or ‘conation’ are probably preferable to any others, for the reason I have just mentioned,—a reason which is recognised by those psychologists who do not explain away the fact. Hence it is idle to ask, what right has attention to be pre-eminently entitled active? if the word ‘active’ cannot properly be applied *here*, then assuredly it may not be used in any other connection whatever. But you cannot get rid of the word or the idea; you may exclude it from attention and volition, but then you will find yourself speaking of consciousness as a whole, or of ‘thought’ or ‘judgment’ or ‘sensation,’ in terms which necessarily imply it; or if not, then it will creep into your account of organic or inorganic phenomena. The notion of *agency* will find for itself a standing in the universe somewhere; without it, reality is reduced to a play of fleeting shadows—shadows cast by nothing on nothing.

A peculiar ambiguity is introduced into this discussion by the failure to distinguish psychical activity as such from the ‘consciousness of’ muscular activity. A doctrine which is widely held—of which Professor Bain is a well-known exponent—recognises that there is an *active* constituent in consciousness which is not



mere feeling or mere sentience or intellection ; but it goes on to explain everything characteristic of the 'active' consciousness as being the result of muscular strain. 'Activity' is affirmed to consist merely of the sensations correlated with those neural processes which effect muscular movement ; and it is pointed out that not only our motor organs but all our sense-organs are supplied with muscles, by the action of which they are moved either wholly or in some of their parts. As Professor Sully has it, "The most obvious general differentiating circumstance" in all active or conative phenomena is "the psychical correlate of muscular action: our consciousness of activity is based on the common peculiarities of our muscular sensibility." Professor Bain—and here too Professor Sully seems inclined to follow him—would insist that these muscular sensations, which give its special character to our 'active' consciousness, are differentiated from all sensations which are peripherally initiated (*i.e.*, dependent on *afferent* nerve-currents) by the fact that they are specially correlated with the *efferent* nerve-currents which effect the muscular movements. They therefore constitute a distinct 'consciousness of innervation.' But the view more prevalent at present, and the one to which the results of experiment and pathological observation would point, denies any such consciousness of efferent innervation, and makes all the so-called muscular sensations result from muscular motion having been effected ; so that they are on the same level with all other sensations as being correlated with afferent processes in the nerves.

Whichever of the two views is taken, the difficulties of the general theory are equally great. It is no doubt plausible to say that when we 'attend' to a sensory

presentation—of sight, for example—the only ‘activity’ in the case is the sensation ‘of’ the muscular adjustment of the organs of sight. But the matter is not so simple when we attend—whether voluntarily (that is, selectively) or not—to a representative image; though here ‘nascent’ muscular activity in the corresponding sense-organ may be brought in as the ‘agent.’ The difficulties seem insuperable when we selectively attend to a process of thought as such; that is, when we voluntarily control the thoughts in view of a certain end, selecting, accepting, or rejecting our conceptual material according to its intellectual harmony with the end. Here the only ‘adjustment’ consists in organising ideas which are perhaps of a high degree of generality; it cannot be reduced to ‘consciousness of’ any muscular process,—to the sensations accompanying such a process. Of course it may be said that when we attend to a general idea as such, what we really attend to is a particular concrete image—viz., the *general term* which we use in language to signify the idea; but this does not apply when we attend to the intellectual relations of the ideas, when we *think* in the proper sense of the word. These are thought-relations, not relations among the mental images of words; and the selective activity involved in organising them must be purely psychical.<sup>1</sup> The difficulty of the muscular-sensation theory is equally great in the case of Desire. When desire for an end (consciously represented) leads to action, can the whole process be reduced to one of pure feeling and pure intellectual apprehension (including concrete imagination)? Professor Sully seems to

<sup>1</sup> I do not understand that those who regard a *vaso-motor* process as the physiological concomitant of this intellectual attention (cf. Stout, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 219) seek to ‘explain’ the latter by the former.

recognise the impossibility of this when he says that the higher forms of volition "involve not merely this psychical concomitant [of muscular activity], but also a psychical antecedent in the way of consciousness of purpose and forecasting of end." Here is implicitly recognised the element of psychical activity or conation. The more one reflects upon it, the more futile seems the appeal to the consciousness of muscular strain to explain what we can only describe as the *active* process of discriminative selection from among ideational and conceptual elements. This process of selection *in view of an end* is not in the least parallel to the process of muscular adjustment. The innervation-theory was itself an implicit recognition that activity is an essential character of consciousness, since it attempted to find a physiological ground for distinguishing the active element, in the fact that it alone is the concomitant of a central nervous discharge. But this physiological ground is now falling away; muscular sensations would seem to be just as passive as other sensations, and these to be just as active as the muscular sense. We must either regard all notions of activity in consciousness as illusory, or we must regard what we call activity as a unique essential characteristic of all mental life. It must further be insisted that no psychological fact can be explained by reference to physiological facts; it is a serious error in method to suppose that any characteristic of the subject-matter of a lower science can explain that of a higher.<sup>1</sup> In saying this, I am not in the least blind to the interest and importance of ascertaining the physiological conditions of various orders of mental fact; but these conditions are in no sense explanations.

<sup>1</sup> The grounds for this statement were set forth in ch. ii.

Professor Sidgwick and Mr Spencer have proposed to 'define' feeling by reference to the fact that a pleasurable content of consciousness is one which we endeavour to retain; a painful content, one which we endeavour to expel, or from which we turn to other contents. This seems true *in general*; but it is scarcely a 'definition' of feeling,—it is rather a statement of the connection of feeling and activity. We find that our mental activity is always first prompted by feeling and sustained in response to movements of feeling; hence arises its selective character, following one line in *preference* to another. It is true that conation may have an effect on feeling, but this is through the intensification, or extension, of the presentations which call forth the feeling. In thus stating the connection of feeling and activity, we have not referred to the bodily movements which constitute the outward side of *conduct* in the ordinary sense. But volition, in the usual sense,—as meaning the state of mind immediately antecedent to muscular movements,—is not constituted otherwise than by a feeling-prompted psychical activity in relation to ideas of aims and ends. At the risk of a small amount of repetition, we may summarise those results of the Psychology of Volition which may be regarded as fairly established. (a) We must distinguish *muscular* effort, in the proper sense of the word, and *mental* effort; what is commonly known as 'muscular exertion' is a compound of the two. It is less misleading and more accurate to speak of muscular *strain* than of muscular effort. (b) The only modes of consciousness connected with muscular motion are sensory presentations and representations of it as *accomplished*; muscular 'effort' or strain is a sensory complex, correlated with the functioning of *afferent* nerve-tracts, and

resulting from movement being accomplished. The supposed feeling of *efferent* innervation does not exist. In this, authorities working from very widely separated standpoints—James, Wundt, Münsterberg, for example—are now agreed. (c) With regard to mental effort, the psychologists who accept the view of mental activity which we have here defended explain it as an intense or concentrated form of that activity. Others explain it as due to some characteristic in the connection of the presentations.<sup>1</sup> The latter view makes attention a ‘resultant,’ as Professor James would say, while the former makes it a ‘force’—that is, an agency not exhausted in the products of intellectual discrimination. The view of attention as a ‘resultant’ implies that the only ‘activity’ which is admitted is the actual intensity, quality, and other special character (such as ‘feeling-tone’) of each distinguishable *Vorstellung*. This conclusion has been worked out by an important school of psychologists, among whom Münsterberg is the most prominent; and it is the logical result of the principles of the English Sensationalist Psychology, as expounded, for instance, by Professor Bain. (d) To place our sense of activity and effort in the nexus between the volition, considered as a psychical state, and the muscular contraction is a view destitute of evidence and open to fatal objections. On such a view it would be difficult to understand how we could execute any bodily movement until we had physiological knowledge of the means necessary for it; not only of the muscles and their contractile properties, but also of the means of exciting a definite motor nerve-tract in the manner necessary for contracting the muscles concerned in

<sup>1</sup> See Mr Bradley's article, “Is there any special activity of attention?” *Mind*, vol. xi.



producing a definite movement which we desire. (e) The object of the volitional effort always lies within consciousness, and is an idea or representation of afferent muscular sensations—in other words, a representation connected nearly or remotely with the latter through the laws of redintegration ('association'). From its intrinsic nature, or from the presence of other ideas of more interest, this representation may tend to lapse from vivid and stable consciousness; attention may be attracted elsewhere. Mental effort in attending may then accompany its maintenance. That this idea, being once maintained, should by the connection between its cerebral seat and other bodily parts give rise to muscular movements, is a secondary matter with which the psychical effort as such has nothing immediately to do.

The general character of the psychological principle which we have adopted is now apparent; in every concrete state of mind there is—

A subject related in its	} action-under-feeling	{ to objects or presentations.

The term subject is employed to emphasise the individualised or centralised character of every consciousness, with its unity at every moment and its continuity through successive moments. We regard the whole nature of the Subject as manifested in and through its threefold function of Intellection, Feeling, Conation; it is not something which exists apart from these. So far as we *know* this threefold function, we know the 'substance,' 'essence,' or real nature of the soul, or what it is 'in itself.' This is the psychological application of the principle on which Lotze and Sigwart have so well insisted—that a thing is what it *does*. The 'phenomenon' is just as much of the 'noumenon'

*as is known*; it is not a screen preventing all access to the 'noumenon' and so turning it into an *Unding*. On the other hand, the so-called 'phenomenal' knowledge, though it has a degree of truth, is not the whole truth about consciousness; hence any psychological conclusion, if treated as absolute, as the whole truth, may lead to insoluble difficulties,—which show not that the conclusion is false, but that such treatment of it is illegitimate.

§ 4. The general analysis has been stated so as to imply an order of dependence among the constituents of consciousness,—feeling being aroused by presentation, activity initiated by feeling. Now, it may be urged, against this, that just as in a horizontal motion we cannot regard direction as depending on velocity, or velocity on direction, though the two are always distinguishable; so in consciousness we cannot say that feeling *depends* on presentation, or conation on feeling. The fact of a motion in a certain direction is itself the fact of a motion with a certain velocity; in the same way, the fact of a cognitive state occurring is at once the fact of a state of feeling and activity occurring. It would thus be impossible that these should act on one another; change in one cannot *produce* change in the other, for change in the one already *is* change in the other.<sup>1</sup>

This is evidently a question which demands careful consideration.

Since the objection is not made from the point of view which denies that in any concrete state the three elements can be distinguished, let us *assume* that there

<sup>1</sup> This view appears, in a modified form, in Mr Stout's *Analytic Psychology*.

is an invariable order of dependence among them: where shall we look to find its nature? Not in such states as bodily feeling, where the cognitive or presentative element is insignificant,—or æsthetic contemplation, where the active is so,—or the process of abstract reasoning, where the affective may be insignificant; but in the normal process of desire realising itself in action, where all three elements are equally prominent. Here we have a real *process*; the distinguishable kinds of mental function are not realised as it were all at once; the representation of the end, as unattained or partially attained, conditions the feeling, and the feeling, initiating mental activity, selectively conditions the trains of ideas representing means to the end. The greater the extent of the end, the more clearly does this appear; the desire then draws after it many lesser desires subordinate to its own realisation. On this account we frequently use expressions implying that the order of dependence among the functions is a time-order; thus presentation is said to be 'prior' to feeling, and so on. Our natural tendency seems to be to express an order of dependence between any two elements A and B by terms implying a relation or order in time, even when A and B occur in strict simultaneity. It is of considerable significance that we should attempt to describe what we regard as—relatively to the other—the *independent variable* of the two by such terms as 'prior,' 'antecedent,' &c., even when we know that there is no actual time-process between them.

But in the end, the question whether the three functions are realised together in strict simultaneity or not, is quite irrelevant to the question of their order of dependence. The emergence of a presentative complex

into distinct consciousness may be absolutely coincident in time with the emergence of the feeling—and, further, the feeling might even emerge *before* the presentation attained to a place in distinct consciousness—and yet it might be always true that the presentation is the condition of the feeling and, relatively to it, the independent variable. This must surely become evident as soon as we take seriously the hypothesis—or rather the proved fact—of subconsciousness, and recognise that there are degrees of consciousness, in the sense that much may be felt or experienced which is not discriminated.<sup>1</sup> There are continually occurring presentations which an individual never specially notices; yet he cannot be considered unconscious of them, for a sudden change or cessation of the presentation is at once noticed. From this point of view I can see nothing objectionable in the supposition that a presentation may arouse feeling in the act of emerging from subconsciousness or sentience, and so bring a concentration of attention on itself; so that the distinct occurrence of the presentation might not only not precede, but even to a perhaps barely perceptible extent succeed the emergence of the feeling. In this case the appearance of the presentation in distinct or focalised consciousness depends on the feeling, but the feeling depends on the presentation as emerging from the subconscious or sentient state. Hence, to cover such cases, we must modify our formula—"whenever some change takes place in our surrounding world, we are, on becoming aware of it, pleased or pained by it, and we act accordingly"; for we may be pleased or pained by it before we become distinctly or intellect-

<sup>1</sup> We are not concerned with any development of the doctrine beyond this; cf. Stout, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 24.

ually aware of it, when it is still a mode of anoetic consciousness. The distinct awareness or noetic consciousness, since in fact it constitutes the intelligence of the state of mind and makes it cognitive, easily but erroneously comes to be regarded as the determining condition of the feeling; while in reality, so far as distinct, it is rather a consequence of the feeling-initiated impulse. I have adduced these considerations in order to emphasise the fact that this question of the mutual dependence of the conscious functions is both complicated and many-sided; too many-sided to be embraced by the ready-made logical distinctions and correlations on which is based the objection we are considering.

It may still be said, however, that the whole conception implied in such manner of speech as we have been employing—*e.g.*, in speaking of any mental function as a relatively independent variable—is inadmissible because it involves the use of the category of causality without that of reciprocity; we are overweighting, so to speak, one term of a reciprocal relation. Here, I think, the real significance of the original objection appears. Thus, Hegel observes that in Reciprocity, which corrects the one-sidedness of Causality, "the one side is a cause, is primary, active, passive, &c., just as the other is; similarly the presupposition of another side and the action upon it, the immediate primariness and dependence produced by the alternation, are one and the same on both sides; the cause assumed to be prior is, on account of its immediacy, passive, a dependent being, and an effect."<sup>1</sup> So interpreted, the principle of reciprocity leads to the view that each of the three constituents of conscious-

<sup>1</sup> *Logic, Enc.*, § 155 (Wallace).



ness is equally dependent and independent, equally active and passive; they all 'depend' on one another in the same sense. This would effectually destroy the general analysis of mind which has been suggested—especially in its implication that the more or less transient feelings are manifestations of a subjective store, so to speak—*i.e.*, that there is a potentiality of feeling over and above the feeling which actually occurs. It would destroy the view defended by James and Lotze that there is, in precisely the same sense, a potentiality of conation, of which *more* may supervene in relation to an object that otherwise would remain constant or fade away. Wundt's view of 'apperception' in its original form certainly involved the like assumption, that the agency of consciousness is not exhausted in the mere production of presentations.<sup>1</sup> Similarly Ward maintains that consciousness is before all else active,—the distribution of the activity being determined by feeling, which is a mode of the Subject conditioned by its own objects.

All criticism of these views, so far as I have seen, either rests upon 'presentationist' principles, which we shall examine presently, or else consists in urging in various ways that the category of reciprocity forbids the assumption on which the writers that I have mentioned rely. Sometimes, however, this latter line of criticism is expressed in a form which it is difficult to describe as other than disingenuous; thus, we are supposed to believe in "an activity outside the stream of events, though acting continually on them," "something outside the facts, gifted with a mysterious power, of which no explanation can be given, of interfering

<sup>1</sup> Not that "consciousness is a real agent producing changes in its own objects," for this implies that the agency is separated from the objects.

with them in some specific manner," "something outside that interferes by a miracle with the course of phenomena."<sup>1</sup> To suppose that conation is regarded as being outside the course of mental 'events' is, to say the least of it, a misconception which might easily have been avoided. Indeed, such declamation would be unworthy of serious notice, did not a certain amount of interest attach to it owing to the apparently peculiar sense in which this magic term 'event' is used; it is used with some arbitrary restriction of meaning, the *rationale* of which is hard to discover. I presume that ordinarily the only limitation to the extent of its meaning is the implication that what is described by it shall be 'in time'; an 'event,' if not a succession of discrete parts, must at least have duration. What in any sense transcends time cannot be called an event. Sometimes the idea of an 'event' is used, in Psychology, as exclusive of, and antithetic to, that of an 'efficient cause,'—as if an efficient cause could not be a process, or a process a cause. The only way of conclusively ascertaining the proper limits of the application of this term 'event' in the sphere of mental life will be to come to some final conclusion upon the metaphysical problems to which the time-process gives rise. In the meantime we may use the term freely of any and every mental fact or function whose existence is not known to go beyond the limiting conditions of succession and duration; and when also using the term of physical or natural processes, we may, if needful, distinguish between 'personal' and 'impersonal' events. If it is said that to speak of any mental function as an event implies not only that

<sup>1</sup> From a 'criticism' which will be found in *Mind*, N.S., vol. iii. pp. 468, 469.

it is 'in time' but that it is reciprocally and *completely* conditioned by antecedent and simultaneous events in time, I would point out that it can only have this implication for those who assume that there is nothing real which in any way transcends temporal succession and duration; this is a vast metaphysical hypothesis which certainly I have no intention of adopting, and which surely never will be dogmatically assumed by those who profess such zeal for clearing Psychology of Metaphysics.

Another form of the appeal to the Hegelian notion of Reciprocity as ultimate for Psychology, consists in the contention that the view we defend "breaks up the life of the soul, divides it into active and passive factors, or supposes a passive beginning with a supervening activity;"<sup>1</sup> and again in the contention that the Libertarian theory of freedom assumes an 'unmotivated choice' or unmotivated intensification of effort, —unmotivated, because not completely and reciprocally determined by its correlate.<sup>2</sup> This principle leads to the view of the "entire immanence of the Self in the process of its own experience," as Professor James Seth has well expressed it: the entire immanence of the Subject in its own objects.

I venture to affirm that we must entirely reject the idea that causality involves reciprocity, in the form in

<sup>1</sup> We have seen that our view cannot suppose any factor of consciousness to be *merely* passive; but the point of the above objection is not quite turned by this.

<sup>2</sup> I am far from supposing that the Libertarian theory of *liberum arbitrium* is a completely true and adequate account of what takes place in our volitional activity; if put forward as being so, I think it deserves to be called 'absurd.' But I am convinced that it is much nearer the truth (see § 3, above, *ad finem*) than any other theory of freedom which has been presented.

which Hegel states it in the passage I have quoted. The only truth contained in the unqualified assertion which he makes, is the general truth that a relation is unthinkable apart from a duality of terms; before we can intelligibly assert a relation we must have distinguishable elements between which it is to hold. Thus, every causal relation implies a distinguishable A and a distinguishable B; in this sense it implies the most general form of the conception of reciprocity. But in this generality, reciprocity simply means relation, and it is certainly true that causation is unthinkable save as a relation.<sup>1</sup> But I hold it of vital importance to remember that the conception of causality has widely different significations in the different departments of knowledge, each valid in its own sphere. There is first the notion of Ground, in the ultimate ontological significance, as expressing the relation between the universal Ground of all and the finite and dependent,—between “the Absolute and its Appearances,” as Mr Bradley would say. The word ‘cause’ may introduce confusion of thought if used to indicate this supreme relation. Then we have to distinguish the use made of the category in the various special sciences. Causation in Physics is not what it is in Chemistry; in Physiology it has a third signification, different from either of the two preceding; and yet a fourth in Psychology. The first and second are cases of the *causa transiens*; the third and fourth, of the *causa immanens*. Only of the *causa transiens* can it possibly be true that “the one side is primary, active, passive, &c., just as the other is.” This notion applies exactly in Physics; it is not so adequate to the facts of Chem-

<sup>1</sup> Hence the contradictoriness of the conception of a First Cause, if ‘first’ implies any reference to time.

istry, where 'affinity' seems strangely like a species of selection; but in Physiology—in the notion of Organism—the significance of immanent causation begins to appear. Transient causation takes place between different individuals or central unities; but in immanent causation, we have a central unity controlling or conditioning a finite circumference as such. As long as we remain within Physiology, the nature of the central unity remains problematical; but though the function of the 'centre' in relation to the 'circumference' (the physical organism) implies the impossibility of their existing apart, it is quite misleading to say that both are equally "primary, active, passive, &c.," and still more misleading in the case of Psychology. Here, when we apply the term 'cause' historically, affirming that in the course of mental development antecedent states are causes of subsequent states, we mean that the former are the conditions upon which the Subject—the central source of the manifold events of thought, feeling, action—produces new states which are an *increment of being* upon their antecedents. Similarly when we apply the term to the relation between particular psychical functions in the concrete, then—in Sigwart's words—"we are dealing with the states or changes of a Subject which by virtue of its nature has other states for a consequence of these, and in this sense an idea is called the cause of a feeling, a feeling the cause of a desire."

We seem, therefore, able to vindicate our analysis of the general nature of consciousness against any objections of an *a priori* or formal character. It is not, indeed, difficult to repel such formal objections as those based on the logical nature of the relation of



Reciprocity, or that of Subject and Object; their discussion, however, helps to show the importance and significance of the conception of the individual Subject as marking the standpoint of Psychology.

§ 5. We must now carefully consider an important and formidable theory, or tendency, in Psychology, which may be generally described as an attempt to reduce our mental life to One constituent: knowledge, regarded as the product of sensations and their mental *residua*, images or 'ideas.' It thus stands in marked antithesis to the method which proceeds on the assumption that there are three fundamental and irreducible mental functions,<sup>1</sup> and to that which applies the conception of individuality to mental life by recognising a Subject of consciousness.

The principle of this theory, which has been called 'Presentationism' by Dr Ward and Professor Seth, is thus concisely expressed by one of its most prominent defenders: "A theory of the soul does justice to the whole range of psychical phenomena, if it assumes as the only function of the soul, *sensation characterised by quality, intensity, and tone of feeling.*"<sup>2</sup> It will be evident that this is the principle with which English Associationism works; indeed, any theory may be regarded as tending in this direction if it declines to recognise a Subject of consciousness—that is, a central source of the various modes of feeling, conation, cognition—and if it goes on to assume, as in consistency

<sup>1</sup> Here and elsewhere I have spoken of three functions; in strict accuracy, we should rather speak of three constituents of the one function in which consciousness consists. But the former expression is sometimes grammatically convenient.

<sup>2</sup> Münsterberg, *Willenshandlung*, p. 96.

it should, that the cognitive elements are fundamental, and all other modes of consciousness a by-product of these. It will come the nearer to Presentationism, the more consistently it treats feeling as an 'aspect' of presentations, and conation as a result of their 'interaction.' So far as there is any basal or substantial element in consciousness, it consists in presentations, regarded simply as *facts*; feeling and activity are attached to these and treated as wholly dependent on them. By adopting this point of view, it is thought that 'metaphysical' assumptions are easily and safely avoided. Nevertheless it is not difficult to show, on epistemological grounds, the impossibility of the pre-suppositions involved in this method.

The attempt made is in brief to "treat the psychological standpoint as if it were essentially the same as a physical standpoint." Psychology is to disregard the conditions of human knowledge, and like the other sciences, treat its material *in abstraction from the knowing subject*; psychologically, consciousness is to be made an *object*,—the mind is to be treated simply as so much *fact to be known*, the evolution of which may be traced and reduced to laws in the same way as the phenomena treated by the other special sciences. But no inquiry would be made into the process by which the facts are known. In dealing 'psychologically' with cognition we should be abstracting from the essence of cognition. The so-called mental 'facts' with which we deal are themselves known by a mental process; and the significance of the former cannot be understood apart from the latter. Can we suppose it reasonable to deal with mental 'events,' so called, and yet ignore the *knowledge* of these events, which—unless it is to be separated from the events—must itself be a

supervening mental event? The distinction between ideas in the sense of psychical states and in the sense of the meaning or content of the psychical existences,—which has been dwelt on by Mr Bradley and others, and explained with admirable clearness by Professor Dewey,<sup>1</sup>—surely cannot be made the ground of distinguishing Psychology from its presuppositions in the Presentationist manner. “To state the whole matter simply,” says Professor Dewey, “every psychical state is at once ‘sensation’ [differentiation of sentience] and interpretation of that sensation—*i.e.*, meaning conveyed: it is sign and signification.”<sup>2</sup> The meaning is susceptible of continuous development, with the development of thought; when it begins to unfold, it appears as “objective, permanent, and universal,”—it “seems to report a reality which is there aside from our particular mental state, one which is equally there for my intelligence at all times under the same conditions, and for all intelligences.” The meaning is “*part* of the psychical fact.” “Every psychical fact has these two aspects.”<sup>3</sup> Thus to take away the conditions of knowledge is to take away everything that makes what *we* know as conscious experience; for as the objective knowledge which we have through the psychical fact is one reference in its meaning, so our psychological knowledge of this process is another reference in its meaning.

The physicist abstracts (in part) from the mental process by which his facts are known; but his position is not analogous to that of the psychologist. The ‘facts’ of the physicist are always in the last resort those of direct perception, with their invariable characteristic of being extensive and intensive *quanta* in

<sup>1</sup> *Mind*, vol. xii. p. 382 ff.

<sup>2</sup> P. 382.

<sup>3</sup> P. 383.

space and time; and these characteristics themselves are simply one part of the 'facts' with which the psychologist has to deal. To say, therefore, that the psychologist deals with 'mental' facts or phenomena, while the physicist deals with 'material' facts, involves a serious confusion if it is given as a sufficient demarcation of psychical from physical science; for the word fact or phenomenon means very different things in the two cases. The same conclusion has been illustrated by Dr Ward in another way. "There is not a genus phenomenon divisible into two mutually exclusive spheres, mental and material, as the latter may be divided into optical, acoustical, and so forth; evidently not, for if we must needs speak of mental phenomena at all, then the physicist himself in converse with material phenomena furnishes the phenomena or rather the phenomenon of the psychologist."<sup>1</sup> In the words of Professor Croom Robertson,<sup>2</sup> "The peculiarity of Psychology is that, however its subject-matter may be *at first* distinguished from that of the other sciences, it finds itself occupied, in a manner of its own, as it advances, with the very matter of the others; . . . it is not Philosophy, but, with Mind for its subject-matter, its scope cannot be less wide than the scope of Philosophy." Thus Psychology deals with the whole of human experience, and can only differentiate itself by the standpoint from which that experience is viewed,—in other words, by distinguishing its standpoint from that of physical science. Now the former emphasises exactly what the latter ignores, namely, presentation to an individual Subject with the facts involved therein; and in ignoring these, the pres-

<sup>1</sup> See his article on "'Modern' Psychology," *Mind*, N.S., No. 5.

<sup>2</sup> See "Psychology and Philosophy," *Mind*, vol. viii. No. 29.

entationist ignores the only means of distinguishing the psychological and physical points of view. The physicist abstracts his subject-matter not only from presentation to an individual mind, but from all facts of attention and feeling which such perception entails. In certain cases these facts have to be taken into account, notably in astronomical observation, where elaborate methods have to be devised for correcting the errors that must arise from the personal, physical, and mental condition of the observer. But in general the physicist means by 'fact' an actual or possible object of knowledge, not for any concrete individual, but for "an imaginary subject freed from all the limitations of actual subjects save that of depending on 'sensibility,'" that is, on sentience as elaborated by thought into perception, for the material which forms the starting-point, the ground or base, so to speak, of its cognitive operations. Thus the distinction of 'mental phenomena' dealt with by Psychology and 'material phenomena' dealt with by Physics, though doubtless popularly useful, is in the end thoroughly indefensible; the same fact (the material of perception) is involved in both sciences, yet the terms 'material' and 'mental' imply the reverse; the two sciences emphasise exactly opposite sides of the fact, yet the term 'phenomenon' implies that the point of view is in each case the same.

But, in fact, the presentational tendency, when thoroughly carried out, does not leave Psychology as an independent science at all. The most advanced exponents of the 'new' Psychology do not leave their *Vorstellungen* floating *in vacuo*, but attach them to the cerebral facts. Psychology, according to these writers, is to be a science of *nervous phenomena accompanied by*



*consciousness*; mental facts are left, as it were, shadows cast on vacancy—are left mere inert accompaniments of the material facts of nerve and brain, and these are explained by purely mechanical principles. As scientific method, we have seen that this is absurd; it is even more absurd when taken in its true character as a metaphysical hypothesis,—since whatever man is, he is not a nervous machine with a useless appendage of consciousness attached to one portion of it.

However, the great obstacle in the way of Presentationism is a psychological one. All forms of the theory find themselves embarrassed by the facts of feeling and activity; especially since thought—more perverse and less pliable in this respect than language—can only with difficulty be forced to conceive of feeling and activity without seeking for a Subject or central source of these functions. Such activity as is recognised is refunded into the presentations; as a recent writer remarks with naïveté, “if other mental elements [than attention] are active, and attract and repel one another, no distinction is gained for this by calling it active.” By such procedure, of course, conscious activity in the proper sense is ignored; for the latter is single, one in kind, not consisting of many kinds of activity. The principle is, to explain the intensity of any presentation—where ‘intensity’ is understood in a very wide sense, signifying any kind of predominance in consciousness—as a determinate function of its relations to other presentations of greater or less intensive magnitude. Presentationism always tends to be atomistic; the *Vorstellungen* are conceived as numerically distinct objects just to that extent which is necessary in order that mental facts which are not *Vorstellungen* may be explained as due to interactions of

these; to this extent they are hypostatized as independent entities, existing on their own account. M. Ribot remarks triumphantly that in the 'new' Psychology "the soul and its faculties,—the great entity and the little entities,—disappear"; but the "little entities" only disappear to reappear in another form, and, moreover, to increase and multiply; every sensation and idea is in effect a distinct *faculty* in the most objectionable sense of the word.

§ 6. The prevalence of the presentational tendency in our own day may be accounted for in three ways: the great influence of the Herbartian Psychology in Germany; the readiness with which the theory facilitates the physiological interpretation of the facts of mind; and finally, a radical difficulty besetting the opposite tendency—a difficulty concerning the mode of cognition of Self which is implied in self-consciousness, when self is regarded as more than the mere unity of the presentational content. Let us examine the bearing of these considerations on the method, or bias, which is under discussion.

The theory of Herbart and his followers resolves attention and feeling into relations between one presentation and another; each presentation is conceived as a kind of *force*, and each is capable of acting to a certain extent independently of others. Thus when presentations co-operate and further each other, pleasure ensues; when the opposite, pain. Now we cannot say that the presence of feeling is accounted for thus, unless there is something transcending existentially all the presentations and *interested in their interaction*. This Herbart would not have denied; he makes presentations depend on the reaction of the soul when disturbed

—he does not regard them as independent entities, but attaches them to the 'Real' called the soul.<sup>1</sup> This ontological side of his Psychology is not well co-ordinated with the main body of his exposition, which deals with the processes of fusion, blending, and complication of presentations. Hence indirectly his work set going a movement or tendency in Psychology, which ignores everything that cannot be resolved into relations among presentations, or made immediately to depend upon presentations as their mode or aspect. Presentationism carries out this movement. No activity is allowed, other than the discrete presentations; and, in accordance with the inevitable tendency of atomism to refer to the *beginning* of existence for principles of explanation, the relation of feeling to presentation in the sphere of *sense* is taken as typical of the relation throughout. Hence feeling is regarded as a mere 'aspect' or 'tone' of distinct presentations. Here the root-difficulty is this. This aspect or *quale* of presentation has the remarkable characteristic of being a measure of the worth of presentations relatively to one another, so that one may *mean* much more, practically, for the whole consciousness than another.<sup>2</sup> They can be no longer treated as discrete, since they are bound together in such a peculiar way that at any time some distinguishable presentation or group may be antagonistically or congruently related, through the feeling aroused by it, to other groups, and that by this

<sup>1</sup> This statement needs expansion and qualification, but is sufficient for our present purpose. It must be remembered that we are here concerned only with the bearing of some initial assumptions of the Herbartian system on modern Presentationism. The interest and value of the Herbartian Psychology could not easily be exaggerated.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. what was said (§ 2) as to the unifying function of feeling within the general unity of consciousness.

relation its intensity or dominance or distinctness is conditioned. A mere relation between different simultaneous impressions cannot of itself produce a feeling and control the dominance of the presentations; no presentation of itself could estimate its worth for the whole into which it enters; such estimation is only possible because the presentations are bound together as elements of a single conscious life. Hence the question: What is this life which is constituted by presentations forming in one aspect a unique totality? We have no need to look far for the answer; as it has been pregnantly stated, "The dynamic efficiency of ideas is entirely excited through the feeling-subject: . . . it is the subject which acts on its appreciation of the stimulus, and the emotional attitude of welcome or repulse is what is meant by feeling." It is not in the least to be denied that pleasure and pain are intimately bound up with certain features of particular constituents in the course of sensations and ideas; but we deny that on this account they can be regarded merely as a variable quality or aspect of such separate or particular presentational facts. Except in the sphere of organic sentience, they are attached to relations among a group of presentations, as Herbart and his followers clearly perceived; and they involve a relation of their conditioning object to consciousness as a whole. *This is what is meant by their 'subjectivity.'* They always appear as an alteration of our whole *psychosis*, in the direction of furthering or hindering, elevating or depressing, our mental life in its totality at the time.

It must be observed that such terms as 'aspect' and 'tone' are exceedingly ambiguous; but they must at least signify that feeling is absolutely dependent upon the material of *particular* presentations, of which

it is a mere quality. This is all that I have taken these terms to imply: and the truth or error of this assumption is the most fundamental question in the Psychology of feeling. It seems to me to be a most serious error,<sup>1</sup> which leads to a thorough misconception of the course of mental growth.

Beyond the influences of the historical tendencies of thought which have been briefly indicated, Presentationism is favoured by the fact that it reduces the functions of consciousness to a form in which they may be very readily 'explained' from the point of view of the Physiology of brain and nerve. The part of Physiology which investigates the localisation of cerebral processes corresponding to the various orders of intellection has proceeded with many fruitful results in the region of simple perception, of mental imagery, and of motion; and it has every prospect of obtaining more. The results have suggested the hypothesis, which I have no desire to criticise if it is not put forward as the ultimate truth, that for every distinguishable change in the content of consciousness there is a corresponding change of cerebral activity. Since comparative embryology shows us that the life-history of the individual is in some respects like an epitome of the life-history of the race, the doctrine of parallelism may be expressed in a more general form: differentiation of presentations is the psychical parallel of differentiation of nervous structure. Though by no means established beyond the possibility of doubt, this principle confirms itself by its suggestiveness. But the case is very different with regard to the inquiry into the conditions of physiological function which are the corporeal

<sup>1</sup> An able and persuasive exposition of it will be found in Mr Marshall's *Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics*.



counterparts of feeling and activity. Here, with conflicting hypotheses and hopeless fragments of ambiguous evidence, we may say that confusion reigns; of this, the two recent works on Feeling—those of Lehmann and Marshall—afford sufficient evidence, though many more might be mentioned. I cannot see that anything is established beyond the truism that feeling varies *somehow* with the condition of the organism.

This confusion is avoided, on the physiological side, if we are able to refund all activity into the presentations themselves, and to treat feeling either as a mere quality of each particular presentation, or as a kind of sensation which has lost its independence, through association with other sensations, so that it now appears as their 'tone.' Thus when we remember how ineradicable is the tendency to explain facts of a higher science by reference to those of a lower, it becomes evident that presentationism, by relieving the difficulties of the physiological interpretation of feeling and activity, must present itself in a favourable light to very many inquirers at the present day.

§ 7. The third condition favouring presentationism arises out of some serious psychological difficulties which apparently stand in the way of the opposite view.

Those psychologists who recognise that the facts of presentation presuppose a Subject of consciousness, regard self-consciousness as the central fact in the human mind. On the other hand, we have to recognise that self-consciousness has a psychological history; in the primitive consciousness, where discrimination is at a minimum, we cannot suppose that it is present at all; and in certain pathological states of mind, it is entirely absent, or is split up into two or

more self-consciousnesses. Further, the whole of self-consciousness is an intellectual process, a mode of knowledge; it belongs to the presentational side of consciousness. Whatever *more* than knowledge there is in mind, the knowledge of it must consist in presentations. The super-presentational constituent of consciousness is supposed to be distinguished and characterised psychologically by the method of introspective analysis; but how can we speak of analysis in mind, or of introspection, save as directed upon a given Content—*e.g.*, a complex of presentations? This suggests that whatever we are able to distinguish by analysis in consciousness must be either itself a presentational content or a mere *quale* of the latter; the very nature of 'introspection,' self-observation or self-knowledge, as ordinarily conceived, seems to point directly to such a conclusion. Hence the attractiveness of the *quale* theory of feeling, which Mr H. R. Marshall has expounded and defended in his work on *Pain, Pleasure, and Æsthetics*,—that pleasure and pain are "qualities of a very general nature, which may, under proper conditions, belong to any content," that they "are not to be looked upon as the outcome of any special and peculiar psychosis, that they are not *sui generis* among psychic phenomena, that they are grasped mentally very much as other qualities of a general nature are grasped"; in other words, "we recognise that a content has pleasure-pain quality, much as we recognise that a content has intensity; in one and the same general manner all qualities in our psychic stream gain recognition." No reader of this able work can fail to feel the force of its general contention, whatever he may think of the special arguments by which the author supports it. The view to which I

am led, and which will be developed later on, emphasises the fact that *all* constituents of our "psychic stream" gain recognition "in one and the same general manner"; but this manner is not that of inspection as by an *inner eye*, but that of a development of the nature of *knowledge* in the proper sense, by which we become aware of ourselves as Subjects whose functions are not exhausted in cognitive reflection on reality around us. Hence we are aware that feeling and will are not *mere* qualities of the presentational content which becomes the vehicle of objective knowledge.

We may state the difficulty in another way when we consider not the supposed nature of the introspective process as such, but the functions themselves, other than presentational contents, which are known by it. If there is in consciousness an 'other' or a 'more' than knowledge—to borrow one of Mr Bradley's expressions—then it seems impossible that we could ever come to know it, just because it *is* more, *i.e.*, is not cognitive; if it were cognitive, it would fall back to the level of presentation. It may be worth while to give a symbolic illustration. Let us denote the cognitive elements in mind by  $f(a, b, c)$ , and the elements of feeling and conation—which for our present purpose need not be distinguished—by  $a\beta\gamma$ . Then all cognition belongs to  $f(a, b, c)$ ; but consciousness consists of  $f(a, b, c) + a\beta\gamma$ ; now  $a\beta\gamma$  is not cognitive of itself or of anything else,—how then can cognition of it enter into  $f(a, b, c)$ ? But suppose  $a\beta\gamma$  is cognitive; by hypothesis it cannot be merely so,—it must be more; call it, then,  $f(a', b', c') + a'\beta'\gamma'$ , where  $a'\beta'\gamma'$  represents the 'more'; how can cognition of the latter element enter into the former?

There is thus no evading the difficulty by retreat, in this way; it follows us, shadow-like, for ever. I need hardly say that the sign of addition, as here used, does not imply that feeling is conceived as a mere mechanical or external addition to the material of presentation; we must recognise that in actual conscious life feeling, activity, and intellection are inseparably combined. But we must also recognise that the functions of feeling and activity are wholly distinguishable, in our thought, from those of the intellect; and if they are, they cannot be cognitive. Intellection is not cognitive without them,—we have no reason to suppose that intellectual processes would be possible without them; but this does not remove the difficulty. Before going further it is necessary to guard against a serious misunderstanding to which, as experience has shown, our position is exposed. In insisting on the almost generic distinction between the selective or feeling-directed activity and intellection as constituents of consciousness, and on the fact that all knowledge of the former belongs to the side of intellection as such, I certainly do not imply that the selective activity is only known through its presentational accompaniments, or that we only know about it through its effects on the course of ideas. From such a view common-sense instinctively recoils; it would readily adopt Mr Marshall's position in preference to such an extravagant paradox, and would insist that we are "immediately conscious of" feeling and will, and its recoil seems thoroughly justified. For how could we even conceive or think about feeling and will without some basis of direct experience to account for the conception? In Mr Marshall's words, "How are we able to bring the

matter of pleasure and pain under intellectual analysis at all, if they are grasped by us in a manner so entirely apart from knowing?"<sup>1</sup> If our knowledge were only indirect, inferential, or mediate, how could we possibly know *what* functions to assume in order to account for the subjectively initiated changes in the presentational field? How could we postulate a feeling-initiated activity to *explain* the selective process which is essential to the development of intellect, unless the postulated function were an actual explicit constituent factor of the Light of Consciousness itself? If we had not some kind of direct immediate hold upon the selective activity of mind, it is impossible that we could ever know it even indirectly or mediately.<sup>2</sup>

The unreflective spontaneous view, to which I have referred, is no solution of the problem, but is itself the question to be interpreted. The judgment of common-sense, that we are immediately conscious of feeling and will, only states the problem over again, as is usual in all such cases. However, it serves to bring out the two sides of the fact that we seek to explain, though it is not able to reconcile them. It is unquestionable that feeling and activity are known *about* (we cannot get rid of the preposition, with its implication of relation or *reference*): this knowledge belongs entirely to the presentational side, and, as Dr Ward has it, "however far extended, it advances only by discernment of new relations." Again, it is

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly it follows that if the existence of the Self, Subject, or Ego is *only* a matter of inference, its character is left (by this inferential knowledge) quite problematical: it may be the Spinozan *unica substantia*, the Leibnizian *Monad*, the Herbartian *Real*, or the Hegelian *Weltgeist*.



unquestionable that feeling and activity are facts *in* consciousness, as we have seen; in this sense we may say that we immediately experience or go through or *live* a life of feeling and activity in relation to the presentational content,—that its relation to this content is a matter of unmediated experience. These two conditions, inseparable in the actual concrete mental state, together constitute what is called ‘consciousness of’ feeling or will. It will now be evident that our problem is simply that of the real nature of the so-called ‘introspective’ process of self-observation; and this, as we shall see, is not to be separated from the question of the real nature of self-consciousness as a mode of cognition. This is a difficult epistemological inquiry with far-reaching consequences, which must be treated independently.

§ 8. It is worth while, in conclusion, to notice certain psychological aspects of self-consciousness.

It is most important to remember that in dealing with our ‘subjective’ knowledge,—in other words, our awareness that we know certain things about objective reality, and that the growth of this knowledge at every stage conditions and is conditioned by a selective or feeling-initiated activity,—we have not to account for the possibility of the psychologist’s scientific generalisations about this ever present yet ever fugitive element of our mental life; we have not to account for the psychologist’s general knowledge about feeling-in-general or activity-in-general—not for his knowledge of a *typical* mind—but for the prior knowledge on which his is based and which he extends and makes systematic: that is, for my knowledge of my dominant modes of activity and feeling as conditioning and

conditioned by my intellectual states,—for your knowledge of yours. We have not to deal with any abstractions, but with the concrete individual's knowledge of his own concrete mental life. Now, in every case, what is this knowledge but *the content of the idea of Self*? In short, as we have said, the nature of 'introspection' and the nature of self-consciousness are one and the same problem: to explain the one is to explain the other. This brings us to the question of the history of self-consciousness, to which allusion was made above.

We are first met by the distinction of a 'pure' and an 'empirical' ego, which is sometimes put forward as though it possessed great significance. It may be said, "In speaking of the content of the idea of Self, which self do you mean—the pure or the empirical?" To this we must in the first place reply that since we are dealing with the actual knowledge which is realised in concrete human spirits—since, in a word, we are dealing with *realities*—the notion of a 'pure' or 'transcendental' self is wholly inapplicable, for, as we shall see, it has no *real* significance whatever. It is surely most unfortunate that this idea of a 'transcendental' self should have been introduced into psychology at all. The mischievous effects which result from its introduction are not in the least obviated by the denial that Psychology as a science is in any way concerned with the meaning and validity of such a conception; for this of course is implicitly to assume the validity of the distinction, of 'pure' and 'empirical,' and on this basis to exclude from consideration the former of the two antithetic terms. The scientific psychologist may exclaim with emphasis that he is not concerned with the 'spiritual substance' assumed by the 'metaphy-

sician'—that his business is *only* to investigate the 'phenomena,' the empirical facts of mind; but this very declaration suggests that he sides with the 'metaphysician' in the baseless assumption of the *separation of the substance or noumenon from its phenomena*, so that we can know the 'phenomenon' to any extent without being any wiser as to the 'noumenon.' The so-called 'pure' ego, the general *schema* or form of consciousness, is a logical abstraction, and is analogous to the abstraction of a motion-in-general which has no particular direction or velocity. The notion inevitably tends to become that of a purely *formal* existence—in other words, one that has no necessary connection with the material with which it is supposed to deal and the results which it is supposed to produce. The real Self is that which is known and realised or lived in and through the actual threefold process of conscious life. It is essentially manifested in this its content; its *individual existence* consists in gradually organising itself in certain explicit, definite forms. If, then, in Psychology and Metaphysics, we reject the notion of a transcendental ego altogether, the notion of an empirical ego must go along with it, for the one is only conceived in antithesis to the other: both are a result of the same misconception.

I do not imply that the conception of a pure ego is an entirely motiveless abstraction; it is a necessary one for the theory of knowledge. Knowledge is only realised through individual thinking minds, hence self-consciousness (as individual or finite) is one of its necessary conditions. But Epistemology necessarily deals with knowledge as such *in abstracto*, without reference to any individual thinker; hence the real unity of an actual self-conscious mind becomes, for the pure

theory of knowledge, the formal unity of an abstract self.<sup>1</sup>

On the general question of the validity of the idea of Self as Subject, we may say with Sigwart: "No one can seriously think that there is a stream of impersonal thought connecting the particular events of seeing, hearing, feeling, and their memory-images, and incessantly, at every moment, creating the illusory thought of a Subject to which these events are referred; and that connected with this there is the further impersonal event, by which is thought the identity of this Subject throughout the successive moments, but which in truth only produces a phantom for thought which has no subject."<sup>2</sup> But apart from such considerations, the alleged history of self-consciousness is not free from ambiguity. As soon as we realise clearly what self-consciousness is and means, it must surely be evident that all which is possible for Psychology—and even this task is one of great difficulty—is to trace the expansion and growing *inwardness* of the Content of the idea of self, as distinguished from its Meaning. I have been using the word Content in a more general sense hitherto; but here it is used in the stricter logical sense in which it is correlative with Meaning, and though inseparable from Meaning, yet may be distinguished from it. To speak of the meaning of an idea (conception) implies that the idea has been constituted a detail of knowledge by Judgment; the meaning is the process of reference by which the idea becomes a portion of our knowledge of objective or subjective reality. The content is the

<sup>1</sup> This point has been thoroughly explained by Professor Seth in his *Hegelianism and Personality*, ch. i.

<sup>2</sup> *Logic*, Eng. Tr., vol. ii. p. 139.

idea in itself,—the intelligible or conceptual mental facts which are thus referred beyond their factual sphere. Now we can make out the various stages of the Content of the idea of Self, from its first appearance as a 'body-complex' up to the idea of the unity and continuity of a personal life of feeling, knowledge, action; but we have to *assume* the meaning throughout, not explain it. I know of no sense of the word 'explain' which is at all applicable to the case. The very first stage in its history must have been the discrimination—however vague—of the general contents of the conscious field from certain elements therein, to which the rest are referred as being their *common centre*. This is the *meaning*. In its highest form self-consciousness means no more than this,—the reference of a manifold which is continually changing to a common centre which is relatively permanent; but the content of the 'centre' is very different in the two cases. In its highest form the content represents certain present experiences—mingling knowledges, feelings, desires, resolves—in relation to the idea of past dominant modes of thought and courses of action and feeling, which have progressively organised themselves, and of which the present states in their prominent moods and directions are the outcome. These ideas may very imperfectly represent the facts to which they refer—each of us probably has a very imperfect acquaintance with his own character as an individual, and far more imperfect apprehension of the deeper currents and the vital sources and hidden roots of his life; but this is only to say that self-consciousness has degrees of truth. Let us once more state our conclusion: there is in the life of intellect an immanent tendency to transcend itself—in other words, to result in knowledge; and the prob-



lem of accounting for our psychological knowledge of our intellectual and volitional activities and states of feeling *as ours*, is really the problem of accounting for the self-transcendence of intellect, on the subjective side—of accounting in the subjective direction for a characteristic which is fundamental and essential in all knowledge, subjective or objective.

We have said that the reference of the many distinguishable states to a common centre implies not only a unity of the present contents of consciousness—this unity is given, as a matter of experience; it implies also a continuity of present and past contents. This is indicated most strikingly in the facts of self-conscious memory, when we recognise an event as being past and as belonging to *our* past. 'I remember *abc*' means that I,—the self-same I that now thinks, feels, acts, in the past thought, felt, or did *abc*. The case may be made clearer by a typical example. At the present moment, when intent on what is going on before me, the presentations of which, complex and vivid, may be symbolised<sup>1</sup> as  $f'(A, B, C, D, \dots) + f''(a, b, c, \dots) + f'''(a, \beta, \dots) + \dots$ , some transient suggestion among these reminds me that more than twenty years ago, in early childhood, I was very much frightened under certain circumstances, of which a faint image,  $\phi(x, y, z)$ , enters consciousness. In the interval my body has lost its identity; and I may not have thought of the event for months and even years, yet the most primary and certain fact of all is that I, who *am* now the Subject of  $f'(A, B, C, D, \dots)$ , &c., *was* in the past the Subject of the experience now

<sup>1</sup> The mingled vagueness and definiteness of presentation, and the mingling of the heterogeneous presentations, seem fittingly indicated by this 'functional' notation.

appearing as  $\phi(x, y, z)$ , so that  $\phi(x, y, z)$  represents *my* past. The natural conclusion is, that an unbroken continuity of existence between the present self and the past is proved to demonstration; not that the present self is *identical* with the past in any abstract sense, but that there has been from the past a *continuous* process of germination of mental capacity, assimilation of experience, and self-organisation.<sup>1</sup>

The constant, normal interruptions of consciousness during sleep, and the occasional abnormal interruptions, due to physical or mental shock or the application of drugs or gases, are no real obstacle to the view which finds the real self essentially manifested in the concrete contents of consciousness. For across the interval there is not merely a qualitative resemblance; my experience of to-day does not merely bear the same kind of general resemblance to my experience of yesterday as my experience of to-day does to yours. There is a special kind of relation here, evinced in the fact that my present is not only *affected* by my past, but is affected by it in a unique manner. My past experiences have left behind psychical dispositions which partially determine the character of my present consciousness, and which are of such a nature that they cause in my present consciousness an explicit reference back to my past. This connection is the ultimate ground and meaning of personal continuity and identity, and of memory. For memory, in its developed form, means that a present idea of mine (1) bears a time-reference to a past which (2) is *my* past. To deal psychologically with this personal time-reference is,

<sup>1</sup> The *logical* difficulties to which this view is supposed to give rise have been dealt with in chap. iii.

truly, a very complex and difficult problem; but the fact would be not only hard to explain, it would be altogether inexplicable and miraculous, if the apparently discontinuous portions of consciousness were really and verily what Mr Bradley calls them, "*divided existences*."<sup>1</sup>

The occurrence of the personal time-reference, in connection with representations, seems further to render evident the futility of all attempts to substitute for the notion of a psychical disposition or tendency (left behind by past experience) the notion of a physiological retention of molecular motions in the brain; founding mental continuity on the continuity of cerebral processes. We have in memory (a) the explicit distinction of the present from the past, and (b) the explicit reference of a presented content to *our* past, or to a past with which ours was in relation. These processes are altogether different from the mere survival of past changes, which is all that physiological retention implies. When considering the gaps in consciousness, of which I have been speaking, we must remember that it is the merest dogmatic assumption to regard the discontinuity as absolute. An absolute break in a personal consciousness *ex vi terminorum* could never be known by that consciousness, for if it were thus known, it would not be an *absolute* break. At most it could only be *assumed* by an outside observer. We have no evidence that there is such a state as perfectly 'dreamless' sleep, or that in any accidental state of so-called

<sup>1</sup> Mr Bradley's chapter on the Self, in his *Appearance and Reality*, is an able and thorough attack upon the notion of personal identity; but in the end he admits that "*somehow* an identical self is real." The hopeless emphasis that has to be laid on the 'somehow' arises from what seems to me to be an erroneous view of the nature and demands of Intellect.

'unconsciousness' the mind is a perfect blank. Fleeting and faint presentations may be constantly occurring to consciousness, and on waking be forgotten beyond recall. We need not even suppose that *discrimination* entirely ceases; but if it does, and nothing remains but an 'anoetic' state of merely felt differences, then the absence of memory on waking is easily explained. There is another point deserving of consideration, though it is so ridiculously obvious that its import is generally overlooked: we are conscious, after any such interruption, that *there has been an interval*—a distinct interval of time for which memory supplies no contents. This suggests that all modes of consciousness could not have been entirely in abeyance. What is discontinuous is *distinct* consciousness; but before assuming that consciousness entirely ceases we must be sure of the limits of mental life within which the term 'consciousness' is applicable.

The same connection between present and past which is evinced in memory, also renders it possible that the conscious life should gradually organise itself, in reaction upon its social and physical environment, into a relatively permanent and stable Character. This does not mean only part of the man,—a mere tendency to act in this way or that in outward conduct: man is not merely a "walking bundle of habits." Character is the whole individuality, in which certain broad features remain the same, constituting what we should call a finite personality. This, as we have seen reason for maintaining, is partly (with more or less of truth) represented in the content of the idea of Self as it is for each individual. The diseases of personality,—cases of mania, the "strange selves of hypnotism," and

similar pathological states of mind on which Mr Bradley dwells,<sup>1</sup> seem to me to have no bearing on the view of finite self-consciousness here defended, simply because they are what M. Ribot called them—*des maladies de la personnalité*. We cannot say whether a mind reduced to such a state has any personality or character at all, or is a self in any sense; but whenever we actually find self-consciousness realised in the normal individual, its characteristics are as we have stated them. How the possibility of diseased and abnormal selves proves that it is an illusion to regard the normal concrete self as a continuous self-determining growth, I confess I cannot see. Take the case of knowledge; in these pathological states the rational power is disorganised, more or less, as it is in ordinary insanity; does it therefore follow that the idea of a systematic, coherent, or rational knowledge is illusory? Indeed we may maintain the general proposition, that until the *normal*, in every case of scientific inquiry, is itself understood, the *abnormal* can throw no light on it: for the abnormal is simply the exceptional. There may be cases of disorganised selves, but these can tell us nothing about the nature or destiny of the self which is *not* disorganised. It would seem that there is only one argument possible to those who are bent on proving that the idea of a real individuality of selfhood is an illusion: to maintain that everything characteristic of concrete individuality is dependent on physiological and physical conditions, and that the diseases of personality afford the best illustrations of this 'fact.' This is a large question, which has to be contested and discussed not merely by mad-doctors, but at every stage through the whole region of psychological inquiry,

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*



where reference to *normal* facts must bear the largest part.

I venture to suggest that the lunatic asylum, the mad-house, the 'spiritualistic' *séance*, and the like, are not the best laboratories for studying human nature, even psychologically.

## APPENDIX.

## SOME PROBLEMS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEELING.

HITHERTO I have been using the term Feeling in a special sense, as indicated in § 2 above. This is the sense in which the term is used by Ward, Wundt, Sully, Lehmann, and Höfding. In this sense, feeling is not a fact of a class; we cannot prefix the definite or indefinite 'article' when employing the word, speaking of *a feeling* or *the feelings*. It is simply the most general designation for the constituent of mental life to which it refers. Hence about feeling in general there is hardly more to be said than has been said in the preceding chapter (§§ 2, 5, 6). If, with Dr Ward and Mr Stout, we think it possible to formulate a *general* theory<sup>1</sup> of the psychological conditions of pleasure and of pain (as distinct from their general physiological conditions, and from the conditions of *particular* classes of pleasures and pains), then of course its discussion would properly, if not conveniently, come under the general analysis of mental function. On the other hand, when we descend into particulars we shall be speaking not of feeling but of *a feeling* or of *feelings*; we shall be speaking of pleasures and pains in relation to the psychologically objective facts which condition them. This, as we have pointed out, is the use of the term in ordinary language.

§ 1. We must first take note of two prevalent tendencies among psychological writers with regard to terminology. One of these is to use the term feeling in a certain sense unsanctioned by common usage and never clearly defined by the authors who avail themselves of it: it seems, however, intended to denote something fundamental in conscious life.

<sup>1</sup> See Stout, *op. cit.*, bk. ii. ch. xii.; and the relative portion of Dr Ward's article *Psychology*.

This tendency is seen in the works of Spencer and Hodgson, and—among more recent writers—Professor James. With regard to Spencer's usage of the term, it is sometimes inferred that he intended to exclude from its signification the properly intellectual elements, since he makes consciousness consist of complexes of "feelings and *relations* among feelings"; but we find him saying, "a relation proves to be itself a kind of feeling—the momentary feeling accompanying the transition from one conspicuous feeling to another."<sup>1</sup> Professor James's use of the word is just as vague. Indeed these writers may be considered to adopt and defend the principle of using *the same name for everything in turn*. In this respect their procedure is to me a matter for respectfully distant admiration rather than for imitation. The case is different with Mr Bradley's employment of the term in question. We have already seen reason for following Mr Bradley and Mr Stout in laying great stress on the distinction of the noetic consciousness, in which discrimination of facts and relations takes place, and the anoetic, in which there is no such distinct discrimination. It is then merely a matter of convenience whether we call the anoetic consciousness 'sentience' or call it 'feeling.' I prefer the former term; and, with Dr Ward, reserve the latter to denote pleasure and pain only.

The other tendency to which I referred appears in an objection on the part of certain writers—who do not deny the threefold analysis of mind—to the identification of feeling in its general sense with pleasure and pain:<sup>2</sup> I may refer to the relative observations of Baldwin and Ladd. It is implied that, though the state of feeling can be distinguished from its accompanying presentation, pleasure-pain is not the whole of the former. This is not so much insisted on in the case of the corporeal as in that of the 'higher' feelings, particularly the emotions. To account for this objection, we must remember that the terms 'pleasure,' 'pain,' have an ineradicable reference to feelings connected with bodily states, so that to speak of the emotions as "phenomena of pleasure and pain" may seem unjustifiably to obliterate certain necessary psycho-

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology*, § 65.

<sup>2</sup> This is quite apart from the question of the existence of a *neutral* feeling.

logical distinctions of quality and complexity; such expressions, too, seem to suggest a theory like that of Spencer, who attempts to derive all forms of higher feeling from complexes of revived physical pleasures and pains. The dispute may easily become merely a question of words. The theory here defended maintains that in any of the higher feelings,—in any Emotion, for example,—there are the following factors: (*a*) the bodily 'expression,'—including in this term *all* the organic changes which accompany the emotion, both internal and external (muscular movements of limb and feature); (*b*) the presentative and representative complex which arouses the emotion,—including the modes of sentience, of presentation, and representation, which accompany and depend on the bodily 'expression'; (*c*) the purely active and affective elements. The affective element may properly be described as a case of feeling in the sense of pleasure or pain of some degree, duration, and breadth. Pleasure and pain are abstracted from all reference to presentational objects of any kind or quality; consequently they can bear no misleading reference to *merely* bodily conditions when, as here, they are referred to feelings aroused by ideas.

From another point of view objection may be brought to the conception of feeling as always either pleasant or unpleasant: *i.e.*, by those who maintain that there is a third species of feeling,—'neutral excitement,' as Professor Bain would call it. Thus, Professor James observes: "There are infinite shades and tones in the various emotional excitements, which are as distinct as sensations of colour are, and of which one is quite at a loss to predicate either pleasurable or painful quality."<sup>1</sup> Now the very possibility of raising this question—which is a purely theoretic one—implies that there actually are feelings which are *practically or comparatively* indifferent; the only question can be, as to the theoretic account that we are to give of them. Höffding observes: "To suppose that pleasure must always have pain as a background would be to mis-

<sup>1</sup> *Psychological Review*, No. 5, p. 525. Cf. discussion in *Mind*, vol. xiii. (Professor Sully, Mr W. E. Johnson, and Miss Mason). In this paragraph I owe certain observations to an unpublished communication from Dr Ward.

understand the law of relativity ; it is most impressive when it follows upon pain, but it may also perfectly well have as background a weaker feeling of pleasure. . . . It is in itself a meaningless employment of terms to call a pleasure or pain negative ; all feeling as such is a real, consequently a positive, state. . . . The feeling that is mainly determined by contrast with another feeling is not on that account less real and positive.”<sup>1</sup> Without disputing the ‘law of relativity,’ so understood, we must dispute an application of it which Höffding proceeds to make. “It has been thought that there is a neutral point, denoting indifference, a point at which neither pleasure nor pain is felt. . . . A purely theoretical treatment might, indeed, lead to the view that, in the line which leads from the highest pleasure to the strongest pain, there must be a central point equally far from both extremes. But this theoretical centre cannot be the expression of a real conscious state. For if we reach it from the side of pain, it will be felt as pleasure ; if from the side of pleasure, as pain—and until an accommodation has been effected, as both. This is a simple consequence of the law of relativity.”<sup>2</sup> This reasoning is only sound on the supposition that the point of indifference is something *objectively* fixed ; but no such assumption can be made as to the neutral point. If pleasure or pain can diminish indefinitely and continuously (in degree), a *zero* must be reached ; and if from the *zero* pain or pleasure can begin and increase, this is all that such a conception of the point of indifference requires. A pleasure which is decreasing does not turn into a pain simply in virtue of its decrease, as Höffding seems to imply. It thus becomes something of an elegant refinement to decide whether pleasures and pains, which are of indefinitely small intensity, shall be called ‘neutral’ or not. The cases of ‘surprise’ and ‘excitement,’ on which Professor Bain dwells, are primarily *active* states. There may be active occupation with little corresponding feeling, for intensity of feeling may diminish more rapidly than intensity of action or concentration.

I think those psychologists are right who claim to be able to detect in the so-called neutral state at the least a faint general

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 286, 287.

<sup>2</sup> P. 287.



colouring of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, or—which is more common—an oscillation between the two.

§ 2. When we understand that feeling is a psychological abstraction, it is seen to be useless to ask whether distinctions of quality can be made in it. It is only realised as *a* feeling; and this may differ in quality from other feelings through its necessary connection with its object and the modes of bodily or organic sentience which accompany it. Thus in enumerating and discussing the differences of quality in feeling, we shall be really discussing the relation of feeling to presentation (in the wide sense). As a preliminary, we can effect a rough-and-ready classification of feelings, for the convenience of future observations.

(i.) The extensive organic feelings or 'somatic consciousness,' corresponding to the general course of the vital functions (especially respiration and the assimilation of nutrition), and to the rise and fall of organic needs. They are very diffused in character and not definitely localised; they approximate to a continuum.<sup>1</sup> Now one aspect, now another, of the continuum obtrudes upon our notice; these aspects vary as comfort or discomfort, but rise into prominence chiefly as pains. In this class we may include the feelings attached to the functioning of particular organs—especially eye, ear, and brain. Such are in immediate connection with the vital feeling, for the condition of the vital functions immediately affects these organs.

(ii.) The feelings which accompany *muscular* strain of every kind and degree. These rise out of the vital feeling; they are indeed merged in it, when the movement is essential to life—*e.g.*, in the case of circulation and respiration. They are more distinct from the vital feeling when the movements are less immediately necessary to the continuance of life,—as in the case of moving the eyes, vocal organs, limbs, and head. But the general organic feeling exists as a background in which they may merge when very intense.

(iii.) The cutaneous feelings of pressure ('touch' in its

<sup>1</sup> This is what we should expect, if organic life is not a mere aggregate of motions but is the *unity* and systematic direction of a complex of processes.

varying degrees) and temperature; these are more or less definitely localised on the surface of the bodily frame. They are still more differentiated (than the muscular feelings) from the vital feeling; but it is still their background.

(iv.) Feelings incident to taste and smell. The analysis of these is a matter of great difficulty, and is one of the most pressing problems for the rising Physiological Psychology. It will be impossible for me to refer to them more fully here, with any profit.

(v.) Feelings dependent on simple or complex perceptions of sight and sound,—including what have been called, by Wundt, for example, the 'lower' æsthetic feelings, *i.e.*, those determined by the *form* of a primary presentation. In passing into this class we have come within the range of *noetic* consciousness; from the feeling we can introspectively distinguish its object, and the object involves some simple or complex discrimination of *terms in relation* to one another.

The feelings embraced in classes (i.) to (iv.) may be called *physiological*, since without exception they correspond to and depend on functional processes in the organism. I have remarked on the uncertainty which exists as to the precise *laws* of this variation, which are constantly being investigated. The inveterate tendency to regard the organism as a mere aggregate rather than as a unity of systematically graded processes—a *hierarchy* of processes, if the metaphor is permissible—is probably the explanation of the confusion and conflict which obtain in this department of inquiry. In another respect the conception of the unity of the organism, to which I have so often had occasion to refer, throws some light on these feelings. We should naturally expect that such physiological feelings as those mentioned under classes (ii.), (iii.), and (iv.) would appear progressively to 'rise out of' or differentiate themselves from the general vital feeling. Some functions are more intimately instrumental or organic to physical life as a whole than others; hence the feelings attending the latter are naturally more differentiated from the general vital feeling than those attending the former. But since every function is in *some* degree instrumental to life, every such feeling is not completely differentiated from the vital feeling but seems to have it for a background.

(vi.) Next must be indicated the vast range of feelings aroused by complete perceptions, free ideas, and complications of these. Herein we shall only be able to speak of the typical emotions as a class : such are joy, sorrow, dread, relief, love, fear, anger, surprise.

(vii.) The following should strictly be included under (vi.), but their supreme importance demands their separation. (a) The ethical feeling, arising out of a past or a contemplated mode of conduct : (b) the higher æsthetic feelings, arising from a primary presentation (complex perception) integrated with its suggested representations ; arising also from a representation which is to be embodied in an art product : (c) the intellectual feelings, arising from consistency and system attained among particular knowledges or intellectual constructions ; arising also from the representation of a unifying consistency greater than any yet attained.

Before going further we must notice a valuable distinction due to the Herbartians, between 'material' and 'formal' feelings. The former are defined as feelings due to the special character of some particular presentation ; the latter, as due to the relations of distinguishable presentations to one another. This distinction we must adopt, in a slightly changed significance. Let us denote as *material* feelings those whose psychological objects approximate to being modes of anoetic consciousness,<sup>1</sup> and therefore are not distinguishable by introspection ; and as *formal* feelings, those whose objects involve explicit noetic consciousness of terms in relation to one another. It is then seen that all the feelings which I have described as 'physiological' are material feelings ; all coming under the remaining classes (v., vi., vii.), are formal.

§ 3. Let us see what can be positively said about the material feelings. It is very little.

It was pointed out above that the feelings afforded by impressions of sight and sound are accompanied by an escort of organic feelings, which are very faint if the organ is functionally efficient. In general they are so faint that we neglect them in comparison with the perception and the feelings and

<sup>1</sup> Localisation is the most distinct 'noetic' element in the consciousness of these feelings.

interests dependent on it. But it is most important that they should be distinguished; and in certain cases we cannot ignore them even practically. Suppose the organ—through over-use or from some constitutional reason—is in a strained or unhealthy condition; then we are aware on the one hand of the feelings accompanying the working of the organ, and on the other of the feeling dependent on the *perception* as such. Thus I may be pleased with a colour or form, *e.g.*, while when looking at it I experience some feeling of discomfort in connection with my organs of sight. If we further suppose the organ to be structurally injured,—if, to take the instance which most readily occurs, we suppose the external stimulus is so intense as to have this effect,—then the physiological feelings may be so intense as to draw to themselves the whole energy of consciousness in the effort physically to get rid of the stimulus, and the formal feelings may disappear altogether.

The most obvious and striking fact about all our material feelings is that they have no conscious object in the sense in which formal feelings have it. They are so closely bound up with the underlying presentational element that the qualitative differences which we must assign to the latter seem at first sight as if they could plausibly be explained by differences and oscillations in the intensity, breadth, and duration of the feeling itself. This is especially the case with the vital feelings. The case is excellently stated by Sully: "Feeling in its lower forms does not seem to follow or to depend on presentative elements. The *initial* phase arising out of organic sensation is distinctly one of feeling. . . . It is this fact which gives support to those who regard bodily feelings as prior to intellect,"—*i.e.*, that consciousness begins as *mere* feeling, pleasure or pain.<sup>1</sup> For a similar reason we may as plausibly say that we localise the feeling as that we localise the presentation. The contrast with formal feelings in this respect is very striking. Thus, to take a simple case, consider the pleasure afforded by a graceful arrangement of curved lines: the presentation is projected in space before me, but the feeling is certainly not so; on the other hand, the pleasure afforded by a soft caressing touch certainly is projected into

<sup>1</sup> *Human Mind*, vol. i. p. 69, 70; Horwicz, *Psychologische Analysen*, pt. i. It is this theory which Dr Ward has in view, art. *Psychology*, p. 40.

the part which is touched. If it were not for this localisation, it seems impossible that the idea of a correlation between these feelings and the functioning of particular organs could ever have arisen.

We are here upon the darkest and most unexplored region of mental life—or rather, of psycho-physical life. I believe it to be in the interest of clear thinking to draw a sharp distinction between the material and formal feelings, corresponding to the distinction between anoetic and noetic consciousness. This is not to make “an ethical valuation unjustifiably determine a psychological conception.”<sup>1</sup> In any case it is a somewhat audacious assumption, to take for granted that a suggested psychological distinction cannot be true, *because*, if it is true, the fact is susceptible of an ethical interpretation; but the ground of the present distinction is simply that—whereas we do know enough about the formal feelings to be able to arrive at results of value, scientifically and practically—we know almost nothing about material feelings. The principle of explanation we have been using (*i.e.*, Subject related in its action-under-feeling to a presentative content) cannot, for the reasons already stated, be applied to them. There is nothing strange in this, for on *a priori* grounds we have seen that no such principle can express the complete truth about mind.

These feelings cannot be treated as *sensations*. Indeed, from our point of view, this statement would, in one sense of it, be absurd; for the so-called sensations, as distinguishable facts, are *simple perceptions*—elementary cases of noetic synthesis: a ‘sensation of colour,’ *e.g.*, is something that we have begun to *know*. On the other hand, if by ‘sensation’ is meant a mode of *sentience*, then to say that material feelings are sensations is only to say that in some way they are intimately bound up with the more anoetic modes of consciousness, which is obviously true. But even if we set aside this distinction—if we assume, with the traditional English Psychology and with modern Presentationism, that *sensations as known* are mere atomic *data*, mere facts—we cannot say that these feelings are sensations on a level with those of sight and sound. The theory that they are so is found more or

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Höffding’s reference to Nahlowsky, p. 221.



less implicitly in English Psychology up to Spencer—we are obliged to say ‘implicitly’ because of the vagueness of the terminology employed by all these writers. Recently attempts have been made by Münsterberg, Nichols, and other physiological psychologists, to complete and defend it. The following facts have been thought to lend support to this view. (a) It has been claimed that specific nerves and nerve-terminals have been discovered for pleasures and pains, though no special brain-centres have been isolated. As regards this point, it is sufficient to say that the evidence has been most carefully scrutinised by Lehmann and Marshall, who have, it will be admitted, conclusively shown that the hypothesis in question was a hasty generalisation from insufficient *data*, and that the notion of specific nerves and terminals must be abandoned until some much more decisive and tangible facts in its favour are discovered.<sup>1</sup> (b) In certain cases the pain produced by a stimulus appears to precede the sensation; in certain other cases the reverse is the case—the pain seems to take longer to be produced than the actual sensation.<sup>2</sup> These facts, it seems to me, when taken on their own merits, prove nothing. All that they could be adduced to show is that we cannot distinguish a presentational element underlying the pain which precedes or succeeds the ‘sensation’ as we can in the case of formal feelings. But we knew this already in the case of other organic feelings. There is nothing in the fact to forbid the assumption made by Lehmann and Marshall that—taking the case of touch, *e.g.*, a prick—a sensation comparatively feelingless is followed by one highly painful.

Quite apart from details of evidence, it is difficult to resist the impression that those who treat physiological feelings as qualities of sensations are on the wrong track; it is a case of illusory simplification. Külpe has remarked that a sensation proper is marked only by quality, intensity, and duration; if *any one* of these becomes zero or vanishes, the whole sensation

<sup>1</sup> Full references are given by Mr Marshall, *Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics*, ch. i. § 4, pp. 15-22. See also his observations in the *Psychological Review*, vol. ii. No. 1, p. 61.

<sup>2</sup> Facts carefully summarised by Höfding, pp. 223, 224.

vanishes. But if the feeling attached to the sensation vanishes, the latter does not go along with it.

We have already noted that the material feelings may be regarded as differentiations of the general vital feeling, and that no one of them is completely independent of it. The vital feeling seems to vary with the variation of the vegetative functions; hence if we may suppose that in the most primitive forms of life the differentiation of vegetative activity from activity through 'irritability' (prompted from without) had not yet arisen<sup>1</sup>—so that the creature's entire physiological relation to its environment consisted in absorbing appropriate material from the latter—then the content of such a creature's consciousness would be most nearly represented by our vital feeling together with certain very vague motor sensations.

Introspection is useless in enlightening this dark region of organic feeling; and it is important to observe that the more sound and healthy the physical organism is, the less possibility is there of any physiological evidence to be obtained therefrom. We have to rely on fragments of evidence from pathological cases in which the organic feelings are not in the normal condition. What most of all needs enlightenment is the question—What can be said of the influence which these feelings seem to have upon the movements of feeling proper? How do they determine our general 'mood'? What are the nature and limits of this influence?

§ 4. From this brief and unsatisfactory survey I turn to the more tangible facts of formal feeling.

Under this head come the emotions. What is the relation of these to their 'expression'?

Instinctive and reflex actions being regarded as secondarily automatic<sup>2</sup> *in the race*, emotional expression falls into line

<sup>1</sup> If the prevalent supposition, that life had an aquatic or marine origin, is correct, it surely is *probable* that no such difference had arisen. As soon as it began to arise, we must suppose that indefinite *sensory* presentations began to supervene upon the vague organic feelings and motor sensations.

<sup>2</sup> This phrase is used in Hartley's sense. It must be observed that the theory here indicated implies that the inheritance of *acquired* characteristics is possible.

with them: as Dr Ward has expressed it, "The purposive actions of an earlier stage of development become—though somewhat atrophied, as it were—the emotive outlet of a later stage; in circumstances where our ancestors worried their enemies, we only show our teeth."

An emotion is an attitude of feeling determined by certain typical relations into which the Self may enter. The Self as entering into the ground of the emotion is of course *objective*,—the 'me,' as Professor James has called it: *i.e.*, it is as much of his real Self (the 'I') as the individual knows. It may be the 'material,' 'social,' or 'spiritual' me, to adopt Professor James's admirably expressed distinctions; and the relations may be perceived, remembered, or merely imagined. All emotions doubtless have some kind of organic accompaniment, but in many of them the bodily 'resonance' is prominent and disturbing, and does not end in internal changes but goes on to outward movements,—which are of course further changes, continuous with the internal, and differing from them only in being more under control. In such cases this expression *as a whole* is—on the genetic psychological theory of instinct to which I have referred—strictly conditioned by the appearance of the whole psychical state; but its *detailed characters* are due to the consolidation and fusion, in the course of evolutionary history, of nervous changes which originally effected purposive or feeling-prompted actions. There are of course special modifications of the psychosis and neurosis, due to the concrete case in which the emotion arises. The so-called corporeal 'resonance' is reported back to the brain, and then originates sensations (especially modes of organic sentience, often of strong feeling-tone) which enter into the emotional state. Such resonance is especially intensive in the case of emotions due to the relations of the 'material me.' Hence to 'introspection'—which in this case is very certainly retrospection—an emotional state may seem to have consisted of nothing but the sensation-feelings which are thus prompted. But retrospection in the case of feeling is notoriously faulty,—it only imperfectly retains even the conditions and concomitants of feeling which were most prominent at the time; hence the psychical disturbance may, for afterthought (however imme-

diate), appear only as a consciousness of physical disturbance.<sup>1</sup> No states that can properly be called emotions can occur until the stage of mental development when percepts and free ideas are possible: to deny this would be little less than fatuous,—in common language the term has at least this much of definiteness. The occurrence of an emotion depends on a presentative-representative complex emerging as the object of consciousness,—it is aroused by the perception or idea of a *total situation* viewed in its relation to self as a centre: we cannot be moved until we perceive the general situation in which we are. This is the case even in the merest bodily fear; hence even in this case the emotion cannot be constituted—though it is accompanied—by the feelings of its bodily symptoms. Herein appears the importance of the distinction of formal from material feeling, and noetic from anoetic consciousness: if any feeling at all is aroused by the perceived situation, it must be a formal feeling. This is a case of an emotion grounded upon a relation of the material me; when it is grounded upon the social me, the effect upon the internal organs need not be so strong, while the emotion may be intense. When the emotion is grounded upon a relation of the spiritual me, the effect upon the internal organs is always comparatively weak. This is notably the case with the higher emotions,—intellectual, ethical, æsthetic, and religious; and these, in many and various directions, are the strongest and deepest moving forces in the history of mankind.

The theory against which these remarks are directed would scarcely have attracted as much attention as it has done, had not Professor James devoted his power and genius to expounding and enforcing it. As presented by him, in the *Principles*, it is not free from serious ambiguities, the nature of which may be indicated by reference to the briefer (and later) exposition in the *Textbook*. Professor James begins by appealing to retrospection: "If we fancy some strong emotion, then try

<sup>1</sup> The upholders of this, the James-Lange theory, say that to make the total expression depend on the occurrence of the total psychical state is 'sheer reflective interpretation' (cf. Dewey, *Emotional Attitudes*, *Psy. R.*, vol. i. No. 6). I would reply that the supposed introspective localisation of the psychical disturbance in various parts of the body is a 'reflective interpretation' which is excessively crude.

to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing emotional left behind . . . a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains."<sup>1</sup> This is the "vital point of the whole theory," but it is ambiguous in the extreme. In the first place it is admitted<sup>2</sup> that the 'subtler' emotions are not constituted by feelings of bodily symptoms. What then are we to understand by 'strong emotion'? Professor James has since declared that he meant to assert the dependence on bodily symptoms of the "emotional seizure or *affect*,"<sup>3</sup> which Professor Dewey further describes as the "characteristic *feel*" of the emotion. Let us then symbolise the emotional state of mind as P (presentative content) *plus* S (sensational feelings of bodily symptoms) *plus* *x*. The first of these terms is the "cold and neutral state of intellectual perception"; if then the "characteristic feel" is nothing but S, the theory becomes a mere tautology—*i.e.*, that feelings of bodily symptoms depend on the bodily symptoms. But the characteristic feel *must* be nothing but S: for, as we have seen, Professor James denies that *x* is anything. We have already seen a variety of reasons for totally rejecting the view which this denial implies; indeed the general principle involved in it—that formal feeling is a species of sentience—should at once prevent our accepting it without the most searching scrutiny.

Further ambiguities appear when we ask, How do these bodily symptoms arise? We are told: "particular perceptions certainly do produce widespread bodily effects by a sort of immediate physical influence."<sup>4</sup> Admitting this, and asking for its bearing upon emotion, we find suggestions of two answers. (1) In 'strong' emotions "the bodily changes follow directly the perception<sup>5</sup> of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion." Here the emotion, though constituted by its organic symptoms, is made to depend upon perception or ideation, and cannot occur until this occurs. (2) "The immediate cause of an emotion is a physical effect on the nerves": this is most clearly seen in "those pathological cases in which the emotion

<sup>1</sup> P. 379.<sup>2</sup> P. 384.<sup>3</sup> *Psy. R.*, vol. i. No. 5, pp. 523, 525 note.<sup>4</sup> P. 376.<sup>5</sup> Professor James explains that he does not mean to exclude ideation.



is objectless," where "it [the emotion] is nothing but the feeling of a purely bodily state, and it has a purely bodily cause." I have already remarked that for 'objectless' we should say 'groundless.' The *first* of these views is the one which Professor James, in response to criticisms, has further developed and declared to be his own;<sup>1</sup> the second—though as it stands it is not verbally inconsistent with the first—is developed by Professor Dewey<sup>2</sup> into what seems to be a coherent theory of physical determinism. Professor Dewey thinks, however, that this was what Professor James really meant.

As regards the first view, all the critics concurred in indicating a serious gap in the statement of it; how comes the perception or idea to excite the reflex discharges on which the emotion, as feeling, depends? Surely it can only have been because the perception itself becomes *ipso facto* the basis of an emotional state, without the mediation of any feelings of bodily symptoms. If I experience the physical symptoms of fear at seeing a certain animal, it is not the perception as such, the "cold and neutral" intellectual state, which initiates these symptoms, which in their turn produce the emotional feeling. There is nothing in the perception of a bear, as such, to produce symptoms of fear; it is because the perception suggests possibilities—it arouses ideas which, when integrated with it, form the representation of a total situation viewed in its relation to some form of the 'me'; and this representation, as soon as it becomes coherent, arouses the emotion. The 'expression' of the emotion is instinctive as regards *what* it is; but *that* it is, is due to the whole psychical state called the emotion of fear. The 'total situation' may be the idea of the bear attacking me or some one in whom I am interested; or if the bear is tame, or chained or caged, the total situation is something quite different; but whatever it is, the emotion depends upon it, and the expression is different according as the emotion is different. There seems indeed to be no motive for making the bodily expression an intermediate term between the perceived situation and the emotion it arouses. Professor James admits that "as soon as an object has become familiar and suggestive, its emotional consequences must start

<sup>1</sup> *Psy. R.*, vol. i. No. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii. No. 1.

rather from the total situation which it suggests than from its own naked presence; but whatever be our reaction on the situation, it is always an instinctive reaction on that one of its elements which strikes us as most vitally important."<sup>1</sup> But *why* does this element strike us as fundamentally important? What is the source of its valuation? What possible answer can there be, but that it is itself, without any interference of the vaso-motor reflexes, the ground of an emotional state? Yet Professor James denies this, and maintains that the "emotional excitement," which follows the idea, follows it "only secondarily and as a consequence of the diffusive wave of impulses aroused" (*loc. cit.*) This mediation by bodily processes is, I think, wholly fictitious. Rejecting it, we are led back to the view suggested earlier in this note.

It is difficult to see how Professor James can consistently remain in his present position. Professor Dewey has indicated the difficulty as clearly as could be wished. He remarks that the passage quoted already from James "seems to involve a mixture of his own theory [*i.e.*, what Professor Dewey regards as his own theory] with the theory he is combating; . . . the conception of an instinctive reaction is the relevant idea; that of reaction upon an element 'which strikes us as vitally important' the incongruous idea. Does it strike us, *prior* to the reaction, as important? Then most certainly it already has emotional worth."<sup>2</sup> Again: "If my bodily changes . . . follow from and grow out of the conscious recognition, *quâ* conscious recognition, of a bear, then the bear is already a bear of whom we are afraid—our idea must be of the bear as a fearful object." Accordingly Professor Dewey, developing the second of the two tendencies that I have indicated, declares: "It is not the idea of the bear or the bear as object, but a certain *act of seeing*, which by habit, whether original or acquired, sets up other acts." This seems to imply that the process is continuous and purely physical, just as in the case of fire melting wax and wax running liquid. Professor Dewey seems to say that the acquired physical co-ordination in the nervous system 'constitutes' the bear a fearful object: the organic, instinctive 'mode of behaviour' is the primary thing; "the idea [*i.e.*, of the 'vitally important' element in the

<sup>1</sup> *Psy. R.*, vol. i. p. 518.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii. No. 1. p. 19.

situation] and the emotional excitation are constituted at one and the same time; indeed they represent the tension of stimulus and response within the [neural] co-ordination which makes up the mode of behaviour."<sup>1</sup> If this be what is meant, it is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view which makes 'bodily symptoms' essential in any emotion.

§ 5. We seem only able to say that emotions are psychical *instincts*,—if the term may by analogy be applied in this connection; they are tendencies to feel characteristically on the presentation of a certain complex ground. If we had any detailed knowledge of the properly psychical effects of repetition and habit—*i.e.*, if we could explore the arcana of the 'subconscious' and of 'psychical dispositions'—we might be able to explain them genetically; but this would lead us entirely beyond the psychological point of view, just as the attempt genetically to explain physiological instincts leads beyond the physiological point of view. *For Psychology, emotions are original subjective facts.*

There is, however, a derivative theory of emotion which demands consideration. It makes all emotions into more or less elaborated compounds of what we have called 'material' feelings. In one form or another this view has been upheld by a large number of influential psychologists; but, so far as I am aware, it has only been stated in a perfectly coherent form by one writer, to whom I shall refer presently. The theory evidently presupposes that pleasures and pains can be revived and complicated just as presentations are. Now if this signifies that a pleasure or a pain, merely as such, considered apart from its presentational base, can be revived or complicated with others, then most certainly this assertion is meaningless; for it is evident that pleasure and pain, in this abstraction, cannot be identified as the same at different times. "The only possible criterion of sameness," it has been well said, "is the sameness of the ideational substrate"; and accordingly no one—apart from those who, like Münsterberg, have on other grounds defended the sensation-theory of feeling—has ever seriously argued that feeling can be reproduced except when the content to which it was originally

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 18.

attached is reproduced. In this case the reply usually made is that we cannot possibly prove that the feeling is reproduced in the sense in which the presentational content is reproduced. But this does not seem the best way of stating the matter; it leaves obscure the sense in which we suppose presentations themselves to be 'reproduced.' We have seen, when dwelling on 'association,' that no presentation is retained *as such*; what is retained is the permanent psychical disposition which conditions the subsequent appearance of a like presentation. Instead then of saying that a new feeling is called forth by the 'old' or the 'revived' presentation, we should say that a new feeling is called forth by the new presentation. The difference between the two is that the bond of identity which holds in the case of presentation (by which the new presentation is 'like' the former one) does not hold in the case of feeling; a presentation which at one time excites pleasure may at another excite pain, and *vice versa*.

Lehmann has made this idea of the reproduction of feeling consistent, by maintaining—if I understand him aright—a theory which is essentially expressed in the following propositions. (1) To each *Vorstellung* belongs a definite mode of feeling (either a pleasure or a pain) which is revived along with it, and which does not change (in relation to this *Vorstellung*) except on the basis of mental changes which amount in effect to an alteration of personality. "Gefühlstöne können dadurch reproduziert werden, dass die Vorstellungen, mit welchen sie verbunden gewesen sind, wiedererzeugt werden. Und je vollständiger die Reproduktion der intellektuellen Elemente stattfindet, um so genauer und stärker werden auch die emotionellen Elemente wiedererzeugt."<sup>1</sup> (2) Each *Vorstellung-Gefühl* has a characteristic organic expression. (3) The object of an emotion being a complex of primary and secondary *Vorstellungen*, and the latter being revived each with its corresponding feeling, the fusion of all the feeling-elements constitutes the feeling-attitude of the emotion. The organic expressions also fuse and contribute elements to the whole state of mind. This theory is of real importance because it works out a particular tendency to a coherent result, and one which, in my opinion, is precisely wrong. This tendency is to override or slur the distinction

<sup>1</sup> *Das Gefühlsleben*, p. 262.

between the 'formal' and the 'material' type of feeling, to reduce the former towards the latter and bring the latter towards the former.<sup>1</sup> The result is a misapprehension of the nature of both. Thus Lehmann's theory rests on the doctrine that to each *Vorstellung* belongs an invariable feeling; this implies that the feeling depends *wholly* on the material of this *Vorstellung*. Lehmann mentions a number of facts which go against his view in this particular, but he seems to me lamely to explain them away by a gratuitous hypothesis. On the other hand the view which we have defended implies that no feeling can be said to depend absolutely upon the material of a particular *Vorstellung* presented to consciousness, for this *Vorstellung* is only distinct or particular in virtue of its relations to others, and the feeling it arouses depends on these relations as well as on the material character of the presentation itself. And when subsequently a like presentation appears, but with a changed feeling, it is because it appears in new relations,—“in a new light,” as we say. In short, as we have already said, the distinction of formal and material feeling stands or falls with that of noetic and anoetic consciousness; whatever value or significance belongs to the one, belongs to the other also. We need first to have a true conception of mental elaboration in the *sphere of intellection*, and then we need to consider how far it is applicable in the sphere of feeling.

All that has been said applies as well to the so-called 'abstract' or purely 'representative' emotions, which we placed in the seventh class, as to the ordinary or typical emotions. But when naming them at that place, we distinguished two forms or aspects in each—according as they are aroused by an idea of a harmony actually attained and experienced by man, or by an idea of one greater and more fundamental than any which has been yet attained.<sup>2</sup> They are

<sup>1</sup> 'Presentationism' also carries out this tendency in an extreme form; but Lehmann's point of view is not that of the presentationist.

<sup>2</sup> I say 'harmony,' for each of these attitudes of feeling is aroused by a harmony either recognised as actual or represented as possible. The ethical feeling depends on a harmony between the Subject's own Will and certain wholly concrete given circumstances in which other personal Wills play the largest part; this harmony constitutes the 'rightness' of particular acts. The æsthetic feeling depends on a harmony of *suggestion, form, and content*, in an actual or possible object of perception; the intellectual feeling on a harmony of knowledges.



placed by themselves only that the latter all-important characteristic may not be ignored. They enter into Desires for the realisation of greater harmony,—desires which involve an ideal representation of a harmony beyond us, transcending indeed all our past experience, yet potentially ours. To investigate the meaning of this fact would carry us beyond Psychology, for it involves transcending the finiteness of the individual personality. The various aspects of the problem which arises out of this fact of self-transcendence are treated in the three following chapters.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE NATURE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE.

WHAT is that mode of knowledge which we call 'introspection,' self-knowledge, or self-consciousness?<sup>1</sup> This is the question to which our discussion of 'Presentationism' led: and it is indeed a question of primary and fundamental importance. The view which we take of the nature of this process, and of its relation to objective knowledge, determines issues of far-reaching significance. By 'objective knowledge'—as I have fully explained elsewhere—is meant our knowledge of the world and universe around us; it is what Kant would have called 'cosmological' knowledge: our 'self-knowledge' is our knowledge of the functions and states which make up our conscious life,—in which of course objective knowledge is included.

<sup>1</sup> As ordinarily used, 'introspection' has a specially psychological, and 'self-consciousness' a specially philosophical, significance. When self-consciousness signifies the individual's knowledge of himself as an object, it is identical with what seems to be meant by 'introspection.' 'Self-knowledge,' as we shall see, is preferable to either of these terms. I have sometimes (after Dr Ward) used the phrase 'Subjective knowledge,' but this use of it is open to criticism; it has many misleading associations from which 'self-knowledge' is entirely free.

According to the view here set forth, self-knowledge is in no respect whatever analogous to a direct inspection of 'inner states'; it is a result of the same self-transcending tendency of thought (or intelligence) which makes possible the objective reference lying at the basis of our knowledge of the so-called 'external' world. The whole of consciousness, the whole mind, is not exhausted in this objective knowledge; and therefore intelligence is not only aware (with more or less completeness and truth) of its own structure and laws, and its contents in the form of objective knowledge; but in virtue of its self-transcending tendency, it is aware (more or less completely) of the relations of mutual dependence which hold between the various modes of objective knowledge and the whole mind. "Self-consciousness," then, has *degrees of truth*, and has a real content which is *more* than the structure and content of objective knowledge. Some of those who develop Kantian principles in the light of Hegel tend to obliterate this distinction. In the second edition of his first *Critique* Kant had arrived at the conclusion that self-consciousness derives all its content from the structure of intelligence acting in objective knowledge. This is not all the truth even when we bring to light the most fundamental presuppositions and ultimate ideals of objective knowledge (e.g., the world as a systematic unity within which general laws obtain): self-consciousness is more than the consciousness of objective knowledge, actual or ideal. In self-knowledge we know ourselves not merely as systematic unities of related parts, but as centralised or focal unities,—each having the unity of a single *life*. Self-knowledge is therefore the primary and fundamental development; objective knowledge, though its

practical importance is indefinitely greater, is really subordinate; for only by reference to the former can the degree of truth of the categories of the latter be judged.<sup>1</sup>

§ 1. Whatever difficulty is found in accepting the view above expressed will arise probably from a misunderstanding of what I have here called the 'self-transcending tendency' of thought, and (elsewhere) its 'objective' or 'trans-subjective' reference. There is a curious philosophical prejudice or superstition—the effects of which can be traced far and wide through the whole history of philosophy—that in order to know a thing it is necessary to *be* that thing. It may, indeed, be argued that, for an intelligent being to *know* something of the world around him, the world and himself must both be rooted in one Being, and this Being must be rational, must be akin to his own intelligence; I am far from rejecting this doctrine, although I reject any attempt to establish it which seems inadequate or superficial. But this doctrine is not at present in question; for, granting fully its truth, we cannot therefore say that the knowing subject simply *is* what it knows; we cannot identify the knowing with the known in order that it may be known. Psychologically, we cannot say that any constituent of consciousness, to be known, must itself be a cognitive fact,—which is the theory involved in what has been called 'Presentationism.' Is it not of the essence of thought or knowledge to be representative or symbolic of something whose existence transcends it,—something which is in a sense 'other' or 'more'

<sup>1</sup> Cf. our discussion of some aspects of the Hegelian dialectic, in ch. iii.

than the knowledge itself? What is symbolised or referred to or known is not to be identified with the process of reference, the knowledge itself. This view—the obvious truth of which must be apparent to every unprejudiced mind as soon as it is stated—we have elsewhere attempted to illustrate and defend at some length. Knowledge is essentially a process of reference; and all knowledge is *direct* in this sense,—that it refers directly to the reality known, the object referred to; and not indirectly through some substitute intervening between this and the knower. When a man reflects on his own states and when he reflects on something in the objective world—*e.g.*, the motives of another man's conduct, or the nature of a chemical combination—his attitude to the 'object' is the same: the reference is equally direct, though the knowledge is necessarily incomplete, and may in some of its details be illusory.<sup>1</sup>

In saying that the intellectual reference in self-knowledge is direct, we are expressing a view which must be carefully distinguished from the misleading implications of certain traditional ways of describing knowledge. I refer to the idea that introspection is essentially a certain direction of the attention, and may be compared to a direct inspection of the objective contents of consciousness; to these contents, therefore, all that introspection reveals (including feeling and will) must belong. This is the inevitable result of certain current modes of describing knowledge. The traditional account recognises that cognition is

<sup>1</sup> The bearing of these considerations on the problem with which our previous chapter closed—the problem (expressed in psychological terms) of the presentative cognition of super-presentational states in consciousness—is surely evident.



always essentially a relation or reference, and therefore involves a duality or *distinction* between the respective *loci*, so to speak, of the knowing and of the known : this is most true and important ; but a favourite way of describing the relation is calculated to produce much confusion. Knowledge, it is usually said, involves a Subject knowing and an Object known ; to this we may, with Dr Ward, add the implications of "a necessary dependence of the Subject on the Object as far as its knowing goes, and no such dependence of the Subject as far as its being goes."<sup>1</sup> The sense in which all these propositions are true has been explained elsewhere ; here we have to deal with some of the implications of that special form of expression which insists on describing knowledge as necessarily involving a duality of terms in the form of Subject knowing and Object known. The question at once arises : If this is true, how can the Subject *know itself* ? Professor Ward has expressed the difficulty thus : "If we identify the two, we transcend our empirical conception of knowledge ; a knowledge in which Subject and Object are one is at best a limiting case towards which we might perhaps conceive ourselves approximating in self-consciousness, and continuing to approximate indefinitely. . . . If, however, on the other hand, we regard the knowing Subject as distinct from the Object known, we require a second Subject, or at least a higher grade of consciousness" in order that the Subject may know itself. This line of thought rests on the supposition that knowledge is analogous to a bond going across from the Subject to the Object, or, to use a less crude metaphor, that it is analogous to a light proceeding from the Subject and shed on the

<sup>1</sup> *Mind*, N. S., No. 5 : "'Modern' Psychology."

Object; the Subject is like an eye that is itself the source of the light by which it sees, and the knowing is like the seeing. For the Subject to know itself would then be for the eye to turn its light into itself; and it involves an analogous impossibility. If we apply this idea to the relation of consciousness and the objects of consciousness, we reach the view that self-observation is a kind of direct inspection of one's mental furniture, which is the traditional view in Psychology. This we may call the 'eye-theory' of self-knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Professor James Ward, in his valuable discussion of our present question, from which I have already quoted, seems inclined to accept the above statements as expressing adequately the real problem of self-knowledge; and he proceeds to deal with the problem, keeping this statement always in view. I shall have to urge, on the contrary, that it is a wholly inadequate statement, and that the difficulty is largely one of our own making: the root of it is the erroneous—I may even add, the absurd—'eye-theory' of self-knowledge. I venture to think that this problem will remain a hopeless one unless we recognise that, in certain fundamental aspects, there is a real correspondence between the relations in which self-knowledge and world-knowledge respectively consist. To say that for knowledge there must be a Subject of knowledge, means simply that thought or knowledge exists only as the thought of a thinker; as Professor Seth has said, "knowledge (knowing) is always an activity, an active-passive experience of an individual subject." To say that for knowledge there must be an object of know-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the impersonal unitary consciousness, assumed by Münsterberg, in contrast to the concrete multiplicity of the *contents* of consciousness.

ledge, means that knowledge is essentially a reference beyond its factual sphere as the conscious function of an individual mind. I may remind the reader that the notion of individuality must be cleared of all implications of a self-contained atomic existence; the mind may be rooted in the Infinite on one side—it may even itself *be* Infinite on one side—but it is individual on another, in the sense of having a centre of selfhood of its own.<sup>1</sup> The ‘reference beyond,’ which I speak of, is in two directions, which may be metaphorically described as ‘inner’ and ‘outer,’ if we bear in mind that the *opposition* which this metaphor implies has simply that degree of truth which is sufficient for the practical and theoretical purposes of everyday life and of physical science. By the ‘outer’ direction of its intelligence, the conscious self conceives (or is capable of conceiving) of the Universe as a Whole, with its innumerable multiplicity of dependent individual beings; by the ‘inner’ direction of its intelligence, it is capable of conceiving of itself as an individual centre, not only of intellectual processes, but of affective (emotional) and active processes which are more and other than the intellectual, however closely they are bound up with these. And just because they are more, the knowledge of them is possible, as involving the necessary transcendent reference of thought.

We thus see that the metaphor of two directions of knowledge has only a limited applicability: for self-consciousness *includes* an awareness of the processes in us by which our consciousness of a world is realised and extended; or rather, it is capable—in its higher degrees of truth—of including this awareness, but always includes fragments of it. Again, though in no

<sup>1</sup> A view set forth in ch. iii., above.

case can the process of knowing be identified with that which is known, yet the mutual dependence of the two terms is greater in the case of self-knowledge than in that of objective knowledge; the modes of self, to which our self-consciousness refers, are all bound together as constituents of a single life,—the life of the individual knower; while the objects to which our world-consciousness refers are to be distinguished, as regards their existence, from the self. Since, from the ontological point of view, there is no *ultimately real* independence even in the latter case, we may state the matter in other words, thus: the *immanence* necessary for every act of knowledge—the fact that knower and known must have a common root—is more explicitly evident in the case of self-knowledge than in the case of objective knowledge.

It is not only in the characteristic of embodying a transcendent reference that our self-consciousness and our world-consciousness correspond; but also in that each is possible only on the basis of a present *fact*, which cannot be described as a mode of knowledge or as referring beyond itself in the cognitive sense,—it must rather be called a mode of pure sentience. We have seen<sup>1</sup> that the whole process of the growth of objective knowledge points back to the sensuous *ἄπειρον* which is the basis of external perception; knowledge begins with the definite articulation of this into intelligible fact. We have seen also<sup>2</sup> that self-knowledge points back to the same undifferentiated germ, which is not itself the knowledge in question, but on the basis of which alone is the knowledge possible. We can only conceive such a state as a limit which may be gradually approached,

<sup>1</sup> Ch. ii. § 3; ch. iii. pt. 3, § 5, and Appendix on Kant.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. ii. § 4; ch. iv. § 7.

—the pole of purely ‘anoetic sentience.’ The *opposite* pole to this is—not a purely noetic consciousness, but—a consciousness where, through the progress of science and philosophy, knowledge is so completely developed that self and world are clearly seen to be embraced as modes in a deeper unity, and no longer even appear to be two opposite kinds of existence, “separated by the whole diameter of being.”

The doctrine that ‘all introspection is retrospection’ seems to be a clumsy expression of the necessary distinction between the knowing and the known, when the object known is a mode of knowledge as such—*i.e.*, when we reflectively know that we know or observe somewhat, and when we become discriminatively aware of the features or aspects of the process of knowledge on which we reflect. The reflection consists in relating it in manifold ways—according to the interest of the time: the most fundamental being the relation to self; it is at least a mode of *my* mental life. The terms ‘introspection’ and ‘retrospection’ seem both entirely inappropriate: the one is merely a clumsy attempt to correct the misleading implications of the other; and the introduction of a time-reference in the latter of the terms in question is particularly objectionable, for the nature and limits of the present in consciousness—by which I mean the *real* present, not the fiction of an indivisible moment of no duration—are irrelevant to the question of the kind of relation in which self-knowledge consists. To try to discover how far our knowledge of our ‘present’ states of feeling or volition is ‘retrospective’ is surely a most futile performance, if intended to throw any light on the nature of the process by which we know them as ours. Introspection, I should say, is simply a particular case of self-



consciousness; we are self-conscious when we reflect upon certain of our states *as ours*, and this is introspection. In ordinary life the interest of such inquiries lies for the most part in idiosyncrasies; the scientific introspection of the psychologist is the *same process*, extended and made as systematic as possible, and directed to the end of discovering not personal peculiarities but characteristics shared by all minds. The deeper aspects of self-consciousness emerge when this same process is still further extended, and so takes in deeper truth.

§ 2. A most important consequence of the view of self-knowledge which has been above explained is, that the conception of *degrees of truth* has as much significance in its regard as it has with respect to objective knowledge. The ordinary view of introspection of course excludes the possibility of this; on inspecting the contents of the mind, we are supposed to see what is there and how it is arranged. The implication is that the *ultimate truth* can be attained by sufficiently careful observation, and that any act of self-knowledge has the highest kind of certainty and is valid in its own right.<sup>1</sup> And since the self whose processes are thus known with perfect accuracy is the individual self *as finite*, it is difficult to exaggerate the fatal importance of the results to which this error leads. The nature of the error itself has been well pointed out by Professor Adamson. "In observation of the inner life the contents of the thoughts whereby we determine the nature of the observed are neither in fact nor in meaning necessarily identical with the observed. Nothing is gained, as regards accuracy of observation,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the doctrine of Descartes as to the superior certainty of the results of self-observation.

by the 'intra-subjective' character of both the observed and the observation. . . . If to know the processes of consciousness means to be able to determine accurately their characteristics and differences, I should be inclined to say that we can hardly claim such knowledge. What we do possess is painfully and laboriously attained, and wants every mark of 'immediate certainty' or 'absolutely self-evidencing' character. . . . I can be, in and through the process of knowing, no more certain of what is *in my* consciousness—if we allow for the moment that any accurate meaning can be put into so metaphorical an expression—than of what is beyond my consciousness. That knowing is a process of mind, and that the known is in the one case likewise a fact of mind, gives no additional certainty to the resulting cognition."<sup>1</sup>

The implication of the view here defended is, that no possible conception which we can form of the constitution of the mind or of any factor therein can be a complete and adequate representation of the reality; we are never able with perfect adequacy to state in intellectual terms the nature of our inner experiences. But our conceptions of them are not therefore false; the more complete truth does not destroy the less complete, but expands and transforms it. Truth is like a picture of boundless extent and infinite detail, which is obliterated for us and needs to be renewed, and of which we have only recovered different disconnected portions, and these in vaguest outline. These portions can only be correctly estimated when they are treated as such; they are fragments *of the whole*, and not illusions; but they are *fragments* of the whole, and not

<sup>1</sup> *Mind*, vol. xii. p. 126 (from a searching review of Volkelt's *Erfahrung und Denken*).

self-contained pieces of truth, each of which can stand on its own merits. This applies both to such general analyses as we have been dealing with in the previous chapter, and to detailed analyses of particular facts. All the results so obtained are relative to the present state of our knowledge; they are necessarily held subject to a revision which may have to be so thorough as completely to transform them, and each in itself has many missing links of connection and exhibits a general want of satisfactory coherence. Notwithstanding this, we must accept them if they are the best account that we can now form of the realities to which they refer. These conclusions as to self-knowledge seem to follow necessarily from the very conception of truth as an organic whole; and they would probably be accepted in theory by many who unfortunately would constantly forget them in practical psychological investigation and discussion.

The Libertarian theory of Freewill is a very important case in illustration of what I have just said; it is worth while to examine the whole controversy from this point of view.

The Libertarian or so-called 'indeterminist' theory is always criticised as if it purported to express the ultimate truth of what the form of all human conscious action verily is; and indeed the Libertarians themselves have constantly spoken as if it were so; but surely the whole question is as to the *truest* analytical account that we can give of our actual consciousness of being *free in a sense in which Nature is not*. This consciousness is for common-sense, as it were, a synthetic unanalysed whole or *datum*; and the unanalysed difference between the mode of activity of a human and a natural agent is recognised as the ground of re-

sponsibility and imputability in the former case. That we are thus conscious is a matter of everyday experience, and is admitted by all parties to the controversy. This consciousness is either wholly illusory or it contains more or less of truth. The former supposition we may set aside as a motiveless dogma of naturalistic Determinism. If, then, there is some degree of truth in our consciousness of being in our conduct somehow raised above the level characteristic of what we call a 'natural' agent, we require for scientific purposes—though not for practical purposes—to grasp in intellectual terms the nature and grounds of the truth it contains. This is a matter of great difficulty; and even if we found ourselves quite unable to do it, we should not be justified in rejecting our consciousness in this matter as illusory. Common Sense, as always in such cases, tends to make this consciousness the solution of the problem instead of itself the problem to be solved; for Common Sense is always practical.

We may expect *a priori* that even the most careful attempts to state the question at issue in this controversy in the form of a perfectly clear alternative will inevitably fail. A disjunction, with regard to any Subject, where the two terms of the alternative are mutually exclusive and together exhaustive, and at the same time intensively full and detailed, is only possible where we have a comprehensive and exact knowledge of the system within which our disjunction places the Subject.<sup>1</sup> Now in the case of volition the system evidently is the whole universe of reality, to the furthest springs of our conscious activity on the one hand, and the furthest reach of its effects on the other,—to the very

<sup>1</sup> See ch. iii. pt. 3, § 4, on disjunction as presupposing the consciousness of a general system.

roots of man's being and the being of the objective world. The whole question may indeed in the last resort be expressed thus: What are the respective parts which the human mind and the objective world play in determining conduct? Manifestly we cannot form any disjunction for the answers to this question, which is not extremely general—much more so than any of the parties to the controversy seem willing to admit. Professor Sidgwick's statement of the issue will afford us an illustration. It is probably the most careful statement that has ever been made. "Is the self to which I refer my deliberate volitions a self of strictly determinate moral qualities,—a definite character partly inherited, partly formed by my past actions and feelings, and by any physical influences that it may unconsciously have received; so that my voluntary action, for good or evil, is at any moment completely caused by the determinate qualities of this character, together with my circumstances, or the external influences acting on me at the moment,—including my present bodily conditions? Or, is there always a possibility of my choosing to act in the manner that I now judge to be reasonable and right, whatever my previous actions and experiences may have been?"<sup>1</sup> It is instructive to compare with this Dr Martineau's statement of the same problem: "Whether, in the exercise of Will—*i.e.*, in cases of choice—the mind is wholly determined by phenomenal antecedents and external conditions, or itself also, as active Subject of these objective experiences, plays the part of determining Cause?"<sup>2</sup> The first of Dr Martineau's alternatives corresponds to the first of Professor Sidgwick's, but with 'phenomenal antece-

<sup>1</sup> *Methods*, p. 62 (4th ed.)    <sup>2</sup> *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 188 (2nd ed.)



dents' substituted for 'determinate qualities of character'; the affirmation of it is supposed to constitute Determinism,—that conduct is the result of 'character' and 'circumstances.'

Dr Martineau's distinction of the active Subject and its 'phenomena' might, in the absence of proper explanations, be taken to imply that all the contents of mind, in the way of thought and feeling, are on the same level as 'phenomena,' and are merely passive; while the real mind, the mind 'itself,' is behind or beneath them and is merely active. In other words, it might be taken to imply that abstract separation of the phenomena from the noumenon which we have already criticised,<sup>1</sup> and which results in the view that we can extend and organise our knowledge of the phenomena without thereby knowing any more of the noumenon. We must reject this conception altogether; and if so, we cannot limit 'character' to any so-called phenomenal states, or, in the end, separate it from the whole nature of the man down to the deepest roots thereof; the effects of his past actions, and the inherited effects of the actions of his progenitors, form only one element determining character. We may indeed make 'character' signify the man as individual, though we have rejected the view that any individuality is self-contained or *merely* finite; but we cannot limit character to any particular factor *within* the individual life. Hence it is unmeaning to say that action is not the result of the individual character in relation to its circumstances; but this admission does not in the least invalidate our unanalysed consciousness of freedom. We therefore conclude that the former of the two alternatives mentioned

<sup>1</sup> See especially ch. iv. § 8.

by Professor Sidgwick and Dr Martineau only involves Determinism when some erroneous theory of the elements constituting the individual self or character is presupposed; or at least we conclude that this deeper question needs to be discussed *first*.

When the Libertarian theory of a freedom of choice, in the literal sense, is understood as it should be—as a merely symbolic representation of what is realised in all human actions—then many current objections to it become groundless. Lotze seems to have this in mind when in the relative section of his *Practical Philosophy* he speaks of freedom of choice as a *formal postulate*. But most Libertarians speak of this theory as if it were meant to be a literally true account of what takes place in consciousness, as though will were a kind of activity which could at any time be shot out or projected freely in either of two given directions.<sup>1</sup> This is absurd in itself, and contradicts the basal principle of psychological science: not ‘uniformity of sequence,’ which is nonsense, but the principle that we only understand mental facts by reducing all their complexity and variety to modes of one and the same fundamental type,—a single complex function found operative at every stage of mental life. Indeed the strict theory of ‘freedom of choice’ contains so little positive truth that, when carefully examined, it amounts to little more than a denial of Determinism. The view which we are naturally led to take is that of Professor James:<sup>2</sup> by a voluntary effort of *attention* the idea of “the action which is judged to be reason-

<sup>1</sup> Directions ‘given,’ because determined by circumstances and present ‘motives.’ No Libertarian has ever held that a man can create his own motives out of nothing.

<sup>2</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 577.

able and right" is brought into sufficient prominence for the mind (through it) to initiate the movements necessary for the action. I do not claim that this mode of expression is literally true, or adequate to the complexity of the real process it attempts to describe, for no such theory can be this; but it is nearer the truth than the 'freedom of choice' theory; and it is not inconsistent with the principle of psychological explanation which we have elsewhere adopted.<sup>1</sup>

It has been observed that, in the sense in which we use the term 'character,' we cannot truly say that a man's character is merely the result of the past history of himself and his race as expressing itself in his present environment. If we are to say that any one is made what he is by his surroundings, we must extend his 'surroundings' so as to include all time and all existence,—the whole universe of reality; but if by 'surroundings' we mean the solidarity and continuity of social life, then it is no more true to say that his life is made by its surroundings than to say that thought is made by language. We shall have to examine this vexed question more fully in the following chapter. If the past—considered simply as a succession of accomplished events—did thus manufacture the present, then it seems to me clear that freedom, in any true sense of the word, would be an impossibility; we should be committed to the thorough-going Determinism which is the inevitable result of regarding the category of Reciprocity as unconditionally valid, for this means that every moment in the

<sup>1</sup> Dr Martineau speaks of the self as *causally* active. The conception of causality has been dealt with (in its psychological references) in the previous chapter.

duration both of man and of Nature is absolutely determined by all past moments, and will determine all future moments.<sup>1</sup> The great advantage of Determinism, from the purely scientific point of view, is that it admits of the unqualified application of this principle to the whole of reality, including Man as well as Nature.<sup>2</sup>

It is therefore impossible to combine the scientific advantages of Determinism and the ethical and philosophical advantages of Libertarianism; and I think it is much to be regretted that Green and others have, in appearance at least, attempted this impossibility, and thereby confused the whole issue. Thus Green says:<sup>3</sup> "There is nothing in the fact that what a man is and does is the result (to speak pleonastically, the *necessary* result) of what he has been and has done, to prevent him from seeking to become, or from being able to become, in the future, other and better than he now is," since the capacity for conceiving a better state of himself has not been lost. Just because in the past his conduct has been guided by a conception of personal good, "there has been in it, and has been continued out of it into his present, a permanent potentiality of self-reform, consisting in the perpetual discovery by the man that he is not satisfied," that he has not found the personal good which he sought, or has only found unsatisfying fragments of it. This is most true and important; but by Green's general metaphysical position, Nature (including human life

<sup>1</sup> See some excellent observations on this idea, in Adamson's *Kant*, p. 220, note 14.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*, p. 63 (4th ed.), where this appears as the most formidable of the arguments converging to establish the Determinist view.

<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena*, § 110.

*in so far* as it is a growth and has a history in time) is a "single unalterable order of relations"; he has, in fact, applied the category of Reciprocity, without qualification, throughout the whole range of Time. On such a view, what can the "potentiality of self-reform" really come to? Surely it is only the abstract possibility of the man's becoming better; the future growth of his character can be modified, on the Determinist view, just as the growth of a tree can be,—and far more easily, for the man's is not a blind unconscious growth, like that of a tree, nor is he ignorant of where he goes and what he does, like a stream in its course. Green identifies the 'potentiality' with an 'inchoate impulse' towards self-reform, which can only become an actuality "by its own relative strength." Whether it obtains the necessary degree of prevalence depends on "the social influences brought to bear on the man: the influences effective for the purpose all have their origin ultimately in the desire to be better on the part of other men," who in their turn are subject to the effect of social influences. Thus there is no escape from the closed circle of Reciprocity, and within it there is no room for any individual initiative or real self-determination.

When the Libertarian denies that the present character, in any individual, is wholly the product of the past, he is not introducing discontinuity into the moral life, as Green supposes;<sup>1</sup> he is denying that the past life, considered simply as a succession of events in time, entirely determines the present. The conditions determining my present conscious decision include more than the effects of the past; they include that total consciousness of Freedom, of which the least

<sup>1</sup> *Prolegomena*, § 110 (at end) and § 111 (at end).



inadequate account—as it seems to me—is the one given by Professor James.

Our conclusions are, then, as follows. Freedom is a quality of the whole mind, the whole nature of man, not specially of some particular function or faculty of the mind. We have an immediate or *anoetic* experience of this quality; and the theory of freedom is an attempt to express this in intellectual terms,—to raise it from the level of *anoetic* to that of *noetic* consciousness; it is not sufficient that we *are* free unless we *know* that we are and *how* we are. As in every such case, the only knowledge that we can attain to is partial and incomplete. Hence a theory of freedom may involve many logical difficulties, but is not on that account to be rejected, if any theory which we can substitute for it has a lower degree of truth.

§ 3. The distinction of *anoetic* and *noetic* consciousness has great significance at every stage of mental growth, though doubtless it is first suggested by the contrast of the earliest with the later stages. It means that there are always whole regions of mental life which, though they may be truly said to be present *in* consciousness, are not present *to* consciousness in the sense of being *known*—*i.e.*, discriminated or intellectually interpreted; but they may largely determine the character and contents of those regions of mental life which are known. Our self-knowledge grows in depth and truth whenever something more of what is present in consciousness becomes not only present in but present to consciousness.

Whenever the investigation of consciousness is pushed so far that its results are required not merely to have the highest degree of truth attainable relatively

to the present state of our knowledge, but to be 'absolute' or 'ultimate'—that is, to be a completely adequate representation of the reality—then the distinctions on which we have been dwelling in the previous chapter fall away and can no longer be maintained. It is of great importance to recognise this, because in two directions we require to place ourselves at such an ultimate point of view. One of these is even within the limits of scientific investigation,—as regards the evolution or genesis of consciousness: we need to discuss the nature of the most primitive or germinal form of consciousness. What can be said as to its constituents? What can be said, positively or negatively, as to the absolute beginning of consciousness? The other case is in Ethics, where we need to discuss the nature of the *ideal* consciousness, in which the highest human faculty on all its sides is completely realised. These two extremes resemble one another in transcending the distinctions which we have to maintain when at the stage characteristic of scientific analysis. Absolute beginnings and ultimate ends are—not beyond the range of knowledge, but—beyond the range of that specialised treatment which we employ in the sciences. In such cases we cannot maintain the distinction of intellectual apprehension arousing feeling and active effort in response, as "three fundamental and irreducible mental functions"; and great difficulties are removed when this is borne in mind. It is not that the distinction is illusory; our whole object in the previous chapter has been to defend it within its proper limits; but *absolute* validity cannot be assigned to it. The great danger is that the attempt shall be made to prove one constituent of the distinction to be fundamental, and to reduce the others to it. In this

case the distinction is transcended, from the absolute point of view, by simply merging two of the constituents in the remaining fundamental one. But when we speak of the distinction of intellectual from other conscious functions as having no absolute validity, we do not mean that any state of consciousness was ever, or will ever, be realised in which any one of the factors is wholly merged in any of the others: we mean that in the beginning they were *at one* in a sense in which they are not now; and that in the end we may be explicitly conscious of their deeper unity in a way in which we are not now. As regards the 'end' of consciousness, we shall have to illustrate this contention in our concluding chapter; as regards the 'beginning,' we may illustrate it by considering the problems which arise when we attempt to explain the *origin of volition*.

In the brief analysis of volition which was given in the previous chapter it was assumed as self-evident that the development of movement, on its psychical side, in the individual consciousness, must begin—as Professor James has it—with “a supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible, left in the memory by experiences of their involuntary (unforeseen) performance.” As Lotze remarks, if it were not for such ‘involuntary’ action, we could never know that our bodies were movable, or that there is a connection between these movements and mental states. There is ample provision for the supply of the motor ideas that Professor James alludes to. We know that without the least reference to consciousness there is physical provision in the nervous system for the accomplishment not only of movements deeply affecting the wellbeing of the organism, and as such controlled wholly by its internal constitution; but also of move-

ments brought on by any external stimulus which affects the organism to its advantage or disadvantage. The influence of the stimulus may extend even to elaborate co-ordinations of muscular movements. These are of course the acts ordinarily called 'reflex' or 'instinctive': the former term, it would seem, being generally applied to the simpler motions, the latter to the more complex co-ordinations. But there is no uniformity in the use of either term.<sup>1</sup> Let us confine ourselves to the use of the term 'primarily automatic' to denote *all* movements of this kind. All these motions result from the given constitution of the individual nervous system in connection with which the conscious life emerges.

It is easy to give a general description of voluntary action in its developed form; it involves consciousness of an end which we wish by exertion to secure—*i.e.*, it involves thought (conception), conation, and feeling; but when we inquire into the simplest form of volition, the difficulties of our general analysis become apparent. The fundamental question is, how do movements first come to be *present to* consciousness? We have just seen that there is no difficulty in answering it as regards the individual being; but when we pass, by means of the link afforded in biological heredity, from the individual to the race—and we must so pass, if we are in search of the simplest form of volition—and ask the question then, it wears another aspect; it then means, What is the origin of the primarily automatic movements in the organism? Let us see how far we can work back from the present, the known, to the unknown, applying in the dark region of the past

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Professor C. Ll. Morgan's article, "Some Definitions of Instinct," *Natural Science*, May 1895.

principles of explanation derived from where the light is strongest—mental life as we know it now. By this means we may test the *ultimate* validity of these principles.

Limiting the view for the moment to the individual, we know that there is provision in what may be called the psycho-physical organism for the lowering of consciously purposive actions to the level of the primarily automatic actions which as a class we have been considering. Actions learnt at first by careful and repeated efforts may at length be performed automatically, without any conscious guidance. These acquired aptitudes and habits are called by Hartley 'secondarily automatic,' a very convenient term, which we shall adopt in contrast to 'primarily automatic.' The physical basis of this lies in the general law, or rather, necessary condition, of all growth, physical (organic) and psycho-physical,—the persistence of past changes; but this side of the question does not concern us here. May we, passing from the individual to the race, look to the facts of secondarily automatic action for an explanation of the primarily automatic? Is it possible that acts which are primarily automatic in the individual may be secondarily automatic in the race?<sup>1</sup>

We have rejected the idea that organic life may, even for the purposes of scientific explanation, be merged in a universal locked or closed system of motions reciprocally determining one another. If it were possible to hold that the vital process might ever be shown to be a congeries of physical and chemi-

<sup>1</sup> This theory has been stated by many writers; but Professor Wundt maintains it with a very full and clear consciousness of its implications in Biology and Psychology. What follows, however, is not simply a reproduction of Wundt's view.



cal processes, then it might be possible to hold—as Bain and Spencer do—that spontaneous organic movements were prior to feeling and conscious volition; for then such movements might plausibly be regarded as due to ‘unstable’ chemical combinations, or—a somewhat wilder hypothesis—to the unstable mechanical equilibrium of the structural elements of which organic matter is composed. But no such explanation of any kind of reflex action can be accepted,—quite apart from the formidable problem of accounting for consciousness and its unity.<sup>1</sup> To suppose that purposive volition is reflex action grown complicated, and so become conscious of itself, is surely just to invert the true relation. Our only reliable analogies point to the opposite conclusion, that what is *πρότερον φύσει*, first in the order of nature, is some form of germinally conscious impulse. Unless we account in this way for the origin of voluntary movements, and indeed of all movements, in the evolution of organisms, we are left, in the oddest of all ways, with “arbitrary freaks of some incomprehensible power of unmotivated willing” upon our hands, in the shape of the primitive reflex actions; for if these are not due to the instability of chemical and mechanical equilibria, they must be due to a real preponderant influence of the psychical side of the psycho-physical organism, whereby the movement of the latter is determined in a particular direction.<sup>2</sup> Or if you are stubbornly resolved to deny the possibility of such influence, you must hypostatise

<sup>1</sup> Spencer’s theory supposes a point reached at which the mechanical reflexes block each other, when in some unexplained way consciousness supervenes.

<sup>2</sup> I express the fact thus, in order to avoid suggesting that bare mind acts on bare body, by impact as it were.

a 'variant principle' acting within the organism, or give up the problem as hopeless.

What, then, can we say as to the nature of the 'germinally conscious impulse'?

Keeping to the general analysis of mind which we have already formulated, we are obliged to conclude that the simplest possible purposive movement means, psychologically, attention to a motor representation (or image) under the stimulus of feeling excited by a sensory presentation. But in fact the simplest possible purposive movement cannot be of this kind, for this implies previous movements whose residual traces (*i.e.*, the motor images) are left in consciousness. Since we have rejected the view that these previous movements can be explained without reference to consciousness or any kind of subjective condition, we must suppose them to have been due directly to feeling excited by a sensory presentation without the mediation of any kind of motor presentation. But this conclusion is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Where physiological differentiation is so limited that there are no distinct motor nerves, then there are no distinct sensory nerves. If differentiation of presentations is the psychical parallel of differentiation of nervous structure, we seem forbidden to assume the possibility, on the psychical side, of sensory presentations appearing without their motor correlatives. General considerations, as to the character of mental growth, should also lead us to assume that at the stage of consciousness where distinct sensory presentations are found, distinct motor presentations are also found; and that as the distinction of sensory presentations from one another becomes evanescent, so does the distinction of sensory from motor presentations. Physiological

considerations suggest forcibly that both emerge together, as forms of noetic consciousness—*i.e.*, as contents distinguishable (in some degree) by the consciousness for which they exist.<sup>1</sup> Physiologically we cannot even speak of a *definite* “simplest possible purposive movement,” or argue from the assumption of such a thing. We cannot represent in intelligible terms the rise of motor presentations, any more than the rise of sensory; we can conceive the differentiation of both, but not the absolute origination of either.

Granting, then, that in the primitive consciousness these distinctions are evanescent—in other words, that the noetic consciousness involved in their discrimination is evanescent—can we suppose that what we analytically know as feeling (pleasure and pain) has a place in it? The only analogy to be suggested for this primitive feeling probably consists of those bodily and organic feelings of ours in which the conditioning presentation is undiscriminated. But in these cases the more intense the feeling is, the more definitely it is *localised*. In those broad, massive, diffused organic sensations whose feeling-tones are not definite pleasure or definite pain—and which, even when we reflect about them, are only localised vaguely as being somehow ‘in us’—we probably have the best analogue of the contents of the primitive consciousness. This view has a physiological basis, for these ‘feelings’ attend the most general vital functions. Professor James suggests a ‘buzzing in the ear’ as least inadequately representing the earliest form of consciousness; but of course this resemblance is only that of a metaphor, though the metaphor is doubt-

<sup>1</sup> I of course assume a *continuous* growth in range and power of intellectual functions through the animal kingdom up to man.

less a good one. Our conclusion therefore must be, that just to the extent to which presentations are undifferentiated from one another, and undistinguished, to that extent feeling and conation are not distinguished from one another or from presentations.

Let us see how far Biology affords help to a satisfactory psychological conclusion on this obscure question. We are postulating a form of consciousness as the primary condition of organic movements, while Biology has to deal with certain general characteristics of these movements in relation to the environment, and may therefore be expected to throw light on the nature of the consciousness which is their condition. What are the general characteristics of living beings which are strictly necessary in order that biological evolution may be possible?

Recent discussions in the biological world seem to have limited the range and importance of 'Natural Selection,' but still leave it as a *vera causa* of the evolutionary process. Natural Selection is a purely physical, even a quasi-mechanical process by which some organisms more fitted to certain recurring situations than others—and having therefore better opportunities of coping with the actual difficulties incident to the 'struggle for existence'—survive longer than the others and have more opportunity of propagating their like. The 'struggle for existence' signifies simply that every creature must work for its living, to use a familiar phrase, and in part can only do it at the expense of other forms of life. The dawn and development of social consciousness among animals tends to make this a struggle much less between individuals than between groups. This 'struggle' of course presupposes the continual occurrence of vari-

ations (slight or the reverse), from which the favourable are 'naturally selected.' Modern biology is also beginning to recognise that another *vera causa* of the gradual development of new races of animals is the continual activity and efforts of the animals themselves. This is simply a partial return to the doctrine of Lamarck and Erasmus Darwin. Charles Darwin and his early followers failed entirely to do justice to the Lamarckian view;<sup>1</sup> but now there is distinct evidence—particularly in France and America—that a change is taking place, although Weismann and his followers in England and Germany maintain a vigorous opposition to all movement in the direction of Lamarckian principles. The latter are distinctly opposed to the doctrine which regards the mechanical forces of the environment, together with the excessive multiplication of life, and the (usually) small variations inevitably associated with reproduction, as the sole determinants of the evolutionary process. This is the extreme or 'ultra-Darwinian' view. The essence of Darwin's theory, in its more moderate form as stated above, is that, as a rule, organs grow because they are useful, because they are *needed*,—that this is the chief though not the exclusive cause of their development and perfection. But they are needed because of the attitude which the creature takes up towards its environment: changed circumstances lead to new wants, and hence to new habits of action, and hence to the modification of organs through the effects of use and disuse, which are inherited; these are the 'Lamarckian factors.' But it would seem

<sup>1</sup> This has been well illustrated by S. Butler in his writings on Evolution, especially in *Evolution Old and New*. Cf. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*, p. 156.



that we may even go further than Lamarck in emphasising the importance of the element of subjective activity. The attitude which the creature adopts towards its circumstances is not wholly determined by those circumstances, but partly by causes in advance of them; we may say that evolution is possible only because a spirit of hopeful endeavour possesses everything—there is something in every creature such that its action is *in advance* of its experience, at every stage of its growth; it acts spontaneously, and learns by acting, and in learning qualifies itself for a new sphere of life, with which come new experiences and fresh enterprises. Water-creatures did not first acquire lungs, and then proceed to live on land, nor did the creeping things of the earth first grow wings and then attempt to fly; these organs became developed because they were needed, and they were needed because trials were made in advance of experience,—trials which there was nothing in past experience to justify.

Thus the conclusion is that in every creature, organism, or animal there is an indwelling principle which—however little else Biology may be able to say about it—is in effect a *Wille zum Leben*, a *conatus*, an *ἔπος* or striving on the part of every living thing not only to keep itself alive, but to increase the scope and fulness of its life. It is a significant fact that the greatest thinkers, prophets, and philosophers of the Eastern and Western worlds, have recognised such a principle operative through all creatures, and being more than the sum of all,—though they have given very different accounts of its nature and tendency. But it is not relevant to our present purpose to discuss the significance of the conception when expressed in this general

form; we must consider how far our general analysis of mind enables us to particularise it more. We saw how this analysis required us to regard the most primitive organic activities as prompted directly by feeling, without the mediation of any kind of motor representation. We were obliged to reject this conclusion, and to deny the validity of the analysis for a primitive consciousness. We have now to see that still more unsatisfactory results follow from it, if it is thus valid. In our discussion of this point it was implied that the feeling itself is aroused entirely by whatever vaguely differentiated presentational content the creature's consciousness is susceptible of receiving. Now such content is simply as much of the environment as the creature is capable of perceiving. Thus in effect our implication was, that all the creature's acts are executed in response to changes in the environment. But we have seen that the facts of life and growth in general forbid this conclusion; in the individual and in the race they would be impossible but for the continual occurrence of action in advance of experience and environment. Translated into psychological terms (assuming the ultimate validity of the general analysis), this is to say that the most primitive consciousness consisted of pure feeling (pleasure or pain) only; and that all through mental development feeling is *absolute*—i.e., is (as it were) a self-sustaining stream of tendency, uprising from the very roots of our being, and determining the course of growth which other mental functions shall take.<sup>1</sup> If feeling means here just what it does for the analytical psychologist—if feeling means pleasure or

<sup>1</sup> This view—at least in reference to the earliest forms of consciousness—is maintained on general grounds by Stanley, *Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling*. Cf. also the well-known doctrine of Horwicz; and more recently, Ribot, *Psychology of the Emotions* (Eng. Tr.)

pain, as such, and *Gefühl* means *Lust oder Unlust*—then this view is not only one-sided but essentially irrational. Any pleasure or pain with this absolute character is unknown in our experience. For, as we have shown, these terms represent psychological abstractions, just as 'motion' represents a physical abstraction. As there can be no motion which is not a motion of something in a particular direction and with a particular velocity, so an unconditioned pleasure or pain can never be a distinct fact of consciousness. It is only the ambiguity of the terms Feeling and *Gefühl*, which makes such a view seem conceivable. For if the terms are not used in the technical sense of pure pleasure or pure pain, but signify something fundamental in conscious life, then the special objections which we have noted must fall away. If 'feeling' means a form of consciousness which is not pleasure, or pain, or conation, or intellection, but is at once none of these and all of them—in other words, if the term means a form of consciousness in which these differences have not yet emerged—then there is nothing irrational in regarding this as the type of the primitive consciousness. Such a conclusion we have already stated in another form.<sup>1</sup>

Equally irrational is it to regard mere impulse or *Trieb* as primordial or fundamental in conscious life. I do not say that Wundt or any one has really held this view in its naked absurdity; but many have spoken and written as if they held it. If these terms, and others such as 'instinct of self-conservation,' signify the undifferentiated form of consciousness which I have been speaking of, then they are admissible; for the influence of this consciousness in determining the tendency of organic movements—*i.e.*, of such organic movements

<sup>1</sup> See p. 245.

as the creature is physically capable of—may be figuratively described as ‘impulse.’ But such metaphors are misleading, for they suggest a blind effort or striving onwards,—an ‘instinct’ which is indistinguishable from a mere mechanical *vis a tergo*. The contents of the primitive consciousness, therefore, are not impulse as opposed to feeling and intellection,—are not any one of these three as *opposed to* or even as *distinct from* the others. Dr Ward’s view that feeling is derivative from the impeded or unimpeded exercise of psychical activity seems to tend away from the truth in this matter, if it implies that conscious beings are ‘before all things’ or ‘essentially’ *active*.<sup>1</sup> It would seem, on the contrary, that psychical life begins with a vague mass of sentience or undefined consciousness which can hardly as yet be described even as general awareness. But, as Mr Bradley has said, it is ‘undefined’ or ‘undifferentiated’ only in the sense of “not yet being broken up into terms and relations;” it is “not ‘undifferentiated,’ if that means that it contains no diverse aspects.”<sup>2</sup>

Thus the “general analysis of consciousness in the concrete” seems to break down if taken to be absolutely valid—*i.e.*, if taken to be applicable primordially, to the ultimate beginnings of consciousness, or fundamentally, to its ultimate Ground. The former application rather than the latter has been, so to speak, the centre of gravity of the preceding observations; but the two are closely related, and their relation is significant. Every inquiry into absolute beginnings ‘in time’ tends to resolve itself into one concerning the possibility of real conditions which transcend time altogether. We must

<sup>1</sup> Professor Ward holds this view, side by side with the view that all psychical activity is feeling-prompted, without correlating the two.

<sup>2</sup> *Mind*, No. 20, p. 472.

refer to this Ground for the origin of the deeper principle of movement immanent in all life; but this question cannot be discussed apart from considerations determining a general ontological position.

In order to get a clearer view of the implications of such a conclusion, let us go back as far as we can towards the beginning of life; remembering always that 'life,' as suggesting an indefinite continuum or a life-in-general, is a misleading abstraction. Life only exists in numerically distinguishable living beings or organisms,—however undeveloped in structure each of these may be. This is the least that we can mean by the term 'life'; and in this sense we cannot conceive life beginning, but only life begun. Our principle requires us to postulate sentience as the initial stage in the germinal development of consciousness in relation to any such organism; but the germ of what we know as the individual consciousness or 'finite centre' cannot take form until vague sensory and motor presentations have emerged. We must observe, in passing, that to regard sentience as primordial is not to regard presentations as 'evolved' from 'feeling' (Horwicz). According to the principle of development formulated in the previous chapter, no difference which has newly emerged in consciousness can be explained as *merely* the effect of previous differences. In the beginning, therefore, movements are prompted by a sentient consciousness which depends ultimately on a deeper principle as its Ground; the latter is the source of "action in advance of experience." The earlier stages in the differentiation of the movements thus prompted are largely helped by Natural Selection, which weeds out those organisms whose movements are unfitted to their continued life



in the given environment; and it is certain that much of this primitive diffusive movement must be so. The outward character of such movement is of course not a matter of 'chance'; it is determined by the structure of the organism, which is only very slightly developed, and admits (we may suppose) only of a blind indefinite struggle.

I shall not attempt to illustrate in detail the biological significance of the deeper principle of movement which we have postulated; but without it the morphological transitions in the evolution of species are surely inexplicable. It would not be possible to illustrate this fully without entering into some difficult and disputed questions concerning heredity and variation; these questions become increasingly difficult the closer we get to the beginnings of life, when forms come structurally nearer and nearer to one another, so that Natural Selection has a smaller and smaller amount of material to work upon,—and when the very modes of generation and reproduction are quite different from what they are in the more complex organisms. Yet it is just at this dark stage that movement and sentient consciousness begin. Let us suppose<sup>1</sup> that we have got beyond the stage of mere sentience: in other words, that Natural Selection has presented us with a creature so far differentiated, psycho-physically, that it is possible for an indefinite though painful sensory impression to be relieved by an indefinite movement,—a change of place, let us say; this movement will leave a vague 'mental residuum,' a motor representation, and it is then possible for an association to be effected between the latter and the sensory impression. This associa-

<sup>1</sup> Of course I am not attempting to explain this process of development, but only to describe it, as far back as possible.

tion *when effected* is the foundation for further advance, the nature of which has been clearly indicated by Professor Bain; but we cannot bring association to bear, as an explaining principle, until voluntary movement—movement in relief of feeling—is fairly originated. To this association will correspond, on the physical side, what we may call a consolidation of nervous centres; so that when the occasion arises for the repetition of the movement, they will accommodate themselves to it more readily—*i.e.*, it will be accomplished with less effort. New sources of feeling are rendered possible through the activity prompted by the old: the movement prompted by a painful impression introduces new impressions which may become objects of emotional welcome or repulse. Throughout we must remember the deeper source of activity, since we have to do not merely with a growing organism, but an organism which is the type of a certain stage in a growing race: the metaphysical problem of the fundamental unity of the successive terms in this racial growth is the problem whose surface biology is stirring when dealing with heredity.

The view of the primitive consciousness which has here been defended differs in an important respect from what I understand to be the view of Dr Ward and Professor Wundt, who seem to argue on the supposition that mental life in its earliest beginnings is more fittingly expressed in terms of mere impulse, or (in Wundt's case) of feeling regarded as impulsive. But in common with their view, ours has an embarrassment to face. We look to the working of an indwelling psychical principle—by which the organism learns to act one way in presence of the favourable, another way in the presence of the unfavourable—

to explain the facts of adaptation, instinct, &c., in animal life. But what is to be said of plant life? Here we have boundless variation, we have growth and outwardly purposive action (which often exactly parallels 'instinct' in animals); hence it may be objected, against our view, that if these facts of plant life can be explained without assuming the operation of any such principle—and the paradox of regarding plants as *beseelt* ought to be the very last position in which to rest—why cannot the corresponding facts of animal life? I can only suggest this question, and note Wundt's conclusion, that we must regard plants as descended from forms of life which we may intelligibly say were *beseelt*. Of special interest, in this connection, is Henslow's theory of 'self-adaptation' in plants, which ascribes to vegetable protoplasm a capacity for adaptive reactions. But the co-operation of Natural Selection would still be necessary. I only refer to Henslow's theory here, because, as far as I can see, the evidence which he has collected has an important bearing on Wundt's view.<sup>1</sup>

§ 4. We have thus illustrated the principle at which we arrived in the early part of this chapter by applying it to the nature of human volition in the developed consciousness, and the manner of its origin in the history of the race. Conclusions which will work if taken as containing truth—in solution, as it were—or, as we may otherwise express it, which are symbolically true, become unworkable and even self-contradictory if taken as absolutely true. Criticism of any theory may be perfectly valid on the latter view of its truth, and yet be worthless on the former

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Henslow's *Floral Structures* (International Scientific Series).

view of it. Any such theory, however concrete or abstract are the terms in which it is expressed, whether it is a psychological generalisation or some one's statement of a personal characteristic of his own—comes under the head of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a mode of knowledge—the most superficial or the most fundamental, according to the degree of truth which we understand it to have attained; but when philosophically analysed, it is seen to be always the most fundamental. It is the knowledge which the self, the only self that exists, the real concrete self, which is neither 'empirical' nor 'transcendental,' has of its own being, or some aspect thereof. The knowledge which this self has of itself shares the imperfections of all knowledge in being a very fragmentary and merely symbolic presentation of the reality to which it refers. Whether we regard self-consciousness, when fundamentally developed, as finite or not, depends on considerations arising out of a general metaphysical position. If we have to conclude that the human self has a finite and an infinite side, then self-consciousness is merely finite, only in so far as we have not learnt to know the real constitution of our nature.

Much instruction may be derived even from a brief examination of Kant's ideas about the nature of self-consciousness, in connection with the masterly exposition of them given by Dr Edward Caird.<sup>1</sup>

Kant's way of treating this topic seems to be determined by his revulsion from a certain form of 'Idealism' which sought to maintain that a man's consciousness of 'external things' *in space* is less essentially reliable and certain than his consciousness

<sup>1</sup> Caird's *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i. p. 605 ff.

of his own existence as an individual. Kant's general reply to this contention becomes much more intelligible when we consider separately the two aspects of it, which have regard to the 'poles' of sense and thought respectively. As regards Perception—that is, as regards thought working in immediate connection with the material of sentience<sup>1</sup>—this 'Idealism' would mean that in some sense the matter of 'external' perception, under the forms of space and time, is less real than that of 'internal' perception, under the form of time only. We are supposed to have as an absolute and irreducible fact a perception of 'subjective states' or 'inner phenomena,' which constitute our own existence in time, while the perception of 'outer phenomena' is somehow problematic. It will be observed that from our point of view even this form of statement is inadmissible. There is no perception, inner or outer, which is not a mode of thought-knowledge, due to the activity of thought organising into knowledge, or intelligible fact, a background of sentiency. Though the sentient consciousness has diverse aspects, it is meaningless to speak of one of these aspects as being more real than another; and they do not constitute knowledge until thought has gone to work upon them: so that the problem of 'Idealism' is really that of the relation between world-knowledge and self-knowledge, in the form in which we have already expressed it. But Kant begins by distinguishing the two kinds of perception, and thus he assumes two *parallel* kinds of experience,—'inner' and 'outer.' We must notice a variety of hopeless perplexities to which this view leads.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. ch. iii., Appendix.



(i.) *In effect* Kant argues against the 'Idealism' which he has in view, that the perception of time is impossible apart from the perception of space. This seems undeniable if we examine their relation as forms of 'outer' experience. Change of qualities consists in one disappearing to *give place to* another which comes after it; the quality *Q* comes in the *place-where* of the quality *P*, but in the *time-after* of *P*. Now if *P* had not a 'place-where,' a spatial position, it would be impossible to perceive *Q* coming after it; unless there were other qualities in the real, *simultaneously* with *P*, the change *P-Q* could never have been perceived; and the other qualities, real at the same time as *P* and *Q*, could not have been distinguished from them without space. In more general terms: to perceive a succession or 'becoming' of qualities requires simultaneously real qualities in contrast with which the succession is perceived, and those perceived qualities must be permanent relatively to this perceived succession; and this perceptive simultaneity and permanence requires space. As forms of the perceptively objective world, of the fragment which projects itself in space before us, time and space seem to be co-ordinate; to perceive qualities occupying the same time (simultaneous qualities) requires space as well as time; none the less, to perceive qualities occupying the same space (after one another) requires time as well as space.

But this does not show in the least what relation the so-called 'perception' of our 'inner' states, in time only, has to that of *spatial* objects in time. Or, rather: if in strictness nothing can be perceived as an object in time unless it is also an object in space, it must follow either that our 'inner states' are extended, are themselves spatial, or that there is no 'perception' of

them at all in the sense in which there is a perception of spatial objects; in other words, that our awareness of our own conscious states is not parallel to the so-called 'perception' of extended things. The doctrine that *all* conscious states as such are 'unextended' is a traditional convention which if thoroughly examined would probably be found lacking in coherence and resting on very insecure foundations; but I shall not inquire further into this, for it would not be fruitful in any results relevant to our present purpose. We shall see that the second alternative remains valid; there is no parallelism between the two kinds of 'perception.'

(ii.) Kant's view that self-knowledge is drawn by an 'inner sense' from 'inner experience,' corresponding to the 'outer sense,' leads to some curious consequences when taken in connection with his first view of the *Ding an sich*, as a 'most real world' which acts on the real mind or Subject and creates sensations in it. As long as this line of thought is to the front, the contrast of the *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements in knowledge becomes identical with that of subjective and objective in the objectionable sense: so that the *a priori* factors (those due to the structure of the mind itself) are subjective in the sense of being not true of reality, and, as some one aptly said, "Whatever we are obliged to think by the necessity of intelligence, is thereby condemned as untrue." Thus when Kant has this conception in his mind, the *a priori* character of perceived space must mean that it is a supersensational mental product, its 'matter' being given from without. For space to be *a posteriori* or "a condition of things in themselves" would mean that it is put into the mind from without—mirrored there—and exists independently of all mind just as it is when perceived. Kant

professes to *demonstrate* the impossibility of this hypothesis; but we must recognise that the very idea becomes absurd if we reject the preconception that I refer to—that we are to regard the objective world as the creative source of all in our experience that cannot be treated as a mental product. Apart from this notion, space (as perceived) takes its true position as ‘subjective’ in the sense of existing only in its presence to an individual mind, and as ‘objective’ in relation to that individual’s successive ideas and thoughts. The phenomenality of perceived space means simply its fragmentariness, its want of absolute reality, *i.e.*, of self-explaining or self-existent character. This is the view that may be learnt from Kant’s deeper thought; but traces of the other view are undeniably to be detected in the *Transcendental Æsthetic*: space is then a *mere* phenomenon, *i.e.*, sensations by being taken up into the mental form of spatial perception become as it were a veil shutting us out from the real nature of the causal agencies which produce the sensations. The same remark applies to perceived time. Now time is a form of ‘inner sense’ as well as of ‘outer sense’; thus we know even our own conscious states *merely* as phenomena and not as they are ‘in themselves.’<sup>1</sup> This is surely a *reductio ad absurdum* of the relativistic superstition.

(iii.) We are bound to take the deeper view of the *Ding an sich*, according to which it is the ultimate Ground of existence—the object of reference in logical and scientific judgments.

Hitherto we have been examining the ‘Idealism,’ which Kant is controverting, in respect of sense-knowledge—as facing, so to speak, towards sentience. In

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Caird, vol. i. p. 606.

this case it is a question of the relation between the two conscious functions regarded rather as *facts* than as modes of *knowledge*. As facing towards thought-knowledge, the theory requires to be stated in another form. We are now dealing with knowledge as such—knowledge as a native function of intelligence. The position would be, that our consciousness of an objective system or world (the objective reference in thought) is some kind of logical inference and therefore possibly false, while our knowledge of conscious states as such is absolutely certain. This is the position of Descartes; but the 'objective system' in his view is the world of extension and motion,—Kant's 'phenomena of the outer sense,' which are treated by Descartes as 'things in themselves,' that is, as existing independently of all percipient consciousness under the same conditions (of extension and its derivatives) as they have when present to consciousness. Thus, since Kant has the 'Idealism' of Descartes in view, he does not consider the question under its two aspects of Perception and Thought.<sup>1</sup> For he seems to combine two attempts; to show that external perception (of *spatial* objects) is no less real, as a matter of fact, than internal perception; and to show that our intellectual awareness of an objective (relatively independent) world is no less certain, as a matter of knowledge, than our awareness of our conscious processes as such. Hence he has been supposed to be meaning to prove the reality of the *Ding an sich*, and even to be trying to prove that the *Ding an sich* consists of objects in space. The latter notion is absurd in view of Kant's general

<sup>1</sup> I hope that in the present section and in ch. iii. I have made it clear that this is no distinction of two separate functions, but of two degrees in the operation of one function.

doctrine; and I may take it as proven, by the expositions of Professor Adamson and Dr Caird, that he is not concerned to prove the reality of the *Ding an sich*.<sup>1</sup>

The objective knowledge which Kant has in view is acquired by the interpretation of phenomena through certain principles, which are produced by the structure of intelligence as it grows, just as the growth of a living body consists in the production of vital organs. The most essential of these principles are those by which the relations of substantiality, causality, and reciprocity are established. The last of these, according to the doctrine of the K. d. R. V., is the highest 'category' (interpretative principle) of objective or scientific knowledge. By the establishment of these relations thought organises sentience into knowledge. If asked to give, in a few words, a definition of the sentient side of consciousness, I should say: the more we *know*, the more we know it. It is the immediate presence of Reality in us which thought inevitably *begins* by shattering and making into an apparent barrier between us and the truth of Reality. Before reading the objective categories into the *ἄπειρον* of sentience, our intelligence forms it in such a way that it becomes present to us under the conditions of space and time. As we have seen (ch. iii., Appendix; and elsewhere), we are not precluded from supposing that in sentience there are real differences which intelligence transforms into relations and distinctions between terms. Now there are certain time-relations in whose intellectual formation lies the germ of the three fundamental categories which make

<sup>1</sup> In ch. iii. (Appendix) I have shown that the real objective world (the world of reference in Judgment) is not adequately represented either by Kant's 'outer phenomena' or by his 'thing in itself,' for, as it seems to me, he assigns a partly false position to both of these,—even when we discard the erroneous line of thought to which I have just referred (ii.)



scientific knowledge possible: the lower use of intelligence prepares the way for the higher. These time-relations, which Kant calls *schemata*, are as follows: (1) Permanence. A group of qualities, remaining (on the whole) coherent in the same manner, is the first foothold, as it were, which intelligence finds in interpreting by the principle of substantiality; or, on our view (ch. iii.), by the principle of individuality. Kant does not contemplate this view, but it at once adapts itself to his doctrine here. In the growth of knowledge such provisional interpretations have constantly to be broken up; but if there were no such permanent coherences we could never begin to refer the conception of individuality to the real. (2) Succession. If there were no general uniformities of succession in the events of experience, it would be impossible to interpret them by the principle of causality—*i.e.*, to think of one individuality as affecting another. Here, again, to a great extent the starting-point is provisional, and may be entirely reconstructed with the growth of knowledge. (3) Coexistence. In addition to these (roughly speaking) recurring relations<sup>1</sup> of antecedence and consequence, there are recurring relations of coexistence, which form the provisional starting-point for interpreting things as reciprocally acting on one another. The provisional footholds in every case are, as we have said, themselves formed by intelligence in a lower function of it; the products of the lower function are broken up and reconstructed by the higher.

<sup>1</sup> I say 'roughly speaking,' to mark off this view from that of Positivism, which regards these uniformities as so universal and regular as to admit of systematic codification (scientific knowledge). This seems a pure fiction: cf. Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*, p. 130. Knowledge consists, not in systematising these relations, but in penetrating through them to something deeper.

The foregoing is a very compressed statement of Kant's view with regard to scientific knowledge as based on 'outer experience.' What then is to be said of our knowledge of 'inner experience,' in time only, which Kant begins by treating as parallel to 'outer'? In the first edition he leaves us to suppose that the same principles of explanation (substance, causality, reciprocity) are applicable to inner experience, to our successive conscious states. But this is evidently impossible, for if 'inner states' are merely in time, the conditions for their interpretation through the categories are wanting.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if we have any knowledge of ourselves at all, it is not parallel to the scientific knowledge of 'outer' events,—a conclusion at which we have already arrived (i.) This, as Dr Caird has shown, is Kant's view in the second edition: the scientific use of the categories of the understanding applies only to outer experience. Self-consciousness means essentially a consciousness of the process on our part by which knowledge of the world around us is realised. "The former consciousness," says Kant in effect, "is a consciousness of what was involved in the latter,—a consciousness of that determination of the inner life of the subject by which knowledge of an object is realised. Properly speaking, it is only in this last reflection that the distinction of inner and outer experience [*i.e.*, of self-knowledge and world-knowledge] emerges, while at the same time they are seen to be correlates of each other."<sup>2</sup> This is essentially Kant's reply to the Cartesian doctrine. Logically taken, Kant's view signifies that the whole self of man is exhaustively realised in scientific knowledge through the categories, with 'reciprocity' as the limit of such

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Adamson's *Kant*, p. 68.

<sup>2</sup> Caird, vol. i. p. 616.

knowledge: or it signifies that we have no awareness of any other function of our nature but this. On Kant's own showing such a view is thoroughly inadequate and one-sided; for he speaks of feeling (pleasure and pain) and will, *die gar nicht Erkenntnisse sind*; how do we become aware of these? And again, we are conscious of ethical obligation and of beauty, each (as it were) from a superpersonal source; and these directions of our activity—to the consideration of which Kant devotes two separate treatises—cannot be brought under the head of scientific knowledge. What precisely is the defect in Kant's view of self-knowledge?

Dr Caird says: "Kant's argument really points to two 'aspects' of experience, regarded as a determination of objects [in the way of knowledge] and regarded as involving a subjective process: in this point of view, self-knowledge is simply world-knowledge under a reflection that brings the two sides into relation with each other. But Kant continually speaks as if it were a distinction of two *objects* in one experience, though he qualifies this by pointing out that the object of self-knowledge cannot be determined in the same way as the objects of world-knowledge. The inadequacy, however, belongs not to the object of self-knowledge but to the categories under which it is proposed to bring it; as self-knowledge is world-knowledge and something more, it requires higher categories to explain it."<sup>1</sup> But how are these categories derived? Have we corrected the inadequacy of Kant's view,—that self-consciousness is wholly realised in the consciousness of scientific knowledge,—when we have made this consciousness of

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 637. In this passage I have ventured to substitute 'self-knowledge' and 'world-knowledge' respectively for 'inner experience' and 'outer experience.'

objective cognition mean a consciousness of the implications and presuppositions of science about the universe, that the universe is an 'intelligible system,' and so on? More than once, through the preceding chapters, we have come in contact with this view. A fuller statement of the grounds on which we reject it must be reserved for the two chapters which follow.

## APPENDIX.

## ON BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EVOLUTION.

IN what follows I shall have to trespass, slightly, in the domain of the specialist. It is necessary to protest against the idea that no one can profitably discuss the validity of a scientific theory unless he is familiar with all the specialised inquiries included in that science. When all is said that deference to authority demands, the fact remains that before a theory can be true it must be sufficiently clear, distinct, and coherent to be intelligible ; and from this point of view it may best be tested by one who is in the first place not a specialist, but a clear and accurate thinker. It is astonishing to observe the unwillingness of the most able special students to engage in necessary criticism of this kind ; constant concentration on the details seems to obscure the importance of obtaining a clear view of the whole. Yet unless the details are viewed in their connection with one another and as a whole, there can be no scientific truth—no explanation of anything. Plato was surely right when he said that true science consists in seeing things together.

We have already dwelt on the unscientific character of the tempting assumption, that because particular organic processes can be most profitably investigated by being practically treated as if they were resolvable into their mechanical *conditions*, therefore the organism of whose life these processes form a part can be explained in terms of mechanical agents. Professor Sanderson—in his address to the British Association, to which I have elsewhere referred—brings out with admirable clearness two things : it is true, on the one hand, that particular factors in the vital process, when isolated, may be made more intelligible by being treated as purely physical and chemical ; but it is equally true, on the other hand, that the co-ordination of these factors cannot ever, as far as we can



see, be so explained. Professor Sanderson definitely adopts the standpoint of a naturalist known as Treviranus, who (writing early in the present century) was the first to formulate the idea of a science of life. Treviranus held that science cannot explain the origin of organic life, but must begin by assuming it; and he found that the fundamental characteristic of organic life is, that the activities of each living creature are made in the interests of itself as a whole. The *least* that we can mean when we speak of an organism is, a being whose actions evince *adaptation or purposiveness*; this is the notion on which biology and physiology are built. Let us then state fully this principle that life must at least involve 'adaptation.' (1) It signifies that every organism is a unity, *i.e.*, not a mere aggregate of parts which are capable of existing separately without losing their character, but a systematised unity of members, each of which, as the organism develops, appears with a distinct place and function. Each member is useless apart from the whole; an amputated limb is not even a limb. The unique way in which these members belong together—a way entirely different from that in which the parts of a material body belong together—is what is meant by the unity of the organism. (2) It also signifies that every organism is able to maintain itself,—the 'unity' involves within it some source of activity such that it is self-sustained: activity, as Professor Sanderson remarked, is an essential attribute of the organism, indispensable for its growth, and not merely a series of incidents in that growth. This characteristic appears first in the way in which the creature adapts itself to changes in the surrounding circumstances which affect it. Yet not only must the creature be capable of thus responding to its outward experience, but it must also be capable of acting in advance of its experience; it has to search, work, and struggle for the means of existence. For the animal's experience is in part made by its own activity; in learning 'from experience' it is really learning from the consequences of its own acts—it makes experiments, so to speak, and learns by trying; and the 'trying,' therefore, cannot be prompted merely from without. Actions of this kind, whose origination cannot be explained by reference to the

experience of the single organism,<sup>1</sup> belong to the class which we have called 'primarily automatic.'

A harder question now arises : Can these actions find their explanation in the experience of the race,—can we say that the race as a whole has been completely moulded by the physical conditions of its life? This theory, as we know, has been prominently put forward and worked out in all departments of Biology, Psychology, Sociology.<sup>2</sup> But it is just with respect to the history of the race that its utter inadequacy is most apparent. We might anticipate that it would be so, for as Professor James most forcibly points out, in a passage which I have elsewhere quoted, on such a hypothesis all living creatures should have been substantially alike, since "experience, the constant shaper, is a constant fact." Indeed it is the fact of the evolutionary specification of organisms which shows us that while it is impossible to explain the development of an individual organism as being moulded entirely from without, it is more than impossible—it is absurd—to explain the development of the race in this way.

The discussion of race-evolution is now passing into a new phase. Until recently, Evolution and Natural Selection were regarded as convertible terms ; and both—in the view of most educated persons who were unfamiliar with the evolution of the evolutionary theory<sup>3</sup>—meant simply the doctrines contained in Darwin's *Origin of Species* and *Descent of Man*. But in reality it is of great importance to distinguish the doctrine of Organic Evolution—the doctrine that all living creatures (including man) are descended from a common ancestry, and are blood-relations of one another—from Natural Selection, which is thought to be the process, or one of the processes, by which this evolution was brought about. The distinction between them is enforced by Romanes, Spencer, Wallace, Huxley, and others ; nevertheless there has been a great tendency to regard the two principles as identical. This identification is implied in the works of Darwin, and in many

<sup>1</sup> In these cases, the 'experience' means only the physical effects of the environment.

<sup>2</sup> I refer of course to Mr Spencer's system.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*.

passages in the writings of Romanes himself: whenever, for instance, arguments for or against Organic Evolution are treated as if they were therefore for or against Natural Selection. But at present not only is the distinction being recognised, but the claim of Natural Selection to be even the predominant factor of evolution is being questioned, and the influence of other factors is being more and more asserted. Organic evolution is passing from the region of theories to that of proved facts.<sup>1</sup> It is supported mainly by four converging lines of evidence: the geographical distribution of species; the manner of development of the individual organism, especially in its earlier stages (Comparative Embryology); the character and distribution of fossil remains of extinct species (Palæontology); and the tree-like ramifications in which species may be arranged when naturally classified.

The theory of Natural Selection starts with the fact that slight variations of the offspring from the parent-form are 'inevitably and necessarily' associated with physiological reproduction; it assumes that the fertility of organic beings over a limited area must lead to a struggle for existence; that this struggle for existence must exercise, among these multitudinous slightly varying forms, a selective influence analogous to that practised by the cattle-breeder and the pigeon-fancier, preserving those which have a slight advantage in the struggle. The theory which regards Natural Selection, so understood, as the only means of modification has been called by Romanes the 'Neo-Darwinian' or 'Ultra-Darwinian' theory, inasmuch as Darwin himself did not hold it, and departed further from it in his later than in his earlier work.<sup>2</sup> Let us briefly notice the defects of the 'Ultra-Darwinian' theory. It involves three principles: variation, heredity, multiplication and competition.

(1) The theory requires us to assume that the variations which occur in connection with reproduction are continuous, and that each is slight in amount; transmutation is the result of the continuous *summation*, through heredity, of the small variations which survive. Now there are many facts which

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Romanes, *Darwin and after Darwin*, ch. i. to vi. (vol. i.)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii., Introduction; and Spencer, *Factors of Organic Evolution*.

show that the variations are not always slight in amount ; this is the contention of Messrs Galton and Bateson, the latter of whom has dealt with the question in an exhaustive work entitled *Materials for the Study of Variation*. There is real evidence of the appearance and continued procreation of abrupt modifications of structure ; an animal may be born which differs from its parents sufficiently to constitute it a new variety or even a new species, and which is endowed with the power of impressing its likeness upon its offspring. Further, since every organism is a self-maintaining unity of co-ordinated parts, a variation in the function of any part may affect that of others, and thus as it were may increase itself. Of course the principle called the survival of the fittest applies to these definite variations,—according as they are distinctly favourable or unfavourable to the continued existence of the animal in the given surroundings.

(2) With regard to heredity, we must bear in mind the significance of the fact that the laws of hereditary transmission are far from being understood. There is a great controversy going on, as we all know, on the question, How much can be transmitted from parent to offspring? On the one side there is the extreme view, identified with the name of Weismann, that no characteristic acquired by an individual during its own life-time can be inherited by its offspring : so that no creature can transmit more to its progeny than its own progenitors transmitted to it ; and on the other side, the view of Spencer and many other authorities that there is a general tendency to the transmission of acquired characteristics. The question is at present in a most unsatisfactory state,—which is owing in no small degree to the continual modifications Weismann has been making in his theories. We have to distinguish *biological* from *social* inheritance. In all questions arising out of the history of human society, the social factor in heredity is of much greater importance than the biological. The former has nothing to do with biological relations : it depends on the education and training and social atmosphere and environment in which individual minds grow ; and by which their characters, ideas, and opinions are influenced. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the assumption was continually made that *all* differences between human

beings were due to differences in education and environment, social and material. The influence of this idea is seen in Locke's theory of the infant mind as a *tabula rasa*, and in some of the assumptions on which Robert Owen based his philanthropic schemes. This extreme view is now generally abandoned; but we must avoid the opposite extreme of exaggerating the biological factor or undervaluing the importance of the sociological, and above all the error of identifying the latter with the former. The great part played by the latter in human society is chiefly due to the possibility of language, and the consequent storing up of past experience in the form of oral tradition (conscious or unconscious) and in writing; and this is not all. Hence all controversies regarding heredity have to be fought out in the region of the lowest animals, where the social factor—if it exists at all—is at a minimum. Accordingly it is in this region that facts for and against 'Weismannism' are being hunted for. In the meantime those who are not specialists but who have to take up some position as regards this question may, it appears, reasonably assume that the truth lies nearer the Spencerian side. The strongest theoretic objection to 'Weismannism' is the enormous amount of work it is obliged to assign to Natural Selection, and its unconditional exclusion of the 'Lamarckian factors.'

(3) The essence of the ultra-Darwinian theory lies in its conception of selective survival resulting from a struggle for existence. In this there are at least the following weak points: (a) The extent of the fertility of organic life, implied in the current phrase "increase in a geometrical ratio," may easily be much exaggerated. Where the 'tendency' to such increase is *realised*, we must ask whether it is to the advantage of such a prosperous race to be modified at all. As a rule, it could hardly be realised, for disease and a crowd of enemies, for whom the increase would mean a feast, would bring a destruction which would not be discriminative in the sense required by the theory. (b) Much of the destruction which takes place in nature is not discriminative in the sense required,—apart from the fertility of organic life; it constantly happens that those who are physically the strongest and most gifted of a race are destroyed by accidents. Such an element



of accident must always enter largely into the pursuit of victims by animals of prey. On the other hand, there are other modes of selection than 'Natural Selection,' which do not like the latter act by life and death; for in this connection, 'selection' means isolation of similar favourable variations for breeding purposes, and this may occur by other means than the death of the unfavoured. (c) If these and similar assumptions cannot be shown to be realised in any limited space or time, we cannot anticipate that they will be realised 'on the whole' or 'in the long run.' This might seem sufficiently obvious had not such authorities as Darwin and Wallace expressly maintained the contrary. (d) The theory assumes that there is always a *bellum omnium contra omnes* acting in its most severe form between individuals of the same species. This idea permeates Darwin's work; and yet there is a great question, whether it is not entirely erroneous. When such internal physical struggle does take place, it is disastrous to the welfare of the species; its severity is greatly modified, and sometimes the 'struggle' is almost eliminated, by the conditions of gregariousness and co-operation. Undoubtedly a struggle for existence, in a sense, is always going on. Every living creature at every moment of its life is consuming its energies even in merely existing, and vigorous efforts are continually necessary to maintain its existence,—efforts directed now against other animals, now against physical obstacles. But this is not the incessant mutual war which the theory assumes. (e) Quite apart from any kind of 'selection,' external circumstances may exercise a direct transforming influence on the organism.<sup>1</sup>

(4) The origin of Instinct has been thought to be one of the "best illustrations" of Natural Selection. We should say rather that it affords the best illustration of how this Darwinian factor requires to be supplemented by the Lamarckian. The attempt to explain instinct by Natural Selection alone ignores the fact—which we have no reason to doubt—that

<sup>1</sup> The points stated in this paragraph are elaborated in an able and painstaking but very involved and diffuse criticism of the Darwinian view, *Nature versus Natural Selection*, by C. C. Coe. The author seriously overstates his case in maintaining—as he appears to do—that Natural Selection plays *no* part in the evolution of species.

wherever life has *begun*, there consciousness has begun; and where consciousness has begun, there is feeling (pleasure and pain) and action in response to feeling. When the development of consciousness has fairly begun — where feeling, action, and sensation are differentiated — then all action seems prompted by and executed in response to movements of feeling and desire; the action is the more 'instinctive' according as the perceptions and ideas that arouse the feeling are more obscure; it is the more 'intelligent' or 'rational' the more clearly the cause of the feeling is apprehended. We then see that there may be another kind of selection — 'subjective' or 'psychological' selection it may be called — where the animal 'selects' the action which relieves a pain or procures a pleasure. By such means habits may be formed which modify organic structure. This seems the real significance of the principle of 'use-inheritance,' — the inherited effects of use and disuse. On the other hand, the further we go back to the beginning of life, the nearer the consciousness is to being a state of pure sentience, and the more room there is for Natural Selection to act on the *random* movements of a merely sentient organism.

Thus on the whole it seems clear, and no doubt will be more widely recognised, that no one theory can hold the field to the exclusion of others. And, upon examination, does it not appear a merely verbal question to ask which principle is the 'most important'? If there are satisfactory reasons for holding that the principle represents a *vera causa*, there seems no meaning in the attempt to determine whether it, or some other, contributes most to the total result.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE METHOD OF ETHICS.

"Moralists are too apt to push their prescriptions upon the healthy, instead of reserving them for disease: to invent artificial reasons for what everybody, unless annoyed by exhortation, will do of his own accord; and to fancy themselves the improvers of Nature, rather than her vindicators and interpreters."—JAMES MARTINEAU.

THE subject of the present Essay arises out of the following well-worn topics, with regard to which I propose to discuss certain possible conclusions: In what sense is Ethics a *science*?—how does it stand in relation to phenomena as they exist?—in what respects does its characteristic method agree with or differ from that of the special sciences? In this connection, by the 'special' sciences I understand, as is usual, the four fundamental branches of knowledge,—Mechanics and Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Physiology, Psychology. These are fundamental, because every variety of *known* natural activity is exhausted in them. Such branches of knowledge as Botany, Zoology, Geology, Astronomy, are partly limited to description and classification of objects, and partly consist in applications of principles borrowed from the four fundamental sciences.

§ 1. We may start with the definition of Ethics as having for its subject-matter the ultimate End or purpose, the supreme Ideal of human life. With regard to such an End, the following questions arise: (1) What is the ground for affirming that *there is* an ultimate End or Ideal? What indeed do we mean by End or purpose? (2) How far can we bring the End into clear consciousness, or get it stated in terms of our actual conscious experience? It will be evident that the terms in which we state it must derive all their meaning from reference to the actual facts of our inner experience; otherwise they could have no meaning. (3) How do the accepted moral rules stand in relation to the End? In what sense, if any, can they be 'deduced' from it, or criticised in the light of it? Now, if we do accept the 'teleological' view that there is a supreme Ideal of human life, a supreme standard of Worth or Value,<sup>1</sup> then we must critically establish the grounds of it. It is too great an assumption to be practically taken for granted; and, as will be seen, if we are not to do that, we cannot separate Ethics from Metaphysics, although for our present purpose we need not do more than work with a forward look towards that dangerous and trackless region. We do not propose immediately to investigate the ultimate grounds for belief in a highest End of Life, but rather to estimate the place and function of the conception in Ethical Theory.

Professor Sidgwick, in his *Methods of Ethics*, seems satisfied to accept as valid the idea of a general or ultimate Good, simply because it is current in ordinary

<sup>1</sup> The former of the two words is doubtless more appropriate for this conception: it is so employed by Lotze and Herbart (*Werth*).

thought.<sup>1</sup> He apparently adopts it just because moralists have been in the habit of theorising, and practical people of talking and thinking, as if there were an ultimate Good. Finding no general agreement as to what it is, he enters on the task of precisely defining its nature. He tacitly assumes that the only significant use of the conception for Ethics is that we may deduce practical rules of conduct from it, and to a great extent justify by it the accepted rules; the sole object of bringing it into clear consciousness is that it may afford practical guidance. Hence the conclusion, that in so far as Virtue is a constituent of the ultimate Good for man, our "reason in relation to practice" is landed in a circle. In other words: in so far as the supreme Good consists in Virtuous conduct—defined as obedience to moral rules—we cannot deduce rules of Virtue from it, unless we know them already: neither can we defend the accepted rules by appealing to the conception of the supreme Good, for that would be to defend them by appealing to themselves. The contention may be illustrated by reference to a passage in the *History of Ethics*,<sup>2</sup> where, after remarking that Cumberland's conception of 'The Good' includes "not merely Happiness in the ordinary sense, but Perfection," Professor Sidgwick observes: "he does not even define Perfection so as to strictly exclude from it the notion of Moral Perfection or Virtue, and so save his explanation of morality from an obvious logical circle." This is almost a *reductio ad absurdum*, for it follows that we cannot 'explain morality' unless all ideas of a distinctively Moral Perfection are excluded from our notion of Perfection as a supreme ethical End. But from another, and perhaps a juster, point

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, bk. i. ch. ix.; bk. iii. ch. xiv.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. iv. § 4.



of view, such a result may be regarded as a *reductio ad absurdum* of that idea of moral Perfection which makes it consist essentially in obedience to certain abstract laws of conduct; for it is only with respect to the justification of these *laws* as a sufficient and complete account of morality, that the logical difficulty in question arises. Professor Sidgwick does not seek for any deeper conception of the nature of Virtue: accordingly, in the fifth edition of the *Methods of Ethics* we find him still adopting the position that it is evidently unreasonable to regard Virtue as having any more than a quite subordinate place as a constituent of the Good: he therefore proceeds to argue that the Good must consist in 'happiness' in the Utilitarian—not the ordinary—sense of that word: the sense in which it signifies Pleasure valued only according to its quantity.

Looking at the general course of Professor Sidgwick's argument, we find some interesting reflections arising out of it. What is ultimately good or desirable must be realised in personal lives—it must be some form of desirable consciousness; mere preservation of life—whether in the sense of the individual life or the life of the species, or the efficiency of the social organisation—is not good in itself, unless the life is accompanied by some form of desirable consciousness. Again, Reason is impartial, and bids us have regard not merely for our present good of the moment, but for our good on the whole; and not merely for our individual good on the whole, but the general good. When stated as self-evident rational principles, these maxims assume the negative form: if some present good of mine is to be regarded as of greater worth than some good that I can attain in the future, it must be for a reason other than the mere fact that the one is present and

the other future; and similarly, if some good that I can attain for myself is to be regarded as of greater worth than some possible good in which another has the chief share, it must be for a reason other than the mere fact that he and I are different persons. So far, doubtless, all will agree; but what seems to be the most essentially necessary link in the proof of the Utilitarian principle now emerges, and turns out to be the weakest. Desirable consciousness must signify *either* happiness merely, *or* certain "objective relations of the conscious mind,"—for instance, Truth, Beauty, Freedom (in the sense of Rational action for its own sake): these are often sought after as ultimately desirable. But can these be conceived as 'alternatives' in the sense of being distinct classes from which we must choose one to the exclusion of the others? Is it not essentially unreasonable to judge the desirability of any conscious state by reference to what is only *one* element in that consciousness? In fact, if the accepted psychological analysis of mind is correct, such disjunctions as those adduced by Professor Sidgwick are seen to be wholly invalid.<sup>1</sup> The alternatives are not only not exclusive, but it is their very nature to be inseparable accompaniments of one another. The Hedonistic doctrine of 'pleasure for pleasure's sake' is a mutilation of our nature. The natural consequence of the view that "what is ultimately desirable must be some form of desirable consciousness," would be to inquire what the nature of consciousness really is,—what are its essential constitutive functions: and to take as the ethical End, the promotion of the highest efficiency of

<sup>1</sup> The phrase 'accepted' needs slight qualification, owing to the existence of such a theory as that of Horwicz, who regards Feeling as the basal element of mind out of which the others emerge.

these functions in their organic unity.<sup>1</sup> I do not imply that this is an adequate statement of the End: as it stands, it suggests merely that instead of taking Feeling by itself, we should take a combination of Feeling, Will, and Intellect. So stated, it would be a perfectly barren conception; but I introduced it only as pointing in the right direction,—the realisation of our nature *as a whole*.

It has been observed that Common Sense has an aversion to admitting Pleasure as the supreme End and standard of right conduct; and Professor Sidgwick endeavours to account for this by pointing out, *inter alia*, that the word Pleasure is not ordinarily used, as it is by the Utilitarian, to include *all* kinds of pleasant feeling; it suggests rather the commoner and coarser kinds of such feelings. But is it not just this classing together of all kinds of 'pleasant feeling' as of equal qualitative worth, for purposes of ethical valuation—whatever be their 'causes,' or the facts conditioning and arousing the pleasures—that Common Sense objects to? Professor Sidgwick speaks further of the 'vastness' and 'comparative security' of the End of Utilitarianism; but in reality it is as 'shifting and insecure' as that of Egoism. What does the General Happiness mean, on such a view? Simply a more or less pleasant feeling on the part of each one of a vast number of numerically distinct individuals. Now if we ignore any qualitative distinctions of higher and lower among feelings, we must recognise that feeling is not only the very element of consciousness in which individuals differ most from one another when their circumstances are the same, but is also the most shifting,

<sup>1</sup> If it be objected that this is to confuse Psychology and Ethics, I should take the liberty of "doubting whether the objector can understand."

insecure, and unreliable element in the consciousness of each individual. An aggregate of such elements may be 'vast' but can hardly be 'comparatively secure.' We are told<sup>1</sup> that "it is the Utilitarian's duty at once to support generally, and to rectify in detail, the morality of Common Sense; and the method of pure empirical Hedonism [calculation of the probable consequences, in the way of pleasure and pain, of a proposed act] seems to be the only one which he can at present use in the reasonings which finally determine the nature of this rectification." The defects of the morality of Common Sense lie in the want of precision in its principles, as shown in Book iii. But in Book ii. Professor Sidgwick has investigated very thoroughly the vagueness and uncertainty of the method of 'empirical Hedonism,' and it does not appear to be superior to that of Intuitionism,—certainly not so superior in exactness as to be capable of correcting details in the latter.

Above all, there is the discrepancy between the End for the individual and the End for the community. Over against the "ultimate good of the universe of sentient beings"—a vast aggregate of numerically distinct and absolutely fluctuating atoms of feeling—stands the ultimate End of the individual's conduct: conformity to Reason. He is to seek the general 'Happiness' solely because the latter—supposing that the proof of the Hedonistic principle is valid—is the only *reasonable* interpretation of the general good. The reasonableness of this interpretation is open to much question, as we have seen; but, waiving all objections on that side, there remains the question: Why am I to sacrifice my own pleasure by obeying the dictates of

<sup>1</sup> Book iv. ch. v. § 1.

Reason, when, so far as the standard of my conduct goes, I treat my fellow-men as though they had no Reason—as merely *feeling* beings? What is Reason, that I should listen to her voice when thus practically denying herself? Professor Sidgwick notices this objection, but does not appear adequately to apprehend its force. It has been remarked by more than one writer that when we consider the real foundations of Professor Sidgwick's Utilitarianism, we find that it is not hedonistic at bottom; its motto is not 'Pleasure for Pleasure's sake,' but 'Pleasure for Reason's sake.' We are to act on certain principles because it is reasonable to do so; in other words, the dictation of Reason is the supreme authority and standard of ethical worth.

Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between Utilitarianism as a *practical method*, and as a *theoretical system* rationally complete. Professor Sidgwick defends it in the latter sense, and the difficulties we have been considering are incident to this view of the matter. But as a practical method, the Utilitarian principle stands on a different footing and needs no defence. This appears when we regard it as enjoining the prevention of pain and suffering, and the removal of their sources. We need no system, no 'calculus,' for this; nor have any theoretical difficulties the slightest significance in this purely practical sphere: in every case, *solvitur ambulando*. We must observe, however, that the real ground of the authority of this aim is not 'hedonistic'; it rests in the fact that pain, especially physical pain, is a hindrance to the higher development of personality on the part of those who suffer it, and a degradation of personality on the part of those who inflict it, when it is inflicted by persons.

It would be irrelevant for my present purpose to



dwell further on the impossibility of 'Rational Hedonism,' in the form in which Professor Sidgwick has presented it; and his is the first serious attempt to make the theory complete and coherent. It will hardly be claimed that these qualities attach to the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. Probably all capable thinkers will now agree that the older theory failed because, as Dr Martineau has put it, from 'each for himself' to 'each for all' there is 'no road,' or none that Bentham, Mill, and their followers could find. Green has observed that the theoretic weakness of the system was its practical strength: its influence was due to its relying on the essentially democratic principle that 'each is to count for one, and no one for more than one.' Professor Sidgwick supplies rational principles in justification of this: but his system only makes more evident the impossibility of regarding Pleasure as the only human Good. Probably the fundamental error in the line of argument by which Professor Sidgwick endeavours to support this conclusion, lies in his treatment of the idea of Good as merely a ground for practical rules: I refer to this again, in order that the view which I am about to suggest may be emphasised by its contrast therewith. We may abandon the assumption that the only significant use of the idea of an ultimate Good, for Ethics, is that rules of conduct may be deduced from it; and we may abandon the attempt to fill in *ab extra* the conception of the Good,—we need not take it and try whether Pleasure, Virtue, Knowledge, &c., will fit it or not. We may turn to the facts which lead us to suppose that there is a supreme End; if such facts are to be found, they ought to show us how to 'fill in' the conception,—in other words, give us a clue as to the form

in which we may represent the End. As a preliminary, however, to a more exact statement of the teleological treatment of Ethics, I proceed to indicate a possible grouping of ethical inquiries, in order to observe their relative importance.

§ 2. The most convenient *starting-point* for Ethics is simply the fact of moral judgment. We say of an act that it is 'right,' our 'duty,' 'ought' to be done; or again that it is 'wrong,' 'ought not' to be done. We also recognise that there is a Good for man, which is believed to be realised, at least in part, in the performance of duty. We have, further, certain characteristic emotions that attach to these distinctions. In proportion as man becomes an intelligent being,—with the growth of civilisation, education, and (in general terms) with the maturing of social life, he manifests these ethical qualities in ways that tend to become similar. Now Ethics, according to the most general possible statement of its problem, seeks for the *meaning* of these characteristics of our nature. The inquiries to which this motive gives rise may provisionally be grouped as follows: (1) The most general questions that may be called the 'Metaphysic of Ethics,' embracing (a) the meaning and significance of what is called 'moral authority'—*i.e.*, the experience of obligation and of personal origination and responsibility; (b) the nature of the Good which seems to be realised in the performance of duty, and the possibility of there being a supreme Good. (2) The ultimate criterion of morality in conduct: the meaning or 'connotation' of the conception of Right. Using a metaphor derived from formal Logic, we may say the general problem here is: What are the 'attributes' of

rightness in conduct? With this is connected the perplexing question of the precise *objects* of moral judgment: to what elements in the complex fact which we call 'voluntary action' or 'conduct' does the judgment refer? <sup>1</sup> (3) The proximate criterion of morality: the 'denotation' of Right. The general problem here is, how do we find out what particular actions are right? This is what is known as Applied Ethics: and it corresponds to Professor Sidgwick's definition of a Method of Ethics.

First of all, we must notice the relation of these inquiries to one another. As regards (2) and (3), it is evident that an answer to the former carries with it an answer to the latter. In dealing with (2) we should arrive at some kind of general conclusion, and the problem (3) would consist in applying this to particular cases. On the other hand, an answer to (3)—for instance, the tendency of the act to promote the greatest happiness of all concerned, or their deliverance from pain—does not necessarily carry with it an answer to (2). Thus Utilitarianism as a *practical method* may be justified, as we have said, while as a theoretic system it falls to pieces on examination. But thus, also, it is possible to expatiate largely in a quasi-scientific manner in the region of Applied Ethics without touching any of the deeper problems. It is more important, however, to observe the relation of (1) and (2). Here, again, it is evident that an answer to the former carries with it an answer to the latter, since if there is a supreme End or Good, right conduct must consist in promoting it. But it is also evident that any answer to (2) *presupposes* an at least partial answer to (1). Indeed whether (1) and (2) are not identical depends on the wider or narrower

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix at conclusion of this chapter.

sense in which the word 'conduct' is understood. It may be taken as coextensive with the whole of conscious activity in the widest sense—the whole of rational action in all directions. In this case the Right means the *Summum Bonum*, the Ideal of the whole life of man, as realised in conation, feeling, and thinking. I might illustrate by reference to Greek Ethics, where this view was widely taken: by Aristotle, in particular, it was firmly held; wellbeing, or *eὐδαιμονία*, according to his conception of it, was such an Ideal. Here question (2) becomes identical with (1).

But we may distinguish a region of mental activity where obligation is commonly supposed to obtain in a more special way than it does in our general intellectual and emotional processes: the sphere of 'volition' as manifested in outward movements. This is 'conduct' in the ordinary sense; and 'moral obligation,' as ordinarily understood, is limited more or less definitely to this sphere. It is with 'conduct' in this narrower sense that modern, and especially English, Ethics has dealt. Here question (2) is a narrower question than (1). But it might still be maintained that we cannot proceed far in dealing with (2) without having, consciously or unconsciously, adopted some point of view with regard to the problems embraced under (1). This is a mere matter of observation: thus Intuitionists hold that Duty consists in obedience to certain moral laws, prescribing certain general kinds of action as obligatory; these laws are inherent in human nature and are "intuitively known to be unconditionally binding."<sup>1</sup> Here there is apparently no reference

<sup>1</sup> This description is not applicable to Dr Martineau's Intuitionist theory, from which much of great value and suggestiveness may be learnt. See the Appendix to this chapter.

to a supreme End of Life: nevertheless these writers as a rule have theorised as if obedience to these laws constituted the highest human good. Their doctrine has been well summed up by Mr Bradley in the maxim—"Duty for duty's sake." This view was explicitly formulated by the profoundest among them, when he said, "The one unconditional good is the good Will."<sup>1</sup> The view of Ethics which is here implied is open to much criticism. It rests on a quite illegitimate limitation of the meaning of 'conduct.' We may say that 'conduct' takes place whenever a being self-consciously represents some end or aim as desirable, and endeavours to realise it. The interest from which the desire springs may be primarily intellectual or artistic as well as 'practical' in the narrower sense referred to above. Conduct is simply the satisfaction of any rational desire, that is, of any desire which consciously has an aim or object. This obvious fact of itself is sufficient to suggest that our conception of the highest Good must be as wide and comprehensive as that of *εὐδαιμονία* among the Greeks; it cannot therefore consist merely in certain kinds of behaviour which can be prescribed by law as distinguished from other kinds. To take as our ethical aim the maxim of "duty for duty's sake" is a mutilation of our nature, as much as to take that of "pleasure for pleasure's sake."

This conclusion is fully confirmed on the one hand by a scrutiny of the particular moral laws which are put forward as binding, and on the other by an examination of the very idea of Law itself. The former aspect of the matter is investigated in the third Book of Professor Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*, where it is conclusively shown that the general conceptions involved in

<sup>1</sup> Kant, *Metaphysic of Ethics*, *ad init.*



+ these laws—Justice, Benevolence, and the like—are in every case so vague that the absolute authority attributed to them becomes of no effect; obscurity in the conception must mean uncertainty and doubt in the practical application. It is not denied that the broad outlines of these conceptions are sufficiently clear for many practical purposes: it would be absurd to maintain that we are always left in doubt when attempting to carry out in practice the laws of Justice, Benevolence, Veracity, &c.; the point is that these laws are not precise enough to sustain the position which is theoretically assigned to them. But the conception of Law itself is sufficient to show that the jural view of morality—the view which makes it essentially a law or code of laws—is inadequate and abstract. As several recent writers on Ethics have urged,—the ethical conception of Right, or conformity with a rule or law, is less fundamental than that of Good, or Worth for an End.<sup>1</sup> The ‘unit of conduct,’ for ethical purposes, is the concrete activity of a desire—springing, as every desire does, from more or less definite Interest or wider circle of desires—which is being realised there and then. This activity is concrete in every particular of its content and its spatial and temporal relations; but the law is abstract and general; so that even if the conception involved in the Law—Justice, for example, or Benevolence—is clear and distinct, it cannot possibly do more than cover certain general features of the concrete case, and therefore is not an adequate measure of that case. Another law may cover other features of

<sup>1</sup> See Mackenzie's *Manual of Ethics*, Dewey's *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*, Muirhead's *Elements of Ethics*, D'Arcey's *Short Study of Ethics*. These form admirable introductions to Green's great work, and to Dr E. Caird's *Critique of the Kantian Ethics* (*Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii.)

it; then there arises doubt and conflict, and we have the beginnings of Casuistry, which has been well described as "a system of laws for the breaking of laws," but which for the same reason can never be adequate to the infinite variety of actual circumstances.

Our conclusion is that neither 'duty' nor 'pleasure' can be regarded as good 'for its own sake'; they are good only in so far as they contribute to the realisation of the highest type of personality. The first of the questions above distinguished is therefore the most fundamental: What is the supreme Ideal of human life?

§ 3. This problem cannot be fruitfully discussed except on the basis of psychological principles developed in their metaphysical bearings; for the problem of whether there is a supreme Ideal, and of the form under which we may represent it, can evidently be settled only by an appeal to the facts of our conscious experience on all its sides—to the actual constitution of the human mind. Its constitution is shown to us, at least in part, by Psychology; but we must push the psychological question so far that it becomes ontological. We cannot rest content with a conclusion which, though it is true 'for Psychology'—true in the psychological reference—may yet be wholly or partly false in some other reference. We want to know what the human mind or self may become—what developments of its being are possible; and for this, we must have an *at least partly true* conception of what it is. In other words, the question of there being an ultimate Ideal is an ontological one; it is, in fact, the question of the nature and purpose of the individual life. This being understood, let us examine the significance, for ethical theory, of the conception of such an Ideal.

In Psychology we distinguish three inseparable constituent factors of conscious life, which are present in every actual state of mind, and which are perhaps most obviously distinguishable in the movement of Desire. Here we have (*a*) the representation of the end desired, that is, of myself as having attained the object: this is an intellectual function; (*b*) the feeling, which is normally one of dissatisfaction or pain aroused by the contrast and discord between the present state of myself and the state which is desired; (*c*) the 'conation,' striving or effort to attain this latter state: and in so far as it is attained the feeling changes to one of satisfaction or pleasure. It is evident that we cannot use this analysis as the ground of a distinction of three sciences,—one dealing with the Ideal of the intellectual factor of consciousness, one with that of the emotional, and one with that of the conative; for as we have seen (§ 1), it is an entirely illegitimate abstraction to think of an Ideal state of feeling or will apart from all intellectual or cognitive states. The three sciences, if this were their only ground of distinction, would have to be merged into one, dealing with the Ideal of human personality as a whole. The fact that the three constitutive functions are always present together in their organic unity, whatever be the direction in which the predominant interest of consciousness may tend,—the fact that the whole of consciousness is present in every direction of its activity,—is the ground for our first position. The Ideal of personality is One. One and the same Ideal determines the ethical worth of human *conduct*, in the wider sense,—whatever be the character of the end which the conduct realises. This, as was implied above, is the position of the greatest Ethical thinkers of ancient Greece: it is, however, the *intention*

rather than the *effect* of their doctrine. Only if consciousness consisted of powers or faculties capable of operating wholly or partially in independence of one another, would it be possible to assume that conscious life is governed by different unrelated ideals.

This consideration suggests the question—What, then, is the ground of the distinction of ἐπιστήμη into θεωρητική, πρακτική, and ποιητική, which has prevailed ever since Greek thought was at its best? It cannot be illusory; and nothing that we have said need imply that it is. Indefinitely numerous and various as are the ends with which the interests of consciousness connect themselves, yet they naturally fall into three great divisions or classes,—not classes of faculties or powers, but of *ends* or objects of desire. The activity of consciousness may be towards the attainment of Truth,—accuracy in intellectual representation of fact and consistency in rational comprehension; or it may be towards the apprehension or creation of the Beautiful; or it may be ‘practical’ in the ordinary sense,—that is, directed to the production of changes in the outer world entirely with a view to their effect on our own self and other selves. The desirableness of these effects is ultimately judged by the Ideal of personality which we are now endeavouring to determine; but, proximately, we see that the judgment of their desirableness depends on Sympathy,—the power of representing to one’s self the life and feeling of another, and the aims and tendencies of *all* sides of his nature. Sympathy in this sense is not a mere mode of feeling, but involves intellectual and emotional elements, both of which are necessary to the result. Let us distinguish these ‘practical’ ends as forming the sphere of morality, in the limited

2 / sense.<sup>1</sup> We may say that every mental activity must  
3 be in the direction of promoting or hindering an end which enters into one or other of these three classes.

In these facts we have the ground for our second position: if there is an Ideal of personality, it is realised by that activity of consciousness which tends to promote the harmonious *efficiency*, as a whole, of those functions of consciousness by which Truth is attained, Beauty created and appreciated, and the social consequences of our conduct—its effect on other selves—adequately comprehended. In this regard the most fundamental quality needed is Sympathy.<sup>2</sup> The Ideal, being One, enjoins us to increase the efficiency of these functions of personality in ourselves and in all human beings affected by our conduct.

The practical difficulties which arise from the fact that these three general aims may be pursued in independence of one another are very serious. It is not that the promotion of the Ideal—in the form in which we have so far determined it—for Self may conflict with its promotion for others: this would be an inadequate and misleading statement of the case. It would be absurd to suppose that the giving free play to one's own intellectual and artistic capacities can *ipso facto* directly involve the suppression of those activities in others. Nor can there be any such direct conflict in the promotion of the distinctively moral end,—the third of the three aspects of the Ideal which we have indicated; unless moral

<sup>1</sup> 'Philanthropy' does not cover all the ground intended, though it covers much of it.

<sup>2</sup> We shall have to dwell on the characteristics of these qualities more in detail in ch. vii.



welfare is interpreted in the strictly hedonistic sense, when a rational regard for one's own pleasure and a like regard for the pleasure of others may dictate very divergent courses. But if we reject the hedonistic view as an unreasonable limitation and indeed a mutilation of our nature, this difficulty is removed. The real difficulty is of another kind, and consists essentially in the fact that the pursuit of one aspect of the Ideal may conflict with the pursuit of another. The promotion of Science and Art may directly conflict with the promotion of morality, in the ordinary sense in which we have used the term. It may lead to a neglect to help others to realise these very capacities for Truth and Beauty in their nature; and not only so, but the energetic cultivation of scientific tastes for one's self may lead to a suppression of one's own artistic capacities, and *vice versa*. Again, exclusive or prolonged devotion to Science or Art may lead to a suppression of our sympathetic power of comprehending the lives of others, which is essential to any effective work for their welfare, whether this be on the part of the individual in relation to his own circle or on the part of the community in the direction of social reform. In order that any such work may produce fruitful results, there is needed on the part of those who promote it a wide and deep *insight* into human nature, beyond any scientific comprehension of economics or politics. This priceless acquisition may be wanting even with a high degree of artistic and literary cultivation: indeed, such cultivation, if made a specialty, may be directly hostile to it. On this account much that has been said about "Culture" must, I think, be condemned as thoroughly shallow.

This problem of the mutual relations of Intellectual,

Æsthetic, and Moral excellence is touched upon in a more or less cursory manner in the ethical works to which we have referred;<sup>1</sup> but it can hardly be said to receive adequate treatment in any of them. In endeavouring to deal with it thoroughly we should best begin with a critical examination of the suggestions made towards its solution by Plato in the *Republic* and by Aristotle in the *Nichomachean Ethics* and the *Poetics*. There seems to be no *general or theoretical* solution unless it be in recognition of a fact which our popular moralists and essayists, and our apostles of science, seem strangely inclined to forget. The human race is still in its infancy; the explicit development of our characteristically *human* faculties must be considered to be only in its beginning,—its crudest, earliest stage. It can hardly be maintained, even in these closing years of the nineteenth century, that mental or even physical evolution has come to a stop, because we, being *in* it,—being unable to assume any higher point of view,—cannot see in definite detail whither it tends. If, therefore, our faculties are in an inchoate imperfect state, the actual possibilities of conflict between them need not prevent us from holding that with their fuller realisation they will appear only as different aspects of One harmonious progressive development. We have more than hints in this direction even now. The creations of the scientific and artistic genius do ultimately—‘in the long run,’ if I may use the phrase—help the higher growth of personality on the part of all. It may also be maintained that as the practical problems of life increase in difficulty with the wider

<sup>1</sup> See also Mr Bonar's pamphlet, *The Intellectual Virtues*, and Mr Bosanquet's *Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Art*.

demands made upon our mental and physical energies and the growing complexity of the social organisation, just in the same proportion the directly practical value of scientific knowledge, and the failure of mere tradition and custom as guides, become manifest.

Our conclusion is, so far, that science does not exist 'for its own sake,' nor art for its own sake, nor morality or 'doing good' for its own sake: even the very phrases remind us of the dilettante, the self-deluded, or the hypocrite. It is for the sake of man that these things exist—for the sake of men, who find their self-realisation in the progressive attainment of these ends. Science, Art, Morality, are made for man, not he for them: but they are made by and for the *whole* man: not one of them can be *permanently* sacrificed to another, but all claim to enter into and form part of One harmonious whole.<sup>1</sup>

§ 4. It is not implied that any one ought to have or could have the ultimate form of the Ideal present to his mind in all action: but so far as he is acting rightly he is promoting some form of the Ideal. What that form must be, will depend on the actual concrete situation in which he finds himself; he is supplied with a general *schema* or outline—the Ideal as we have formulated it—which, so to speak, must be filled in from the details of the concrete case. This 'filling in' constitutes *the good* relatively to this particular case: while, relatively to the ultimate Ideal, this particular good is only a small fragment of a stage in its realisation. The outline conception of the supreme

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, in what we have said it has been implied that temporary sacrifice of one to another—especially of the ends of science and art to that of morality—is *necessary* in the present state of society.

Ideal is not formless: as we have seen, we are able to get it stated in terms of our actual conscious experience.

The function of Ethics, then, is not to supply rules, but to investigate the real nature of *moral action in the complete sense of that term*. Ethical theory inquires into the essential conditions of the life which has moral worth, just as Epistemology seeks for those of the purely intellectual life.<sup>1</sup> It is very satisfactory to observe the way in which a group of writers, some of whom may not object to be classed as Neo-Hegelians, have laid stress upon this. The position is of so much importance that it seems desirable to illustrate it by a somewhat lengthy series of quotations. Mr J. H. Muirhead says: "It would be a mistake to confuse the task of the ethical philosopher, which is to bring the human end or standard of moral judgment to clear consciousness, with that of the ethical writer [*e.g.*, of such ethical and political discussions as these carried on in the pulpit and the press], which is to make this clear consciousness prevail and turn it to practical account for the guidance of life."<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Professor J. S. Mackenzie says: "What seems to be needed is rather a critical study, . . . defining for us the ideal by which we are to be inspired, but leaving the particular applications of it to the sensible good neighbour and citizen."<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere Professor Mackenzie says: "Just as it is true that we interpret experience by conceptions that are not merely empirical, so it is true that we judge conduct by an Ideal which is not merely empirical. To understand this Ideal is to clarify moral judgment,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. chapter ii. § 1 (the meaning of the question, what Reasoning *ought* to be) and *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> *Mind*, No. 7, p. 397.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 10, p. 200.

and is in that sense practical. It is not to tell us what in particular we are to do: it is not even to furnish us with general rules to be applied to particular cases. But assuredly it is to enlighten us with respect to the principles by which common-sense is to be guided in its practical judgments. Common-sense . . . is guided by principles which . . . it does not understand; and so long as it does not understand its principles it is blind and blundering. It is the business of Ethics to enlighten and guide common-sense, to bring its underlying principles to clear consciousness, to criticise them, and see within what limits they are valid."<sup>1</sup> In Green's great work we find the matter stated as clearly as could be wished. In one passage<sup>2</sup> there is an extreme statement which seems to suggest that the Ideal cannot be defined in any degree: "Man can never give a sufficient account of what his unconditional good is, because he cannot know what his capabilities are until they are realised. This is the explanation of the infirmity that has always been found to attach to attempted definitions of the moral Ideal. They are always open to the charge that there is employed in the definition, openly or disguisedly, the very notion which profession is made of defining." The apparent implication of this passage is corrected when we compare it with the general tenor of Green's doctrine; he is concerned to show that the Ideal cannot be *completely* defined, nor defined so as to deduce rules of conduct from it. Thus, he says elsewhere: "We cannot indeed determine any state in which man, having become all that he is capable of becoming—all that according to the divine plan of the world he is destined to become—would find rest for his

<sup>1</sup> *Manual of Ethics*, 2nd ed., pp. 327, 328.

<sup>2</sup> *Prolegomena*, § 194.



soul. We cannot conceive it under any forms borrowed from our actual experience, for our only experience of activity is of such as implies incompleteness. . . . Yet the conviction that there must be such a state of being, merely negative as is our theoretic apprehension of it, may have supreme influence on our conduct, in moving us to that effort after a Better which, taken as a conscious effort, implies the conviction of there being a Best."<sup>1</sup> Green's contention—as Dr E. Caird has shown—is that while we cannot say that man's end is anything else than to realise the faculties of his conscious being, and we cannot know what these faculties are apart from their realisation, yet *from reflection upon that realisation as far as it has gone, we can in a measure estimate both what the faculty is and what is the direction in which it may be further developed.*<sup>2</sup>

Are we then, it may be asked, left by ethical theory with no other guidance than the precept to fill in from the details of life the general *schema* of what ought to be in the realisation of Truth, Beauty, and Sympathy? No doubt the form of statement which we have employed gives a rather more concrete content to our conception of what man's better nature is, than Green's statements do: but is it sufficiently concrete to be of any practical use whatever? Mr Fairbrother has acutely observed that the answer to such a question "would probably be positive or negative according to the character, or even the temporary mood, of the questioner. The plan of a house on paper is assuredly nothing at all to a man craving immediate shelter, but in certain other references it might be regarded as almost everything. In regard to a theory of Ethics,

<sup>1</sup> *Prolegomena*, § 172.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Prolegomena*, §§ 171-174, and *Mind*, vol. viii, pp. 553, 554.

especially where even the fundamental basis is a matter of controversy, such a 'form' [of the End] as that given will be a very haven of rest to the tired inquirer." But the principle that the good is always realised in the concrete circumstances of life, has more significance than might appear on a superficial view. This may be illustrated by another able writer of the school to which I have referred. Speaking of "the possibility of deciding whether this or that proposed act is right," Professor John Dewey says: "We have only to analyse the act itself. We have certain definite and wholly concrete facts,—the given capacity of the person at the given moment and his given surroundings. The judgment as to the nature of these facts is, in and for itself, a judgment as to the act to be done. The question . . . is simply, What is this case? The moral act . . . is that which meets the present actual situation. Difficulties indeed arise, but they are the difficulties of resolving a complex case. They are intellectual, not moral. The case made out, the moral end stands forth."<sup>1</sup> As Professor Dewey has it elsewhere, the content of the moral end "is concrete to the core, including every detail of conduct: and this not in a rigid formula, but in the movement of life." For it is very questionable whether any act is ever done from pure ill-will or unmixed evil intent. Before any evil is perpetrated there is always the action, in the deliberating mind, of all kinds of prejudices, prepossessions, and specious pleas, which may so cloak the wished-for deed with masks and disguises that it appears to be something quite *other* than what it really is, and may at last be brought into apparent harmony with the higher rational desires which at first conflicted with it. The evil arises from

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Ethics*, pp. 134, 135.

the wilful blindness which fails to realise what the proposed action verily is. If, however, Professor Dewey, when calling this an 'intellectual' question, means that it is gained by purely intellectual operations, or that intellectual powers of a high order would facilitate its acquisition, he is in fatal conflict with ordinary experience. The question lying at the heart of every moral problem is this: What will the deed that I wish for really do? What forces will it set at work in my world, and whither will they return? Above all, what will it do in and for the lives of others? This is a knowledge that can only be the fruit of an *insight* springing from the whole nature of man, as moulded by the widest and deepest experience of life in all its aspects. This insight may well be *rational* in the deepest sense, but surely Professor Dewey cannot mean to identify it with *rationality*, or to treat it as a product of reasoning. The same comment may be made on Green's account of the "social interest," *Prolegomena*, § 199 *sqq.* To this we shall have to recur (ch. vii.)

We must further bear in mind that all such practical decisions may be enlightened by reference to the established moral ideas of the age, so far as these have attained to any permanency and fixity. There is an established order of morality, in which the self-realising moral activity of man has taken form; and which, as Green says, must be regarded as unconditionally binding against every desire except that 'Desire for the best' which produced the present code and will from time to time suggest its improvement. Again, for the social side of conduct, important practical guidance may be derived by the 'ethical writer' and 'practical reformer' not only from the best insight of his own

time, but by considering the *expansion of the conception of Right* which takes place with the maturing of social life in the course of history. There can be no doubt that the ideas of the concrete forms of duty have been modified in the course of time, according to the varying requirements of social life and conditions; and a study of this process of growth must be of value for understanding what forms of conduct are appropriate to the present conditions. On this view the question is purely sociological, not biological. We start with individuals living in the presence of their fellows—individuals who have the capacity for sympathetic insight into the social consequences of their conduct, and who are capable of *valuing* such consequences as one form of the standard or Ideal. *Within such a moral world* we may have an intelligible evolution of ideas of Duty and Right. This study, however, belongs essentially to practical or applied Ethics; and valuable material for it exists in many sociological and ethical writings. An instance—in outline—of the kind of study that I refer to will be found in Green's brief but brilliant and deeply suggestive account of the Origin and Development of the Moral Ideal.<sup>1</sup>

§ 5. We must now discuss a mode of stating the End which has its origin in Hegel, and is very prominent in the ethical writings of Green, Caird, and their followers, from some of whom quotations have already been made. We adopted the formula of 'self-realisation' to indicate the character of the End,—the progressive realisation of the faculties of our nature as a whole, where the lower desires are given their proper place in the service of the higher. The 'self'

<sup>1</sup> *Prolegomena*, bk. iii. ch. iii.-v. (§§ 199-285).

which we had in view was essentially the individual self, whose existence consists in the progressive assimilation of its experiences, in moulding itself or building itself up, in organising itself in certain explicit, definite forms. In this process its faculties are 'realised' in varying degrees under the guidance of the Ideal which we have determined. But by Green and others the term self-realisation is used in a much more extended significance: the self which is to be realised is held to be Infinite, to be Rational, to be Social. Let us examine what is involved in these contentions.

It is evident that without going beyond the view we have already expressed, we can, and must, admit that the Ideal is infinite. We cannot conceive ourselves as knowing that there is nothing more to be known, or indeed as having reached any *static* condition of perfection. But more than this is intended, as we shall see directly. With regard to the contention that the self which is to be realised is essentially Rational, we find that great importance is attached to this terminology: it therefore suggests that what is surely a one-sided emphasis has been laid on the intellectual side of our mental life, and that the Ideals of Goodness and Beauty are of no worth unless they can be reduced to cases of the cognitive process or states of 'thought.' This is to subordinate all else to certain quite imaginary demands of the intellectual Ideal. In reality Truth is more modest. We have already seen that the intellectual factor<sup>1</sup> should take its place as one element in the whole Ideal of human personality, being neither more nor less fundamental than the others. If this is really the view of the writers in question, many of their modes of expression

<sup>1</sup> That is, as working in the realisation of 'world-knowledge.'



are inappropriate and cannot fail to be misleading. The matter will be rendered clearer by an examination of the most recent statement of the 'self-realisation' theory—that of Professor Mackenzie.<sup>1</sup>

The form or type of the Ideal Self Professor Mackenzie finds in the highest form of self-consciousness. He distinguishes three grades of self-consciousness, which are not absolutely separate from one another, but in which the higher emerges from the lower. The lowest stage is the unity of the mere feeling of pleasure or pain conditioned by experience of the present state of the bodily organism.<sup>2</sup> A higher stage is reached when the individual being is conscious of the unity of his personal life through its successive changes. The highest form is the consciousness of that systematic Unity of the Universe which it is the Ideal of Science and Philosophy to make explicit in knowledge. The author remarks, in passing, that "the familiar line 'self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,' may be quoted as an illustration of these three senses of the term 'self.' The self which we control is the animal self; the self which we know is the individual self; the self which we reverence is the Ideal self."<sup>3</sup> It is in regard to the *highest* form of self-consciousness that our view is in serious divergence from his. Man's consciousness of the Ideal is not exhausted in the intellectual Ideal of knowledge; to this I have already alluded, and the question will meet us again when we investigate the metaphysical postulates of Ethics. I agree with Professor Mackenzie that the form of this

<sup>1</sup> See his *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, ch. iii.-iv. (2nd edition).

<sup>2</sup> "Consentience" is a convenient term which has been suggested—by Mr Mivart, I believe—to indicate this stage of conscious unity.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 189.

Ideal is that of the systematic Unity of the Universe : but here, apparently, we diverge.<sup>1</sup> Although this Ideal is the perfection of one aspect of our personal consciousness—namely, Intelligence ; yet the reality to which the Ideal refers—that is, the systematic Whole, or Universe, which I agree with Professor Mackenzie in regarding as the originating source of the Ideal as this appears in the individual consciousness—cannot properly or even intelligibly be said to be a mode of self or a state of the personal life : it is a *super-personal* reality. Hence consciousness of the Ideal of Knowledge cannot properly be called a form of self-consciousness. The term ‘self’ should be reserved for the personal life of the individual : which is not something *in se ipso totus teres atque rotundus*, but is conscious of itself as imperfect, finite, and dependent, and, therefore, of itself as ruled by an Ideal of infinite and absolute worth. The former consciousness is inseparable from the latter, and indeed *implies* it ; but to call the latter a form of self-consciousness, inevitably suggests that the *identity* of the Ideal and the Actual, of Man and God, is emphasised in excess of the *difference* which this and every identity implies : or it suggests that the Ideal answers to no *present* Reality at all, so that the Divine is simply a name for the highest term of human progress.

The next important point that needs to be cleared up is the significance of the contention that the real self is a Social self. According to the school of Green and Caird, the self which is being realised is infinite, and finds itself in “the realisation of a community of persons.” This conception of the ultimate good, in

<sup>1</sup> The following statements appear, perhaps, dogmatic ; but they are so expressed only for the sake of brevity and clearness.

Green's words, "does not admit of the distinction between good for self and good for others":<sup>1</sup> the true good of one man is simply *identical* with that of others. Now our view, as has been pointed out, implies that the self which is being realised is the individual life: and this not only admits but renders necessary the distinction referred to: what it excludes is an opposition, contradiction, or conflict between good for self and good for others. We may go further and say that the identity necessarily involves the distinction; for no unity or identity can be intelligibly maintained unless there are *distinguishable* things between which it is to hold: only because of difference is identity asserted, and it is self-contradictory to make the identity annihilate the differences which are its necessary basis. If the foregoing expresses all that Green's apparently paradoxical statement implies, the divergence of view is of course much more apparent than real.

Again, since it is not in the least to be denied that man is only moral and indeed only human 'in society,' that is, when living in the presence of his fellows and holding certain definitely organised relations to them,—since, in a word, "social life is to personality what language is to thought," we may say with Green that "it is only by participating in the life of a community that the individual, in spite of his finitude, can realise the infinite possibilities of his nature." Hence we may state our view of the true Good either as the realisation of an ideal community or as the realisation of all the functions of personality in the service of the highest of them,—knowledge, beauty, rational sympathy. From some points of view the former is the more suggestive; from others, the latter. The latter, perhaps, has the

<sup>1</sup> *Prolegomena*, § 235, and *passim*.

more direct bearing upon life, as being less void of positive content than the former; but the value and significance of the idea of partnership in a larger whole—which the former view emphasises—cannot easily be exaggerated. That Man's nature is to make himself a member of a kingdom whose uniting bonds are a harmony of the true interests and aims of its members, has been the burden of the ethical teaching of Christianity from the beginning, and it has found clear and strong expression in the utterances of the greatest thinkers of ancient Greece and of the modern world. Our being's end and aim may be far *more*, but it cannot be less, than this: make thyself a member of such a kingdom—a kingdom whose union consists in the working together of harmonious, though different, interests, desires, and aims. Let us not think that such a kingdom is worthless because it is small, or be led away by that shallow view which would make 'universality' tantamount to mere extent in space and time. Its value depends not on the number of its members or its wide extent, but on the ethical worth of its uniting principle. The kingdom of the social reformer may be the field of the social and political organisation of society; the kingdom of the philosopher or scientific thinker may be the whole intellectual empire of humanity; the kingdom of the mother may be only the circle of her little ones in her home; but it is not *this* difference that makes the one worth more or less than the other. The reformer's or the thinker's kingdom is not *therefore*—simply because it extends to a larger number of persons—worth more than hers; and it may be worth much less. The ideal kingdom in this sense is a spiritual fellowship transcending all national limitations, all distinctions of race and class, even all limita-

tions of time and space and earthly existence. It is a kingdom where the only conditions of citizenship are intellectual and spiritual faith, love, and brotherhood; into which all enter in whose lives these are the moving springs of conduct. Even though they know it not, they are not alone. The existence of this kingdom is the best guarantee for the welfare of the visible social community: and the growth of this kingdom is assuredly the only 'social progress' worth the name.

The doctrine of the essentially social character of the Ideal of personality is given a very different turn when the community that is to be 'realised' is identified with the actual social organisation. The whole contents of morality disappear into the external routine of "my social station and its duties," and human selves are regarded simply as the products of society; they are products of a general life of humanity which uses them as its vehicles, but which cannot be said to be realised in them. It cannot be said to be realised in their individual lives, for these are transient and disappear, with the marks of all their imperfections thick upon them,—unrealised ideals, unsatisfied desires, failures, sins, missings of the mark. 'Society,' indeed, goes on: but is it not a solemn mockery to consider the history of the social organisation as a process of 'self-realisation' on the part of its individual members?

Yet this view certainly seems to be implied in many statements of the Neo-Hegelian school in Ethics,—particularly Dewey, Bradley, and Muirhead: and they have taken no pains to repudiate it. It is implied, too, in a tendency which is widely prevalent at the present day,—to merge Ethics in Politics:<sup>1</sup> the theory of

<sup>1</sup> 'Politics,' of course, is to be understood "in the ancient and honourable, not the modern and degraded, sense of the term."



man's characteristic *ἔργον*, of what man ought to be, is merged in the theory of civil society. I may illustrate by reference to the *Fabian Essays in Socialism*, a book representing a mode of thought and feeling which has wide influence. Here it is laid down that, for the production of individual types of character, personal development is to be superseded by "social organisation": "or rather, the most perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest development of his own personality, but the filling in the best possible way of his humble function in the great social machine."<sup>1</sup> The idea seems to be that the life of the individual is not in truth his own life at all, but one aspect of the general life of the actual, visible social organism. Mr Muirhead, referring to the case of the suicide, observes that "no man has a life of his own to take: his life has been given him, and made all that it is, by Society,"—he is merely an element in it, and the welfare of any such element is altogether subordinate to that of the whole.

Now even if this account of the relation of the individual to the social life were completely satisfactory, it would be necessary to be perfectly clear on the question how far the organisation of society is a natural product,—the result of a struggle for existence among communities and among different ideas of desirable conduct within any community. If society is such a natural product, then the fact that a certain kind of conduct tends to preserve the efficiency of its organisation affords no reason why we should act in that way rather than in any other; why should we take social health as the End, in preference to any other natural

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 57 ff.

object to which our desires can be directed? If the 'social organism' is only an outcome of natural evolution, it is on the same level with any other product of that evolution: what is the ground for the special value assigned to it in relation to ethical action? On the 'naturalistic' theory of the origin of morality, as maintained, among many others, by Professor Alexander,<sup>1</sup> it is difficult to see what ground there is for taking as the supreme ethical End the vitality of the social 'organism' rather than that of, say, the vegetable kingdom. Both alike are aimless products of a continuous process of universal change. If we give a Utilitarian turn to the argument and interpret social welfare or health in the hedonistic sense, then the evolutionary basis is abandoned and we are involved in all the difficulties besetting the Utilitarian theory as a system. Mr Spencer partly adopts this position: he takes the preservation of life—in the individual and the race—as the final end, but equally with this he takes the realisation of the general pleasure as the end, since life that is not pleasant is not worth preserving. The weakest part of his argument is the attempted proof<sup>2</sup> that these two ends—Life and Pleasure—are ultimately identical. It must be observed, too, that with him Life tends to be understood always in the biological sense, while Alexander and Stephen tend to understand it in the sociological sense. It is difficult to use more definite expressions, for none of the writers have properly investigated the real relation of Biology and Sociology. However, Professor Alexander and Mr

<sup>1</sup> See his *Moral Order and Progress*, and Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*.

<sup>2</sup> See Professor Sidgwick's critical examination of the system, *Mind*, vol. v. p. 216; and cf. his article in vol. i. p. 52.

Stephen are clear in subordinating the realisation of Pleasure to that of Life.

If the naturalistic theory of the origin of morality is rejected, then of course the above objections do not apply. It may be held that underlying the social union is a metaphysical unity of the innumerable outwardly distinct selves which make up society; and the existence of this unity may be held to be the real ground of our duties to the visible social organism. Thus Professor Mackenzie, following Dr Caird, identifies the deeper and only real 'unity of society' with the unity of all rational beings as such.<sup>1</sup> This too is unquestionably the view which Green was concerned to defend. We need not now discuss the metaphysical aspects of the question: we may agree that the reality of such a fundamental principle of unity is a necessary postulate for Ethics, Æsthetics, and Epistemology, and that in the further determination of its nature we find the ground for the reality and obligatory worth of the Ideal we have assumed: these positions we shall have to defend. For our present purpose the question is, ✓ How far can we regard this fundamental Principle, this Ground of the obligation to serve the Ideal of personality, as *identical* with, or as *realised* in, the actual social order? Is there any suggestiveness, or any meaning, in describing the action which is governed by the ideal as an identification of one's self with society—a giving to one's self definite place and membership in the social community? To this we must return a negative answer: for a man's personal perfection is not essentially and immediately, but only partially and in effect, manifested in the performance of the duties determined by his civic or social position. The effective perform-

<sup>1</sup> *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, ch. iii. *ad fin.*; ch. iv. *ad fin.*

ance of these is a consequence<sup>1</sup> of his growth in perfection, although this growth would be impossible were he not in the society of his fellows. That this was Green's position appears plainly when we consider his answer to the question, What do personal moral Goodness and personal moral Progress consist in, essentially and fundamentally? If he had explained these conceptions merely by reference to the Society in which the person in question finds himself, defining the good as that which promotes the equilibrium, harmony, efficiency, health, &c., of that Society, then his doctrine would have been on the lines which are laid down by Mr Muirhead, and which have only to be further developed to lead to the doctrine of Professor Alexander. But he explains the nature of the good by reference to the constitution of the personal life, which indeed "cannot be torn from its environment except by a process of violent abstraction"; but the environment is not exhausted in civic society: it must be extended so as to include *all time and all existence*.<sup>2</sup> A man's true good, therefore, is not exhausted in his duties to society: it consists in a perfection of character which is realised in the harmonious fulfilment of *all* his capacities in their due order of subordination: and "this perfection being that of an agent who is properly an object to himself, cannot lie in any use that is made of him, but only in a use that he makes of himself."<sup>3</sup> Green, therefore, I think, would have assented to the view that the adequate fulfilment of the duties of a

<sup>1</sup> This word is open to objection, but we may waive interrupting refinements.

<sup>2</sup> In other words, his *selfhood* is not made what it is by its relations to 'society.' That it is deeply affected by these relations from earliest infancy is perfectly obvious: but they do not manufacture it.

<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena*, § 247 and *passim*.

man's social position is not the most fundamental form of his good: we can go deeper than this. The fulfilment of such things is a consequence of such goodness or Worth as has been realised in the man's personal character: and *this* realisation is the best security for the performance of social functions.

The *animus* of these suggestions is not in the direction of the doctrine that a man's 'self-realisation' or personal good is in any respect anti-social or attainable in selfish isolation: but that it is a hopelessly inadequate account of his good to regard it as realised simply in working out the functions determined by the political and social institutions of the community in which he actually finds himself. When limited thus, duty becomes an external routine; the concrete good of any and every case in actual life must contain far more than this. Let us suppose any concrete case; the idea that what is obligatory and binding on a man in this present juncture can be exhaustively described by reference to any 'social institutions' is one which becomes almost meaningless upon examination; for to say that my present duty is determined by my position in relation to my fellow-men—my position as husband, father, fellow-workman, fellow-citizen, or whatever it be—is only to say that I ought to do what I ought to do: it is the special form which these relations take in this case which gives rise to my problem and determines my duty. There are certain general ideas of the conduct characteristic of a 'good' father, citizen, &c., which will be found current in the thought of the community; and such enlightenment as these can give I am of course bound to avail myself of. But they only present themselves in the form of general



principles: and, as we have seen, their guidance may be very partial and defective, and they may not go very deep; for—as Mr Stephen has said—although “Be good, if you would be happy” is the verdict even of worldly prudence, it adds in an emphatic aside, “Be not *too* good.”

Such considerations as those that we have been dwelling on lead us to reject the view—to which we referred above—that the individual human life is a mere correlate of the general social life, and is an unreal abstraction if regarded as in any way independent of the latter. It is of the greatest importance to be clear on this subject: let us therefore follow Professor Mackenzie in distinguishing the various possible conceptions of the relation between the man and the community.<sup>1</sup> Of these there are five. “A *monadistic* view of society would be one which regarded all the individuals of whom the society is composed as by nature independent of each other and as connected together only by a kind of accidental juxtaposition. Such a view *might* lead to the conclusion that the connection of individuals in a society tends to interfere with the development of the individual life, and that it would be better for the individuals if they could manage to live apart. A *monistic* view, on the other hand, would be one which regarded the union of human beings as the primary fact with regard to them, and the whole nature and character of the individual life as a mere outcome of social conditions. The natural conclusion of this view would be, that the individual has no right to any independent life of his own, that he owes all that he is and has to the society in which he is born, and that society

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 150, 151.

may fairly use him as a mere means to its development. A *mechanical* or dualistic view, again, would regard the individual as partly dependent and partly independent,—as to some extent possessing a life of his own and yet to some extent dependent on his social surroundings.<sup>1</sup> This view would naturally lead in practice to a certain effort after compromise,—an effort to realise our individual lives and yet so to subject ourselves to social conditions as not to miss that element of our being with which they provide us. A *chemical* view would be similar, except that it would regard the new life with which we are provided by society as a complete transformation of our original and natural life. . . . Finally, an *organic* view of society would be one which regarded the relation of the individual to society as an intrinsic one,—one which recognised that the individual has an independent life of his own, and yet which saw that that independent life is nothing other than his social life."

The only objection to the fifth or 'organic' view—to my mind—is, that it is thoroughly vague and ambiguous; the form of it which is apparently the same may, in the minds of different writers and readers, express really divergent ideas. The greatest danger is that it shall be understood so as to become identical with the second or abstractly monistic conception. The truth it contains seems much better expressed by a development of the third view in such a way as to bring out an intelligible connection be-

<sup>1</sup> Professor Mackenzie might have pointed out that the 'dualism' arises only in so far as these two kinds of life are left by the theory in abstract separation from one another, without any suggestion of an intelligible relation between them. So far as such relation is discoverable, the theory is neither 'mechanical' nor 'dualistic.'

tween the 'individual' and the 'social' sides of man's nature. We can ascertain the source of the ambiguity by bringing the matter down to first principles. In Green's idea that the Good does not admit of the distinction between good for self and good for others,—in Professor Mackenzie's view that the social life is related to the individual life as a whole "whose essence consists in its relations to its parts, and the essence of whose parts consists in their relations to it,"<sup>1</sup>—and in many similar statements found in writers representative of this school, we seem to have an ambiguous doctrine of Relation. There are two views with regard to the nature of a relation as such. One is that of Green in the metaphysical part of the *Prolegomena*: relations 'constitute' the reality that stands in them; any *object* is made what it is by its relations to other objects and ultimately to the Universe as a whole. Applying this principle to the question we are speaking of—the relation of the individual life to the social community—we are led to the abstractly monistic view that the individual is an abstraction,—he is nothing but what the past history and present state of society have made him. We must notice that such a conclusion only follows even from this epistemological doctrine by a false abstraction of 'society': granting that every being is made what it is simply by its relations to Reality as a whole or the Absolute, the monistic view of 'society' only follows if we in effect identify 'society' with the Absolute: that is to say, if we deify humanity. But precisely this idea is implicit in much of modern sociological and ethical speculation: even in 'Hegelian' thought there is an important tendency which results in the Absolute,

<sup>1</sup> P. 155.

or God, being made simply a name for the highest stages of human progress. Our point is, therefore, that even if this were true—even if God were simply Humanity at its best, as we know it—we must still insist that our personal lives are not *mere* correlatives of Humanity. This doctrine that the being of anything is exhausted in its relations to other things, is essentially irrational. Nothings cannot be related; the terms are something beyond their relation, which requires them as much as they require it, or *more* than they require it. Mr Bradley has forcibly but quite truly said that “a relation which somehow precipitates terms which were not there before, or a relation which can get on somehow without terms, and with no differences beyond the mere ends of a line of connection, is really a phrase without meaning”:<sup>1</sup> and it is just as absurd to regard individuals as if they were nothings except as mere parts of Society, or had been “somehow precipitated” by Society. Such an attempt to affirm *relations without terms* is as one-sided and irrational as the opposite attempt to affirm *terms without relations*. This doctrine would hold that any being may be what it is quite independently of its relations to other beings, which only affect it in an accidental and immaterial way; and it would lead to the abstractly monadistic view which stands first in Professor Mackenzie’s list.

The truer view denies that terms can exist out of relation, for such would be unthinkable; but at the same time it denies that the nature of any term can be exhausted in its relations to other terms. This principle is implicitly adopted by Green in working out his view of the significance of the social in relation to the

<sup>1</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, p. 30.

individual life: it is explicitly adopted by Professor Mackenzie, when he says, in another passage, "There is a monadistic as well as a monistic element in human society; if it is true that the individual is formed by the habits and customs of the people, it is true that the habits and customs of the people *grow out of* the characters of the individual citizen; . . . the individual is the expression of his society, but . . . a change in society *takes place only through* change in its individual members."<sup>1</sup> It would, I think, be difficult to state the truth in this perplexing question more effectively than is here done; and the best analogy is that indicated by Green: As Language is to Thought, so is Society to the Individual. Without the former, there could be nothing of the latter as we know it; but the former, in each case, is, so to speak, more the dependent function of the latter than the latter is of the former.

Let us now briefly review our position. We started with the assumption that *there is* a supreme Ideal, which we found must be an Ideal of personal life. We were led to reject two theoretical views of its nature, each of which was proved to be one-sided by reference to the actual constitution of the life whose Ideal it claimed to state, and neither of which, when carried out systematically, had sufficient coherence to maintain itself. Falling back, therefore, on the development of personality as a whole, we found three supreme ends which are capable of being pursued independently of one another *to a certain extent*, but which seemed to have equally just claims to enter into the Ideal.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 174, 175; the italics are mine. The same view is expressed by Professor James Seth, *Study of Ethical Principles*, pp. 298 ff., and by Dr Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory* (3rd edition), vol. ii. pp. 402-406.



What, then, is the *ground* of their joint claim to constitute it? As regards this question, we have, through the greater part of the preceding discussion, adopted a point of view which may be called that of a higher form of Intuitionism: instinctively we know that in the progressive attainment of Truth, Beauty, Righteousness, we are realising the highest capacities of our nature, in whose service all other springs of action should be co-ordinated, and that these are the aims which give to life all its worth. Now it may prove that there is a sense in which an Intuitionism of this kind is the last word of Ethics; but we must push the question further before we can rest in such a conclusion. More than once we have been led to go beyond this point of view. We have pointed out how in realising these 'highest' aims the individual is carried beyond himself: his life, without ceasing to be his own, without being lost in something impersonal, begins to be brought into deep harmony with other lives. This has appeared most clearly in the Intellectual and Moral Ideals; and it brings us to the question, Is this self-transcending character of the Good the real ground of its obligation upon us?

The problems here suggested are those that lead from Ethics into Metaphysics; but at this transition we must close our present inquiry.

## APPENDIX.

## THE "OBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT."

It is well known that the question whether the object of moral judgment generally is and always ought to be the 'motive,' or the 'intention,' has been debated, for the most part with much ambiguity of terms, between 'Intuitionists' and 'Utilitarians.' A little reflection is sufficient to show that the kernel of the question is this: Is ethical action—the action which properly comes within the sphere of ethical valuation—the action of a person, as such, or can we attribute praise and blame to conduct considered merely as a succession of so many events in the external world, without regard to the character of the agent?

Those who think, with Professor Sidgwick, that the goodness or badness of an act depends on its 'intention,' that is, on all of its consequences which were foreseen, take the second view. They omit the reference to character: for them the question is, Were these consequences foreseen? But they cannot entirely ignore the personal reference, for it would sometimes be necessary to ask, Can we reasonably say that these consequences ought to have been foreseen?

We cannot be satisfied with this. In estimating the ethical worth of an act, we must ask, Which of these consequences did the agent *desire*, and why did he desire them? This question "Why did he desire them?" introduces the reference to personal character; for the *desire*, to satisfy which the action was carried out, is the offspring of the character. The agent's character was such that on this particular occasion this thing appeared to him desirable. We may therefore say that the worth of an act depends on its motive, if by 'motive' we mean a desire for a certain object. [A motive in this sense is not a mere feeling of want, but a feeling together with the idea of the object which satisfies it.] It is evident that

the feeling of want alone, in abstraction from its object, cannot be called good or bad : we should scarcely pass moral judgment upon a man for *wanting* merely, until we found out *what* he wanted and in what circumstances. Some writers have used the word 'motive' in this sense of a feeling in abstraction from its object. But if we must use this term at all—this 'fossilised confusion' as Sir A. Grant well called it—it seems best to make it include both the ideational and the affective elements, as being the idea of the consequences for which the act is done.

In the constructive part of Dr Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory*, the word 'motive' wavers between these two senses : so does each of the terms that he uses as synonymous with it, —'spring of action,' 'impulse,' 'tendency,' 'incentive,' 'impelling principle,' 'inner propulsion,' 'inner suggestion.' This ambiguity is specially unfortunate for his theory, because his fundamental contention is that the moral quality of the act depends on its 'motive' and on nothing else. The ambiguity that I speak of has two forms. Dr Martineau frequently allows himself to speak of motives, or springs of action, as if they were independent forces playing in the theatre of the mind ; but at the same time he explicitly states that each spring is "issued by the mind," and has its "dynamic source" *there*. In other words, it is the offspring of character in relation to present circumstances. This is quite inconsistent with the language of personification ; but this language is resorted to so frequently as to make the reader feel that it is not intended to be purely figurative. Again, the place he assigns to the "primary springs of action" is open to much question. A primary spring is defined as a mere *spontaneity*, a tendency urging us in the way of unreflecting instinct to the attainment of objects not foreseen by ourselves. With regard to this, Professor Sidgwick has justly observed that though in the adult human being such spontaneities may occasionally operate, they cannot be at all intense or prolonged without calling up a representation of the consequences to which they prompt. They are *residua* or habits due to past fully conscious acts. If some of Dr Martineau's expressions in his account of these 'natural tendencies' were taken literally and pressed, they would result in the doctrine that the proper

objects of moral judgment are wants in abstraction from their objects, desires which are desires for nothing in particular;<sup>1</sup> when two of these conflict, we have a feeling *sui generis*, of their relative moral worth, and this feeling is the ground of the moral judgment. 'Secondary springs'—in other words, those that are directed to the pleasure and gratification, as such, which are afforded by a primary spring—are judged in the same way relatively to one another and to the primaries. Manifestly such a doctrine cannot be held for a moment. But there are other expressions in Dr Martineau's account of the 'primary springs' which tend to represent them more as desires for *objects* which are consciously represented to the mind. We are told<sup>2</sup> that the voluntary state, where at least two impulses are present, "implies undeniably *an end in view*, and no end can bring itself into view except in relation to some other to set it off into distinctness for our contemplation." Again: "We think only *by differencing*; and nothing can lie before us as an object, otherwise than as it is cut out by contrast either from its antecedents in time or from its analogies in place or possibility. . . . All judgment *is relative and predicates distinction*; and our mind could attach no predicate to a spring of action, did we not see it side by side with something dissimilar." If, therefore, Dr Martineau admits a consciousness of the distinction between two such impulses, and of their moral worth, he must admit a consciousness of their complementary objects,—their 'ends in view',<sup>3</sup> as one of Dr Martineau's critics has truly said, "If a man *knows* that he is being driven by the impulse of love, he knows that he is being driven towards a beloved object: if he *knows* that he is being driven by a desire for food, he also knows that food will satisfy his hunger."<sup>3</sup>

If, then, purposive desire is the 'unit of conduct,'<sup>4</sup> and every

<sup>1</sup> That is, in the consciousness of the agent. As we have seen, Dr Martineau conceives of them after the analogy of instincts.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 35 (3rd edition).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Professor S. W. Dyde's critical account of Dr Martineau's theory, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. xxii. pp. 138-169. The doctrine of 'secondary springs' is, however, misunderstood; these are desires for *pleasure*, arising out of the primaries as lust may arise out of appetite.

<sup>4</sup> It is not denied that blind instinct plays a very important part in the *historical* evolution of mind; but Ethics must deal with man as possessed of conscious purpose.

such desire springs from a wider circle of desires, or an interest, which again depends upon character, it is evident that in case of a conflict between two or more particular desires we cannot properly pass moral judgment on the case if we do no more than consider the relation of these desires, merely as particulars, to one another. Other desires for wider aims would arise, on each side, in whose train the original one would take its place,—until some end or aim which was regarded as supremely regulative of Life was appealed to. Professor Sidgwick has well said<sup>1</sup> that, “If a serious question of conduct is raised, I cannot conceive myself deciding it morally by any comparison of motives below the highest: . . . the comparison ultimately decisive would not be between the lower motives primarily conflicting, but between the effects of the different lines of conduct to which these lower motives respectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end or ends of reasonable action.” Thus Dr Martineau’s theory of conscience, when developed on lines that he himself suggests but does not work out, results in the ethical theory which has been expounded in the preceding chapter. We retain what is deepest and truest in his system: we accept his doctrine that our ‘springs of action’—understood as consciously purposive desires—cannot be divided into two classes, the absolutely right and the absolutely wrong, but arrange themselves in a scale of moral worth and ~~have~~ various degrees therein; we recognise gratefully his insistence on the truth that every one of our ‘natural tendencies’ is ethically justified *in its proper place*,<sup>2</sup> and his brief but profound interpretation of moral progress as the gradual organisation of such tendencies, high and low, and of our reflection upon them, into ‘social consensus

<sup>1</sup> *Methods*, III. xii. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Dr Martineau excludes the ‘secondary passions’ as ‘alone inadmissible.’ But these passions seem to be only another name for what has been called pure or disinterested malevolence—that is, the delight in inflicting pain and injury simply because it is pain and injury and for no other reason whatever. I think with Mr Bradley that such a propensity does not exist; though I am aware that the contrary view is strongly maintained by so competent a psychologist as Professor Bain; see *Mind*, vol. viii. pp. 415, 562. But if there is such a thing as pure malevolence, we certainly accept Dr Martineau’s judgment on it.



and religion.'<sup>1</sup> We say, with Dr Martineau,<sup>2</sup> that "any 'knowledge with ourselves,' large or small, which we may have of the superior right of one spring of action over another comes under the head of *conscience*," and that this is the true form of the moral judgment; but this judgment of the relative worth of our desires is not based merely on a special kind of feeling which arises when two of them meet: it is based on a comparison of their objects with what *for the time being* is taken as the supreme Ideal of life as a whole. In view of such an Ideal their organisation takes place, as the historical evolution of morality proceeds.

Thus, as regards the question placed at the head of the present note, our conclusion is that the 'motive,' in the sense here explained, is the most fundamental determinant of the moral worth of conduct; when we go beyond this, it is to consider the whole personality of the agent, and not the consequences of his conduct in abstraction from himself. Take the case—sometimes brought forward in this discussion—of an inquisitor torturing a heretic because he sincerely believes that it is for the eternal good of the latter, or concludes to "the glory of God": it is said that the motive is a pure one, but the action is thoroughly bad. Now here we must not *stop* when we have traced the motive back to a desire for the heretic's 'good' or a desire to 'glorify' God; we must ask, How came the inquisitor to think that any divine or human good could be attained *by such a means*? May we not say that what is implicitly condemned in such a case is the whole system of personal beliefs and convictions which could produce a desire to torture men 'for their good'? In other words, the act is bad because ultimately the motive is bad; the character of the agent, on its intellectual side at least,—and perhaps beyond the intellect,—is thoroughly perverted. To regard *intelligence* as an essential part of *character* may seem contrary to common-sense; intellectually, we only make mistakes, while morally, we do wrong. It may thus be said that the intellectual fault is a mere misfortune, while the moral fault cannot be looked upon in that light. It will be evident that a prior question which needs to be settled is this:

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 401-406 (quoted below).

<sup>2</sup> P. 402.

What is the place and function of Intelligence or Reason in our nature? If intelligence means only the 'analytical understanding,'—if, as Hume and Comte tell us, it is only a *calculating faculty*, for determining means to ends which are outside itself,—then intellectual excellences or defects are, in the main, indifferent to character; for by supposition the intelligence, so understood, can be put in the service of all ends indifferently, moral or immoral. This is what is meant by saying that it is only a faculty for calculating means to ends 'outside itself': it has nothing more in common with the motives springing from the noblest feeling of self-sacrifice, than with those springing from the basest egoistic feeling. Even in this case, common-sense would only allow that Intelligence is *for the most part* indifferent to character; for intellectual mistakes which are signs of 'carelessness' are moral faults; and a blundering, careless pursuit of a high moral aim would sometimes be condemned as morally blameworthy. But in truth, when Reason is thus limited our nature is mutilated; our Intelligence has functions and capacities which *ought* to be developed, and which effectually carry us beyond the one-sided views and narrow regions to which any point of view furnished merely by the analytical understanding would limit us; and simply for this reason it is possible for morality to be rational,—for sympathetic insight to be a function of our whole nature. Self-consciousness depends in part on the development of Reason; and the more profoundly we are conscious of our selves, the deeper is our insight into the real needs of other selves. From this point of view, such conduct as that of the inquisitor must be condemned as profoundly bad, because its motive ultimately depends on the *idea* that God can be glorified, or the divine element in man benefited, by torture of the body.

In the course of the preceding discussion I have been led to refer to the fundamental positions in Dr Martineau's ethical theory; and have shown, incidentally, how far it is from being, what it is sometimes represented as being, an objectionable form of individualistic Intuitionism. The quotations and references given in §§ 2 and 3 of the next chapter will afford further proofs of this.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE POSTULATES OF IDEALIST ETHICS.

THE problem of ethical theory, in the proper sense, we take to be this: What is the supreme Ideal of human life—its ultimate or absolute End? The correspondence of Ethics with Metaphysics is therefore at once apparent; for the problem of metaphysical theory is to deal with the question, What is the ultimate or absolute Reality? By the latter term we mean that on which all other realities depend, but which depends on nothing beyond itself, so that all other beings hold their existence, as it were, in fee from it; and similarly, by the ultimate end we mean that which cannot be compared or subordinated to anything beyond itself, so that all other ends hold their significance and worth in fee from it. We have spoken of ethical theory 'in the proper sense,' to distinguish it from the Ethics of Conduct, or what in the previous chapter was called Applied Ethics. The latter is not a coherent science, but a body of doctrines bearing on practice; it assumes the End, and is very often quite unconconscious of what it has assumed, or indeed that it has assumed anything: but when the

End is brought out and explicitly stated, practical Ethics looks—and must necessarily look—to Sociology and Psychology, to the facts of social morality, actual and historical, and the facts of the individual life, for guidance in realising the End. The sense in which this conclusion is to be accepted has been explained in the preceding chapter.

The analogy which we have just indicated between Ethics and Metaphysics raises in a suggestive way the question, What is the relation between the two? Let us try to express this relation with as much precision as possible. In the first place, even if we endeavour to set aside all questions concerning man's place in the cosmos, or the relation of the End for man to the cosmic process,—if we think thus to avoid the way into metaphysics,—it still remains necessary to assume an End for man. Manifestly, if there were no single Purpose which can be considered to regulate life as a whole, there would be no unity in life; one kind of conduct would be of the same worth as another,—it would not matter what men did. To judge that this action is *worth* more than that, implies a reference to some end by which the acts are measured: and to judge absolutely and without qualification, that the one is worth more than the other implies a reference to some ultimate aim in life. If the latter were a wholly inadmissible conception, Ethics could not exist, but would have to be merged in Psychology, Sociology, and History—all dealing with the various forms of human activity as mere facts.<sup>1</sup> We may, however, grant the necessity of assuming an End of

<sup>1</sup> For a treatment of Ethics on these lines, see Georg Simmel's *Einführung in die Moralkwissenschaft*, where not even the provisional assumption of a unifying purpose for life is theoretically admitted.

absolute worth if ethical theory is to be possible at all, or indeed if moral judgment is to be possible at all; and yet we may refuse to do more than define the End as a human conception, and discuss the organisation of life in view of it. What is involved in going further than this, and why do we need to go further? An answer to this question is suggested when we consider that Ethics really has a twofold problem, corresponding to the two meanings of the ambiguous assertion that it has to show 'what the supreme End of life *is*.' When we ask, What is the End? we may be asking either, How are we to define the End? or, What do we mean by saying that this *is* the End?<sup>1</sup> And in a penetrating analysis of the sense in which we can say that there *is* an End—*i.e.*, of the sense in which it can be referred to reality—we are compelled to raise the deepest questions of ontology. It is not enough for Ethics to try to *define* the End, without investigating the sense in which we can affirm the reality of the defined.

To separate Ethics from Metaphysics is to attempt the definition without paying any attention to the question of how we can affirm the reality of the defined. This tendency finds expression in the Ethical Culture movement of the present day, in the Religion of Humanity, and in all constructive ethical work which attempts to dispense with the basis afforded by positive religious or philosophical convictions. In such cases Ethics tries to deal with man in abstraction from Nature; it assumes an End for man *out of relation*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. ch. ii. § 6, where we distinguished the determination of a conception and its reference to reality, the former attempt being futile if the latter is ignored.



to the cosmic process altogether, and either denies that we need in any way concern ourselves with this relation, or is willing to accept the 'naturalistic' results to which the conclusions of physical science are sometimes supposed to lead. The consistency of the latter position we shall consider further on: here it may be illustrated by a quotation, from a thoughtful writer, which very well indicates its general character: "We find it hard to understand how it can make any difference with regard to the End or highest good of man whether man's End is also the End of the whole movement of things. . . . In Ethics of course teleology (in one sense) is supreme: an ethical system must bring all the results of knowledge under the 'category of teleology' with a view to determining its bearing on the End of man. But when we consider things theoretically, then it is the conception of Law that is supreme: we are no longer at the practical point of view: and to the impartial outlook of the theoretical reason, the good of man is no longer anything but the term of a single series among innumerable other series in a process of universal change."

The agnostic or positivist view of Ethics, which deals with man out of relation to the cosmic process, is quite in harmony with a dominant tendency of our time,—to dwell, almost to the verge of sentimentality, on such Ideals as those of which Ethics treats, and yet to ignore their ontological significance, by which they become a means of understanding our nature and place in the Universe. Dr Martineau has well and truly said that "amid all the sickly talk about Ideals, which has become the commonplace of our age, it is well to remember that

so long as they are dreams of future possibility and not faiths in present Reality, so long as they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, and not its personal surrender to immediate communion with Infinite Perfection, they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air-bubbles glittering in the sunshine and broken by the passing wind. You do not so much as touch the threshold of Religion [Idealism] so long as you are detained by the phantoms of your thought; the very gate of entrance to it, the moment of new birth, is the discovery that your gleaming Ideal is the Everlasting Real: no transient brush of a fancied angel's wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls."<sup>1</sup> If our Ideal is to have any real worth for life—if it is to justify its claim upon us in the eyes of reflective Reason—we must be assured that it is more than a phantom of our thought, a mere dream of future possibility, or a *self-painting* of the yearning but perhaps deluded spirits of men: and of this Ethics, apart from Metaphysics, can give us no assurance, for in this abstraction Ethics simply sets aside the question, as though it mattered not whether the rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, were mere 'provincialisms of this planet' or not.

§ 1. The lines of thought brought together in the second and third chapters of this work lead to the conclusion that the world of sense-appearances, and the world of pure material motion which physical

<sup>1</sup> The contrast between this passage and the one which I quoted just before it, is striking and suggestive: it is chiefly for this reason that I have placed them side by side.

science assigns as its condition, is an abstraction so long as it is conceived apart from its relation to an intelligent and sentient consciousness. So far from matter explaining spirit, "we must say that even matter itself cannot be fully understood save as an element in a spiritual world."<sup>1</sup> Two qualifications are necessary when this statement is made. It must not be understood as signifying that we *see how* matter becomes the expression of a spiritual world. As Mr M'Taggart has said, "philosophy can teach us what the fundamental nature of reality is, and what therefore everything *must* be; but it does not pretend to show us *how* everything partakes of that nature—to trace out in every detail of the Universe that rationality which, on general grounds, it asserts to be in it."<sup>2</sup> Further, by a 'spiritual world' we mean a world whose nature is more fully and truly made manifest in what we know as 'spirit' than in 'matter'; these are not parallel 'aspects,'—the spiritual side is nearer to the heart of things. The conception here employed is one of great importance, which requires to be firmly grasped; it is that of a reality which is revealed through its appearances in varying degrees. The appearances, therefore, are not illusory but are themselves real, and yet are vitally related to a reality which is more and deeper than they. Thus nothing is a *mere* appearance, but an appearance *of* the real; matter is an appearance of it, and so is spirit,—the latter being a more adequate appearance than the former. Only *in* the world of appearances can we find any clue as to the nature of

<sup>1</sup> Dr E. Caird's statement of the necessary result of a consistent Critical Philosophy.

<sup>2</sup> *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 207.

the Absolute, and only when, recognising that degrees of Worth are essential to it, we compare different elements in it with one another. This Hegelian principle is the one which Mr Bradley employs in the constructive lines of thought in Book II. of his *Appearance and Reality*:<sup>1</sup> "In the end no appearance, as such, can be real [*i.e.*, absolutely real]; but appearances fail of reality in varying degrees, and to assert that one, on the whole, is worth no more than another, is fundamentally vicious." "It is a simple matter to conclude . . . that the Real sits apart, that it keeps state by itself and does not descend into phenomena. Or it is as cheap, again, to take up another side of the same error. The Reality is viewed, perhaps, as immanent in all its appearances, in such a way that it is alike and equally present in all. Everything is so worthless on the one hand, so divine on the other, that nothing can be viler or can be more sublime than anything else. It is against both sides of this mistake, it is against this empty transcendence and this shallow pantheism, that our pages may be called one sustained polemic. The positive relation of every appearance as an adjective to Reality [*i.e.*, not a *mere* adjective, but as dependent upon the Real]; and the presence of Reality among its appearances in different degrees and with diverse values—this double truth we have found to be the centre of philosophy."<sup>2</sup> The Idealistic view—that Reality must "satisfy *all* the main tendencies of our nature"—has already been briefly stated;<sup>3</sup> and in the previous chapter we have seen that there are three such main ten-

<sup>1</sup> That is, the constructive as distinguished from the Brahmanic lines of thought.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 511, 551.

<sup>3</sup> Ch. ii., Appendix.

dencies. We have now to analyse each of these more fully, and then to show in what sense Reality can be said to *satisfy* them.

Let us recall the conclusions at which we have arrived as to the root-assumptions and postulates implicit in the operations of Intelligence,<sup>1</sup>—for these will furnish the most complete formulation of the intellectual Ideal which is at present possible.

We have found that the growth of knowledge depends on certain *principles* derived from the nature of Intelligence, and certain *data* which *primâ faciê* are not so derived. The *data* are facts of 'outer experience,'—events in space and time which, when expressed in intellectual terms, become 'individual judgments' true only under certain conditions of time and place. The *principles* may be brought to light by an examination of the logical evolution of judgment: the reference to an objective world, implied in every 'cosmological' judgment; the implication, in the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, that this world is a *system*—*i.e.*, that it is made up of mutually dependent parts, among which general laws obtain, under the supreme rule that the same cause shall always produce the same effect; and, we must add, the implication, in the individual judgment, that these parts can only be described as having some degree of individuality or selfhood. The individual judgment implies the reality simply of some individual or group of such; the hypothetical judgment, without negating this implication, adds the further one that the individuals are causally related under general laws; the disjunctive judgment, that this causation is reciprocal and systematic. Reciprocity is thus the highest category of 'objective' or

<sup>1</sup> Ch. iii. *passim*, and Appendix.



cosmological knowledge. It is important to add that this remains true even if we deny that the reciprocity is merely mechanical. Modern Physics treats it as such if it makes the law of "Conservation of Energy" universal; for this, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> is simply the law that every mode of motion is completely and mechanically conditioned, in reciprocity, by other modes of motion, and can be conditioned by nothing else. Kant seems to have had this result in view, since he does not allow any 'objective' use to the category employed in biology and physiology—that is, he denies that the teleological principle of Adaptation can be instrumental in building up scientific knowledge, as are the principles of Substance, Causality, Reciprocity. But there is no need to limit these principles to their merely mechanical reference; if science should decide to distinguish the categories of physiology and chemistry from that of physics, it will still endeavour—so long as it is mere science and not philosophy—to understand the world by the principle of reciprocity. As long as we keep to 'world-knowledge,' to the principles and methods of science applied to *data* of 'outer experience,' we cannot get beyond reciprocity.

Yet intelligence itself assigns an ideal which does go beyond this limit. Kant's criticism of scientific knowledge brings this out clearly. "Experience<sup>2</sup> never satisfies reason fully, but in answering questions refers us further and further back and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their complete solution." "Every

<sup>1</sup> Chap. ii. § 5.

<sup>2</sup> That is, scientific knowledge through the categories on the basis of events in space and time,—*cosmological* knowledge. Kant applies the same criticism to *psychological* knowledge based on events of 'inner experience.' But as his account of this experience, so far as it can be stated at all, is quite untenable, we must set aside this aspect of the question.

answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question which likewise requires its answer, and thereby shows the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason." "The sensuous world is nothing but a chain of phenomena connected according to general laws; it has therefore no subsistence by itself—*i.e.*, it is not the *Ding an sich*; it points beyond itself to that which contains the basis of the phenomenal experience, and only in the thought of this basis or ground of experience can reason hope to satisfy its desire of completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to the conditions."<sup>1</sup> We must beware of ignoring the fact that as Kant's conception of the *Ding an sich* grew deeper his conception of 'phenomena' did the same. At first<sup>2</sup> phenomena are the effects produced in the individual mind by unknown agencies beyond it. Here the word is used as it is by English Positivists, to signify mere 'sensations.' But afterwards a 'phenomenon' is not limited to a sensible appearance, but signifies any existence which has 'no subsistence by itself,'—the sense in which Mr Bradley uses the word 'appearance.' The world of scientific knowledge, the world of supersensible motions and atoms, is a phenomenon in this, the deeper and truer, sense of the word. The noumenon or *Ding an sich* is the self-existent Ground of the objects of scientific knowledge.

Thus the essence of the imperfection in the scientific understanding is the endless regress to which it is limited,—from one set of causal conditions to another. If this were all, reality would be left as an indefinite continuum, in which our knowledge could pass from

<sup>1</sup> *Prolegomena*, Mahaffy's tr. (in the main), pp. 118, 119, 121.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the relativistic line of thought in the *Ästhetik*; cf. *supra*, ch. iii., Appendix.

point to point without ever finding itself any nearer to a resting-place than it was at the beginning. Manifestly a postulate that experience must be self-contained—self-existent and self-limited—underlies this criticism, as Kant saw. He recognised that such an ideal is vital in the working-up of experience into scientific knowledge,—that we have not reached a completely rationalised and intelligible version of experience until we are able to know it as a *res completa*. Kant's criticism further shows that we cannot know it as a *res completa* so long as we assume that the characteristic principles of physical science—reciprocal causation of events in space and time—have absolute or ultimate validity; it is the very nature of experience, so understood, to fail to satisfy the ideal of reason: such is the outcome of the cosmological discussions in the *Dialektik*. But Kant will not allow any real validity to the ideal itself—*i.e.*, it cannot be taken as a determination of the *Ding an sich* which is the ground of experience. Hence, in his well-known phrase, we can only proceed *as if* experience could, at some time, be known as a *res completa*. Evidently this half-hearted attitude is due to Kant's failure to assign any intelligible relation between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, so that the ideal of the former cannot be brought into relation with the real of the latter. But if it is the nature of the noumenon to reveal or manifest itself in the phenomenon, then—though we may be unable to trace the mode of manifestation in detail—*e.g.*, in the world of pure matter and motion—it is possible to regard the ideal of knowledge as at least in part a determination of the Absolute Reality, the noumenon, or 'thing in itself.'

We cannot further 'fill in' the intellectual Ideal without raising the question, What must be the nature

of an existence which is thus *self-limited*? And this question cannot be answered as long as we consider only knowledge in the cosmological reference, apart from self-knowledge in the true sense. The view which we have been led to is, that self-knowledge has a real content which is more than a consciousness even of the most fundamental implications involved in cosmological knowledge—*i.e.*, it is more than a consciousness of the universe as a system which (1) is of parts in reciprocal relation to each other, and (2) is rounded and complete. There is a great tendency in Hegelian thought to deny this 'more,' to make self-consciousness, in its deepest truth, mean consciousness of the systematic unity of the universe, and to identify philosophy with physical science become explicitly aware of its fundamental presuppositions and ultimate Ideals. In other words, the Ideal by which Kant judges scientific knowledge is made into an *exhaustive* determination of the absolute. In estimating the adequacy of this line of thought, we must observe that the two elements in the intellectual ideal are not held on precisely the same terms,—system or unity as implying only reciprocal connection *ad infinitum*, and as implying the character of a *res completa*. To deny the unity of the universe in the former sense must, as we have seen, be condemned as self-contradictory; indeed the mere fact that the process of things goes on and does not entangle itself in infinite confusion is sufficient evidence that there are orderly connections of mutual dependence among its parts. But there is nothing intellectually impossible in the idea that Reality is nothing more than an *indefinite continuum* of this kind. It is very questionable whether the *intellectus sibi permissus*, in the strict sense of the term, could ever get be-

yond this endless relating of things to one another so as to make them a continuum; and this does not give any focal unity or even systematic completeness. Intelligence logically implies, by necessity of its nature, only the former process. Undoubtedly, as Kant shows, reason is not 'satisfied' with such a result,—it 'desires' something more; but 'desire' and 'satisfaction' are not the same as inevitable intellectual necessity. It desires something more, because it never is *sibi permissus* but is always involved in a concrete self-consciousness from which it cannot be taken away,—because implicitly it reflects not only upon its own nature but upon the whole nature of man, and hence—as Mr Bradley puts it—it demands that in the absolute reality 'all the main tendencies of our nature' shall be consummated. This is to appeal to that self-knowledge which is wider and deeper than a consciousness of the implications of cosmological knowledge, and which postulates that the Absolute shall be not merely a rounded system but shall have the centralised or focal unity of a single Life. In fact Kant inadequately expresses the Ideal which would 'satisfy' reason—if such a phrase is admissible at all—when he describes it merely as a *res completa*, for this fails to imply *being for self*.

On strictly Hegelian principles the view which I have just tried to express is inadmissible; the insight into the constitution of Reality which our profoundest self-consciousness gives us, is only a *development* of that abstract conception of the world which is furnished by scientific research and reflection,—its continuation and completion on the same lines. In other words: Kant's ideal of a systematic *res completa* is made by Hegel into the Absolute; it is an eternally complete system of thought-determinations (*Denkbestimmungen*)



—*i.e.*, a system of knowledge treated as a *Ding an sich* or self-existent thing. It gradually ‘realises itself’ through individuals or finite centres of life; and because they are entirely dependent on the Absolute they are conscious of finiteness in their knowledge (*i.e.*, in the Absolute Knowledge as realised through them), and of an Ideal of completed knowledge. Thus man, as intelligence, has an infinite as well as a finite side; the infinite side is the ultimate reality, so that the universe *thinks itself in him*. Thus again, thought is *absolute*—*i.e.*, is conditioned by its own nature and structure alone, not by any kind of reality beyond and apart from thought. “Thought itself becomes the object of philosophy; . . . the business of philosophy is the explication of the distinctions which belong to the nature of thought, and this is otherwise definable for Hegel as the explication of God.”<sup>1</sup>

Neither Hegel himself nor any of his modern followers seem quite able to free themselves from this all-devouring intellectualism—this tendency to maintain the ‘identity of thought and being,’ as the phrase is, instead of their necessary relation. The phrase ‘identity of thought and being’ is not often used now, and this is well; for on Hegel’s own showing identity always involves difference. To say that Reality is *rational* is not the same thing as to say that Reality is *rationality*; in denying the latter we are not denying the former. The objectionable consequences of the Hegelian tendency appear in the refusal to regard any mode of consciousness, or direction of conscious activity, as having any Worth, unless it can be reduced to purely intellectual terms,—to a case of the cognitive process or a state of thought. I do not affirm that

<sup>1</sup> Seth, *From Kant to Hegel*, p. 146.

Hegel or any 'Hegelian' has even intended to maintain all that this implies;<sup>1</sup> but there is a real bias in Hegelian thought, which, when fully carried out, results in the view that our essential nature is manifested only in our intellectual functions, as such; for if the Ideal of our nature can be exhaustively described as the clearing up of our world and the making it into an intelligible system—that is in a process which can be realised only by thought—then it would seem that the only feeling which has any ultimate worth is that which depends on clear intellectual discernment; and consequently that the only directions of the will having any real worth are those that have the same end in view. As personal and spiritual life become perfectly developed, intelligence will retain its essential character as synthetic, discriminative, &c., while feeling and volition will lose their character and become transformed and transmuted in such a way as to be merged in intelligence. On the other hand, the metaphysical meaning of the threefold analysis of mental life on which we have laid such stress—the meaning of the *distinctness* of the three kinds of function from each other—is simply that not one of them is more fundamental than another; the 'essence' or 'nature' of consciousness is not manifested or revealed more in one of the three elements than in another. This position has to be maintained against *three one-sided tendencies*, all of which are exemplified in various doctrines in the air at present. X

It may be said: granting that feeling and will are aspects of our mental life distinct from intelligence,

<sup>1</sup> These paragraphs must not be understood as teaching any *general* condemnation of 'Hegelianism': this will be evident from the observations made at the close of this section of the present chapter and throughout the last section.

and are equally with intelligence essential revelations of the absolute nature of that life; must we not conclude that the *perfection* of knowledge must necessarily carry with it the perfection of all other spiritual activities? With *perfect* insight into the nature of the cosmos, feeling and activity would necessarily adapt themselves thereto.<sup>1</sup> To this the reply seems to be: 'perfect' or 'complete' knowledge is a limiting conception—*i.e.*, one which is far from meaningless but which cannot be made the basis of argument.<sup>2</sup> It seems a serious error in method to take a 'limiting conception,' giving some kind of definite expression to its content, and then, assuming that this content may adequately represent a state of existence actually to be realised, to attempt to draw conclusions from this representation as if it ever could be unconditionally true. What is a limiting conception? It seems to arise in this way. We recognise certain main tendencies or dispositions of our nature, to which we ascribe unconditional worth; the ends involved in these are progressively realised, not all at once or by leaps and bounds. Now this very conception of progressive attainment suggests the idea of a state of being in which these ends are completely realised or absolutely consummated; but we have no positive conception of such state beyond knowing that these tendencies are directed towards it. We have no analogue for it within experience, though it is that to which experience points; our experience may approximate to it indefinitely, but we cannot realise it as we are. We cannot therefore argue as to what must follow in case of this limiting conception being realised until it has actually become real

<sup>1</sup> Cf. M'Taggart, *op. cit.*, § 193.

<sup>2</sup> As Mr M'Taggart does, § 186 and § 195 ff.

*within* our experience; and in that case there would be no need for argument.

Mr M'Taggart assumes that Absolute Knowledge must involve the most complete unity and differentiation of Subject and Object.<sup>1</sup> On our view even this cannot be asserted without qualification; and since we are far from having attained complete knowledge, we are far from knowing what that necessary qualification may be. But let this pass. The argument which Mr M'Taggart proceeds to base on this assumption is well worthy of mention. He says: "All propositions are the assertion of a partial unity between the subject and the predicate. The 'This,'<sup>2</sup> on the other hand, is just what distinguishes the subject from its predicates. . . . In the 'This' we have something which is at once within and without knowledge; which it dares not neglect and yet cannot deal with." It is essential to knowledge and yet knowledge must always regard it as alien, and therefore it prevents knowledge from ever attaining its Ideal of perfect differentiation and unification of Subject and Object. Such a conclusion seems to rest on an erroneous view of the function of the 'This' in knowledge, suggested (possibly) by Mr Bradley's critique of the Individual Judgment in his *Logic*, and by a special turn which he gives, in *Appearance and Reality*, to his doctrine that Reality is 'more' and 'other' than thought. Those aspects of the real, complementary to thought, says Mr Bradley, are what thought itself 'desires and implies' and yet *can never reach*, simply because they are 'more' than itself. It

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, §§ 195 to 200.

<sup>2</sup> A term used in this passage to signify the "unity in which the predicates cohere": considered by itself it is, epistemologically, the abstract object; and, logically, the abstract subject.

is true that thought cannot 'reach' the *whole* of reality—in the sense of becoming identical with it, if we understand 'identical' in the abstract sense; but there is nothing to prevent thought from *knowing* it through and through and so transcending the 'alien' aspects of it. The fact that reality is more than thought is brought home to us by the contrast between the 'immediacy' of sentience and the intelligible experience which has begun to be explicitly formed by thought. Sentience is the background of *all* intelligible experience, whether in the way of world-knowledge or self-knowledge. It is the inexhaustible background out of which all intelligible experience, *including thought itself*, seems to arise; for thought only gradually comes to be explicitly aware of its own nature, and all the nature of thought, which waits to be known, is merged in and undistinguished from the general background. Now the assertions which Mr M'Taggart makes about the 'This' are inapplicable to sentience; and if the 'This' is anything other than sentience, then, I submit, it is a mischievous fiction,—it becomes, in fact, the unknowable 'in itself' of Relativism.<sup>1</sup> Sentience in a manner is 'alien' to thought, as we now imperfectly know thought; but 'alien' only in the sense that thought progressively defines it. And we cannot say that sentience is what distinguishes the subject (the epistemological object) from its predicates. This is not true even of the individual judgment. The conception of individuality is definable by pure thought (ch. iii.); in this sense it is *a priori*: and though the assertion of it would be impossible apart from sentience, the latter

<sup>1</sup> Such is the inevitable suggestion when Mr M'Taggart explains the 'This' (the source of the imperfection in knowledge) as a general name for the *central unity* of the object.



does not simply *give* the thought-distinctions in which that assertion consists.

These considerations enable us to judge of a doctrine maintained by Green and Caird, that a complete knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of an object is equivalent to the reality of the object. "If we could know the whole conditions of an object apart from perception, we should know its reality."<sup>1</sup> This, I presume, does not merely mean that we should know what, if experienced by way of sense-perception, would constitute its reality; this would be an identical proposition. The meaning must be that this complete knowledge of its conditions would be equivalent to the presence of the object to the consciousness of the knower, in the way in which the 'cosmological' objects which we know are present to our finite consciousness. But since thought as we know it (thought in the accepted and only intelligible sense of the term) always works by relations, organising, under its own laws, a material or background which would otherwise be formless,—and since thought cannot conceive itself as working without this material,—we cannot make any such assertion as that quoted from Dr Caird. The systems of relations or conditions which thought organises or constructs can never be *merely identical* with the whole of reality, and therefore a complete knowledge of the conditions of an object can never be "equivalent to" its reality. "Complete knowledge," as we have seen, is a limiting conception, meaning the consummation of the tendencies of thought as we know them in our own case; and there does not seem to be any tendency in thought, or knowledge, as it progresses, to *eliminate* the sentient aspects of our experience, or to

<sup>1</sup> Caird, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 598.

sublime them *away*, as it were, into abstract systems of relations.<sup>1</sup>

The experiment which Green is constantly inviting us to make—*i.e.*, to think away all the relations in which an object stands, and see if anything is left—is quite beside the mark, if directed against the doctrine here maintained.

We do not, then, reject Hegel's view of thought; but we supplement it. Man is infinite as well as finite not only in thought but in feeling and will,—or rather in the whole nature of which these are equivalent though inseparable manifestations. Instead of maintaining the 'identity' of thought and being, we maintain their necessary relation, in the sense that while thought is not the whole of being, the whole of being is *rational*. It is rational in the sense that thought will in the end be capable of comprehending the whole of being in its own way, by following out its own laws as thought. We affirm, with Hegel, that thought is 'absolute' in the sense of being conditioned by its own structure and laws, and not by anything *apart from* itself; but thought is necessarily related to all the main tendencies of our nature, and we do not propose to separate them from it or it from them, any more than to identify them with it. No one pretends that we could be conscious of degrees of Worth in art and in social conduct, apart from the co-operation of intelligence informing these Ideals, any more than that we could be conscious of degrees of Worth in knowledge—*i.e.*, degrees of truth—apart from intelligence. At the same time, Beauty and Social or Sympathetic In-

<sup>1</sup> Hence a perceptive thought is different in kind from anything that we can understand by thought. It will be seen that the doctrine of Green and Caird is the extreme opposite to that of Bradley and M<sup>r</sup> Taggart.

sight are other than forms of truth or knowledge, and are not simply to be identified with the latter. Hence in seeking to determine the *Ding an sich*, the Absolute Ground, by appeal to self-knowledge as being more than world-knowledge, we are not appealing from the intellect to the heart. Appeal to the heart is worthless until we know *whose* heart it is; it may be the heart of a Christ or that of a Caligula: we require a standard of *manhood* by which to judge the 'heart.' The appeal is from man, as occupied with reflective interpretation of the universe around him under the light of his intellectual ideal, to the whole nature of man, which realises itself not only in truth, in this intellectual comprehension of the world, but in productive social insight and productive artistic aspiration. In self-knowledge we know ourselves not only as individuals but as individuals ruled by a triune Ideal. Hence we think of the Absolute as that in which these ends are consummated and fully accomplished, and as being not simply a system but as having an existence of which our own *being for self* is the least imperfect analogue.

Mr Bradley has declared that the use of the term 'activity' in current philosophical discussion is a 'scandal'; the same might be said with more truth of the term 'thought.' If thought is not to be opposed to emotion and will, how much of these is its signification to include? In what sense are pleasure, pain, desire, volition, modes of 'thinking'? Such questions might be multiplied, and would lead us to Mr Bradley's own conclusion that unless thought or reason means something more than intellect, unless it is used "with some strange implication that never formed part of the meaning of the word," then we cannot admit that reality can ever be exhausted in rationality. So far as

Psychology is concerned, the matter is clear enough. It can hardly be necessary, at the present time, to observe that all knowledge consists in attention to various complexes of relations, whatever references they may have. The Psychology of cognition has to trace the mere time-order in which these references appear in the normal mind; or if it attempts more than this, it soon passes over into the theory of knowledge, which regards the intellectual processes as products of an *organic* growth whose structure can be traced. That thought can never get beyond the relational point of view, seems to me to have been convincingly expounded by Bradley and Lotze. Mr Bradley's further development of the view that intelligence involves an ideal, judged by which its own relational procedure is seen to be unintelligible, is quite another matter. We have already seen reason for rejecting this view.

§ 2. We have dwelt on the intellectual ideal, and indicated its implication as regards the character of the Absolute,—an implication which needs to be complemented by that of the moral, and by that of the artistic, consciousness. We shall have to discuss the form in which these 'implications' must be stated; at present we proceed to examine more fully the forms in which the other two Ideals can be expressed.

In the first place the reader will have noticed that we dwelt on two defects of the 'intellectualist bias': that it tends to obliterate the threefold analysis of mind, and that it tends to reduce morality and art to cases of knowledge. In reality these are not two *distinct* defects,—the one is a consequence or a particular case of the other; for a suggestive way of distinguishing the ideal

aims is to notice that the order of dependence between the three factors of consciousness is not the same in the three cases. In intellectual activity the feeling of satisfaction in attainment of the end (truth) is entirely conditioned by the intellectual relations which are in question, and their nature and extent; the feeling of 'pleasure' in the attainment of truth arises in consequence of the Judgment 'this is true.' This aspect of the case is obvious on the surface, and, whatever results a deeper analysis may bring to light, they cannot entirely subvert this primary relation. In the artistic consciousness there is a similarly obvious relation between the intellectual and the emotional element, but it is of the opposite kind. We do not first on intellectual grounds judge 'this is beautiful' and then feel pleasure; the judgment is rather an expression of the feeling of satisfaction in the contemplation of the object. This cannot be denied, or entirely subverted by deeper analysis, though it is far from being an adequate account of the æsthetic consciousness. In sympathetic insight, from which *moral* activity springs, there seems to be a function of our whole nature, in which the rational, the volitional, and the emotional are merged, and which, as we have pointed out, is fostered only by a wide and deep experience of life. In this capacity of his nature the individual seems to transcend his finitude, or *go beyond himself*, more completely than in the pursuit of science or art: he enters into the *life* of another, representing to himself the other's thought, feeling, and desire. In the previous chapter we maintained that the Worth of social conduct depended on the extent to which the agent had attained to "Sympathy" or "Sympathetic Insight," so understood. "Social Insight," productive or effective, would have



been a more pregnant designation. We do not mean a formal or abstract acknowledgment,—a scientific conclusion as to the bonds which in fact bind together all men, so far as they really are men, into one humanity; we mean an insight into the special form which these relations have taken in some concrete case. This insight must spring from the whole man, not his intelligence merely, or his feeling merely; for the particular social relations which it reveals spring ultimately from our whole nature. And in the end this social union itself has to be regarded as arising from the fact that all men share in a sustaining Life which operates unspent through all things, and whose character is revealed in their Ideals.

Observation of modern civilised life seems hardly to bear out this conclusion. Looking round on the world as it is, what do we seem to see? We seem to see only a chaos of conflicting elements—individual men and classes of men: our communities are battle-grounds; interests and experiences clash together; each one seems able to benefit itself only at the expense of others. Popular agitators industriously instil this idea into the public mind, and a multitude of causes, practical and theoretical, work together to make it survive. Hence we find that the ethical problems involved in determining the right course in legislation and social action are continually being made to take this form—of *balancing against one another* certain interests which are supposed to be conflicting. In private life, it is generally the ‘interests’ or ‘rights’ of two or more individuals; in political life, of different classes. That this is really the essence of every practical problem in social life, is implicitly asserted by thinkers of high authority: for instance, by Mr Spencer, in his work on *Justice*,

and in the concluding chapters of his *Data of Ethics*;<sup>1</sup> and by Professor Sidgwick, in the concluding chapters of his *Methods of Ethics*. I shall not try to define the theory of society which is implied. We can distinguish it by its results; it is the theory which results in every practical problem being regarded as one of compromise between the conflicting interests or rights of different members in society.

This is not the last word. Looking more intently at human society as it is, we see that all who constitute it seem to have one common root, in spite of all their conflict and strife. Their essential being is the same, their destiny is the same, as is their origin, and what constitutes goodness in the one constitutes goodness in the other. These simple matters of fact have suggested another view of society, a view which the modern world has been learning chiefly from Auguste Comte and from his contemporary Hegel: although both these thinkers tend to overstate their case in this matter. This view—the proper limits of which we were endeavouring to assign in the last chapter—has been most effectively set forth by Dr Martineau.<sup>2</sup> “The process of social evolution so implicates together the individual agent and his fellows, that we can scarce divide the causal factors into individual and social, inner and outer. *Bodily*, no doubt, each man stands there by himself, while his *family* are grouped separately around him; but spiritually he is not *himself* without them, and the major part of his individuality is relative to them, as theirs is relative to him. He

<sup>1</sup> Mr Spencer's ‘conciliation’ of egoism and altruism is true and important as far as it goes: my contention is that it is not a true way of stating the central problem in Ethics.

<sup>2</sup> *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. ii., “Hedonism with Evolution,” § 7.

has no self which is not reflected in them, and of which they are not reflections; and this reveals itself by a kind of moral amputation, if death should snatch them away and put his selfhood to the test of loneliness. It is the same with the larger groups which enclose him in their sympathetic embrace. His *country*, with its history and its institutions, is not external to himself; its life-blood courses through his veins, inseparably mingled with his own. The social union is most inadequately represented as a compact or tacit bargain, subsisting among separate units, agreeing to combine for specific purposes. . . . It is no such forensic abstraction, devised as a cement for mechanically conceived components; but a concrete though spiritual form of life, penetrating and partly constituting all persons belonging to it. What we call a conflict between a private and a public interest, and treat as a dissension between a man's inner self and an outward society, is not really a wrestling-match between two independent organisms or personalities, unless it comes to physical rebellion and war. The inner man is himself the scene of the living strife: the public interest that pleads with him is *his* interest too: the society that withstands him is *his* society. It is no foreign and intrusive power that confronts and stops his calculating prudence, or the madness of his pleasure or his passion, but his own share of an altruistic reason and love that live in other hearts and minds as well."<sup>1</sup> Because men are members of one body, — because their interests, rights, duties, desires, aims, are thus bound up together, — it is superficial and misleading to regard any problem of life as simply one of compromise between

<sup>1</sup> I have introduced a few phrases at the conclusion of this passage, but without in any way altering the author's meaning.

mutually opposing forces. The divergence when truly estimated is not between *my* interest or what is good for me, and *yours*; it is between different elements or aspects of *our common* good. A complete idea of our highest good seems to demand that these aspects shall be harmonious and at one; but the conditions of modern civilisation in its present state are constantly making them stand in absolute opposition to one another.

Let us recognise, then, that the social bond is a concrete spiritual life penetrating its members, and ask: What is the bond of this union—through what sides of our nature does this life live and realise itself? According to one doctrine, it is in feeling only, it is an affair of the ‘heart’ *alone*; the intellect is guided by no definite objective aim derived from itself,—it is “the slave of the passions.” This is plainly a one-sided view, and we can set over against it an opposite one-sidedness,—that the social side of our nature is found only in intelligence. Everything which binds us to our fellow-men, all social sympathy and insight, is the product of intelligence alone, while feeling is peculiar to the individual and is a principle separating and isolating men from one another. How are we to judge between these extremes?<sup>1</sup> This brings us to the consideration of one of the most important tests of truth that is open to us, and one which at the present day we need to apply in every direction. In the preceding chapters we have indeed applied it more than once. It is constantly happening in the history of human thought that on every problem of importance two extreme conclusions take form, and are maintained in conflict with one

<sup>1</sup> These opposite tendencies will be found in the doctrines of Green and Comte respectively,—to mention no others (cf. Green’s *Prolegomena*, p. 216).

another. This is especially the case in problems of philosophy, and of political and social ethics.

Aristotle teaches us that in every such case what is required is τὸ διαρίξαι,—the rational discrimination which enables us to find a middle way between the two extremes.<sup>1</sup> Now there are two ways of finding a mean between two extremes. One of them is simply to take what the two extreme views have in common, and throw away all their differences. As a general rule the differences are so extensive—as between extreme State-socialism and extreme Individualism—that the only mean which we can get between them in this way amounts to nothing at all: we have only a barren “suspense of judgment.” This is sometimes treated as if it were the special mark of profound thought and of a mind free from prejudice. I fear that in many cases it is only the mark of intellectual cowardice or idleness. But there is another method of finding a middle way,—a middle way which does not contain less truth than either of the extremes, but *more* than either. This is of course the real meaning of the Hegelian ‘synthesis of opposites’ or ‘higher unity.’ This was the ‘mean’ that Aristotle had in view: and to reach it, it is essential that we should be reasonable or rational. This does not mean that we should be always arguing—endeavouring to pass from premisses to conclusions by discursive argument: it has been truly said that the most *reasonable* portion of the community does not consist of the persons who are constantly engaged in *reasoning*. It is the best result of a genuine education, a genuine training of the mind, so to *widen* the mind on every side that it is capable of this kind of

<sup>1</sup> The conception of the mean is of central importance for the whole philosophy of Aristotle, not merely for his Ethics.



rational discrimination. This is a translation into modern ideas of Aristotle's *dictum*, that τὸ διορίζειν is that of which the philosopher should be capable, and of which 'the many' are not capable. It takes the whole of our nature—not merely the analytical understanding—to find the true mean between the extremes. To do this we must rise above them both, find the truth that there is in each, and include it in a wider truth. It is never easy to do this; but whenever we can do it with two opposing doctrines or beliefs, we may be sure we have gone beyond them both to a deeper truth. The value of their conflict and their opposition is just to suggest the need for a deeper truth, and sometimes also to suggest the way to reach it.

The case I was speaking of before this digression is a comparatively simple one. We found two opposite assertions: that the only social bond between men is one of feeling,—reason being a principle of selfishness and isolation; and the exact opposite of this, where the terms 'reason' and 'feeling' have changed places. The 'middle way' is to regard man as social not in virtue of his reason only, or his feeling only, but in virtue of his whole nature on every side of it. The 'social impulse' is a tendency uprising from the very roots of our being and expressing itself in every direction of mental activity. Our intelligence is not a mere calculating machine, for working out means to ends foreign to itself; it has a structure and laws of *its own*, as a living organism has. Reason is *social*, in that my reason cannot work unless it works together with the reason of my fellow-men; for its structure and laws are identical in all of us. In this way reason carries me beyond myself and unites my life with other lives. On the other hand, along with the unity there must be the

difference. In order that reason and knowledge may go to work there must be different personalities to work it out; my reason is my own, your reason is your own, though in all it has a common root. Just in the same sense, feeling is social. Each man's emotions and feelings are his own, and yet in them he is carried beyond himself, and cannot rest unless in reason and feeling alike his life is in harmony with other lives. We must in fact regard ourselves as being *in the service* of an Ideal of Personality, a Supreme Good, which appeals alike to all sides of our nature, and requires the united efforts of many different personalities,—the unity and the difference being equally necessary.

The essence of Immorality in conduct seems to be that it regards the *differences* between men as ultimate and ignores their *community*. The immoral act need not consciously base itself on this as an intellectual assumption, but the assumption is always involved. Different men are essentially and fundamentally different from one another; each man's real being consists in his own finite individuality, to which everything else is foreign. Thus in practice this principle will lead the individual to pursue only his own ends, the ends which he thinks the interests of his finite life demand; frequently it will lead him to use others as if they had been created for his purposes, to be consumed, used up as it were, as tools of his; always it will lead him to ignore their welfare and treat them as mere incidents in his surroundings. Of course no one could consistently live out a life on such principles; pure egoism, as Spencer has shown, defeats itself. But every case of real moral evil—every case, great or small, of injustice, cruelty, lying, envy, persecution, revenge—rests upon this principle that all men are foreign to

each other. So far as such conduct ever pretends to offer intellectual justification for itself, the justification amounts to the assertion of this first knowledge that all men are different,—that the *unity* of men in their social life is illusory. This, then, is the principle underlying pure immorality or egoism. \*

At the opposite extreme stands the morality of pure altruism, resting on the supposition that the *differences* between men are verily and in truth absolute illusions, or that they are somehow to disappear in the course of social evolution. The former of these two conceptions is essentially metaphysical, and is represented in various forms by the doctrine of Brahmanism, that of Spinoza, and that of Schopenhauer. Why am I to love my neighbour as myself? Because there is no difference between us,—we are all one and the same being. The intellectual grounds of this Brahmanic attitude of mind—so far as it has such grounds—have been examined elsewhere (ch. iii.) It is impossible to maintain human life and experience to be a mere illusion: nor has any one done so even with an approach to consistency. If the differences between men are illusory, obviously the difference between the grossest egoism and the purest altruism is also illusory. The other conception mentioned above applies to historical tendencies in the first place, and is represented by the doctrine of Comte. Comte regards the egoistic and the altruistic desires as two distinct impulses of our nature,—distinct in such a way that the selfish impulses may entirely disappear in the course of social progress, and the unselfish tendencies be left in their purity. This seems a noble and lofty conception, but in reality it rests on confusion and is contradicted by experience. Taken quite seriously, what does it mean? That in a perfect society, any

individual man, when considering his duty, would have to think of himself as on the one side, and the aggregate of his fellow-men on the other, and that he would regard himself as worth nothing except as their tool or organ, as working wholly for them, as using himself up in their service. The same idea is involved in Comte's *dictum*, "the individual is an abstraction,—nothing is real but Humanity." The individual *is* nothing apart from others, and therefore he ought to regard himself as *worth* nothing except as a tool in their service. In such a state of things, social life would be impossible, for each man's object in life would contradict that of every other man. Comte's ideal would require a condition of existence where the differences between men had disappeared,—where there would be no place for the question "What ought I—I, as a finite individual—to do?" where indeed the personal pronouns and all their derivatives and correlates would have no meaning. I am not saying that there is no apparent conflict between the selfish and unselfish impulses; this apparent conflict constitutes the most serious practical problem of life. But we are not therefore to make an absolute separation between the two—*i.e.*, to suppose that one could exist without the other, and that the opposition between them can only be overcome by *denying* one of them. The practical problem arising out of their opposition needs to be solved in the same way as the intellectual problems of which we were speaking a few paragraphs back: not by accepting one of the extremes as all-sufficient, and denying the other, but by finding a middle way which includes the truth and justice of both. And, as I have said, this practical problem becomes much more intelligible when we regard it as arising out of a real though partial and limited conflict

between different elements in the supreme Ideal of life. In other words, what we have to seek is a *common good*. Whatever be the different ways in which men may seek their own or others' good, whatever divergence there may seem to be between these two, we have to take our stand upon this, that no man can find the highest good for himself unless he so lives that his life (with or without conscious effort on his part) helps others to find that same good. This seems to be the meaning of the precept "Love thy neighbour *as thyself*." This is the primary condition of realising the end and aim of life.<sup>1</sup> This again is the real *ethical* meaning of the unity of society.

The metaphysical meaning of the social union is that though the differences between men are not illusory—though each man has a *real* individuality of his own—their lives have a common root in their dependence upon one and the same Reality, whence come the Ideals which they recognise as different aspects of their common good. Social Insight is the means by which they may help one another to the attainment of this common good. *It is a real principle of conduct,—the one principle which makes moral conduct possible, since only through it can we feel and act towards others as towards ourselves.* Social Insight is the social side of the man's nature coming within the range of his self-consciousness; and since, as we have seen, man is social on every side of his being, this insight is the product of his whole nature. It is capable of infinitely various degrees of truth, just as self-consciousness is. In fact, the insight which the individual has into his own character (his intellectual and moral needs, his desires and

<sup>1</sup> It may be treated as a brief *formal* definition of what that aim is, as explained and *materially* defined in ch. v.



aims), and into the conditions on which his finite being depends, seems to vary with his insight into other selves. Only on an abstract view can we assign any kind of priority to either side. If we consider the mere order in time, and nothing more, then, as Dr Martineau has said, "The 'individual' is in fact the later product, and disengages himself into his independent wholeness as the ripest fruit of a collective development. Humanity first, as a plural organism, and then personality, in its singular force—that is the order of Nature, by reference to which we must be careful to correct our inference from the inverse method of investigation,"—*e.g.*, in Psychology. This is merely a case of the general law of evolution, as formulated by Spencer,—the uniform, the homogeneous, precedes the differentiated, the heterogeneous. But though the presence of others is indispensable to the development of self-consciousness, since they are the means of discovering us to ourselves, it would be absurd to maintain that the former is prior to the latter in any other sense than that of time. The presence of others is a means of discovering the individual to himself because *their* experiences are actually or potentially *his*, and he knows it. In social insight, says Dr Martineau, "the very essence of the phenomenon lies in its duplication; my fellow is merely myself over again, and is simply on that account understood by me at a glance; though it is also true that, had it not been for this externalisation of my affection in a second personality, it might have passed through me like a dream, without recognition or appreciation. The visible life of my own *double* throws off a light both ways,—on *his* inner nature which it immediately expresses, and on *mine* which it

mediately exhibits and repeats; and there is certainly something very wonderful in that sympathetic affinity between one mind and another which makes mutual intelligence a thing of lightning, and interprets natural signs that have never been learnt. It seems as if a feeling was never understood till acted out in open day and flung into shape upon the air; but that its manifestation became a common medium, flashing not only mutual exchange but separate intensity into our self-consciousness. In short, our artificial analysis has unduly separated between sign and thing signified, the inner spiritual fact and the outer physical manifestation; and the Greek conception was truer, which made one term, — *Logos*, — serve for both, and treated the silent thought and the spoken word as one organic act of life, two momenta of the same function, not detached, like involuntary impulse from its deliberately chosen tool, but only opposite surfaces of the same spontaneous pulsation.”<sup>1</sup> Just as Social Insight is capable of many varying degrees of truth, so it is awakened in many and various ways, due to the innumerable conscious and unconscious influences which every human life is always receiving and exerting. Its main forms correspond to the main lines of ‘differentiation and integration’ in social development. All the facts that English psychologists and moralists have described as ‘general benevolence,’ ‘social sympathy,’ and the like, are more or less inadequate statements of the different ways in which Social Insight operates. ‘Sympathy,’ in the ordinary sense, or *Mitgefühl*, — the mere community of individuals in particular feelings more or less transient, where the one mind simply

<sup>1</sup> *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. ii. pp. 31, 32.

reproduces the feeling of the other,—is really the least worthy form of a fruitful sympathetic insight.<sup>1</sup> Dr Martineau has given a brief but excellent analysis of three dominant springs of action to which Social Insight gives rise: Parental Affection, Social Affection, and Compassion.<sup>2</sup> He errs, I think, in representing these as fixed formed faculties of our nature, and as mere *impulses*. [A spring of action always presents itself as a desire for an object; in this case, a *desire that another person shall be, or attain to, something which we think to be better than his present state*. This ‘something better’ is not merely a truer intellectual comprehension of reality; to regard it as this, would be to limit Social Insight to the mutual understanding involved in the interchange of ideas and the growth of knowledge: it is a state of his whole being; and—in the distinctively moral reference which we here speak of—it refers *more directly* to those aspects of his being which reveal themselves in his emotions and volitions than to those which reveal themselves in his intellectual activities as such. Again, this ‘something better’ is judged to be better because we find it actually realised in ourselves or others; hence we implicitly compare it with the state of the person or class to whom our desire has reference. There is a *converse* form of this desire, based on a recognition of our own state as unworthy when compared with that of another personality,—*realised* in him, and *potentially* ours. Dr Martineau most truly says: “It is the objective image of the nature sleeping within us, that wakes it up and startles it into self-knowledge. The living exhibition

<sup>1</sup> The error of Adam Smith in making *this* the supreme moral principle is trenchantly stated by Dr Martineau, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 185.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. ii. p. 144.

in another of higher affections than we have known, far from remaining unintelligible to us, is the grand means of spiritual culture,—the quickener of conscience and the opener of new faith. The natural language of every passion of which we are susceptible speaks to us with a marvellous magic, and calls up fresh islands and provinces of consciousness where there was a blank before. And whoever is the first to give explicit manifestation to our own implicit tendency touches us with admiration and acquires a certain power over us. If the feeling he expresses is nearly *on our level*, if he is only a little beforehand with us in shaping our dumb and formless wants, he becomes our literary interpreter or our party leader,—a chief indeed, but of the same kind with the followers. If the affection he realises is *above us*, strange to our experience but congenial with our capacity,—a more heroic endurance or a more conquering love than we had conceived,—he becomes to us an author of faith, prophet and brother at once, even mediator helping us into nearer union with God.”<sup>1</sup>

§ 3. We must now notice certain aspects of the distinctively æsthetic tendencies of man’s nature—those aspects of it which are relevant to our purpose here.

The relation of ‘Æsthetics’ to Philosophy is a troublesome question, owing mainly to the undefined scope of the science itself. It deals with Beauty, in the comprehensive sense, as found in nature and art; and its problems, as generally set forth, are the following: (a) How does Beauty affect us? (b) What is Beauty? (c) What are the mutual relations of the fine arts, and their function in human life? The first ques-

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 63, 64.

tion is psychological; to it we shall return directly. The second, when separated from the third, becomes a somewhat formal and barren metaphysical inquiry, usually taking the form—What is Beauty in itself? In other words: What is the essential quality or principle, running through all beautiful objects, capable of being apprehended by all minds, and constituting (so far as apprehended) their consciousness of Beauty? The question assumes that there is such a single principle involved; and the answer to the question naturally follows from some general philosophic position, arrived at on other grounds. We have first a metaphysical principle and then we seek to explain Beauty as a manifestation thereof. The system of Plato is perhaps the most impressive example of this tendency. With this may be classed a large group of doctrines, of which Ruskin's is typical,<sup>1</sup> which treat Beauty as symbolic of some 'divine' attribute. Such theories deserve to be called formal or barren only in so far as they neglect to apply their principle to the concrete artistic activities of man. It may be—according to our view it certainly is—quite sound in principle to regard Beauty as a case of the self-realising or self-manifesting process of the Absolute. But such a doctrine goes a very little way unless we are able to apply it to the main forms of art,—to exhibit the world of human artistic effort as a hierarchical system in the light of our metaphysical principle of evolution, according to the degrees in which the latter expresses itself therein. This is the third of the three questions of 'æsthetics' which we have indicated; and this seems the real function of a Philosophy of Art. Its main lines of investigation will be as follows: What are the rela-

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, Ruskin's doctrine as expounded in *Modern Painters*, Bk. ii.



tions of artistic to natural beauty, and what are the essential aims of art as a whole? To what extent can the special forms of art be defined and classified according to their powers of embodying these general aims? To what extent can the general and special principles, so arrived at, be applied to the interpretation of, and criticised by, the main historic tendencies of artistic achievement? Obviously these inquiries demand extensive technical and historical knowledge, and go quite beyond the sphere of philosophy in the ordinary sense. In this place we need only thus indicate their general nature.

The psychological method is often extolled because it explains our concrete æsthetic experiences; it begins with what would seem to be nearest to us,—the facts of our own consciousness: again, because it does not begin with the highest stages of the æsthetic consciousness, which are extremely complex, but with its elementary forms. Now as long as Psychology keeps to the strictly individualistic standpoint—as the traditional English Psychology has always done, and as the modern Physiological Psychology must necessarily do—it is almost certain to ignore some of the most important characteristics of the æsthetic consciousness, since in their 'elementary forms' these characteristics are comparatively insignificant. Professor Sully has remarked that to overlook the lower intensities of a psychical phenomenon may lead to radical error in the whole interpretation of consciousness; and this applies both to general and to special analysis.

The elements in our perception of Beauty, which the 'scientific' treatment is apt to overlook, may be classed under three heads: they are the elements which for our present purpose it is most important to emphasise.

In the *first* place, what are the 'lower limits' of the æsthetic consciousness? On the one hand it has been maintained that a 'pure sensation'—blue, for instance—may have æsthetic quality in and for itself, and that in the same manner various colours and sounds may affect us in various ways, each in and for itself. On the other hand, it has been maintained that 'sensations as such' are devoid of æsthetic value—that a mere colour or a mere sound has as little artistic significance as a mere taste: æsthetic value can only attach to a sensation in virtue of its relations to other sensations, which together with it form a more or less complex whole. This is the Kantian view, resting on the separation of sense and thought,—the function of thought being to relate, and so to unify, a 'manifold' of data received from foreign sources. The answer—in accordance with the distinction of the noetic and anoetic aspects of consciousness, on which great stress is laid in the present work—must be that 'mere' or 'pure' sensations, 'sensations as such,' cannot enter into anything which we can call experience. No mode of sentience can come to be present *to* a consciousness unless it is to some extent discriminated, and therefore to that extent put in relations, by that consciousness. Hence the æsthetic *object* is always a mode of the noetic consciousness. Only as more or less discriminated and related can a so-called 'sensation' have æsthetic value; though the discrimination may only be as regards extension or duration, and the relation in which we place it may shade off at once into the anoetic background. In the latter case it may appear, on a superficial view, to be an isolated *datum*, but it is not. Of course I am not saying that the source of Beauty is *merely* the intellectual element involved in these relations.

This consideration explains a universally recognised quality of the attitude which the æsthetic consciousness adopts towards its object. The object becomes an organic whole, and only on condition that it remains so can its æsthetic value remain: its value is mutilated and destroyed by an attempt at analytical dissection. We have to go back upon it in order to do this. Hence arise the divergent ideals of the scientific and the artistic mind: as Dr Martineau has well said—"The one reads its objects piecemeal by traversing hither and thither, and putting together the contents of the field"; the other "instinctively seizes the harmonies of the scene before it and frames it into a speaking whole,"—and more, it "catches the whole before it fixes upon anything, and *carries the entire idea into the interpretation of every part.*"<sup>1</sup> This seems to apply to every form of Beauty as perceived by us; it reverses, in part, the characteristic method of Science. The scientific instinct is, first to take a thing to pieces in order to understand it, and to describe it by describing the parts one by one. Hence science brings truth to the mind piece by piece,—in a series of intellectual assertions which have been reached by analysis or dissection. Not that science is *merely* analytic in this sense; for, as we have abundantly seen, it presupposes that the facts with which it deals depend on an intelligible system of laws. Just as little is art *merely* synthetic. Hence it is only provisionally true to say that the artistic apprehension of beauty reverses the scientific apprehension of truth.

In the *second* place, the strictly individualistic treatment of æsthetic experience obscures the fact that the feeling involved in it is *super-personal*, and is indeed the

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 159.

most impressive example of how in feeling the single individual is carried beyond himself. The super-personal aspect of the apprehension of Beauty appears first in its essentially *social* character. It is always, actually or potentially, a social experience, depending on objects of common perception, which may be enjoyed by a number of persons together and sympathetically. This is a reason for fixing the lower limit of æsthetic experience at the two 'higher senses,' sight and hearing. A pleasure of taste or touch is a restricted individual experience, which we cannot have in common—*e.g.*, we cannot touch the same 'pleasant' object in the same way and at the same time. The æsthetic value which is sometimes supposed to be attached to certain sensations of the three 'lower' senses seems doubtful and disputable.<sup>1</sup> Not only is the æsthetic experience a social one in this sense; its particular judgments depend largely on social conditions. It is true that when every allowance is made for due variations to the accidents of individual lives, "there remains a central apprehensiveness of beauty, which *uses* the outward senses as organs of the imagination." But this central element in the individual person's consciousness of Beauty is no more independent of the social atmosphere than is any other function of his consciousness. Only on an abstract view is it true to say that the æsthetic experiences of our *own* consciousness are "nearest to us."

In the *third* place, we come to the most important consideration affecting the value of a psychological treatment of our perception of Beauty: and that is, the

<sup>1</sup> These sensations may of course *suggest*, through past association, real æsthetic experiences of a higher kind.

extent to which it recognises the vital truth that the perceptive consciousness in art is identical in quality with the creative, and differs from the latter only in what, for want of a better word, we may call intensity. Dr Martineau seizes on this truth and puts it before us in his own forcible way: "The great difference between the ordinary and the extraordinary energy of this gift [the artistic gift]—for example, between the poet's reader and the poet himself—is perhaps that in the former it is dumb and unconscious, doing its work without disentangling the elements into view; while in the latter, it is too vivid to remain unconscious and instinctive. The sense of beauty clears itself from every foreign impression, flings down the sediment of neutral matter, and by spontaneous analysis disengages the transparent essentials. It is indeed the tendency of all intense human feeling to quit its indeterminate state and become distinct, for, in proportion to its force, it is unable to sleep within; it thirsts for expression; and expression is first self-clearance, and then self-intelligence."<sup>1</sup>

§ 4. In these three ways we have the Idea of Perfection, given by self-consciousness; in other words, self-consciousness in its deeper and more reflective form shows us the Ideal under which we work. Our consciousness of the Ideal expresses itself in the formation of rational desires, which point beyond the limits of experience in time and space. The *typical* forms of these desires are, as we have already pointed out: in the *first* place, a desire for harmony in our various knowledges, in order to the comprehension of the

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 159.



universe somehow as a complete whole;<sup>1</sup> in the *second* place, a desire that our own or another personality may attain to a better state, which we know to be actually realised in some human life; or, as we may otherwise express it, a desire that I may think, feel, and act towards another as towards myself; or, again, a desire for perfection in the *relations* of my will to other wills; in the *third* place, a desire for the realisation of beauty,—the æsthetic activity being the same in principle through all stages of its exercise,—from an apparently ‘passive’ enjoyment up to the creative efforts of the highest genius. In self-consciousness, then, we may know ourselves as individuals ruled by a threefold Ideal which expresses itself in these forms. A few pages back, it was said that “we think of the Absolute as a being in which the Ideal is consummated and fully accomplished, and as being not simply a ‘system’ but as having an existence of which our own *being for self* is the least imperfect analogue.” The real meaning and the grounds of this passage from the finite to the Absolute, is the final problem which now concerns us.

Let us consider first the intellectual Ideal, in the limited form in which Kant states it in his cosmological Dialectic. The Ideal of Worth as Truth, which is the mainspring of all attempts at science and philosophy, is one which authenticates itself. To ignore it, or explain it away, would be to lapse into universal scepticism; and this, as we might with Kant appeal to history to show, is not a possible *permanent* attitude for the human mind. Men have rested in such a result for a while,

<sup>1</sup> The Ideal by which Kant criticises scientific knowledge. As we have seen, in one sense his statement of it implies too much, in another too little. But when we are dealing with intelligence in relation to the whole of consciousness, and at the same time have to express its Ideal separately, we may best state it in this form.

but never for long. The vital functions of intelligence must be reliable if any knowledge whatever is to be possible. The aim of Epistemology is to show that knowledge is such an organic unity that we cannot give up one part of it which we find troublesome, while we keep another which pleases us—‘sense knowledge,’ for instance—as safe and sound. The only alternative is a scepticism complete and absolute: and this cannot be intellectually refuted because it cannot be intellectually reached. It is equivalent to a refusal to think at all; and the man who so refuses, *to that extent* abdicates his humanity. If the scepticism is not complete, then to that extent it is self-contradictory, on the organic view of knowledge. If, then, the principles of intelligence are reliable, this is equivalent to saying that the world is so constituted that it can be known by the mind of man,—that the ends of intelligence can be realised in it. This may seem tautological, but it is not so. Reason from its nature thinks of the world as constituted in a certain manner: and its ends cannot be realised unless the world is so constituted. This implies not merely that the forms of objective reality *correspond* to the logical functions of thought (individuality, causality, &c.); but that in the completeness of intelligence we should know the objective world as complete in the same sense. The world must therefore be the *expression* of intelligence. Intelligence is at least one fundamental aspect of the Absolute Reality. This postulate must be true if any real knowledge is to be possible. This postulate expresses what we mean by the *validity* of the intellectual Ideal.

Now why may we not attach to the Ideal of Worth, in its ethical and æsthetic aspects, as much significance as must be attached to the Ideal of Worth as Truth?

Can we ignore or explain away the Ideal in two of its aspects, while we regard the third as supreme?

That view of the world which may be called Naturalism answers the question in the affirmative. Naturalism maintains that wholly unconscious and unspiritual realities—*e.g.*, the 'Unknowable,' 'Unconscious Will,' 'Unconscious Intellect,' the 'Atom and Void,' &c.—are the most fundamental Realities in the universe; our Ideals of Worth are of no more significance for the nature of the Whole—are no less the products of blind struggles with circumstance—than is the fact that we are bipeds, or the fact that other animals have protective colouring. The weakness of this theory, from the purely rational point of view, becomes apparent when we consider the way in which the Ideal of Worth, as a fact of conscious experience, is 'explained.' Nature—in the lower or narrower sense in which the term is used to denote all that happens in the known world *except* the conscious activities of human beings—is hypostatized, treated as self-existent, and then man's conscious life is explained as its 'product,' as evolved or developed 'from' it, &c., according to the current phraseology. But what is *not* explained is the fact that the mind of man has persisted, and seemingly always will persist, in the attempt to think consistently about reality and make it rational and intelligible. Naturalism itself, like every science and every philosophy, does homage to this tendency and recognises its Ideal as supreme; and the problem, What is its significance? whence comes it? presses for solution. It is curious that neither evolutionists nor associationists have endeavoured to 'explain' how it is that πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει,—how it is that inevitably, 'by nature,' all

men endeavour to understand and comprehend things for the sake of understanding them. It would seem that a really consistent Naturalism must be tantamount to Scepticism. It is most reasonable to regard the three aspects of the Ideal of Worth as co-ordinate, so that whatever significance is attached to one of them may be claimed for the others also. Thus the world must be so constituted that the aims of true morality and true art can be realised in it; and this means that the world is the expression of Absolute Goodness and Absolute Beauty.

The line of thought on which we have been dwelling may be concisely expressed thus: If any thought at all is valid, then on the organic view of knowledge the vital principles of all thought are valid; in other words, the world is constituted in the way these principles indicate. By analogy we then extend the conclusion to cover the principles of morality and art. In this lies the application of a remark made in the Introductory chapter of this work, that the principle of proof is the same over the whole region of philosophy. For in the last resort the principle of proof must be stated in the form of a postulate, assumption, trust, faith—call it what you will—which must be true if some whole region of spiritual endeavour is to be intelligible, and not to be “vanity and a striving after wind.” But I scarcely think that this is the most pregnant way of stating the involution of the Absolute in the finite.

Let us examine the ‘ontological argument’ which endeavoured to pass from finite thought to Absolute Being through the idea of Perfection or of a Perfect Being. Kant’s famous criticism of this argument, and the Hegelian reply thereto, are most instructive. The following is an admirably concise and pointed statement

of the Hegelian view: "I may have [says Kant] an idea of a hundred dollars, but my pocket may be empty enough for all that. In like manner, he argues, I may have an Idea of God, but this is far from proving, as the supporters of the ontological argument would have us believe, the objective existence of a being corresponding to my idea. Clearly Kant's reasoning depends for its validity on the measure of the analogy between God and a hundred dollars. If God is a being or thing as separable from me as the hundred dollars are, then certainly there is no passage from idea to reality. Deism puts God at a distance in this way, and Deism therefore succumbs to Kant's illustration. But if God cannot be in any sense a thing or object, the idea of God may very well be at the same time his real existence. If the idea of God is inseparable from consciousness as such—is in fact the perfect rational synthesis of which every consciousness is, and recognises itself to be, the potential form—then this existence 'in thought' seems to give all the reality that can be asked for. Unless indeed we are prepared to materialise God into an object of our present or future senses, this is the only reality of which we can speak."<sup>1</sup> In other words, God is the perfect rational synthesis of the Universe. This synthesis is not a *fact* found in the course of scientific or cosmological knowledge; but a deeper reflection shows that it is the Ideal of this knowledge. It must therefore arise because our human intelligence shares in an Absolute Intelligence which is the realisation of what to us is an ideal synthesis.

Evidently this is in the main not a rehabilitation of the old argument but the substitution for it of another. I say 'in the main,' because it would seem that, in the

<sup>1</sup> Seth, *From Kant to Hegel*, pp. 142, 143.



case of Descartes and Leibniz at least, this was the idea, half understood and half misunderstood, which sought expression in the 'ontological proof.' This proof, according to the usual expression of it, seemed to say that we could not think of Perfection unless a Perfect Being really existed: this is a pure *non sequitur* unless *the Idea of Perfection is itself the immediate presence in us of the Perfect Being*; but for this presence, we could have no such idea. In principle Hegel's version of the ontological proof is, I contend, thoroughly sound; but its form is too limited. We are conscious of 'obligatory Ideals,' which present themselves in our experience as of absolute and unqualified worth and validity, requiring us not only to seek for and realise Truth in thought, but Righteousness in character and social conduct, and Beauty in nature and human life. All these Ideals impose on those whom they inspire the absolute obligation to embody them in the work of life. We have seen that the question whether absolute or perfect knowledge 'includes' the perfection of all other spiritual activities is not one which we can intelligibly discuss. In the actual constitution and history of human experience we find no such tendency in any one aspect of the Ideal to absorb the others.<sup>1</sup>

There are two principles involved in Hegel's argument. The first is this: the fact that the self-conscious spirit is capable, in these respects, of rising above itself, of comparing itself with other selves, and of passing judgment upon its own character in all aspects thereof, is proof positive that that which is not finite and self-contained, but infinite and universal, is immanent within it. This is, in fact, the essence of the religious view

<sup>1</sup> Except of course in the sense in which this is due to one-sided ethical or philosophical doctrine.

of the world,—this gives to religion all its strength and vigour : Man is not, as Naturalism would have it, merely a superior kind of animal ; he is endowed with rational hopes, desires, and aspirations which point beyond the limits of time and space, and make him a child of Eternity. Hence he is divinely discontented with everything finite and imperfect, and can never find rest therein. If we were entirely finite beings, if we were wholly shut up within our own limits, how could we ever know that we were so? If man were what Naturalism makes him to be, it is surely impossible to understand why he should ever have thought of himself as anything more. In this connection, Mr Spencer's doctrine that we have "a vague consciousness of the Absolute" is extremely significant. We could have no sense of imperfection, or feeling of the brief and transitory character of visible things, did we not share in an eternal Life,—a being in whom is no variableness nor shadow cast by turning. The other fundamental principle involved in Hegel's argument is this. That we are thus conscious of the imperfection of our own lives,—in thought and knowledge, feeling, conduct,—implies not merely that our little lives should be rooted in a perfect Life, but that we should be *personally conscious*, in however vague or incipient a form,<sup>1</sup> of this super-personal perfection as a *present reality*. Not only are we conscious of a standard of perfection, but we are always incipiently conscious of its reference to a present reality, the ground of our Existence and the Source and Consummation of our Ideals.

It is curious that the most scientific agnostic of modern times should have developed a doctrine which

<sup>1</sup> In this appears the significance of the conception that self-consciousness has degrees of Truth. Cf. *infra*.

at once invites comparison with that of religious mysticism—a doctrine which, to a certain limited extent, keeps the fundamental truth and the fundamental error of mysticism. I refer of course to the “vague consciousness of the Absolute” which Mr Spencer affirms that we possess. Now mysticism finds the basis of religious belief in an immediate experience or ‘feeling’ of a universal, eternal, or super-personal being in vital relation to our own consciousness; though this experience is felt with varying degrees of distinctness, differing with different minds. This is, I contend, an inseparable element of all religious belief of the deeper and more vital sort. Mr Spencer, in a manner, admits it to be so, and affirms that it is the only element destined to survive. But in effect he commits the very same error which mysticism commits, and in an aggravated form. Mysticism has usually supposed that the experience in question arises through some special faculty distinct from the general activities of the human mind. Mr Spencer’s doctrine expressly excludes the possibility of its having any relation to these activities. For our Reason, the Absolute is unknowable because of the very nature of knowledge,—according to Mr Spencer’s conception of its nature; and he thinks that he has explained the real origin and source of the moral and artistic ideals by tracing their history in time, so that *they* are no revelation of the Absolute. Thus the vague consciousness of the Absolute is a name for we know not what. The scornful criticisms which have been passed upon this “bastard mysticism of the relativists” seem well deserved. If we have any consciousness of the Absolute at all, it must arise *in and through* those Ideals which rule our whole consciousness or experience. The truth

we have to recognise is this: if the reality of the Absolute Perfection is not *directly evinced* in some aspect of consciousness, we could never pass to it by any *process*, whether of argument or of any other kind. We cannot pass from ourselves as finite to the Absolute unless in a sense we are, though finite, already there; were we not consciously already there, we could not even discuss the possibility of such a 'passage.' We may express this view in general terms, thus: In our deeper self-consciousness there is an immediate apprehension of the Absolute, of God, as immanent in our rational, ethical, and spiritual Ideals. Our self-consciousness, at its truest, tells us that we as individuals are finite and dependent creatures, and that there is living and operative in our higher life that which is self-existent and eternal. This self-revelation of God presents itself as no mere abstraction, no "self-painting of the yearning spirit," but as the Eternal Mind and Heart of Nature speaking in and to our finite spirits.

From the standpoint of scientific Psychology, the assertion has been made that this is simply to revive the obsolete appeal to "the evidence of consciousness," and then to "surrender our philosophic judgment to this charming but perhaps lying witness." Such a statement is a serious misrepresentation, and derives its plausibility simply from the ambiguities of the term 'consciousness.'

(a) From the purely theoretic point of view there is no more difficulty in the fact that the finite mind transcends itself so far as to be capable of grasping the Infinite, than in the fact that it transcends itself so far as to be capable of *knowing* anything whatever, or of representing to itself the life of another self. The Infinite which we are speaking of is not that which is indefinitely

extended in time and space, but that which is self-limited and self-existent.<sup>1</sup> Indeed we have no right to speak of a 'difficulty' in this connection, for if the term means anything, it means some kind of intellectual obstacle or stumbling-block; and the intelligence which finds its own essential nature a stumbling-block is surely approaching the pathological state. The nature of thought is to point beyond its present *locus* or point of attachment; and its conception of this 'beyond' is capable of infinite articulation and development—the finite consciousness goes beyond itself on every side. It is thoroughly unreasonable, then, to admit the principle of self-transcendence and deny that ultimate application of it which is suggested by the principle itself, and which indeed is only its real meaning, implicitly, *throughout*. And every one *admits* the principle who even addresses an intelligible assertion to another mind. Again, there is nothing 'contradictory' in the ultimate expression of our conclusion in the form "man is infinite as well as finite." No doubt a region of space or a duration of time cannot be at once limited and unlimited, but this is not the infinity or the finitude of which we here speak. No doubt we cannot form a mental picture of something which combines both these qualities; but this again is irrelevant. Indeed the nature of the human self is, in the end, the only standard of intelligibility; for the thought which gives such standards is a main function of the self, and whatever thought finds involved in the existence of the self is thereby involved in its own nature as thought. The difficulty is no more real than the supposed puzzle of understanding how there can be a unity of diverse aspects; there can be,

<sup>1</sup> This of course is Hegel's distinction of the 'false' and the 'true' Infinite.



because in the reality of the self there *is* such a unity. When we push our inquiry into the relation between Thought and Reality far enough,—that is, when we carry it back to the foundations of self-consciousness,—we find that Thought is inseparable from Reality, and that their relation, viewed from the side of Thought, may be expressed thus: The nature of our Thought is, to produce from itself principles which express the nature of Reality; and viewed from the side of Reality, thus: The nature of Reality is to *be* what is signified by those principles which express the nature of Thought.

(b) From the practical point of view, it is objected—to the conclusion we have reached—that men are not aware of any ‘infinite’ side to their consciousness. This objection is in principle the same as that which Mr Balfour has so effectively stated in his *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*. He is referring to ‘transcendental’ arguments—*i.e.*, those which endeavour to prove the reality of certain factors in the structure of knowledge. “When a man is convinced by a transcendental argument it must be because he perceives that a certain relation or principle is necessary to constitute his admitted experience; this is to him a fact, the truth of which he is obliged to recognise”—*e.g.*, the fact that any *intelligible* experience could not be so were it not for the presence of certain functions of intelligence (categories) as constitutive factors *in* the experience. “But another fact which he may also find it hard to dispute is that he himself, and as it would appear the majority of mankind, have habitually had this experience without ever thinking it under this relation. The transcendentalist would no doubt say at once that the relation in question had always been thought implicitly even if it had not

always come into clear consciousness. . . . But if an implicit thought means in this connection what it means everywhere else, it is simply a thought which is logically bound up in some other thought, and which for that reason may always be called into existence by it: now from this very definition it is plain that so long as a thought is implicit it does not exist."<sup>1</sup> Surely "from this very definition" it is plain merely that the "implicit thought" has not yet been clearly discriminated by the thinker for himself in his own mind. But to identify existence *in consciousness* with what the thinker has distinctly *discriminated*—i.e., broken up into terms and relations—is a violent measure which, I presume, Mr Balfour does not contemplate.<sup>2</sup> To say that any function of consciousness (intellectual or other) exists *implicitly* is to say that it forms an as yet undiscriminated part of the general background of sentience, out of which arises thought itself and the experience which thought makes intelligible—that is, the experience of which we are *explicitly* conscious. In this sense of the words, we must be implicitly conscious of any factor in our experience before we can be explicitly conscious of it; it must first come to us as an undistinguished part of the whole of experience. As Mr Stout says, "It is we that distinguish, but *what* we distinguish is fixed for us, not by us; in this respect we are obviously at the mercy of some condition distinct from our own subjective activity. But this condition is not in any sense external to the individual mind; it is an immanent factor in mental process, not an agency determining it from without." This immanent factor is so far from

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Mr Stout's discussion of the difficulties to which this identification leads: *Analytic Psychology*, Bk. i. ch. 2.

being an agency external to the discriminative activity of thought, that we find its presence implied in the analysis of thought itself by thought. The stubborn objector to the doctrine that the anoetic element of sentience or immediacy<sup>1</sup> is a fundamental aspect of consciousness, seems driven to deny even that thought can become progressively aware of its own nature as thought—*i.e.*, to deny that any discoveries have ever been made, or can be made, in the logical theory of knowledge. This element of 'immediacy' must then be recognised as present somewhere,—it cannot be wholly expelled from consciousness; and, having admitted the principle, to assign an arbitrary limit to its application is futile.

Thus the fundamental answer to all such objections as those we have been considering is to point out the significance of the fact that self-consciousness, in every direction of it, has and must have degrees of truth. It attains truth by rationalising the immediate elements of experience, which are always *real* and may be so tumultuous as to entail fatal consequences if the individual's intelligence is not sufficiently developed to be capable of giving them adequate form. In being progressively made rational, the immediate is not gradually removed, as the mathematically irrational element in a surd is removed by extraction of the root to any required degree of accuracy; it is not sublimed away, so to speak, or destroyed by being known under the form of relations, any more than thought destroys its own nature by becoming aware of itself. The immediate is

<sup>1</sup> The term 'anoetic sentience' is employed by Mr Stout; the term 'immediacy' is Hegelian. Hegel's doctrine of the immediate in experience (*Gefühl*) is ambiguous; but it at once suggests such a doctrine as that which is here defended.

present at every stage of conscious experience—as much in the highest as in the lowest—and is always prior (in the sense explained) to distinct knowledge. We are, then, able to make the following generalisations. The process of finite *knowledge* arises from the gradual emergence of thought, which is part of and in necessary relation to the whole development of finite *being*, and which *both makes and finds* differences in the immediate. Awareness of an objective world (of some kind and some extent) is what first discovers the individual to itself, mainly by the emphasis which that world compels it to lay on its own pleasures and pains; but as long as it is not capable of *conscious* intercourse with another like itself (as many of the lower animals certainly are), it is at the stage of what we may call the *material self*; self-knowledge cannot be said to exist,—there is only *consentience*. With the development of, and the knowledge of, other selves in the environment, a higher stage of self-hood and self-consciousness is reached,—the *social self*. In man, the finite self is organising itself (including its knowledge of itself and of its race) in certain explicit, definite forms. Inasmuch as its being is now, in a sense, differentiated from the Absolute, its *knowledge* is chiefly interested in itself as *finite* (i.e., in itself as thus differentiated) and in the objective world which it has learnt to distinguish from itself and other selves. The Absolute is the Ground and Source of the whole process of growth, but the finite self need not be aware of this. The first *trace* of its presence which we find is that universal principle of movement, the principle of “action in advance of experience,” which the theory of evolution seemed to postulate, and by which the world of life has been unconsciously moulded. The human race is not un-

consciously moulded by it ; we recognise its operation in the formation of an Ideal which is in advance of all past experience and attainment. Nothing follows from the mere fact that this or that man, or most men, do not recognise in this Ideal anything which they are inclined to call the presence and self-revelation of the Absolute Reality. It is fatal blindness to deny that in such Ideals there is an experience which can only so be described. There is a conscious self-surrender in man's earnest scientific work,—in his sincerest and profoundest philosophic thinking,—in his devotion to that which has real and abiding beauty,—above all, in his yielding to the promptings of humanity and love. Herein he is not merely realising himself in the light of an *idea* of what is highest and best ; he is also consciously surrendering himself to what is the Everlasting Real. The human race is constantly beset by such experience ; aroused, it may be, by thinking over the achievements of intellectual, moral, and spiritual genius, or by the personal appeals of such, or by the mysterious yet very real influences of the beautiful and sublime in nature or in human life. Such appeals *raise our selfhood to a higher level*. Let us recall the conclusion to which the most reasonable epistemological, psychological, and ethical considerations have led,—as regards the meaning of 'selfhood.' The finite self is not a mere succession of 'phenomena,' as in Positivism ; it is not a 'substance,' self-identical, and fixed or static or permanent, 'underlying' these phenomena, as in pre-Kantian rationalism ; its nature is to be a continuous self-realising or self-organising process,—a *growth*, for there seems to be no more pregnant expression for the truth than this. The human self is always growing,—becoming something more and other than it is. But the



pre-Kantian doctrine stubbornly survives; it is still the doctrine of common-sense *theory*,—of popular and theological psychology; and it will survive as long as the equally one-sided Positivist theory is represented to the thoughtful public as the only ‘scientific’ conclusion in the matter. In consequence, the true nature of morality—that the main principles of ethics must be expressed in the form *Be this*, rather than *Do this*—is completely misunderstood. The essential doctrine of Christianity, so far as this is understood by its exponents, and the influence of certain writers and teachers here and there, are fortunately in the right direction as regards this basal question.

Once more we must appeal to the doctrine which our whole investigation in these chapters has been a sustained effort to expound and defend and apply to actual experience—the doctrine of Degrees in Reality and Truth. Our Ideals are the immediate self-revelation of the Absolute *for us*; but they are not, therefore, abstractly identical with the existence of the Absolute *for itself*. Only in ceasing to be man and becoming God could we comprehend this existence. Otherwise, reflection will show that the attempt intellectually to determine the existence of the Absolute for itself is to ask, *What is it in so far as we do not know it?* We only know it in so far as our highest experience is a revelation of it,—a revelation which is true for us since it is the best we have. It is true “so far as it goes”; and this phrase is not meaningless. A useful metaphorical expression of its meaning is to regard knowledge as comparable to the view which an observer takes of a tract of country. On the ground his view of it is limited by the conditions of his position; but though

limited it is a view of a real constitutive portion of the whole region, in which the characteristic physical features of the whole may be more or less adequately detected. As his point of view ascends, his observation embraces and transcends the limited field to which it had previously been shut in; and this field itself appears in truer proportions because its relations to the parts beyond it are now in view: yet, though modified, the first view is not and cannot be done away with. The highest aspects of human experience, then, are the highest *points of view* we can attain,—those from which we can take the most adequate views of Reality. Such a metaphor, of course, must not be pressed, but it serves the purpose of a valuable illustration. The highest achievements of human life have an indefinite ‘beyond,’—they have possibilities of rising again, and yet again, and ever again, to a higher stage; and as long as they are thus, as long as we are human, they cannot be more than symbols,—a symbolic revelation of God.

How then can the Ideal which prompts them be the *very presence* of the Divine in us?

It may be the very presence of God in us, but it cannot be an absolutely true *revelation* of God to us until thought has gone to work upon it and reflectively known it to be this. Now reflection shows that the absolute completion or perfection of the Ideal is a limiting conception; as we have seen, it is a conception of that to which our experience points, but which from its nature is beyond us, though progressively realised by us. Hence it is the inevitable deficiencies in our intellectual formulation of the Ideal which make it only a symbolic revelation of the Absolute. This is

no covert assertion of 'agnosticism,' if by this term we understand the doctrine that everything which exists has an unknowable core, 'in itself.' Our thought is in a sense 'agnostic' with regard to the nature of the Absolute, but only in the sense in which it is agnostic with regard to the *consummation of its own* nature,—*i.e.*, with regard to absolute knowledge. The widest and deepest knowledge that *we* could obtain would not be an absolute knowledge; on the other hand, in the conception of this widest and deepest knowledge we have the *truest* representation of what absolute knowledge is; and it is the same with goodness and beauty. By a similar line of thought we were led to reject the conception that the Ideal is a form of *self-consciousness*.<sup>1</sup> This doctrine indeed would logically result in the identification of the Absolute with the process of human experience,—so that the only existence which it has is an existence which *we* have accomplished. In realising our Ideals we would be progressively creating God,—in the only sense in which this name has any meaning. This is equivalent to the Comtist deification of Humanity.<sup>2</sup> But such a view, I contend, refuses to be *thought out*. It is an incoherent compromise between Naturalism and Idealism.

What is the essence of the Idealist view? That which for us as individuals *is* not realised but *may* be so, is for the Absolute eternally real; in the Absolute is eternally realised the goal to which our Ideals would direct us. This statement enables us to symbolise in

<sup>1</sup> Ch. vi. § 5.

<sup>2</sup> There are lines of thought in Hegel which lead to this result; but there are others which show us the way out of it.

yet another way—perhaps the most pregnant way of all—the ineffable transcendence of the Absolute above and beneath the finite, and its self-manifestation in the finite.

Our experience, in the widest sense, including the Ideals by which it is ruled, is essentially a process in time; everything human must *have a history*, wherein is revealed

“the Light

That guides the nations,—groping on their way,  
Stumbling and falling in disastrous night,  
Yet hoping ever for the perfect day.”

Such is human progress. But the eternal realisation of human Ideals in the Absolute implies nothing less than this: a process in time cannot be the ultimate and most fundamental fact in the Universe. The Absolute cannot really have a history, as its revelation to finite beings has. And this again is only to say in other words that every consistent Idealism must regard the universe as *fundamentally* rational, righteous, and perfect. On the other hand, it is equally essential firmly to keep hold on the reality of the time-processes of growth and change in individual lives, for whom the Ideal may be *more or less* fully realised. For “in all real growth it is implied that though the less perfect is destined to give place to the more perfect, the less perfect *exists* in its own time and place, no less than the more perfect to which it leads up.” Hence come the irrationality and unrighteousness which enter into actual life. There is no more fatal error, no more injurious misrepresentation of the very spirit of Idealism, than to regard it as holding that evil is unreal or merely ‘negative.’ Evil has indeed no ultimate reality, it is not a self-existent

thing; but the finite selves, of whose life it forms part, are not self-existent things: it is as real *as our individuality*.<sup>1</sup> To deny this would be to deny the very motive for which Idealism exists—the one which gives it all its significance; for the experience of the threefold *ἔπος in individual centres of life* is the main motive to the construction of an idealistic theory of things. Hence these finite centres of life must have a reality of their own, and not be mere accidents or incidents of a universal Life. It is not enough to say, with Parmenides and Spinoza, that

“The One remains, the many change and pass;  
 Heaven’s light for ever shines, Earth’s shadows fly;  
 Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,  
 Stains the white radiance of Eternity,  
 Until Death tramples it to fragments.”

Such a view may be found satisfactory if everything is subordinated to the supposed demands of the purely intellectual Ideal, so that the individual life is supposed to exist *only* as the ‘potential form’ of a perfect rational synthesis of the Universe. It was the presence of this strain in the systems of Aristotle and of Hegel that led some of their followers to develop a purely naturalistic theory therefrom.

Another consideration confirms our conclusion. If a process in time is the most fundamental fact in the universe, the very idea of a Final Cause or world-aim would have to be rejected as a figment of the imagination. To speak of a Final Cause implies that the ultimate and most reasonable explanation of existence

<sup>1</sup> Or, as real as that side of our nature whose growth it opposes. It is well for us that this is not always our whole nature.



must be sought, not in a 'First Cause' or state out of which things emerge, but in a goal towards which they move,—a τέλος or End regarded as the explanatory cause of the whole development. Hence, on the one side, unless the movement—the process of change—is real, there is nothing to explain, and it would be meaningless to speak of a Final Cause: on the other side, unless the τέλος in all its fulness is an abiding reality through the process, it is no explanation; it would have to be thought of as another process added on to the former.

It must be observed that by Time is not meant abstract or 'empty' Time,—Time unfilled by any kind of events,—Time without any kind of content. This is an abstraction which it is perfectly useless to talk about, even if it were intelligible, which is doubtful. Time is only *experienced* by us in the form of a succession of changing events, and for our experience it can mean nothing else. I therefore regard it as accepted that the conception of Time is indistinguishable from that of Change or Becoming (these terms being used as synonymous),—that Time as conceived is simply the general schema or form of Change. The question of the reality of Time is the question of the reality of human experience in general.

The conclusion to which Idealism points is in brief this: *Time or Change is neither an absolute reality nor an absolute unreality*; notwithstanding that each of these views has been maintained in an extreme form by thinkers in ancient and modern times, and in the Eastern and Western worlds. They are not mutually exclusive alternatives, one or the other of which must be true; nor can we form an absolute antithesis between temporal and super-temporal existence. There

must be some *via media* between them, which makes it possible to conceive of Reality as a multiplicity of individual, finite, growing lives, immanent in a universal and eternally complete Life; and of this *via media* the doctrine of Degrees is a brief but boundlessly suggestive statement.

Let us summarise the constructive principles which we have employed in these pages. They are the following: (1) that Thought has a real content—*i.e.*, has a structure which works or grows according to laws of its own; it is not (as with Herbart, Lotze, and the Formal Logicians) a merely formal activity capable only of arranging foreign material: (2) that owing to a mass of inherited and unconscious prejudices, the true Law of Identity always tends to be forgotten in particular even if acknowledged in general: (3) that the operation of Thought is inconceivable except as involving the presence of an element of Immediacy, out of which Thought itself, together with the experience which Thought makes intelligible, arises: (4) that human experience as a whole, and regarded as a hierarchical system, is the only possible *revelation* of the Absolute for man: (5) that the highest Ideals which rule our experience are, and are at times *known* to be, the very presence of the Absolute in us: (6) that this conclusion is explicable by the doctrine of Degrees in Reality and Truth, by which an adequate Philosophy is enabled to do justice both to the Individual side of our nature,—to the reality of our finite, growing self,—and to its universal side, to the self-revelation of the Absolute in it.

Each of these principles we may take to be in the main Hegelian, inasmuch as they are all suggested by a study of his works and are present in his thought,

though their expression is often ambiguous, and the true significance of some of them was not seen by Hegel, and is not seen by many of those who have been called Hegelians. Hegel's genius enabled him to gather them as fruits of the wisdom of the ages; and it is well known that the most fruitful source of his richest thought lay in his profound study of the spirit of Greek Philosophy and the spirit of the Christian Religion.

THE END

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